fundamental principle in New York

2026ORDERED that the appeal is dismissed as academic, without costs or disbursements. "'It is a fundamental principle of our jurisprudence that the power of a court to declare the law only arises out of, and is limited to, determining the rights of persons which are actually controverted in a particular case pending before the tribunal'" ( Tomasino v Tomasino , 127 AD3d 1069, 1070 , quoting Matter of Hearst Corp. v Clyne , 50 NY2d 707, 713 ; see Funderburke v New York State Dept. of Civ.

2026"It is a fundamental principle of our jurisprudence that the power of a court to declare the law only arises out of, and is limited to, determining the rights of persons which are actually controverted in a particular case pending before the tribunal" ( Matter of Hearst Corp. v Clyne , 50 NY2d 707, 713 ; see Matter of Kirkland v Annucci , 150 AD3d 736, 737 ).

2018These formal prerequisites are merely a framework for a court to use in conducting a fundamental inquiry of whether litigation should be permitted in a particular case in light of what are often competing policy considerations, fairness to the parties, conservation of judicial resources, and the societal interests in consistent and accurate results ( Staatsburg Water Co. v Staatsburg Fire Dist. , 72 NY2d 147, 153 [1988]).

2010“In the end, the fundamental inquiry is whether relitigation should be permitted in a particular case in light of what are often competing policy considerations, including fairness to the parties, conservation of the resources of the court and the litigants, and the societal interests in consistent and accurate results” (Staatsburg Water Co. v Staatsburg Fire Dist., 72 NY2d 147, 153 [1988]).

2026"The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard 'at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner'" ( Mathews v Eldridge , 424 US 319, 333, quoting Armstrong v Manzo , 380 US 545, 552).

2026"The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard 'at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner'" ( Mathews v Eldridge , 424 US 319, 333 , quoting Armstrong v Manzo , 380 US 545, 552 ).

2025"This right has long been regarded as a fundamental privilege of the defendant in a criminal prosecution" ( People v Martin , 16 NY3d 607, 611 [internal quotation marks omitted]).

2023The constitutional right to a public trial “‘has long been regarded as a fundamental privilege of the defendant in a criminal prosecution’” (People v Roberts, 31 NY3d 406, 425 [2018], quoting People v Martin, 16 NY3d 607, 611 [2011]).

2006The issue of whether a party has had a full and fair opportunity to contest the prior decision “requires consideration of the ‘realities of the litigation’ ” (Staatsburg Water Co. v Staatsburg Fire Dist., supra at 153, quoting Gilberg v Barbieri, 53 NY2d 285, 292 [1981]; see Buechel v Bain, supra; Matter of Halyalkar v Board of Regents of State of N.Y., 72 NY2d 261 [1988]), and “the fundamental inquiry is whether relitigation should be permitted in a particular case in light of what are often competing policy considerations, including fairness to the parties, conservation of resources of the c

1982It is a fundamental rule that “[d]ue process * * * [does] not permit a litigant to be bound by an adverse determination made in a prior proceeding to which he was not a party” (Gilberg v Barbieri, 53 NY2d 285, 291 ; see, also, Schwartz v Public Administrator of County of Bronx, 24 NY2d 65, 71 ).

2025Co. v Gliedman , 57 NY2d 588, 593 [1982] ["A fundamental principle of administrative law long accepted by this court limits judicial review of an administrative determination solely to the grounds invoked by the agency, and if those grounds are insufficient or improper, the court is powerless to sanction the determination by substituting what it deems a more appropriate or proper basis"]).

2011Co. v Gliedman, 57 NY2d 588, 593 [1982] [“A fundamental principle of administrative law long accepted by this court limits judicial review of an administrative determination solely to the grounds invoked by the agency, and if those grounds are insufficient or improper, the court is powerless to sanction the determination by substituting what it deems a more appropriate or proper basis”]).

2021Courts are prohibited from rendering advisory opinions and "an appeal will be considered moot unless the rights of the parties will be directly affected by the determination of the appeal and the interest of the parties is an immediate consequence of the judgment" ( id. at 714 ; see Saratoga County Chamber of Commerce v Pataki , 100 NY2d 801, 810 ).

2020Courts are prohibited from rendering advisory opinions and "an appeal will be considered moot unless the rights of the parties will be directly affected by the determination of the appeal and the interest of the parties is an immediate consequence of the judgment" ( id. at 714 ; see Saratoga County Chamber of Commerce v Pataki , 100 NY2d 801, 810 ).

2026See also , Eaton v. New York City Conciliation & Appeals Bd. , 56 NY2d 340, 345 (1982) ("It is a fundamental principle of statutory interpretation that a court should attempt to effectuate the intent of the Legislature." GOL 7-108 (1-a)(g) provides that a person "found to have willfully violated this subdivision shall be liable for punitive damages of up to twice the amount of the deposit or advance." An "award of punitive damages is warranted where the conduct of the party being held liable evidences a high degree of moral culpability, or where the conduct is so flagrant as to transcend mere

2026See also , Eaton v. New York City Conciliation & Appeals Bd. , 56 NY2d 340, 345 (1982) ("It is a fundamental principle of statutory interpretation that a court should attempt to effectuate the intent of the Legislature." GOL 7-108 (1-a)(g) provides that a person "found to have willfully violated this subdivision shall be liable for punitive damages of up to twice the amount of the deposit or advance." An "award of punitive damages is warranted where the conduct of the party being held liable evidences a high degree of moral culpability, or where the conduct is so flagrant as to transcend mere

2025See People v. Jelke 308 NY 56 [Ct of App 1954.] There are, however, limitations to such public access contemplated by NY JUD §4 stating that "sitting of every court within this state shall be public, and every citizen may freely attend the same, except that in all proceedings and trials in cases for divorce, seduction, rape, assault with intent to commit rape, bastardy, filiation, or a crime formerly defined in sections 130.50, 130.45, and 130.40 of the penal law , the court may in its discretion, exclude therefrom all persons who are not directly interested therein, excepting jurors, witnesse

2016Further, if, as appellate counsel now suggests, defendant was not fully able to appreciate trial counsel’s advice, that claim also involves matters not reviewable on this record. 3 Defendant also claims counsel was ineffective for failing to object when the court ordered the courtroom cleared during voir dire to ensure seating for the prospective jurors. 4 This Court has held that “the right to a public trial has long been regarded as a fundamental privilege of the defendant in a criminal prosecution” (People v Jelke, 308 NY 56, 61 [1954]).

2025C.], 156 AD3d 193, 206-210 [2d Dept 2017].) However, having carefully reviewed the claim, testimony, and evidence, Mr. Padilla does not assert that he was prejudiced by the subsequent seven requests to extend the hearing.

2018"It is a fundamental principle of [this Court's] jurisprudence that the power of a court to declare the law only arises out of, and is limited to, determining the rights of persons which are actually controverted in a particular case pending before the tribunal" ( Matter of Elizabeth C. [Omar C.] , 156 AD3d 193, 198 [internal quotation marks omitted]).

2021We have explained that “the fundamental inquiry is whether relitigation should be permitted in a particular case in light of what are often competing policy considerations, including fairness to the parties, conservation of the resources of the court and the litigants, and the societal interests in consistent and accurate results” (id. at 153; accord Buechel v Bain, 97 NY2d 295, 304 [2001], cert denied sub nom Bain v Buechel, 535 US 1096 [2002]).

2006The issue of whether a party has had a full and fair opportunity to contest the prior decision “requires consideration of the ‘realities of the litigation’ ” (Staatsburg Water Co. v Staatsburg Fire Dist., supra at 153, quoting Gilberg v Barbieri, 53 NY2d 285, 292 [1981]; see Buechel v Bain, supra; Matter of Halyalkar v Board of Regents of State of N.Y., 72 NY2d 261 [1988]), and “the fundamental inquiry is whether relitigation should be permitted in a particular case in light of what are often competing policy considerations, including fairness to the parties, conservation of resources of the c

2017Our analysis proceeds from the fundamental principle that, with limited exceptions, “[a] parent has a ‘right’ to rear [his or her] child, and the child has a ‘right’ to be reared by [his or her] parent” (Matter of Bennett v Jeffreys, 40 NY2d 543, 546 [1976]; see Santosky v Kramer, 455 US 745, 753-754 [1982]; Rankel v County of Westchester, 135 AD3d 731, 733 [2016] [“parents have a liberty interest in the care and custody of their children, and children have a parallel liberty interest in not being dislocated from their family”]).

1981It is a fundamental rule that “[t]he parent has a ‘right’ to rear its child, and the child has a ‘right’ to be reared by its parent” (Matter of Bennett v Jeffreys, 40 NY2d 543, 546 , quoted in Matter of Tyrrell v Tyrrell, 67 AD2d 247, 248 , affd 47 NY2d 937 ).

2025What the parties "say in their writing" provides us with "[t]he best evidence" of this intent ( id. , quoting Slamow v Del Col , 79 NY2d 1016, 1018 [1992]), and when a written contract is "complete, clear and unambiguous on its face," we must enforce its plain terms ( id. ).

2025What the parties "say in their writing" provides us with "[t]he best evidence" of this intent ( id. , quoting Slamow v Del Col , 79 NY2d 1016, 1018 [1992]), and when a written contract is "complete, clear and unambiguous on its face," we must enforce its plain terms ( id. ).

2025Council 82, AFSCME, AFL-CIO v Cuomo , 64 NY2d 233, 239 [1984] ["it is a fundamental principle . . . that each department of government should be free from interference, in the lawful discharge of duties expressly conferred, by either of the other branches"]).

2025Council 82, AFSCME, AFL-CIO v Cuomo , 64 NY2d 233, 239 [1984] ["it is a fundamental principle . . . that each department of government should be free from interference, in the lawful discharge of duties expressly conferred, by either of the other branches"]).

2013Our cases make clear that the zoning power is not a general police power, but a power to regulate land use: “[I]t is a fundamental principle of zoning that a zoning board is charged with the regulation of land use and not with the person who owns or occupies it” (Matter of Dexter v Town Bd. of Town of Gates, 36 NY2d 102, 105 [1975] [citations omitted]; see also Matter of St.

2011The Court recognized that “all too often the administrative or legislative determination seems to turn on the identity of the applicant or intended user, rather than upon neutral planning and zoning principles.” (Matter of Dexter v Town Bd., 36 NY2d at 105 .) The Court of Appeals characterized this approach as error and a “lack of adherence to the fundamental rule that zoning deals basically with land use and not with the person who owns or occupies it” (Matter of Dexter v Town Bd., 36 NY2d at 105 ).

2026"It is a fundamental principle of our jurisprudence that the power of a court to declare the law only arises out of, and is limited to, determining the rights of persons which are actually controverted in a particular case pending before the tribunal" ( Matter of Hearst Corp. v Clyne , 50 NY2d 707, 713 ; see Matter of Kirkland v Annucci , 150 AD3d 736, 737 ).

2023The court also denied the petitioner's application to convert the proceeding. "'It is a fundamental principle of our jurisprudence that the power of a court to declare the law only arises out of, and is limited to, determining the rights of persons which are actually controverted in a particular case pending before the tribunal'" ( Matter of Kirkland v Annucci , 150 AD3d 736, 737-738 , quoting Matter of Hearst Corp. v Clyne , 50 NY2d 707, 713 ). "'Courts are generally prohibited from issuing advisory opinions or ruling on hypothetical inquiries.

2024"Courts are generally prohibited from issuing advisory opinions or ruling on hypothetical inquiries" ( Coleman v Daines , 19 NY3d 1087, 1090 ).

2022"It is a fundamental principle of our jurisprudence that the power of a court to declare the law only arises out of, and is limited to, determining the rights of persons which are actually controverted in a particular case pending before the tribunal" ( Matter of Hearst Corp. v Clyne , 50 NY2d 707, 713 ; see Coleman v Daines , 19 NY3d 1087, 1090 ).

2026"The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard 'at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner'" ( Mathews v Eldridge , 424 US 319, 333, quoting Armstrong v Manzo , 380 US 545, 552).

2026"The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard 'at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner'" ( Mathews v Eldridge , 424 US 319, 333 , quoting Armstrong v Manzo , 380 US 545, 552 ).

2024Co ., 300 NY 375 [1950]), and "if qualified with conditions it is equivalent to a rejection and counteroffer" ( see id quoting Roer v Cross County Medical Center Corp ., 83 AD2d 861 [2d Dept 1981]; citing Woodward v Tan Holding Corp ., 32 AD3d 467 [2d Dept 2006]).

2010Co. of N.Y., 300 NY 375, 382 [1950] [“It is a fundamental rule of contract law that an acceptance must comply with the terms of the offer”]; Homayouni v Banque Paribas, 241 AD2d 375, 376 [1997] [“whenever a purported acceptance is even slightly at variance with the terms of an offer, the qualified response operates as a rejection and termination of — and substitution for — the initially offered terms”]). 15 Thus, plaintiff himself avers that his suit is not based on any agreement that he would enjoy the right of first refusal set forth in Spinelli’s e-mail — which, to reiterate, was linked to

2013It is well settled that “the fundamental principle of the compensation law is to protect the worker, not the employer, and the law should be construed liberally in favor of the employee” (Matter of Illaqua v Barr-Llewellyn Buick Co., 81 AD2d 708, 708 [1981] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]).

2013It is well settled that “the fundamental principle of the compensation law is to protect the worker, not the employer, and the law should be construed liberally in favor of the employee” (Matter of Illaqua v Barr-Llewellyn Buick Co., 81 AD2d 708, 708 [1981] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]).

2025We also reject plaintiffs' contention that the jury's receipt and use of revised verdict sheets is a fundamental error that warrants reversal despite the alleged lack of preservation ( see id. ; see generally Breitung v Canzano , 238 AD2d 901, 902 [4th Dept 1997]).

2025We also reject plaintiffs' contention that the jury's receipt and use of revised verdict sheets is a fundamental error that warrants reversal despite the alleged lack of preservation ( see id. ; see generally Breitung v Canzano , 238 AD2d 901, 902 [4th Dept 1997]).