exclusionary rule in Texas

2025See Woerner, 709 F.3d at 533–34 (citing Leon, 468 U.S. at 921–25); see also United States v. Massi, 761 F.3d 512, 530 (5th Cir. 2014). 8 The Massi court ultimately concluded: The good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies here where the search warrant, though ultimately obtained as a result of an illegal detention in violation of the Fourth Amendment, was obtained and executed by a law enforcement officer in good faith and under an objectively reasonable belief that it was valid and relied upon appropriately obtained evidence.

2022The good faith exception therefore “bars the application - 20 - 04-19-00745-CR of the exclusionary rule to exclude evidence obtained pursuant to a warrant if law enforcement officers act under an objectively reasonable, good faith belief that the search warrant in question is valid—even if it, in fact, is not.” United States v. Jarman, 847 F.3d 259, 264 (5th Cir. 2017). “[O]ur good-faith inquiry is confined to the objectively ascertainable question whether a reasonably well trained officer would have known that the search was illegal despite the magistrate’s authorization.” Leon, 468 U.S. at 9

2019“The Supreme Court concluded that ‘[e]vidence obtained during a search conducted in reasonable reliance on binding precedent is not subject to the exclusionary rule.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Davis, 564 U.S. at 241).

2019“The Supreme Court concluded that ‘[e]vidence obtained during a search conducted in reasonable reliance on binding precedent is not subject to the exclusionary rule.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Davis, 564 U.S. at 241).

2025EXCLUSION WOULD BE IMPROPER IN ANY EVENT Finally, the lack of any unreasonable action by the officers (as opposed to Jaks) is not only fatal to the Fourth Amendment inquiry and any related claim of common-law trespass; it also forecloses application of the exclusionary rule under Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).

2018The exclusionary rule was once criticized as potentially permitting a criminal to go free simply “because the constable has blundered.” Mapp, 367 U.S. at 659 (responding to criticism by stating “[n]othing can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws”).

2021See Johnson v. State, 878 S.W.2d 164, 168-69 (Tex.Crim.App. 1994) (en banc) (under the exclusionary rule of the Fourth Amendment, evidence which is obtained as the result of an illegal arrest may be suppressed by a defendant), citing Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484 (1963); see also TEX.CODE CRIM.PROC.ANN.

2021IV. 10 Id.; see Lerma, 543 S.W.3d at 190 . 5 “quintessential seizure” of the person. 11 Thus, traffic stops based on an officer’s suspicion that the driver violated a traffic law “is a ‘seizure’ of the occupants of the vehicle and therefore must be conducted in accordance with the Fourth Amendment.”12 Should police obtain evidence based on the violation of a suspect’s Fourth Amendment rights, the federal exclusionary rule usually prevents a state from using the evidence in a criminal proceeding against the party whose rights were violated.13 The exclusionary rule prevents the State from using

2015Appellant cites authority discussing application of the exclusionary rule to an improper search and seizure by a private citizen: "if an officer violates a person's privacy rights by his illegal conduct making the fruits of his search or seizure inadmissible in a criminal proceeding under Article 38.23, that same illegal conduct undertaken by an 'other person' is also subject to the Texas exclusionary rule." Miles v. State, 241 S.W.3d 28, 36 (Tex. Crim.

2015In Welchek, the Court of Criminal Appeals had refused to recognize an exclusionary rule under the Texas Constitution for three jugs of whiskey seized without a 12 warrant and had “specifically rejected the reasoning of the United States Supreme Court cases that had imposed an exclusionary rule on federal courts under the Fourth Amendment.” Id.

2015See Drago v. State, 553 S.W.2d 375, 378 (Tex. Grim.

2014See Drago v. State, 553 S.W.2d 375, 378 (Tex. Crim.

2021IV. 10 Id.; see Lerma, 543 S.W.3d at 190 . 5 “quintessential seizure” of the person. 11 Thus, traffic stops based on an officer’s suspicion that the driver violated a traffic law “is a ‘seizure’ of the occupants of the vehicle and therefore must be conducted in accordance with the Fourth Amendment.”12 Should police obtain evidence based on the violation of a suspect’s Fourth Amendment rights, the federal exclusionary rule usually prevents a state from using the evidence in a criminal proceeding against the party whose rights were violated.13 The exclusionary rule prevents the State from using

2016Applicability of exclusionary rule Finally, we address the State’s first point of error, in which it asserts that, “[e]ven if the police had violated O’Brien’s constitutional rights, the exclusionary rule does not apply.” The State focuses its argument almost entirely on the federal exclusionary rule, which is a judicially created remedy that requires the suppression of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment.39 As the State observes, there are exceptions to the federal rule based on an officer’s good-faith reliance on the law as it existed at the time of the officer’s actions.4

2015State v. 11 Molegraaf 86 S.W.3d 311,312-13 (Tex. App.-Austin 2002, no pet.).Z That purpose is the same for both the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule and Article 38.23: to protect a suspect's liberty interests against the 3 overzealousness of others in obtaining evidence to use against her; "to 4 deter unlawful actions which violate the rights of criminal suspects. " [T]he fairest reading of [Article 38.23(a)] is that it must have been intended to permit challenges to evidence on the basis that the evidence was obtained in violation of a "law" that serves to protect an individual's personal

2003Roy v. State, 608 S.W.2d 645, 651 (Tex.Crim.App.1980) (violation of the Assumed Name Statute did not require suppression under article 38.23); Pannetl v. State, 666 S.W.2d 96, 97-98 (Tex.Crim.App.1984) (violation of a disciplinary rule of the Code of Professional Responsibility of the State Bar of Texas does not constitute a violation of a state law within the meaning of article 38.23); Andrews v. State, 164 Tex. Crim. 1 , 296 S.W.2d 275, 276 (1956) (testimony of physician not licensed to practice in Texas who conducted examination of a rape complainant was did not invoke article 38.23); Fishe

2021See Lane v. State, 951 S.W.2d 242, 244 (Tex. App.—Austin 1997, no pet.) (determining that alleged statutory violation of failing to hand defendant “DIC-24 warning form” “was unrelated to the purpose of the exclusionary rule” where defendant “orally received the information . . . before being asked to give the breath sample,” where “[t]here was no evidence that appellant did not understand this information,” and where “there was no evidence that the officer’s failure to timely hand him the printed DIC-24 warning form had any impact whatsoever on appellant’s decision to take the breath test”).

2010Proc. art. 18.10, which requires a court order to remove property from the county in which it was seized, does not invoke article 38.23); Lane v. State, 951 S.W.2d at 243 (article 38.23 "may not be invoked for statutory violations unrelated to the purpose of the exclusionary rule”); Stockton v. State, 756 S.W.2d 873, 874 (Tex.App.-Austin 1988, no pet.) (violation of education code did not require suppression of evidence). .

2019The exclusionary rule has been described as “a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved.” Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348 . 24 The Texas Supreme Court has likewise declined to extend the exclusionary rule beyond criminal trials.

2016The Fourth Amendment prohibition has long been vindicated by the exclusionary rule: “a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved.” United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 , 94 S.Ct. 613 , 38 L.Ed.2d 561 (1974); see also Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 , 34 S.Ct. 341 , 58 L.Ed. 652 (1914).

2026That statute provides no basis for exclusion if either of two things are true: (1) the law said to be violated by the State is “unrelated to the purpose of the exclusionary rule” or BARBER DISSENT–7 (2) where the evidence was “obtained by a law enforcement officer acting in objective good-faith reliance upon a warrant issued by a neutral magistrate based on probable cause.” Wilson v. State, 311 S.W.3d 452, 459 (Tex. Crim.

2026Well before Woodard, we held that “the plain language of article 38.23(a) would suggest that evidence obtained in violation of any law must be suppressed” but that “article 38.23(a) may not be invoked for statutory violations unrelated to the purpose of the exclusionary rule.” Wilson v. State, 311 S.W.3d 452, 459 (Tex. Crim.

2023Based on the pleas, the trial court sentenced Runyon to serve concurrent, seven-year sentences. 15 Standard of Review Texas law requires that evidence obtained by a person in violation of the Constitution be excluded even if the person has acted in good faith when investigating a crime. 6 The exclusionary rule created by the exclusionary statute, Article 38.23, encompasses private individuals even though the private individual was not when gathering the evidence acting as an agent of the state. 7 Under Article 38.23(a) the defendant bears the initial burden to show a “causal connection” betwee

2010See Chapin v. State, 107 Tex.Crim. 477 , 296 S.W. 1095, 1099 (Tex.Cr.App.1927); Craft v. State, 107 Tex.Crim. 130 , 295 S.W. 617, 618 (Tex.Cr.App.1927); Chavez v. State, 9 S.W.3d 817, 822 (Tex.Cr.App.2000) (Price, X, concurring in the judgment) (legislative history of Article 38.23(a) makes it "virtually irrefutable” that Article 38.23(a) was enacted "in order to provide Texas citizens with the protections of the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule”); State v. Johnson, 939 S.W.2d 586, 588-93 (Tex.Cr.App.1996) (McCormick, P.J., dissenting) (in enacting our state statutory exclusionary rule, th

2015With only one justice dissenting, the Supreme Court’s decision pondered the exclusionary rule’s limits which had been briefly considered in Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31,33,37-38 (1979) (suggesting that exclusion might have been appropriate had the provision been “grossly and flagrantly unconstitutional”) (citation omitted).

2015In Michigan v. DeFillippo, the Court stated: “We have held that the exclusionary rule required suppression of evidence obtained in searches carried out pursuant to statutes, not previously declared unconstitutional, which purported to authorize the searches in question without probable cause or a warrant.” 443 U.S. 31, 35-51 (1979).

2010See Chapin v. State, 296 S.W. 1095, 1099 (Tex.Cr.App. 1927); Craft v. State, 295 S.W. 617, 618 (Tex.Cr.App. 1927); Chavez v. State, 9 S.W.3d 817, 822 (Tex.Cr.App. 2000) (Price, J., concurring in the judgment) (legislative history of Article 38.23(a) makes it “virtually irrefutable” that Article 38.23(a) was enacted “in order to provide Texas citizens with the protections of the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule”); State v. Johnson, 939 S.W.2d 586, 588-93 (Tex.Cr.App. 1996) (McCormick, P.J., dissenting) (in enacting our state statutory exclusionary rule, the Legislature intended to make our

2010See Chapin v. State, 107 Tex.Crim. 477 , 296 S.W. 1095, 1099 (Tex.Cr.App.1927); Craft v. State, 107 Tex.Crim. 130 , 295 S.W. 617, 618 (Tex.Cr.App.1927); Chavez v. State, 9 S.W.3d 817, 822 (Tex.Cr.App.2000) (Price, X, concurring in the judgment) (legislative history of Article 38.23(a) makes it "virtually irrefutable” that Article 38.23(a) was enacted "in order to provide Texas citizens with the protections of the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule”); State v. Johnson, 939 S.W.2d 586, 588-93 (Tex.Cr.App.1996) (McCormick, P.J., dissenting) (in enacting our state statutory exclusionary rule, th

2019Evidence that is seized by police in violation of the Fourth Amendment is subject to the exclusionary rule codified in Article 38.23(a) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.2 TEX.CODE CRIM.PROC.ANN. art. 38.23(a); see also State v. Daugherty, 931 S.W.2d 268 , 272–73 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996).

2015This court must defer to the express dictates of the Legislature and arguments urging that in certain situations the exclusionary rule should not be applied must, in Texas, be directed to the Legislature.”). 28 Daugherty, 931 S.W.2d at 275 n.1 (McCormick, PJ, concurring and dissenting, joined by White and Keller, JJ.) (citations omitted). 29 Garcia, 829 S.W.2d at 803 n.1 (Miller, J., concurring, joined by Campbell, J.). 10 exclusive departure from the rule, but rather is intended as a clarification adding and acknowledging a provision where this Court had historically failed to do so.”30 “The

2023When a criminal defendant claims the right to protection under an exclusionary rule of evidence, it is his task to prove his case.” Id. at 773 (quoting Mattei v. State, 455 S.W.2d 761, 766 (Tex. Crim.

2018App. 2005) (internal quotation omitted). “‘When a criminal defendant claims the right to protection under 5 an exclusionary rule of evidence, it is his task to prove his case.’” Id. (quoting Mattei v. State, 455 S.W.2d 761, 766 (Tex. Crim.

2013Nix, 467 U.S. at 443 (describing doctrine as permitting “admission of evidence that has been discovered by means wholly independent of any constitutional violation”); Murray, 487 U.S. at 537 (stating that independent source doctrine permits introduction of “evidence initially discovered during, or as a consequence of, an unlawful search, but later obtained independently from activities untainted by the initial illegality”).4 Thus, in determining whether challenged evidence is admissible under the independent source doctrine, the central question is “whether the evidence at issue was obtained b

1996See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 905-13 , 104 S.Ct. 3405, 3411-15 , 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984); Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 442 , 104 S.Ct. 2501, 2508 , 81 L.Ed.2d 377 (1984) (core rationale for applying the exclusionary rule is that this "admittedly drastic and socially costly course is needed to deter police from violations of constitutional and statutory" protections).

2010Proc. art. 18.10, which requires a court order to remove property from the county in which it was seized, does not invoke article 38.23); Lane v. State , 95 S.W.2d at 243 (article 38.23 "may not be invoked for statutory violations unrelated to the purpose of the exclusionary rule"); Stockton v. State, 756 S.W.2d 873, 874 (Tex. App.--Austin 1988, no pet.) (violation of education code did not require suppression of evidence). 30.

2010Proc. art. 18.10, which requires a court order to remove property from the county in which it was seized, does not invoke article 38.23); Lane v. State, 951 S.W.2d at 243 (article 38.23 "may not be invoked for statutory violations unrelated to the purpose of the exclusionary rule”); Stockton v. State, 756 S.W.2d 873, 874 (Tex.App.-Austin 1988, no pet.) (violation of education code did not require suppression of evidence). .

2015Ann. art. 2.132(b)(6); State v. Purdy, 244 S.W.3d 591, 595 (Tex. App.-Dallas 20013, pet. struck) (holding that violation of a 11 statute that is administrative in nature and unrelated to the purpose of the exclusionary rule does not warrant excluding evidence under article 38.23); Bachick, 30 S.W.3d at 553 (noting that when nothing in the record indicates that the objectionable evidence was obtained as a result of the alleged statutory violation, exclusion is not required).

2014Ann. art. 2.132(b)(6); State v. Purdy, 244 S.W.3d 591, 595 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, pet. struck) (holding that violation of a 11 statute that is administrative in nature and unrelated to the purpose of the exclusionary rule does not warrant excluding evidence under article 38.23); Bachick, 30 S.W.3d at 553 (noting that when nothing in the record indicates that the objectionable evidence was obtained as a result of the alleged statutory violation, exclusion is not required).

2016See Leon, 468 U.S. at 907 , 104 S.Ct. 3405 (“ ‘Our cases have consistently recognized that unbending appli cation of the exclusionary sanction to enforce ideals of governmental rectitude would impede unacceptably the truth-finding functions of judge and jury.’ ” (quoting United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 734 , 100 S.Ct. 2439 , 65 L.Ed.2d 468 (1980))); see also United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 448-49 , 96 S.Ct. 3021 , 49 L.Ed.2d 1046 (1976) (“Jurists and scholars uniformly have recognized that the exclusionary rule imposes a substantial cost on the societal interest in law enforcement

2016See Leon, 468 U.S. at 907 , 104 S.Ct. 3405 (“ ‘Our cases have consistently recognized that unbending appli cation of the exclusionary sanction to enforce ideals of governmental rectitude would impede unacceptably the truth-finding functions of judge and jury.’ ” (quoting United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 734 , 100 S.Ct. 2439 , 65 L.Ed.2d 468 (1980))); see also United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 448-49 , 96 S.Ct. 3021 , 49 L.Ed.2d 1046 (1976) (“Jurists and scholars uniformly have recognized that the exclusionary rule imposes a substantial cost on the societal interest in law enforcement

2014Id,., 438 U.S. at 170 , 98 S.Ct. at 2674 .

2014Id,., 438 U.S. at 170 , 98 S.Ct. at 2674 .