901 Kansas opinions name it 3 courts 1895–2026 110 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Kansas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Gonzalesgreen2 sentences2003“The fundamental rule of statutory construction, to which all others are subordinate, is that the purpose and intent of the legislature governs when that intent can be ascertained from the statute, even though words, phrases, or clauses at some place in the statute must be omitted or inserted.” State v. Gonzales, 255 Kan. 243 , Syl. ¶ 2, 874 P.2d 612 (1994). 2003“The fundamental rule of statutory construction, to which all others are subordinate, is that the purpose and intent of the legislature governs when that intent can be ascertained from the statute, even though words, phrases, or clauses at some place in the statute must be omitted or inserted.” State v. Gonzales, 255 Kan. 243 , Syl. ¶ 2, 874 P.2d 612 (1994). | 6 | 16 |
City of Wichita v. 200 South Broadway, Ltd. Partnershipgreen2 sentences1997If any person has a prior conviction under this section or a conviction for a substantially similar offense from another jurisdiction, then such person shall be guilty of a drug severity level 4 felony.” The following rules of statutory interpretation provide guidance in interpreting 65-4162(a). “ Tt is a fundamental rule of statutory construction, to which all other rules are subordinate, that the intent of the legislature governs if that intent can be ascertained.’ ” City of Wichita v. 200 South Broadway, 253 Kan. 434, 436 , 855 P.2d 956 (1993). 1997If any person has a prior conviction under this section or a conviction for a substantially similar offense from another jurisdiction, then such person shall be guilty of a drug severity level 4 felony.” The following rules of statutory interpretation provide guidance in interpreting 65-4162(a). “ Tt is a fundamental rule of statutory construction, to which all other rules are subordinate, that the intent of the legislature governs if that intent can be ascertained.’ ” City of Wichita v. 200 South Broadway, 253 Kan. 434, 436 , 855 P.2d 956 (1993). | 3 | 55 |
State v. Jordangreen2 sentences2021State v. Warren, 307 Kan. 609, 612 , 412 P.3d 993 (2018). 3 "'The most fundamental rule of statutory construction is that the intent of the legislature governs if that intent can be ascertained.'" State v. Jordan, 303 Kan. 1017, 1019 , 370 P.3d 417 (2016). "'An appellate court must first attempt to ascertain legislative intent through the statutory language enacted, giving common words their ordinary meanings. 2021State v. Warren, 307 Kan. 609, 612 , 412 P.3d 993 (2018). 3 "'The most fundamental rule of statutory construction is that the intent of the legislature governs if that intent can be ascertained.'" State v. Jordan, 303 Kan. 1017, 1019 , 370 P.3d 417 (2016). "'An appellate court must first attempt to ascertain legislative intent through the statutory language enacted, giving common words their ordinary meanings. | 3 | 22 |
| State v. Rileygreen | 3 | 5 |
In Re the Marriage of Killmangreen2 sentences2006The Alvarez court stated: "Significantly, the Edwards court failed to mention K.S.A. 79-5204(c), which requires that a dealer affix a drug tax stamp `immediately after receiving the substance.' Rather than applying a broad test to determine whether a dealer was in possession sufficient to affix a drug tax stamp, the Edwards court could have relied on K.S.A. 79-5204(c). `It is a fundamental rule of statutory construction, to which all other rules are subordinate, that the intent of the legislature governs if that intent can be ascertained. [Citation omitted.]' In re Marriage of Killman, 264 Kan 2006The Alvarez court stated: "Significantly, the Edwards court failed to mention K.S.A. 79-5204(c), which requires that a dealer affix a drug tax stamp `immediately after receiving the substance.' Rather than applying a broad test to determine whether a dealer was in possession sufficient to affix a drug tax stamp, the Edwards court could have relied on K.S.A. 79-5204(c). `It is a fundamental rule of statutory construction, to which all other rules are subordinate, that the intent of the legislature governs if that intent can be ascertained. [Citation omitted.]' In re Marriage of Killman, 264 Kan | 2 | 38 |
Mathews v. Eldridgegreen2 sentences2022Procedural due process constrains governmental actions which deprive individuals of liberty or property interests within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments. "'The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard "at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner."'" State v. 16 Juarez, 312 Kan. 22 , 24, 470 P.3d 1271 (2020) (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 , 96 S. Ct. 893 , 47 L. 2022Procedural due process constrains governmental actions which deprive individuals of liberty or property interests within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments. "'The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard "at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner."'" State v. 16 Juarez, 312 Kan. 22 , 24, 470 P.3d 1271 (2020) (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 , 96 S. Ct. 893 , 47 L. | 2 | 12 |
In the Interest of J.D.C.green2 sentences2026"The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner." In re J.D.C., 284 Kan. 155, 166 , 159 P.3d 974 (2007). 2024We Analyze Whether Mother's Due Process Rights Were Violated "The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner." In re J.D.C., 284 Kan. at 166 . | 2 | 8 |
In Re JDCgreen2 sentences2026"The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner." In re J.D.C., 284 Kan. 155, 166 , 159 P.3d 974 (2007). 2024"The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner." In re J.D.C., 284 Kan. 155, 166 , 159 P.3d 974 (2007). | 2 | 7 |
| State v. Fierrogreen | 2 | 5 |
| Steffes v. City of Lawrencegreen | 2 | 4 |
Winnebago Tribe of Nebraska v. Klinegreen2 sentences2008“The fundamental rule of statutory construction is that the intent of the legislature governs if that intent can be ascertained.” Winnebago Tribe of Nebraska v. Kline, 283 Kan. 64, 77 , 150 P.3d 892 (2007). 2008“The fundamental rule of statutory construction is that the intent of the legislature governs if that intent can be ascertained.” Winnebago Tribe of Nebraska v. Kline, 283 Kan. 64, 77 , 150 P.3d 892 (2007). | 1 | 29 |
State v. Keysgreen2 sentences2026See State v. Keys, 315 Kan. 690 , 698, 510 P.3d 706 (2022) (the most fundamental rule of statutory construction is that the intent of the Legislature governs if that intent can be ascertained). 2026"An appellate court must first attempt to ascertain legislative intent through the statutory language enacted, giving common words their ordinary meanings." State v. Keys, 315 Kan. 690 , 698, 510 P.3d 706 (2022). | 1 | 14 |
West v. Collinsgreen2 sentences2002It is a fundamental rule of statutory construction, to which all other rules are subordinate, that the intent of the legislature governs if that intent can be ascertained.” West v. Collins, 251 Kan. 657 , Syl. ¶ 3, 840 P.2d 435 (1992). *898 “ ‘In determining legislative intent, courts are not limited to consideration of the language used in statute, but may look to the historical background of the enactment, the circumstances attending its passage, the purpose to be accomplished, and the effect the statute may have under the various constructions suggested. 2002It is a fundamental rule of statutory construction, to which all other rules are subordinate, that the intent of the legislature governs if that intent can be ascertained.” West v. Collins, 251 Kan. 657 , Syl. ¶ 3, 840 P.2d 435 (1992). *898 “ ‘In determining legislative intent, courts are not limited to consideration of the language used in statute, but may look to the historical background of the enactment, the circumstances attending its passage, the purpose to be accomplished, and the effect the statute may have under the various constructions suggested. | 1 | 9 |
Szoboszlay v. Glessnergreen2 sentences1996Our conclusion is further supported by the fundamental rule of statutory construction that "the latest legislative expression controls." Szoboszlay v. Glessner , 233 Kan. 475 (1983). 1985The general rules for statutory construction are set forth in Szoboszlay v. Glessner, 233 Kan. 475, 477-78 , 664 P.2d 1327 (1983), where the court stated: “[W]e are mindful of the fundamental rule of statutory construction, to which all others are subordinate, that the purpose and intent of the legislature governs when that intent can be ascertained from the statute. | 1 | 8 |
Neighbor v. Westar Energy, Inc.green2 sentences2020When interpreting statutes, "the fundamental rule to which all other rules are subordinate is that the intent of the legislature governs if that intent can be ascertained." Neighbor v. Westar Energy, Inc., 301 Kan. 916 , Syl. ¶ 2, 349 P.3d 469 (2015). 2020When interpreting statutes, "the fundamental rule to which all other rules are subordinate is that the intent of the legislature governs if that intent can be ascertained." Neighbor v. Westar Energy, Inc., 301 Kan. 916 , Syl. ¶ 2, 349 P.3d 469 (2015). | 1 | 7 |
Todd v. Kellygreen2 sentences1995“The fundamental rule of statutory construction, to which all others are subordinate, is that the purpose and intent of the legislature governs when that intent can be ascertained from the statute, even though words, phrases, or clauses at some place in the statute must be omitted or inserted.” State v. Gonzales, 255 Kan. 243 , Syl. ¶ 2, 874 P.2d 612 (1994). “ There is a presumption that the legislature does not intend to enact useless or meaningless legislation.’ ” Todd v. Kelly, 251 Kan. 512, 515 , 837 P.2d 381 (1992) (quoting City of Olathe v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 10 Kan. 1995“The fundamental rule of statutory construction, to which all others are subordinate, is that the purpose and intent of the legislature governs when that intent can be ascertained from the statute, even though words, phrases, or clauses at some place in the statute must be omitted or inserted.” State v. Gonzales, 255 Kan. 243 , Syl. ¶ 2, 874 P.2d 612 (1994). “ There is a presumption that the legislature does not intend to enact useless or meaningless legislation.’ ” Todd v. Kelly, 251 Kan. 512, 515 , 837 P.2d 381 (1992) (quoting City of Olathe v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 10 Kan. | 1 | 7 |
| Johnson v. McArthurgreen | 1 | 6 |
| State ex rel. Schmidt v. City of Wichitagreen | 1 | 5 |
| State v. Overtongreen | 1 | 4 |
| Bandel v. Pettibonegreen | 1 | 4 |
| State v. Graceygreen | 1 | 4 |
| Hoesli v. Triplett, Inc.green | 1 | 4 |
| State v. Collinsgreen | 1 | 4 |
| State v. Lygreen | 1 | 4 |
| State v. Fordgreen | 1 | 3 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Kansas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. LaPointe
green
2 sentences2024State v. LaPointe, 309 Kan. 299 , 314, 434 P.3d 850 (2019). 2024State v. LaPointe, 309 Kan. 299 , 314, 434 P.3d 850 (2019). | 42 | 2019–2024 |
State v. Arnett
green
2 sentences2016We exercise unlimited review over questions of statutory interpretation, and the principles we follow are well settled: "The most fundamental rule is that the intent of the legislature governs if that intent can be ascertained. [State v.] Arnett, 290 Kan. [41,] 47[, 223 P.3d 780 (2010)]. 2012The most fundamental rule is that the intent of the legislature governs if that intent can be ascertained. 290 Kan. at 47 . | 35 | 2010–2016 |
Bergstrom v. Spears Manufacturing Co.
green
2 sentences2019"The most fundamental rule of statutory construction is that the intent of the legislature governs if that intent can be ascertained." Bergstrom v. Spears Manufacturing Co. , 289 Kan. 605 , 607, 214 P.3d 676 (2009). 2019"The most fundamental rule of statutory construction is that the intent of the legislature governs if that intent can be ascertained." Bergstrom v. Spears Manufacturing Co. , 289 Kan. 605 , 607, 214 P.3d 676 (2009). | 33 | 2010–2022 |
Martindale v. Tenny
green
2 sentences1997It is a fundamental rule of statutory construction to which all other rules are subordinate that the intent of the legislature governs when that intent can be ascertained.” “When a statute is plain and unambiguous, the court must give effect to the intention of the legislature as expressed, rather than determine what the law should or should not be.” Martindale v. Tenny, 250 Kan. 621 , Syl. ¶¶ 1, 2, 829 P.2d 561 (1992). 1997It is a fundamental rule of statutory construction to which all other rules are subordinate that the intent of the legislature governs when that intent can be ascertained.” “When a statute is plain and unambiguous, the court must give effect to the intention of the legislature as expressed, rather than determine what the law should or should not be.” Martindale v. Tenny, 250 Kan. 621 , Syl. ¶¶ 1, 2, 829 P.2d 561 (1992). | 22 | 1992–2026 |
State v. Williams
green
2 sentences2016Typically, when we conduct our de novo review of statutes, we begin with the most fundamental rule of statutory construction: The intent of the legislature governs. 157 State v. Williams, 298 Kan. 1075, 1079 , 319 P.3d 528 (2014). 2016Typically, when we conduct our de novo review of statutes, we begin with the most fundamental rule of statutory construction: The intent of the legislature governs. 157 State v. Williams, 298 Kan. 1075, 1079 , 319 P.3d 528 (2014). | 12 | 2015–2019 |
State v. Adee
green
2 sentences1995“The fundamental rule of statutory construction is that the purpose and intent of the legislature governs when the intent can be ascertained from the statute.” State v. Adee, 241 Kan. 825, 829 , 740 P.2d 611 (1987). 1995“The fundamental rule of statutory construction is that the purpose and intent of the legislature governs when the intent can be ascertained from the statute.” State v. Adee, 241 Kan. 825, 829 , 740 P.2d 611 (1987). | 12 | 1989–1995 |
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.
green
2 sentences2024Ed. 2d 18 (1976) ("The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard 'at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.'"); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 , 70 S. Ct. 652 , 94 L. 2024Ed. 2d 18 (1976) ("The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard 'at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.'"); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 , 70 S. Ct. 652 , 94 L. | 11 | 2011–2024 |
State v. Sutherland
green
2 sentences1998“The fundamental rule is that a statute operates prospectively unless its language clearly indicates that the legislature intended it to operate retroactively. [Citation omitted.] An exception to the fundamental rule is that if the statutory change does not prejudicially affect the substantive rights of the parties and is merely procedural or remedial in nature, it applies retroactively. [Citation omitted.] Thus, the issue becomes whether the statute is substantive criminal law, which either defines a crime or involves the length or type of punishment.” State v. Sutherland, 248 Kan. 96, 106 , 1998“The fundamental rule is that a statute operates prospectively unless its language clearly indicates that the legislature intended it to operate retroactively. [Citation omitted.] An exception to the fundamental rule is that if the statutory change does not prejudicially affect the substantive rights of the parties and is merely procedural or remedial in nature, it applies retroactively. [Citation omitted.] Thus, the issue becomes whether the statute is substantive criminal law, which either defines a crime or involves the length or type of punishment.” State v. Sutherland, 248 Kan. 96, 106 , | 11 | 1991–2010 |
Hill v. Hill
neutral
2 sentences2005We therefore examine what is meant by “full hearing.” “ ‘The fundamental rule of statutory construction is that the intent of the legislature governs. [Citation omitted.] When construing a statute, a court should give words in common usage their natural and ordinary meaning.’ ” Sawyer v. Oldhams Farm Sausage Co., 246 Kan. 327, 331 , 787 P.2d 697 (1990) (quoting Hill v. Hill, 13 Kan. 1993“The fundamental rule of statutory construction is that the intent of the legislature governs. [Citation omitted.] When construing a statute, a court should give words in common usage their natural and ordinary meaning.” Hill v. Hill, 13 Kan. | 11 | 1989–2005 |
Director of Taxation v. Kansas Krude Oil Reclaiming Co.
green
2 sentences1997The fundamental rule in Kansas is that a tax exemption statute is to be construed strictly in favor of imposing a tax and against an allowance of an exemption for one who does not clearly qualify. [Citation omitted.] The burden of establishing an exemption from taxation is upon the one claiming the exemption. [Citation omitted.]” Director of Taxation v. Kansas Krude Oil Reclaiming Co., 236 Kan. 450, 454 , 691 P.2d 1303 (1984). 1997The fundamental rule in Kansas is that a tax exemption statute is to be construed strictly in favor of imposing a tax and against an allowance of an exemption for one who does not clearly qualify. [Citation omitted.] The burden of establishing an exemption from taxation is upon the one claiming the exemption. [Citation omitted.]” Director of Taxation v. Kansas Krude Oil Reclaiming Co., 236 Kan. 450, 454 , 691 P.2d 1303 (1984). | 11 | 1986–1998 |
Hall v. Dillon Companies, Inc.
green
2 sentences2011The most fundamental rule of statutory construction is that the intent of the legislature governs if that intent can be ascertained. *298 Hall v. Dillon Companies, Inc., 286 Kan. 777, 785 , 189 P.3d 508 (2008). 2011The most fundamental rule of statutory construction is that the intent of the legislature governs if that intent can be ascertained. *298 Hall v. Dillon Companies, Inc., 286 Kan. 777, 785 , 189 P.3d 508 (2008). | 9 | 2009–2015 |
Citizens State Bank of Grainfield v. Kaiser
neutral
2 sentences1991“The fundamental rule of statutory construction, to which all others are subordinate, is that the intent of the legislature governs .... [Citations omitted.] In determining legislative intent, courts are not limited to consideration of the language used in the statute, but may look to the historical background of the enactment, the circumstances attending its passage, the purpose to be accomplished, and the effect the statute may have under the various constructions suggested. [Citations omitted.] Ordinarily, courts presume that by changing the language of a statute the legislature intends to 1990The rules for statutory construction are well known: “The fundamental rule of statutory construction, to which all others are subordinate, is that the intent of the legislature governs; the court must give effect to the legislature’s intent ‘even though words, phrases or clauses at some place in the statute must be omitted or inserted.’ [Citations omitted.] In determining legislative intent, courts are not limited to consideration of the language used in the statute, but may look to the historical background of the enactment, the circumstances attending its passage, the purpose to be accomplis | 9 | 1988–1997 |
State v. Looney
green
2 sentences2023State v. Looney, 299 Kan. 903, 906 , 327 P.3d 425 (2014). "'The most fundamental rule of statutory construction is that the intent of the Legislature governs if that intent can be ascertained. 2023State v. Looney, 299 Kan. 903, 906 , 327 P.3d 425 (2014). "'The most fundamental rule of statutory construction is that the intent of the Legislature governs if that intent can be ascertained. | 8 | 2014–2023 |
State v. Cole
green
2 sentences1997The Magness court noted that the statute was a product of the legislature but its roots originated in the Judicial Council: “ ‘The fundamental rule of statutory construction is that the purpose and intent of the legislature governs.’ State v. Cole, 238 Kan. 370, 371 , 710 P.2d 25 (1985). 1997The Magness court noted that the statute was a product of the legislature but its roots originated in the Judicial Council: “ ‘The fundamental rule of statutory construction is that the purpose and intent of the legislature governs.’ State v. Cole, 238 Kan. 370, 371 , 710 P.2d 25 (1985). | 8 | 1986–1997 |
Easom v. Farmers Insurance Co.
green
2 sentences1978“The fundamental rule of statutory construction, to which all others are subordinate, is that the purpose and intent of the legislature governs when that intent can be ascertained from the statute.” Easom v. Farmers Insurance Co., 221 Kan. 415 , Syl. 2, 560 P.2d 117 . 1978“The fundamental rule of statutory construction, to which all others are subordinate, is that the purpose and intent of the legislature governs when that intent can be ascertained from the statute.” Easom v. Farmers Insurance Co., 221 Kan. 415 , Syl. 2, 560 P.2d 117 . | 8 | 1978–1994 |
Harsay v. University of Kansas
green
2 sentences2026When asked to interpret a statute we begin with the fundamental rule that "'the intent of the legislature governs if that intent can be ascertained.'" Harsay v. University of Kansas, 308 Kan. 1371 , 1381, 430 P.3d 30 (2018) (citing In re Estate of Strader, 301 Kan. 50, 55 , 339 P.3d 769 [2014]). 2022Harsay v. University of Kansas, 308 Kan. 1371 , 1381, 430 P.3d 30 (2018). | 7 | 2020–2026 |
Williamson v. City of Hays
green
2 sentences2005As was said in Williamson v. City of Hays, 275 Kan. 300, 305 , 64 P.3d 364 (2003): “The fundamental rule of statutory construction to which all other rules are subordinate is that the intent of the legislature governs if that intent can be ascertained. 2005As was said in Williamson v. City of Hays, 275 Kan. 300, 305 , 64 P.3d 364 (2003): “The fundamental rule of statutory construction to which all other rules are subordinate is that the intent of the legislature governs if that intent can be ascertained. | 7 | 2003–2005 |
| State Ex Rel. Ferguson v. American Savings Stamp Co. green | 7 | 1974–1995 |
| Brown v. Keill green | 7 | 1979–1995 |
| State v. Dumler green | 7 | 1977–1985 |
| John Doe v. M.J. green | 6 | 2024–2026 |
| Legislative Coordinating Council v. Stanley green | 6 | 1999–2000 |
| Hunziker v. School District No. 26 green | 6 | 1941–1990 |
| Kansas State Board of Healing Arts v. Dickerson neutral | 6 | 1982–1985 |
| In re M.M. green | 5 | 2024–2025 |
| In Re Tax Appeal of Collingwood Grain, Inc. green | 5 | 1995–2012 |
| State v. Hutchison green | 5 | 1991–2010 |
| Bank IV Wichita, National Ass'n v. Plein green | 5 | 1993–1998 |
| Cyr v. Cyr green | 5 | 1993–1996 |
| State v. Bishop green | 5 | 1974–1995 |
| Zabel v. Stewart green | 5 | 1943–1982 |
| Stewart Title of the Midwest, Inc. v. Reece & Nichols Realtors, Inc. green | 4 | 2024–2025 |
| State v. Keel green | 4 | 2018–2023 |
| State v. Waite green | 4 | 1965–2016 |
| State v. Six Slot Machines neutral | 4 | 1965–2016 |
| State v. Hill green | 4 | 1965–2016 |
| State v. Wade neutral | 4 | 1965–2016 |
| Johnson v. United States green | 4 | 2007–2014 |
| Robinett v. the Haskell Co. green | 4 | 2002–2008 |
| In Re Adoption of Trent green | 4 | 1983–2006 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.