fundamental principle in Tennessee

2025“The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976) (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)); see also Dotson v. State, 673 S.W.3d 204 , 223 (Tenn. 2023); House v. State, 911 S.W.2d 705, 711 (Tenn. 1995).

2021A fundamental requirement of due process is “the opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’” Id. at 732 (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976)).

2020The employment-at-will doctrine “is the fundamental principle controlling the relationship between employers and employees.” Williams, 465 S.W.3d at 108 (quoting Mason v. Seaton, 942 S.W.2d 470, 474 (Tenn. 1997)).

2019Tennessee recognizes the employment-at-will doctrine as “the fundamental principle controlling the relationship between employers and employees.” Mason v. Seaton, 942 S.W.2d 470, 474 (Tenn. 1997).

2014“The fundamental test of the sufficiency of an indictment is the adequacy of the notice to the defendant conveyed by its terms.” Green v. State, 143 S.W.2d 713, 715 (Tenn. 1940). “[I]ndictments which achieve the overriding purpose of notice to the accused will be considered sufficient to satisfy both constitutional and statutory requirements.” Hammonds, 30 S.W.3d at 300 .

2012“The fundamental test of the sufficiency of an indictment is the adequacy of the notice to the defendant conveyed by its terms.” Green v. State, 143 S.W.2d 713, 715 (Tenn. 1940).

2016Although this separation of powers is a fundamental principle of our government, ―it has long been recognized that it is impossible to preserve perfectly the theoretical lines of demarcation between the executive, legislative[,] and judicial branches of government.‖ Underwood v. State, 529 S.W.2d 45, 47 (Tenn. 1975) (citations omitted).

2006The Tennessee Supreme Court has held: The primary separation of powers provisions of the Tennessee Constitution are Article II, Section 1, which states that “the powers of the government shall be divided into three distinct departments: the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial,” and Article II, Section 2, which states that “no person or persons belonging to one of these departments shall exercise any of the powers properly belonging to either of the others, except in the cases herein directed or permitted.” The doctrine of separation of powers, as set forth in these two sections of the Tenness

2021“It is a fundamental rule of judicial restraint” that “a reviewing court will not reach constitutional questions in advance of the necessity of deciding them.” Three Affiliated Tribes of Fort Berthold Rsrv. v. Wold Eng’g, P.C., 467 U.S. 138, 157 (1984); see also Burton v. United States, 196 U.S. 283, 295 (1905) (“It is not the habit of the court to decide questions of a constitutional nature unless absolutely necessary to a decision of the case.”).15 C.

2013“It is well-settled in Tennessee that ‘courts do not decide constitutional questions unless resolution is absolutely necessary to determining the issues in the case and adjudicating the rights of the parties.’” Waters, 291 S.W.3d at 882 (quoting State v. Taylor, 70 S.W.3d 717, 720 (Tenn. 2002)); see also Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold Eng’g, P.C., 467 U.S. 138, 157 , 104 S.Ct. 2267, 2279 , 81 L.Ed.2d 113 (1984) (“It is a fundamental rule of judicial restraint . . . that this Court will not reach constitutional questions in advance of the necessity of deciding

2013“A fundamental rule of statutory construction is that ‘the mention of one subject in a statute means the exclusion of other subjects that are not mentioned.’” State v. Blanchard, 100 S.W.3d 226, 229 (Tenn. 2002) (quoting State v. Harkins, 811 S.W.2d 79, 82 (Tenn. 1991)).

2003A fundamental rule of statutory construction is that “the mention of one subject in a statute means the exclusion of other subjects that are not mentioned.” State v. Harkins, 811 S.W.2d 79, 82 (Tenn. 1991).

2024Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. 339 U.S. 306 , 70 S.Ct. 652 , 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950); In Re Riggs, 612 S.W.2d 461, 465 (Tenn. App. 1980).

1993PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS A “fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.” Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 , 70 S.Ct. 652, 657 , 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950); see also Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 , 96 S.Ct. 893, 902 , 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976) (the fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a

2021“It is a fundamental rule of judicial restraint” that “a reviewing court will not reach constitutional questions in advance of the necessity of deciding them.” Three Affiliated Tribes of Fort Berthold Rsrv. v. Wold Eng’g, P.C., 467 U.S. 138, 157 (1984); see also Burton v. United States, 196 U.S. 283, 295 (1905) (“It is not the habit of the court to decide questions of a constitutional nature unless absolutely necessary to a decision of the case.”).15 C.

2004State v. Taylor, 70 S.W.3d 717, 720 (Tenn.2002); Owens v. State, 908 S.W.2d 923, 926 (Tenn.1995) (citing cases); see also Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold Eng’g, P.C., 467 U.S. 138, 157 , 104 S.Ct. 2267 , 81 L.Ed.2d 113 , (1984) (“It is a fundamental rule of judicial restraint ... that this Court will not reach constitutional questions in advance of the necessity of deciding them.”); Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101, 105 , 65 S.Ct. 152 , 89 L.Ed. 101 (1944) (“If there is one doctrine more deeply rooted than any other in the process of consti

2010Co. v. Puckett, No. W2005-00083-COA-R3- CV, 2006 WL 44037 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan.9, 2006) discussed ratification of a non-authorized contract as follows: A fundamental principle of agency law is that "[a] principal is bound neither by contracts made by a person not his agent, nor by those of his agent beyond the scope of his actual and apparent authority, which he has not ratified and is not estopped to deny." See, e.g., Bells Banking Co. v. Jackson Ctr., Inc., 938 S.W.2d 421, 425 (Tenn. Ct. App.1996).

2010A fundamental principle of agency law is that “[a] principal is bound neither by contracts made by a person not his agent, nor by those of his agent beyond the scope of his actual and apparent authority, which he has not ratified and is not estopped to deny.” See, e.g., Bells Banking Co. v. Jackson Ctr., Inc., 938 S.W.2d 421, 425 (Tenn.Ct.App.1996).

2013“It is well-settled in Tennessee that ‘courts do not decide constitutional questions unless resolution is absolutely necessary to determining the issues in the case and adjudicating the rights of the parties.’” Waters, 291 S.W.3d at 882 (quoting State v. Taylor, 70 S.W.3d 717, 720 (Tenn. 2002)); see also Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold Eng’g, P.C., 467 U.S. 138, 157 , 104 S.Ct. 2267, 2279 , 81 L.Ed.2d 113 (1984) (“It is a fundamental rule of judicial restraint . . . that this Court will not reach constitutional questions in advance of the necessity of deciding

2004State v. Taylor, 70 S.W.3d 717, 720 (Tenn.2002); Owens v. State, 908 S.W.2d 923, 926 (Tenn.1995) (citing cases); see also Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold Eng’g, P.C., 467 U.S. 138, 157 , 104 S.Ct. 2267 , 81 L.Ed.2d 113 , (1984) (“It is a fundamental rule of judicial restraint ... that this Court will not reach constitutional questions in advance of the necessity of deciding them.”); Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101, 105 , 65 S.Ct. 152 , 89 L.Ed. 101 (1944) (“If there is one doctrine more deeply rooted than any other in the process of consti

1997"The fundamental rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and, if possible, give effect to the intention or purpose of the legislature as expressed in the statute." Memphis Publ'g Co. v. Holt, 710 S.W.2d 513, 516 (Tenn. 1986) (citing Worrall v. Kroger Co., 545 S.W.2d 736 (Tenn.1977)).

1987In Worrall v. Kroger Co., 545 S.W.2d 736, 738 (Tenn.1977), our Supreme Court stated: The fundamental rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and, if possible, give effect to the intention or purpose of the legislature as expressed in the statute.

2014The Supreme Court has articulated that the “long standing rule in this State is that an employee-at-will may be discharged without breach of contract for good cause, bad cause or no cause at all, without being thereby guilty of legal wrong.” Id. (quoting Harney v. Meadowbrook Nursing Center, 784 S.W.2d 921, 922 (Tenn. 1990)).

1998That principle was stated in Harney v. Meadowbrook Nursing Center, 784 S.W.2d 921, 922 (Tenn. 1990), as follows: “The long standing rule in this State is that an employee-at-will may be discharged without breach of contract for good cause, bad cause or no cause at all, without being thereby guilty of legal wrong.” This doctrine recognizes that employers need the freedom to make their own business judgments without interference from the courts. “[A]n employer’s ability to make and act upon independent assessments of an employee’s abilities and job performance as well as business needs is essent

2005General Portland, Inc. v. Chattanooga Hamilton County Air Pollution Control Bd., 560 S.W.2d 910, 914 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1976).

2005General Portland, Inc. v. Chattanooga Hamilton County Air Pollution Control Bd., 560 S.W.2d 910, 914 (Tenn.Ct.App.1976).

2004State v. Taylor, 70 S.W.3d 717, 720 (Tenn.2002); Owens v. State, 908 S.W.2d 923, 926 (Tenn.1995) (citing cases); see also Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold Eng’g, P.C., 467 U.S. 138, 157 , 104 S.Ct. 2267 , 81 L.Ed.2d 113 , (1984) (“It is a fundamental rule of judicial restraint ... that this Court will not reach constitutional questions in advance of the necessity of deciding them.”); Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101, 105 , 65 S.Ct. 152 , 89 L.Ed. 101 (1944) (“If there is one doctrine more deeply rooted than any other in the process of consti

2004State v. Taylor, 70 S.W.3d 717, 720 (Tenn.2002); Owens v. State, 908 S.W.2d 923, 926 (Tenn.1995) (citing cases); see also Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold Eng’g, P.C., 467 U.S. 138, 157 , 104 S.Ct. 2267 , 81 L.Ed.2d 113 , (1984) (“It is a fundamental rule of judicial restraint ... that this Court will not reach constitutional questions in advance of the necessity of deciding them.”); Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101, 105 , 65 S.Ct. 152 , 89 L.Ed. 101 (1944) (“If there is one doctrine more deeply rooted than any other in the process of consti

2004State v. Taylor, 70 S.W.3d 717, 720 (Tenn. 2002); Owens v. State, 908 S.W.2d 923, 926 (Tenn.1995) (citing cases); see also Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold Eng'g, P.C., 467 U.S. 138, 157 , (1984) ( "It is a fundamental rule of judicial restraint ... that this Court will not reach constitutional questions in advance of the necessity of deciding them.");Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101, 105 (1944) ("If there is one doctrine more deeply rooted than any other in the process of constitutional adjudication, it is that we ought not to pass on quest

2004State v. Taylor, 70 S.W.3d 717, 720 (Tenn.2002); Owens v. State, 908 S.W.2d 923, 926 (Tenn.1995) (citing cases); see also Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold Eng’g, P.C., 467 U.S. 138, 157 , 104 S.Ct. 2267 , 81 L.Ed.2d 113 , (1984) (“It is a fundamental rule of judicial restraint ... that this Court will not reach constitutional questions in advance of the necessity of deciding them.”); Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101, 105 , 65 S.Ct. 152 , 89 L.Ed. 101 (1944) (“If there is one doctrine more deeply rooted than any other in the process of consti

2004State v. Taylor, 70 S.W.3d 717, 720 (Tenn. 2002); Owens v. State, 908 S.W.2d 923, 926 (Tenn.1995) (citing cases); see also Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold Eng'g, P.C., 467 U.S. 138, 157 , (1984) ( "It is a fundamental rule of judicial restraint ... that this Court will not reach constitutional questions in advance of the necessity of deciding them.");Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101, 105 (1944) ("If there is one doctrine more deeply rooted than any other in the process of constitutional adjudication, it is that we ought not to pass on quest

2004State v. Taylor, 70 S.W.3d 717, 720 (Tenn.2002); Owens v. State, 908 S.W.2d 923, 926 (Tenn.1995) (citing cases); see also Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold Eng’g, P.C., 467 U.S. 138, 157 , 104 S.Ct. 2267 , 81 L.Ed.2d 113 , (1984) (“It is a fundamental rule of judicial restraint ... that this Court will not reach constitutional questions in advance of the necessity of deciding them.”); Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101, 105 , 65 S.Ct. 152 , 89 L.Ed. 101 (1944) (“If there is one doctrine more deeply rooted than any other in the process of consti

2020In such cases, it is also immaterial that the two actions are based on different grounds, or tried on different theories, or instituted for different purposes, and seek different relief.” Gerber v. Holcolm, 219 S.W.3d 914, 919 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006) (quoting Cotton v. Underwood, 442 S.W.2d 632, 635 (Tenn. 1969)); accord Wayman, 2010 WL 1293796 , at *3 (holding that res judicata prohibits the re-litigation of the same issues and “all claims and issues which were relevant and which could reasonably have been litigated in the prior action.”).

2014See Cotton, 442 S.W.2d at 635 (“‘It is a fundamental principle of jurisprudence that material facts or questions, which were in issue in a former action, and were there admitted or judicially determined, are conclusively settled by a judgment rendered therein; and that such facts or questions becomes Res judicata and may not again be litigated in a subsequent action between the same parties or their privies, regardless of the form the issue may take in the subsequent action whether the subsequent action involves the same or a different form or proceedings[.]’ ”) (citation omitted).

2020The employment-at-will doctrine “is the fundamental principle controlling the relationship between employers and employees.” Williams, 465 S.W.3d at 108 (quoting Mason v. Seaton, 942 S.W.2d 470, 474 (Tenn. 1997)).

2017The employment-at-will doctrine is “a bedrock of Tennessee common law and is a fundamental principle controlling the employer-employee relationship.” Richmond v. Vanguard Healthcare Servs., LLC, No. M2014-02461-COA-R3-CV, 2016 WL 373279 , at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 29, 2016) (quoting Williams v. City of Burns, 465 S.W.3d 96, 108 (Tenn. 2015)) (internal quotations omitted).

2004“A fundamental requirement of due process is notice and an opportunity to be heard.” Phillips v. State Bd. of Regents, 863 S.W.2d 45, 50 (Tenn.1993).

1999A fundamental requirement of due process is notice and an opportunity to be heard, Phillips v. State Bd. of Regents, 863 S.W.2d 45 (Tenn. 1993), or, as our Supreme Court said in State ex rel.

2026The trial court correctly noted that “[i]f the parties cannot be put in status quo, or if, due to the passage of time or other reasons, equity cannot be done, there is no ground for rescission.” Lamons v. Chamberlain, 909 S.W.2d 795, 801 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993).

2018“If the parties cannot be put in status quo, or if, due to the passage of time or other reasons, equity cannot be done, there is no ground for rescission.” Lamons v. Chamberlain, 909 S.W.2d 795, 801 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Oct. 4, 1993); see Stonecipher v. Estate of Gray, No. M1998- 00980-COA-R3-CV, 2001 WL 468673 , at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 4, 2001).

2026Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969); State v. Wilson, 31 S.W.3d 189, 194 (Tenn. 2000); State v. Mackey, 553 S.W.2d 337, 340 (Tenn. 1977), superseded on other grounds by Tenn. R.

2025Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 , 89 S.Ct. 1709 , 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969); State v. Wilson, 31 S.W.3d 189, 194 (Tenn. 2000); State v. Mackey, 553 S.W.2d 337, 340 (Tenn.1977), superseded on other grounds.