693 Connecticut opinions name it 3 courts 1899–2026 35 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Connecticut courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Malone v. Steinberggreen2 sentences2014Completed written reports on non-agreements will be submitted to the Court within five (5) months from the time of the referral notification date.’’ Judicial Branch Court Support Services Division Policy and Procedures, Family Services Comprehensive Evaluation, pp. 6–9. 5 The record reflects that, although the plaintiff’s counsel indicated the need for an emergency hearing, no written motion requesting such a hearing had been filed. ‘‘The purpose of requiring written motions is not only the orderly administration of justice; see Malone v. Steinberg, 138 Conn. 718, 721 , 89 A.2d 213 (1952); but 2014Completed written reports on non-agreements will be submitted to the Court within five (5) months from the time of the referral notification date.’’ Judicial Branch Court Support Services Division Policy and Procedures, Family Services Comprehensive Evaluation, pp. 6–9. 5 The record reflects that, although the plaintiff’s counsel indicated the need for an emergency hearing, no written motion requesting such a hearing had been filed. ‘‘The purpose of requiring written motions is not only the orderly administration of justice; see Malone v. Steinberg, 138 Conn. 718, 721 , 89 A.2d 213 (1952); but | 6 | 6 |
Connecticut State Medical Society v. Connecticut Board of Examiners in Podiatrygreen2 sentences2000The fundamental test for establishing classical aggrievement is well settled: "[F]irst, the party claiming aggrievement must successfully demonstrate a specific personal and legal interest in the subject matter of the decision. . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Med-Trans of Connecticut, Inc. v. Dept. of Public Health Addiction Services, 242 Conn. 152 , 158-59 , 699 A.2d 142 (1997); accord State Medical Society v. Board of Examiners in Podiatry, 203 Conn. 295 , 299-300 , 524 A.2d 636 (1987). 2000The fundamental test for establishing classical aggrievement is well settled: "[F]irst, the party claiming aggrievement must successfully demonstrate a specific personal and legal interest in the subject matter of the decision. . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Med-Trans of Connecticut, Inc. v. Dept. of Public Health Addiction Services, 242 Conn. 152 , 158-59 , 699 A.2d 142 (1997); accord State Medical Society v. Board of Examiners in Podiatry, 203 Conn. 295 , 299-300 , 524 A.2d 636 (1987). | 5 | 10 |
| Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Jonesgreen | 4 | 5 |
State v. Skakelgreen2 sentences2021Compare Vollemans v. Wallingford, 103 Conn. App. 188, 197 , 928 A.2d 586 (2007) (Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act, General Statutes § 46a-51 et seq., is remedial legislation that must ‘‘be construed liberally to effectuate [its] beneficent purposes’’ (internal quotation marks omit- ted)), aff’d, 289 Conn. 57 , 956 A.2d 579 (2008), with State v. Skakel, 276 Conn. 633, 674 , 888 A.2d 985 (‘‘criminal statutes are governed by the fundamental principle that such statutes are strictly construed against the state’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1030 , 127 S. Ct. 2021Compare Vollemans v. Wallingford, 103 Conn. App. 188, 197 , 928 A.2d 586 (2007) (Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act, General Statutes § 46a-51 et seq., is remedial legislation that must ‘‘be construed liberally to effectuate [its] beneficent purposes’’ (internal quotation marks omit- ted)), aff’d, 289 Conn. 57 , 956 A.2d 579 (2008), with State v. Skakel, 276 Conn. 633, 674 , 888 A.2d 985 (‘‘criminal statutes are governed by the fundamental principle that such statutes are strictly construed against the state’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1030 , 127 S. Ct. | 3 | 5 |
Connolly v. Connollygreen2 sentences2025The purpose of requiring written motions is not only the orderly administration of justice . . . but the fundamental requirement of due process of law.’’ (Citations omitted.) Connolly v. Connolly, 191 Page 16 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0 18 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1 Surgent v. Surgent Conn. 468, 475, 464 A.2d 837 (1983). 2020See, e.g., Connolly v. Connolly, 191 Conn. 468 , 475–78, 464 A.2d 837 (1983); see also In re Nasia B., 98 Conn. App. 319, 329 , 908 A.2d 1090 (2006) (‘‘[t]he purpose of requiring written motions is not only to provide for the orderly administration of justice, but also to fulfill the fundamental requirement of due process of law’’); Berglass v. Berglass, 71 Conn. App. 771, 783 , 804 A.2d 889 (2002) (same). | 2 | 8 |
Munhall v. Inland Wetlands Commissiongreen2 sentences2002Second, the party claiming aggrievement must successfully establish that this specific personal and legal interest has been specially and injuriously affected by the decision." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Munhall v. Inland Wetlands Commission , supra, 51. 2002Second, the party claiming aggrievement must successfully establish that this specific personal and legal interest has been specially and injuriously affected by the decision." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Munhall v. Inland Wetlands Commission , supra, 51. | 2 | 8 |
| Huck v. Inland Wetlands & Watercourses Agency of Greenwichgreen | 2 | 5 |
| Laurel Park, Inc. v. Pacgreen | 2 | 3 |
State v. Langleygreen2 sentences2001While “[t]he constitution of Connecticut has never contained a provision against double jeopardy . . . [it] has long [been] recognized as a fundamental principle of common law that no one shall be put in jeopardy more than once for the same offense.” (Citations omitted.) State v. Langley, 156 Conn. 598, 600-601 , 244 A.2d 366 (1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1069 , 89 S. Ct. 726 , 21 L. 2001While “[t]he constitution of Connecticut has never contained a provision against double jeopardy . . . [it] has long [been] recognized as a fundamental principle of common law that no one shall be put in jeopardy more than once for the same offense.” (Citations omitted.) State v. Langley, 156 Conn. 598, 600-601 , 244 A.2d 366 (1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1069 , 89 S. Ct. 726 , 21 L. | 1 | 12 |
Lewis v. Connecticut Gaming Policy Boardgreen2 sentences2026See, e.g., Lewis v. Gaming Policy Board, 224 Conn. 693, 698 , 620 A.2d 780 (1993) (“[i]t is a fundamental rule that a court may raise and review the issue of subject matter jurisdiction at any time”). 2026See, e.g., Lewis v. Gaming Policy Board, 224 Conn. 693, 698 , 620 A.2d 780 (1993) (“[i]t is a fundamental rule that a court may raise and review the issue of subject matter jurisdiction at any time”). | 1 | 7 |
SFA Folio Collections, Inc. v. Bannongreen2 sentences2017SFA Folio Collections, Inc. v. Bannon , 217 Conn. 220 , 232, 585 A.2d 666 ("it is a fundamental principle of corporate law that the parent corporation and its subsidiary are treated as separate and distinct legal persons even though the parent owns all the shares in the subsidiary"), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1223 , 111 S.Ct. 2839 , 115 L.Ed.2d 1008 (1991). 2017SFA Folio Collections, Inc. v. Bannon , 217 Conn. 220 , 232, 585 A.2d 666 ("it is a fundamental principle of corporate law that the parent corporation and its subsidiary are treated as separate and distinct legal persons even though the parent owns all the shares in the subsidiary"), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1223 , 111 S.Ct. 2839 , 115 L.Ed.2d 1008 (1991). | 1 | 7 |
Cumberland Farms, Inc. v. Town of Grotongreen2 sentences2026Col- lateral estoppel express[es] no more than the fundamental principle that once a matter has been fully and fairly litigated, and finally decided, it comes to rest.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cumberland Farms, Inc. v. Groton, 262 Conn. 45, 58 , 808 A.2d 1107 (2002). 2026Col- lateral estoppel express[es] no more than the fundamental principle that once a matter has been fully and fairly litigated, and finally decided, it comes to rest.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cumberland Farms, Inc. v. Groton, 262 Conn. 45, 58 , 808 A.2d 1107 (2002). | 1 | 6 |
State v. Campbellgreen2 sentences2004It is a fundamental principle of statutory interpretation that, "[i]nsofar as the language of the statute will permit, we interpret it in accordance with the purpose of the statute, because legislation is a purposive act." Cislo v. Shelton, 240 Conn. 590, 598 , 692 A.2d 1255 (1997); see also State v. Talton, 209 Conn. 133, 141 , 547 A.2d 543 (1988) (basic tenet of statutory construction that "the legislature acted to accomplish some purpose" and statutes must be interpreted accordingly [internal quotation marks omitted]); State v. Campbell, 180 Conn. 557, 561 , 429 A.2d 960 (1980) ("fundamenta 2004It is a fundamental principle of statutory interpretation that, "[i]nsofar as the language of the statute will permit, we interpret it in accordance with the purpose of the statute, because legislation is a purposive act." Cislo v. Shelton, 240 Conn. 590, 598 , 692 A.2d 1255 (1997); see also State v. Talton, 209 Conn. 133, 141 , 547 A.2d 543 (1988) (basic tenet of statutory construction that "the legislature acted to accomplish some purpose" and statutes must be interpreted accordingly [internal quotation marks omitted]); State v. Campbell, 180 Conn. 557, 561 , 429 A.2d 960 (1980) ("fundamenta | 1 | 6 |
| Yellow Bus Lines, Inc. v. Drivers, Chauffeurs & Helpers Local Union 639green | 1 | 5 |
| Riley v. Delawaregreen | 1 | 5 |
| State v. Williamsgreen | 1 | 4 |
| Northrop v. Town of Clintongreen | 1 | 4 |
| Pappas v. Pappasgreen | 1 | 4 |
| Carter v. Cartergreen | 1 | 4 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Connecticut. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Ellis
green
2 sentences2013Collateral estoppel is grounded in “the fundamental principle that once a matter has been fully and fairly litigated, and finally decided, it comes to rest.” State v. Ellis, 197 Conn. 436, 465 , 497 A.2d 974 (1985), on appeal after remand sub nom. 2013Collateral estoppel is grounded in “the fundamental principle that once a matter has been fully and fairly litigated, and finally decided, it comes to rest.” State v. Ellis, 197 Conn. 436, 465 , 497 A.2d 974 (1985), on appeal after remand sub nom. | 34 | 1988–2013 |
Nader v. Altermatt
green
2 sentences1996Second, the party claiming aggrievement must successfully establish that this specific personal and legal interest has been specially and injuriously affected by the [challenged action]."' Mystic Marinelife Aquarium, Inc. v. Gill, supra, 175 Conn. 493 , quoting Nader v. Altermatt, 166 Conn. 43 , 51 , 347 A.2d 89 (1974). `The determination of aggrievement presents a question of fact for the trial court and a plaintiff has the burden of proving that fact.' Mystic Marinelife Aquarium, Inc. v. Gill, supra, 493 . . . . 1996Second, the party claiming aggrievement must successfully establish that this specific personal and legal interest has been specially and injuriously affected by the [challenged action]."' Mystic Marinelife Aquarium, Inc. v. Gill, supra, 175 Conn. 493 , quoting Nader v. Altermatt, 166 Conn. 43 , 51 , 347 A.2d 89 (1974). `The determination of aggrievement presents a question of fact for the trial court and a plaintiff has the burden of proving that fact.' Mystic Marinelife Aquarium, Inc. v. Gill, supra, 493 . . . . | 16 | 1978–1996 |
Mystic Marinelife Aquarium, Inc. v. Gill
green
2 sentences1995As the Supreme Court has held in Mystic Marine Life Aquarium, Inc. v. Gill, 175 Conn. 483 (1978) "The fundamental test for determining aggrievement encompasses a well settled two fold determination: CT Page 3104 First, "the party claiming aggrievement must successfully demonstrate a specific, personal and legal interest in the subject matter of the decision, as distinguished from a general interest, such as is the concern of all members of the community as a whole. 1992I As to plaintiffs Brown and Schmidt, the fundamental test for determining classical aggrievement encompasses a two-fold determination, Rose v. Freedom of Information Commission, 221 Conn. 217 CT Page 4737 (1992), p. 230; and Mystic Marinelife Aquarium v. Gill, 175 Conn. 483 (1978), p. 493. | 13 | 1983–1999 |
State v. Vitale
green
2 sentences2001“It is a fundamental rule of appellate review of evidentiary rulings that if [the] error is not of constitutional dimensions, an appellant has the burden of establishing that there has been an erroneous ruling which was probably harmful to him.” State v. Vitale, 197 Conn. 396, 403 , 497 A.2d 956 (1985). 2001“It is a fundamental rule of appellate review of evidentiary rulings that if [the] error is not of constitutional dimensions, an appellant has the burden of establishing that there has been an erroneous ruling which was probably harmful to him.” State v. Vitale, 197 Conn. 396, 403 , 497 A.2d 956 (1985). | 11 | 1986–2001 |
O'Shea v. United States
green
2 sentences2001While “[t]he constitution of Connecticut has never contained a provision against double jeopardy . . . [it] has long [been] recognized as a fundamental principle of common law that no one shall be put in jeopardy more than once for the same offense.” (Citations omitted.) State v. Langley, 156 Conn. 598, 600-601 , 244 A.2d 366 (1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1069 , 89 S. Ct. 726 , 21 L. 1996While “[t]he constitution of Connecticut has never contained a provision against double jeopardy . . . [it] has long [been] recognized as a fundamental principle of common law that no one shall be put in jeopardy more than once for the same offense.” (Emphasis added.) State v. Langley, 156 Conn. 598, 600-601 , 244 A.2d 366 (1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1069 , 89 S. Ct. 726 , 21 L. | 11 | 1985–2001 |
State v. Paradise
green
2 sentences2013State v. Paradise, 213 Conn. 388 , 567 A.2d 1221 (1990), overruled in part by State v. Skakel, 276 Conn. 633, 693 , 888 A.2d 985 , cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1030 , 127 S. Ct. 578 , 166 L. 2013State v. Paradise, 213 Conn. 388 , 567 A.2d 1221 (1990), overruled in part by State v. Skakel, 276 Conn. 633, 693 , 888 A.2d 985 , cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1030 , 127 S. Ct. 578 , 166 L. | 10 | 1993–2013 |
Bakelaar v. City of West Haven
green
2 sentences1992Milford v. Local 1566, 200 Conn. 91 , 96 ; Bakelaar v. West Haven, supra, 66 ; Hartford Distributors, Inc. v. Liquor Control Commission, 177 Conn. 616 , 620 . "`The fundamental test for determining aggrievement encompasses a well settled twofold determination: first, `the party claiming aggrievement must successfully demonstrate a specific personal and legal interest in the subject matter of the decision, as distinguished from a general interest, such as is the concern of all members of the community as a whole. 1991Bakelaar v. West Haven, 193 Conn. 59, 65 , 475 A.2d 283 (1984). “ ‘The fundamental test by which the status of aggrievement . . . is determined encompasses a well-settled twofold determination. | 10 | 1987–1992 |
Winick v. Winick
green
2 sentences2013Hasbrouck v. Hasbrouck, 195 Conn. 558, 559-60 , 489 A.2d 1022 (1985). ‘[T]he failure of a court to comply with this requirement of notice is a serious breach of a fundamental requirement of due process of law.’ Winick v. Winick, 153 Conn. 294, 299 , 216 A.2d 185 (1965). ‘In cases in which a divorce decree was issued in a foreign court without one party’s knowledge or consent, Connecticut courts have refrained from recognizing the foreign divorce decree under comity.’ Nirookh v. Aburabei, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. FA-09-4012235-S (concluding that plaintiff was denied due process because 2013Hasbrouck v. Hasbrouck, 195 Conn. 558, 559-60 , 489 A.2d 1022 (1985). ‘[T]he failure of a court to comply with this requirement of notice is a serious breach of a fundamental requirement of due process of law.’ Winick v. Winick, 153 Conn. 294, 299 , 216 A.2d 185 (1965). ‘In cases in which a divorce decree was issued in a foreign court without one party’s knowledge or consent, Connecticut courts have refrained from recognizing the foreign divorce decree under comity.’ Nirookh v. Aburabei, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. FA-09-4012235-S (concluding that plaintiff was denied due process because | 9 | 1967–2014 |
State v. Ross
green
2 sentences2001Finally, “unless a contrary interpretation would frustrate an evident legislative intent, criminal statutes are governed by the fundamental principle that such statutes are strictly construed against the state.” State v. Ross, 230 Conn. 183, 200 , 646 A.2d 1318 (1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1165 , 115 S. Ct. 1133 , 130 L. 2001Finally, “unless a contrary interpretation would frustrate an evident legislative intent, criminal statutes are governed by the fundamental principle that such statutes are strictly construed against the state.” State v. Ross, 230 Conn. 183, 200 , 646 A.2d 1318 (1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1165 , 115 S. Ct. 1133 , 130 L. | 8 | 1996–2004 |
Scalzo v. City of Danbury
green
2 sentences1993Both legal doctrines promote judicial economy by preventing relitigation of issues or claims previously resolved. [Citation omitted.] `The concepts of issue preclusion and claim preclusion are simply related ideas on a continuum, differentiated, perhaps by their breadth, and express no more than the fundamental principle that once a matter has been fully and fairly litigated, and finally decided, it comes to rest.' Scalzo v. Danbury, 224 Conn. 124 , 127 . 1993Both legal doctrines promote judicial economy by preventing relitigation of issues or claims previously resolved. . . . [Citation omitted.] `The concepts of issue preclusion and claim preclusion are simply related ideas on a continuum, CT Page 5974 differentiated, perhaps by their breadth, and express no more than the fundamental principle that once a matter has been fully and fairly litigated, and finally decided, it comes to rest.' (Citation omitted.) Scalzo v. Danbury, 224 Conn. 124 , 127 . | 8 | 1993–2002 |
Peters v. Department of Social Services
green
2 sentences2009Moreover, concerns regarding subject matter jurisdiction implicate the court’s fundamental authority and may properly be raised and decided by the court sua sponte. 8 See, e.g., Peters v. Dept. of Social Services, 273 Conn. 434, 441 , 870 A.2d 448 (2005) (“[I]t is a fundamental rule that a court may raise and review the issue of subject matter jurisdiction at any time. . . . 2009Moreover, concerns regarding subject matter jurisdiction implicate the court’s fundamental authority and may properly be raised and decided by the court sua sponte. 8 See, e.g., Peters v. Dept. of Social Services, 273 Conn. 434, 441 , 870 A.2d 448 (2005) (“[I]t is a fundamental rule that a court may raise and review the issue of subject matter jurisdiction at any time. . . . | 7 | 2006–2022 |
State v. Davis
green
2 sentences2009We are mindful that we “must refrain from imposing criminal liability where the legislature has not expressly so intended. . . . [C]riminal statutes are not to be read more broadly than their language plainly requires and ambiguities are ordinarily to be resolved in favor of the defendant. . . . [Ujnless a contrary interpretation would frustrate an evident legislative intent, criminal statutes are governed by the fundamental principle that such statutes are strictly construed against the state.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Davis, 255 Conn. 782, 788-89 , 772 2009We are mindful that we “must refrain from imposing criminal liability where the legislature has not expressly so intended. . . . [C]riminal statutes are not to be read more broadly than their language plainly requires and ambiguities are ordinarily to be resolved in favor of the defendant. . . . [Ujnless a contrary interpretation would frustrate an evident legislative intent, criminal statutes are governed by the fundamental principle that such statutes are strictly construed against the state.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Davis, 255 Conn. 782, 788-89 , 772 | 7 | 2001–2009 |
State v. Roque
green
2 sentences1997State v. Rogue, 190 Conn. 143, 150 , 460 A.2d 26 (1983). 1997State v. Rogue, 190 Conn. 143, 150 , 460 A.2d 26 (1983). | 7 | 1986–1997 |
Hall v. Planning Commission
green
2 sentences1991Second, the party claiming aggrievement must successfully establish that this specific personal and legal interest has been specially and injuriously affected by the decision' . . . ."' Cannavo Enterprises, Inc. v. Burns, 194 Conn. 43 , 47 , 478 A.2d 601 (1984); Bakelaar v. West Haven, 193 Conn. 59 , 65 , 475 A.2d 283 (1984). `Aggrievement is established if "there is a possibility, as distinguished from a certainty, that some legally protected interest . . . has been adversely affected." O'Leary v. McGuinness, 140 Conn. 80 , 83 , 98 A.2d 660 CT Page 250 (1953).' Hall v. Planning Commission, 18 1991Second, the party claiming aggrievement must successfully establish that this specific personal and legal interest has been specially and injuriously affected by the decision' . . . ."' Cannavo Enterprises, Inc. v. Burns, 194 Conn. 43 , 47 , 478 A.2d 601 (1984); Bakelaar v. West Haven, 193 Conn. 59 , 65 , 475 A.2d 283 (1984). `Aggrievement is established if "there is a possibility, as distinguished from a certainty, that some legally protected interest . . . has been adversely affected." O'Leary v. McGuinness, 140 Conn. 80 , 83 , 98 A.2d 660 CT Page 250 (1953).' Hall v. Planning Commission, 18 | 7 | 1986–1991 |
Cannavo Enterprises, Inc. v. Burns
green
2 sentences1991Second, the party claiming aggrievement must successfully establish that this specific personal and legal interest has been specially and injuriously affected by the decision' . . . ."' Cannavo Enterprises, Inc. v. Burns, 194 Conn. 43 , 47 , 478 A.2d 601 (1984); Bakelaar v. West Haven, 193 Conn. 59 , 65 , 475 A.2d 283 (1984). `Aggrievement is established if "there is a possibility, as distinguished from a certainty, that some legally protected interest . . . has been adversely affected." O'Leary v. McGuinness, 140 Conn. 80 , 83 , 98 A.2d 660 CT Page 250 (1953).' Hall v. Planning Commission, 18 1991Second, the party claiming aggrievement must successfully establish that this specific personal and legal interest has been specially and injuriously affected by the decision' . . . ."' Cannavo Enterprises, Inc. v. Burns, 194 Conn. 43 , 47 , 478 A.2d 601 (1984); Bakelaar v. West Haven, 193 Conn. 59 , 65 , 475 A.2d 283 (1984). `Aggrievement is established if "there is a possibility, as distinguished from a certainty, that some legally protected interest . . . has been adversely affected." O'Leary v. McGuinness, 140 Conn. 80 , 83 , 98 A.2d 660 CT Page 250 (1953).' Hall v. Planning Commission, 18 | 6 | 1987–1991 |
State v. Taylor
green
2 sentences1976Our practice ‘does not permit a defendant in a criminal case to fail, whether from a mistake of law, inattention or design, to object to matters occurring during a trial until it is too late for them to be corrected or even considered and then, if the outcome proves unsatisfactory, to raise them for the first time on an appeal.’ State v. Taylor, 153 Conn. 72, 86 , 214 A.2d 362 , cert. denied, 384 U.S. 921 .. . .” State v. Van Valkenburg, 160 Conn. 171, 174 . 1976Our practice ‘does not permit a defendant in a criminal case to fail, whether from a mistake of law, inattention or design, to object to matters occurring during a trial until it is too late for them to be corrected or even considered and then, if the outcome proves unsatisfactory, to raise them for the first time on an appeal.’ State v. Taylor, 153 Conn. 72, 86 , 214 A.2d 362 , cert. denied, 384 U.S. 921 .. . .” State v. Van Valkenburg, 160 Conn. 171, 174 . | 6 | 1970–1976 |
Lovell v. Tennessee
green
2 sentences1976Our practice ‘does not permit a defendant in a criminal case to fail, whether from a mistake of law, inattention or design, to object to matters occurring during a trial until it is too late for them to be corrected or even considered and then, if the outcome proves unsatisfactory, to raise them for the first time on an appeal.’ State v. Taylor, 153 Conn. 72, 86 , 214 A.2d 362 , cert. denied, 384 U.S. 921 .. . .” State v. Van Valkenburg, 160 Conn. 171, 174 . 1976Our practice ‘does not permit a defendant in a criminal case to fail, whether from a mistake of law, inattention or design, to object to matters occurring during a trial until it is too late for them to be corrected or even considered and then, if the outcome proves unsatisfactory, to raise them for the first time on an appeal.’ State v. Taylor, 153 Conn. 72 , 86 ... , cert. denied, 384 U.S. 921 . . . .” State v. Van Valkenburg, 160 Conn. 171, 174 . | 6 | 1970–1976 |
Dowling v. Finley Associates, Inc.
green
2 sentences2001"Both doctrines protect the finality of judicial determinations, conserve the time of the court, and prevent wasteful relitigation . . . and express no more than the fundamental principle that once a matter has been fully and fairly litigated, and finally decided, it comes to rest." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. 2001“Both doctrines . . . express no more than the fundamental principle that once a matter has been fully and fairly litigated and finally decided, it comes to rest.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. | 5 | 1999–2022 |
Crone v. Gill
green
2 sentences2021Second, the party claiming aggrievement also must demonstrate that its asserted interest has been specially and injuriously affected in a way that is cognizable by law.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Crone v. Gill, 250 Conn. 476 , 479–80, 736 A.2d 131 (1999); see also Practice Book § 72-1 (a) (‘‘[w]rits of error for errors in matters of law only may be brought from a final judgment of the Superior Court to the Appellate Court in the following cases: (1) a decision binding on an aggrieved nonparty; (2) a summary deci- sion of criminal contempt; (3) a denial of transfer 2021Second, the party claiming aggrievement also must demonstrate that its asserted interest has been specially and injuriously affected in a way that is cognizable by law.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Crone v. Gill, 250 Conn. 476 , 479–80, 736 A.2d 131 (1999); see also Practice Book § 72-1 (a) (‘‘[w]rits of error for errors in matters of law only may be brought from a final judgment of the Superior Court to the Appellate Court in the following cases: (1) a decision binding on an aggrieved nonparty; (2) a summary deci- sion of criminal contempt; (3) a denial of transfer | 5 | 1999–2021 |
Sturdevant's Appeal from Probate
green
2 sentences2021While in determining the question as to the mental capacity of a testator evidence is received of his conduct and condi- tion prior and subsequent to the point of time when it is executed, it is so admitted solely for such light as it may afford as to his capacity at that point of time and diminishes in weight as time lengthens in each direction from that point.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Bassford v. Bassford, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S (reprinted at 180 Conn. App. 340–41); see also Atchison v. Lewis, 131 Conn. 218 , 219–20, 38 A.2d 673 (194 2021While in determining the question as to the mental capacity of a testator evidence is received of his conduct and condi- tion prior and subsequent to the point of time when it is executed, it is so admitted solely for such light as it may afford as to his capacity at that point of time and diminishes in weight as time lengthens in each direction from that point.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Bassford v. Bassford, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S (reprinted at 180 Conn. App. 340–41); see also Atchison v. Lewis, 131 Conn. 218 , 219–20, 38 A.2d 673 (194 | 5 | 1905–2021 |
| Malloy v. Town of Colchester green | 5 | 2007–2020 |
| Mazziotti v. Allstate Insurance green | 5 | 1997–2017 |
| Mathews v. Eldridge green | 5 | 1997–2017 |
| Payton v. New York green | 5 | 1992–2011 |
| State v. Velasco green | 5 | 2000–2008 |
| Sasso v. Aleshin green | 5 | 1993–2002 |
| State v. Ledbetter green | 5 | 1999–2001 |
| Harris v. Schaefer green | 5 | 1996–2001 |
| O'LEARY v. McGuinness green | 5 | 1987–1991 |
| State v. Van Valkenburg neutral | 5 | 1974–1976 |
| Jackson v. Waller green | 4 | 1995–2021 |
| Steeneck v. University of Bridgeport green | 4 | 1996–2020 |
| Malloy v. Town of Colchester green | 4 | 2007–2020 |
| Independence One Mortgage Corp. v. Katsaros green | 4 | 1999–2012 |
| Town of Westport v. Bossert Corp. green | 4 | 1982–2012 |
| Cleary v. Cleary green | 4 | 2008–2012 |
| State v. Burns green | 4 | 1997–2007 |
| Kizis v. Morse Diesel International, Inc. green | 4 | 2002–2003 |
| Kimberly neutral | 4 | 1899–2002 |
| State v. Dolphin green | 4 | 1993–2001 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.