fundamental principle in Utah

2012See State v. Anderson, 701 P.2d 1099, 1103 (Utah 1985) ("It is a fundamental rule that this [clourt should avoid addressing constitutional issues unless required to do so."). 3 .

2008See State v. Aquilar, 758 P.2d 457, 459 (Utah Ct.App.1988) (" 'It is a fundamental rule that this [clourt should avoid addressing constitutional issues unless required to do so"" (quoting State v. Anderson, 701 P.2d 1099, 1108 (Utah 1985))). 116 In a related argument, the City asserts that Defendant's challenge to the constitutionality of Utah Code section 41-6a-515 affords this court the opportunity to specifically hold that calibration certificates are self-authenticating documents under a statutorily created hearsay exception, whose foundational threshold for admissibility is equivalent to

2023See State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71, 82 (Utah 1982) (“It is a fundamental rule that [courts] should avoid addressing a constitutional issue unless required to do so.”). 82 USAC concedes that “the fact that a trespass law did not prohibit use of the waterbed does not prove the existence of an easement,” but it maintains that “the lack of trespass laws relating to such use is consistent with the existence of an easement.” 31 UTAH STREAM ACCESS COALITION v. VR ACQUISITIONS Opinion of the Court existence of a Conatser easement.

2021Section 78B-5-825 does not limit a court‘s authority to award fees in the way Grayeyes describes. ¶42 Although we generally only award attorney fees to prevailing parties when authorized by statute or contract, ―[t]he absence of such authority . . . does not bar the court from awarding attorney fees ‗when it deems it appropriate in the interests of justice _____________________________________________________________ 28 See, e.g., State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71, 82 (Utah 1982) (―It is a fundamental rule that we should avoid addressing a constitutional issue unless required to do so.‖). 12 Cite as:

2017Bd. , 956 P.2d 279 , 281 (Utah 1998) ("A fundamental rule of statutory construction is that statutes are to be construed according to their plain language....

2004See State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355, 1357 (Utah 1993). 17 "A fundamental rule of statutory construction is that statutes are to be construed according to their plain language." O'Keefe v. Retirement Bd., 956 P.2d 279, 281 (Utah 1998); see also Larsen, 865 P.2d at 1357 .

2015See State v. Worwood, 2007 UT 47, ¶ 16 , 164 P.3d 397 . 122 The most fundamental principle of equal protection is that those who are "similarly situated should be treated similarly" and those who are "in different cireum-stances should not be treated as if their circumstances were the same." Malan, 693 P.2d at 669 .

2015See State v. Worwood, 2007 UT 47, ¶ 16 , 164 P.3d 397 . ¶ 22 The most fundamental principle of equal protection is that those who are “similarly situated should be treated similarly” and those who are “in different circumstances should not be treated as if their circumstances were the same.” Malan, 693 P.2d at 669 .

2002However, as we have previously stated, "[the fundamental rule of statutory construction is that statutes are generally to be construed according to their plain language.'' Zoll & Branch, P.C. v. Asay, 932 P.2d 592, 594 (Utah 1997).

1998See Zoll & Branch, P.C. v. Asay, 932 P.2d 592, 594 (Utah 1997) (“The fundamental rule of statutory construction is that statutes are generally to be construed according to their plain language.”).

2001See State v. Anderson, 701 P.2d 1099, 1103 (Utah 1985) ("It is a fundamental rule that this Court should avoid addressing constitutional issues unless required to do so."); Hoyle v. Monson, 606 P.2d 240, 242 (Utah 1980) (refusing to address validity of statute because "unnecessary decisions are to be avoided and . . . the courts should pass upon the constitutionality of a statute only when such a determination is essential to the decision in a case"). ¶ 38 I therefore concur only in the result.

2001See State v. Anderson, 701 P.2d 1099, 1103 (Utah 1985) ("It is a fundamental rule that this Court should avoid addressing constitutional issues unless required to do so."); Hoyle v. Monson, 606 P.2d 240, 242 (Utah 1980) (refusing to address validity of statute because "unnee-essary decisions are to be avoided and ... the courts should pass upon the constitutionality of a statute only when such a determination is essential to the decision in a case"). 38 I therefore concur only in the result.

1998See also Johnson v. Utah State Retirement Bd., 770 P.2d 93, 95 (Utah 1988) (“A fundamental principle of statutory construction is that unambiguous language in the statute itself may not be interpreted so as to contradict its plain meaning.”).

1997See also Johnson v. Utah State Retirement Bd., 770 P.2d 93, 95 (Utah 1988) (“A fundamental principle of statutory construction is that unambiguous language in the statute itself may not be interpreted so as to contradict its plain meaning.”).

2013Our determination of reasonableness is guided by the fundamental principle that an agency's rules "must be construed in a manner consistent with the statute...." SF Phosphates Ltd. v. Auditing Div., Utah State Tax Comm'n, 972 P.2d 384, 386 (Utah 1998).

2012Our determination of reasonableness is guided by the fundamental principle that an agency's rules "must be construed in a manner consistent with the statute." See SF Phosphates Ltd. v. Auditing Div., Utah State Tax Comm'n, 972 P.2d 384, 386 (Utah 1998). ¶ 9 Claimant further challenges the Board's decision to impose a fraud penalty, arguing that the Board's decision was based on a misconstruction and misapplication of the underlying statute.

2000But the fact that the State progressively applied regulation to the acquisition of use rights in water does not disturb the fundamental principle that all water ... at least from the time it reaches land within the confines of this state belongs to the public-the people of this state." Id. (quoting McNaughton v. Eaton, 121 Utah 394, 405 , 242 P.2d 570, 575 (1952) (Wolfe, C.J., concurring)). 12 132 SFPC's reliance on the 1985 textual changes to the Water Code is likewise misplaced.

2000But the fact that the State progressively applied regulation to the acquisition of use rights in water does not disturb the fundamental principle that all water ... at least from the time it reaches land within the confines of this state belongs to the public-the people of this state." Id. (quoting McNaughton v. Eaton, 121 Utah 394, 405 , 242 P.2d 570, 575 (1952) (Wolfe, C.J., concurring)). 12 132 SFPC's reliance on the 1985 textual changes to the Water Code is likewise misplaced.

1999Id. ¶ 8 It is “a fundamental rule of statutory interpretation ... that a statute ‘be looked at in its entirety and in accordance with the purpose which was sought to be accom plished.’ ” State v. Scieszka, 897 P.2d 1224, 1227 (Utah Ct.App.1995) (quoting Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake County, 568 P.2d 738, 741 (Utah 1977)).

1999Id. ¶ 8 It is "a fundamental rule of statutory interpretation ... that a statute `be looked at in its entirety and in accordance with the purpose which was sought to be accomplished.'" *304 State v. Scieszka, 897 P.2d 1224, 1227 (Utah Ct.App.1995) (quoting Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake County, 568 P.2d 738, 741 (Utah 1977)).

1999Id. ¶ 8 It is “a fundamental rule of statutory interpretation ... that a statute ‘be looked at in its entirety and in accordance with the purpose which was sought to be accom plished.’ ” State v. Scieszka, 897 P.2d 1224, 1227 (Utah Ct.App.1995) (quoting Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake County, 568 P.2d 738, 741 (Utah 1977)).

1999Id. ¶ 8 It is "a fundamental rule of statutory interpretation ... that a statute `be looked at in its entirety and in accordance with the purpose which was sought to be accomplished.'" *304 State v. Scieszka, 897 P.2d 1224, 1227 (Utah Ct.App.1995) (quoting Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake County, 568 P.2d 738, 741 (Utah 1977)).

1993Rowe II is dispositive. “[Suppression of evidence is an appropriate remedy for illegal police conduct only when that conduct implicates a fundamental violation of a defendant’s rights.” State v. Rowe, 850 P.2d 427, 429 (Utah 1992) (citations omitted). “ ‘It is only where the violation also implicates fundamental, constitutional concerns, is conducted in bad-faith or has substantially prejudiced the defendant that exclusion may be an appropriate remedy.’” State v. Fixel, 744 P.2d 1366, 1369 (Utah 1987) (quoting Commonwealth v. Mason, 507 Pa. 396 , 490 A.2d 421, 426 (1985)); accord Rowe II, 850

1993In State v. Rowe, 850 P.2d 427, 429 (Utah 1992), the supreme court held that absent a fundamental violation of rights, suppression is only required if the search would not have otherwise happened or the search was the result of deliberate disregard of a provision of the rule.

2016See World Peace Movement of Am. v. Newspaper Agency Corp., 879 P.2d 253, 257 (Utah 1994) ("Although the parties urge myriad constitutional claims and defenses upon us, '[ilt is a fundamental rule that this Court should avoid addressing constitutional issues unless required to do so.'" (alteration in original) (citation omitted)). 3 .

1995See World Peace Movement of Am. v. Newspaper Agency Corp., 879 P.2d 253, 257 (Utah 1994) (“ ‘It is a fundamental rule that this Court should avoid addressing constitutional issues unless required to do so.'" (quoting State v. Anderson, 701 P.2d 1099, 1103 (Utah 1985))).

2015Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 675 (1962); State v. Herrera, 1999 UT 64 , ¶ 33 n.13, 993 P.2d 854 . 87 State v. Mace, 921 P.2d 1372, 1377 (Utah 1996) (footnote omitted) (citing Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 284 (1983)). 23 STATE v. HOUSTON Opinion of the Court an evolving analytical framework, the fundamental principle of the Eighth Amendment remains unchanged: “[C]riminal punishments are prohibited if they are excessive or contravene evolving standards of decency and human dignity.” 88 We also note, however, that sentencing statutes derive from a variety of often imprecise policy consid

2011See Urau Cope Ann. §§ 58-37-8(2)(a)(i), 58-37-2(1)(ii), 58-37-2(1)(c). 54 . 370 U.S. at 666 , 82 S.Ct. 1417 .

2015Words and phrases are presumed to have been used according to their plain, natural, and common import and usage of the language, unless obviously used in a technical sense."); State v. Navaro, 83 Utah 6 , 26 P.2d 955, 956 (1933) ("Under the ordinary canons of construction of statutes we are required to give the word its plain, natural, ordinary, and commonly understood meaning, in the absence of any statutory or well-established technical meaning, unless it is plain from the statute that a different meaning is intended."); State v. Hendrickson, 67 Utah 15 , 245 P. 375, 378 (1926) ("[It is] the

2015Words and phrases are presumed to have been used according to their plain, natural, and common import and usage of the language, unless obviously used in a technical sense."); State v. Navaro, 83 Utah 6 , 26 P.2d 955, 956 (1933) ("Under the ordinary canons of construction of statutes we are required to give the word its plain, natural, ordinary, and commonly understood meaning, in the absence of any statutory or well-established technical meaning, unless it is plain from the statute that a different meaning is intended."); State v. Hendrickson, 67 Utah 15 , 245 P. 375, 378 (1926) ("[It is] the

2015Words and phrases are presumed to have been used according to their plain, natural, and common import and usage of the language, unless obviously used in a technical sense."); State v. Navaro, 83 Utah 6 , 26 P.2d 955, 956 (1933) ("Under the ordinary canons of construction of statutes we are required to give the word its plain, natural, ordinary, and commonly understood meaning, in the absence of any statutory or well-established technical meaning, unless it is plain from the statute that a different meaning is intended."); State v. Hendrickson, 67 Utah 15 , 245 P. 375, 378 (1926) ("[It is] the

2015Words and phrases are presumed to have been used according to their plain, natural, and common import and usage of the language, unless obviously used in a technical sense."); State v. Navaro, 83 Utah 6 , 26 P.2d 955, 956 (1933) ("Under the ordinary canons of construction of statutes we are required to give the word its plain, natural, ordinary, and commonly understood meaning, in the absence of any statutory or well-established technical meaning, unless it is plain from the statute that a different meaning is intended."); State v. Hendrickson, 67 Utah 15 , 245 P. 375, 378 (1926) ("[It is] the

2015Except in the case of technical words and phrases, they must I be construed according to their plain and ordinary meaning."); Miles v. Wells, 22 Utah 55 , 61 P. 534, 536 (1900) ("[WJhere there is no ambiguity, the language must be taken as the expression of the legislature's intention, unless other provisions of the statute clearly show that the language was used in a sense different from its natural and ordinary meaning."). .

2015Except in the case of technical words and phrases, they must I be construed according to their plain and ordinary meaning."); Miles v. Wells, 22 Utah 55 , 61 P. 534, 536 (1900) ("[WJhere there is no ambiguity, the language must be taken as the expression of the legislature's intention, unless other provisions of the statute clearly show that the language was used in a sense different from its natural and ordinary meaning."). .

2015See State v. Worwood, 2007 UT 47, ¶ 16 , 164 P.3d 397 . 122 The most fundamental principle of equal protection is that those who are "similarly situated should be treated similarly" and those who are "in different cireum-stances should not be treated as if their circumstances were the same." Malan, 693 P.2d at 669 .

2015See State v. Worwood, 2007 UT 47, ¶ 16 , 164 P.3d 397 . 122 The most fundamental principle of equal protection is that those who are "similarly situated should be treated similarly" and those who are "in different cireum-stances should not be treated as if their circumstances were the same." Malan, 693 P.2d at 669 .

2012Utah Dep't of Transp. v. Osguthorpe, 892 P.2d 4, 8 (Utah 1995) (emphasis added by trial court) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

2002Comm'n, 949 P.2d 746, 758 (Utah Ct.App.1997). " 'The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard, at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner, and, when this opportunity is granted a complainant, who chooses not to exercise it, that complainant cannot later plead a denial of procedural due process'" Utah Dept. of Trans. v. Osguthorpe, 892 P.2d 4, 8 (Utah 1995) (citation omitted).

2006Legal malpractice “actions are grounded on the fundamental principle that attorneys must be completely loyal to their clients and must never use their position of trust to take advantage of client confidences for themselves or for other parties.” Kilpatrick I, 909 P.2d 1283, 1290 (Utah Ct.App. 1996) “[A]n attorney’s fiduciary duty is twofold: undivided loyalty and confidentiality.” Id. 1.

2006Legal malpractice "actions are grounded on the fundamental principle that attorneys must be completely loyal to their clients and must never use their position of trust to take advantage of client confidences for themselves or for other parties." Kilpatrick I, 909 P.2d 1283, 1290 (Utah Ct.App. 1996) "[A]n attorney's fiduciary duty is twofold: undivided loyalty and confidentiality." Id. 1.

2004See id. ¶12 Judicial and administrative proceedings following the State's removal of children from their home are no exception to this fundamental principle.

2004See id. ¶ 12 Judicial and administrative proceedings following the State’s removal of children from their home are no exception to this fundamental principle.

2008A. Huish’s Case-in-Chief ¶ 3 “The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’ ” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 , 96 S.Ct. 893 , 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976) (citation omitted).

2008A. Huish’s Case-in-Chief ¶ 3 “The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’ ” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 , 96 S.Ct. 893 , 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976) (citation omitted).

2008"The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard `at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.'" Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 , 96 S.Ct. 893 , 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976) (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 , 85 S.Ct. 1187 , 14 L.Ed.2d 62 (1965)).

2008"The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard `at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.'" Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 , 96 S.Ct. 893 , 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976) (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 , 85 S.Ct. 1187 , 14 L.Ed.2d 62 (1965)).

2018"Therefore, the more fundamental test is whether under the particular circumstances the defendant should have foreseen that his conduct would have exposed others to an unreasonable risk of harm." Dee , 2012 UT App 237 , ¶ 5, 286 P.3d 22 (quoting Watters v. Querry , 588 P.2d 702 , 704 (Utah 1978) ) (quotation simplified). ¶14 Although the UOVC paid reparations to Victim, the State must still satisfy the proximate cause test.

2018"Therefore, 'the more fundamental test is whether under the particular circumstances the defendant should have foreseen that his conduct would have exposed others to an unreasonable risk of harm; and this includes situations where negligent or other wrongful conduct of others should reasonably be anticipated.' " Dee , 2012 UT App 237 , ¶ 5, 286 P.3d 22 (brackets omitted) (quoting Watters v. Querry , 588 P.2d 702 , 704 (Utah 1978) ). ¶44 Under these standards, and in the absence of any Concealment, we have no trouble concluding that the expert medical testimony presented at trial was more than

2023But this exception applies only where exclusion of the evidence “foreclose[s] any meaningful avenue for presenting a defendant’s fundamental defense to charges against him.” See State v. Thornton, 2017 UT 9, ¶ 74 , 391 P.3d 1016 ; see also State v. Nunez-Vasquez, 2020 UT App 98, ¶ 32 , 468 P.3d 585 , cert. denied, 474 P.3d 945 (Utah 2020).

2023But this exception applies only where exclusion of the evidence “foreclose[s] any meaningful avenue for presenting a defendant’s fundamental defense to charges against him.” See State v. Thornton, 2017 UT 9, ¶ 74 , 391 P.3d 1016 ; see also State v. Nunez-Vasquez, 2020 UT App 98, ¶ 32 , 468 P.3d 585 , cert. denied, 474 P.3d 945 (Utah 2020).

2023But this exception applies only where exclusion of the evidence “foreclose[s] any meaningful avenue for presenting a defendant’s fundamental defense to charges against him.” See State v. Thornton, 2017 UT 9, ¶ 74 , 391 P.3d 1016 ; see also State v. Nunez-Vasquez, 2020 UT App 98, ¶ 32 , 468 P.3d 585 , cert. denied, 474 P.3d 945 (Utah 2020).

2023But this exception applies only where exclusion of the evidence “foreclose[s] any meaningful avenue for presenting a defendant’s fundamental defense to charges against him.” See State v. Thornton, 2017 UT 9, ¶ 74 , 391 P.3d 1016 ; see also State v. Nunez-Vasquez, 2020 UT App 98, ¶ 32 , 468 P.3d 585 , cert. denied, 474 P.3d 945 (Utah 2020).

2002Although recent cases have focused on only four factors, see, eg., State v. DeCorso, 993 P.2d 837 , 1999 UT 57 at ¶ 50 , we emphasize that the photographs must be viewed as a whole and therefore at times "[ojther factors will also come into play.'' Lafferty, 749 P.2d at 1257 . 8 .

1993Such conduct will be found to be prejudicial only if, absent the misconduct, “there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the defendant....” Id. (quoting State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239, 1255 (Utah 1988)).