fundamental rule in California

2019(See Select Base Materials v. Board of Equal. (1959) 51 Cal.2d 640, 645 [“The fundamental rule of statutory interpretation is that the court should ascertain the intent of the Legislature so as to effectuate the purpose of the law.”].) The purpose of section 13304 is to authorize a regional board to issue a CAO to any person “who has caused or permitted . . . any waste to be discharged or deposited where it is, or probably will be, discharged into the waters of the state.” (§ 13304, subd. (a).) As these words amply demonstrate, the Legislature sought to address the discharge of waste into the

2011Statutory Ambiguity “The fundamental rule of statutory construction is that the court should ascertain the intent of the Legislature so as to effectuate the purpose of the law.” (Select Base Materials v. Board of Equal. (1959) 51 Cal.2d 640, 645 [ 335 P2d 672 ].) In determining legislative intent, we look first to the words of the statute itself.

2026(Miller v. Department of Corrections (2005) 36 Cal.4th 446, 460 .) We cannot engage in our usual de novo review because we do not have an adequate record. “[I]t is a fundamental principle of appellate procedure that a trial court judgment is ordinarily presumed to be correct and the burden is on an appellant to demonstrate, on the basis of the record presented to the appellate court, that the trial court committed an error that justifies reversal of the judgment.” (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594 , 608–609 (Jameson).) Unless the record shows otherwise, we 3 make all presumptions in favor

2026As the California Supreme Court has explained: “[I]t is a fundamental principle of appellate procedure that a trial court judgment is ordinarily presumed to be correct and the burden is on an appellant to demonstrate, on the basis of the record presented to the appellate court, that the trial court committed an error that justifies reversal of the judgment. [Citations.] ‘This is not only a general principle of appellate practice but an ingredient of the constitutional doctrine of reversible error.’ [Citations.] ‘In the absence of a contrary showing in the record, all presumptions in favor of t

2003Appeals Bd. (1973) 10 Cal.3d 222 , 230- 231, as follows: "We begin with the fundamental rule that a court "should ascertain the intent of the Legislature so as to effectuate the purpose of the law.' [Citation.] In determining such intent "[the] court turns first to the words themselves for the answer.' [Citation.] We are required to give effect to statutes "according to the usual, ordinary import of the language employed in framing them.' [Citations.] "If possible, significance should be given to every word, phrase, sentence and part of an act in pursuance of the legislative purpose' [citation

1997“We begin with the fundamental rule that a court ‘should ascertain the intent of the Legislature so as to effectuate the purpose of the law.’ [Citation.] In determining such intent ‘[t]he court turns first to the words themselves for the answer.’ [Citation.] We are required to give effect to statutes ‘according to the usual, ordinary import of the language employed in framing them.’ [Citations.] ‘If possible, significance should be given to every word, phrase, sentence and part of an act in pursuance of the legislative purpose.’ [Citation.] ‘[A] construction making some words surplusage is to

2026A. General Principles of Appellate Review Well-established principles of appellate review guide our analysis. “[I]t is a fundamental principle of appellate procedure that a trial court judgment is ordinarily presumed to be correct and the burden is on an appellant to demonstrate, on the basis of the record presented to the appellate court, that the trial court committed an error that justifies reversal of the judgment.” (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594 , 608–609, citing Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564 .) As the appellant, Doe bears the burden of showing that the trial c

2026Mr. Sanchez timely appealed. “[I]t is a fundamental principle of appellate procedure that a trial court judgment is ordinarily presumed to be correct and the burden is on an appellant to demonstrate, on the basis of the record presented to the appellate court, that the trial court committed an error that justifies reversal of the judgment.” (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608-609 (Jameson), citing Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564 (Denham).) It is the appellant’s burden to provide this court with an adequate record on appeal.

2026(See generally Halbert’s Lumber v. Lucky Stores (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1233 (Halbert’s Lumber).)6 Courts apply the fundamental rule of construction of “ ‘ “ascertain[ing] the intent of the Legislature so as to effectuate the purpose of the law.” ’ [Citations.]” (California Teachers Assn. v. San Diego Community College Dist. (1981) 28 Cal.3d 692, 698 .) As many courts have recognized, statutory interpretation involves a process that has as many as (but not 5 Eisenberg in her opening brief emphasizes the fact that Water District did not cite section 516.050 in its memoranda filed below, and it onl

2025(See generally Halbert’s Lumber v. Lucky Stores (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1233 (Halbert’s Lumber).)6 Courts apply the fundamental rule of construction of “ ‘ “ascertain[ing] the intent of the Legislature so as to effectuate the purpose of the law.” ’ [Citations.]” (California Teachers Assn. v. San Diego Community College Dist. (1981) 28 Cal.3d 692, 698 .) As many courts have recognized, statutory interpretation involves a process that has as many as (but not 5 Eisenberg in her opening brief emphasizes the fact that Water District did not cite section 516.050 in its memoranda filed below, and it onl

2026(See People v. Sanghera (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1567 , 1573 5 [“Perhaps the most fundamental rule of appellate law is that the judgment challenged on appeal is presumed correct, and it is the appellant’s burden to affirmatively demonstrate error”].) While this court is required to evaluate the specific arguments that Mendez presented in his supplemental brief, we are not required to independently review the record to identify unraised issues.

2026(People v. Sanghera (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1567, 1573 [“Perhaps the most fundamental rule of appellate law is that the judgment challenged on appeal is presumed correct, and it is the appellant’s burden to affirmatively demonstrate error.”].) 5 Manson’s choice to act as his own attorney on appeal does not entitle him to any leniency as to the rules of practice and procedure.

2024(Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal (1941) 17 Cal.2d 280, 292 .) This is a fundamental rule of procedure “followed under the doctrine of stare decisis, and binding upon all courts.” (Id. at p. 293.) A court’s intervention before an administrative agency has resolved the claim constitutes jurisdictional interference.

2024(Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal (1941) 17 Cal.2d 280, 292 .) This is a fundamental rule of procedure “followed under the doctrine of stare decisis, and binding upon all courts.” (Id. at p. 293.) A court’s intervention before an administrative agency has resolved the claim constitutes jurisdictional interference.

2024(Kesner v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1132, 1145 .) As stated in Rowland and other California Supreme Court cases, “it is clear that in the absence of a statutory provision declaring an exception to the fundamental principle enunciated by section 1714 …, no such exception should be made unless clearly supported by public policy.” (Rowland, supra, 69 Cal.2d at p. 112 , italics added; Kesner, at p. 1144; Cabral, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 771 .) “[T]he Rowland factors are evaluated at a relatively broad level of factual generality.” (Cabral, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 772 .) “[T]he legal decision

2023Code, § 1714, subd. (a).)1 “This is the Legislature’s ‘conclusory expression[ ]’ that, as ‘legal duties are not discoverable facts of nature,’ generally speaking, ‘liability should be imposed for damage done.’ ” (Brown, at p. 224 (conc. opn. of Cuéllar, J.).) Thus, our high court has long recognized a general duty of ordinary care is to be presumed and, “in the absence of [a] statutory provision declaring an exception to the fundamental principle enunciated by section 1714 of the Civil Code, no such exception should be made unless clearly supported by public policy.” (Rowland v. Christian (196

2025Principles of Interpretation and the Applicable Building Code Provisions In interpreting statutory language, courts begin “ ‘with the fundamental rule that [its] primary task is to determine the lawmakers’ intent.’ ” (MacIsaac v. Waste Management Collection & Recycling, Inc. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 1076, 1082 .) “ ‘Under well-established rules of statutory construction [to effectuate the purpose of the law,] . . . we first examine the words themselves, giving them their usual and ordinary meaning and construing them in context’ ” with “ ‘the whole system of law of which it is a part. . . .’ ” (

2025Principles of Interpretation and the Applicable Building Code Provisions In interpreting statutory language, courts begin “ ‘with the fundamental rule that [its] primary task is to determine the lawmakers’ intent.’ ” (MacIsaac v. Waste Management Collection & Recycling, Inc. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 1076, 1082 .) “ ‘Under well-established rules of statutory construction [to effectuate the purpose of the law,] . . . we first examine the words themselves, giving them their usual and ordinary meaning and construing them in context’ ” with “ ‘the whole system of law of which it is a part. . . .’ ” (

2024Agens Was Entitled to Attorney Fees As a “Prevailing Party” Applying a de novo standard, we conclude the trial court erred when it interpreted section 1947.10, subdivision (a), to exclude an award of fees to a prevailing landlord. “ ‘ “The fundamental rule of statutory construction is that the court should ascertain the intent of the Legislature so as to effectuate the purpose of the law. [Citation.]” ’ ” (Morin v. ABA Recovery Service, Inc. (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 200, 205 , disapproved on another ground in Lakin v Watkins Associated Industries (1993) 6 Cal.4th 644 .) “In determining such inten

2009“The fundamental rule is that a court should ascertain the intent of the Legislature so as to effectuate the law’s purpose, and in determining intent the court first turns to the words used. [Citation.] [f] When statutory language is clear and unambiguous, there is no need for construction and courts should not indulge in it.” (People v. Overstreet (1986) 42 Cal.3d 891, 895 [ 231 Cal.Rptr. 213 , 726 P.2d 1288 ].) “If, however, the language supports more than one reasonable construction, we may consider ‘a variety of extrinsic aids, including the ostensible objects to be achieved, the evils to

2025“The Board may delegate to a local assessor the duty to assess a property used but not owned by a state assessee on which the taxes are to be paid by a local assessee.” “We begin with the fundamental rule that our primary task is to determine the lawmakers’ intent. [Citation.] In the case of a constitutional provision enacted by the voters, their intent governs. [Citations.] To determine intent, ‘ “The court turns first to the words themselves for the answer.’ ” [Citations.] ‘If the language is clear and unambiguous there is no need for construction, nor is it necessary to resort to indicia of

2022(Kolodge v. Boyd (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 349, 355-356 ; Haniff v. Superior Court (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 191, 198 (Haniff).) “We begin with the fundamental rule that our primary task is to determine the lawmakers’ intent.” (Delaney v. Superior Court (1990) 50 Cal.3d 785, 798 .) First, we consider the plain language of the statute, “giving the words their usual and ordinary meaning.” (Smith v. Superior Court (2006) 39 Cal.4th 77, 83 (Smith); Janken v. GM Hughes Electronics (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 55, 60 [words used by Legislature are “primary determinant” of legislative intent].) “The language must be

2026As we have stated, “[I]t is a fundamental principle of appellate procedure that a trial court judgment is ordinarily presumed to be correct and the burden is on an appellant to demonstrate, on the basis of the record presented to the appellate court, that the trial court committed an error that justifies reversal of the judgment.” (Jameson v. Desta, supra, 5 Cal.5th at pp. 608-609; see also In re Marriage of Arceneaux, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 1133 [“A judgment or order of a lower court is presumed to be correct on appeal, and all intendments and presumptions are indulged in favor of its correct

2025DISCUSSION A. Standard of Review It is a fundamental principle of appellate review that “[a] judgment or order of a lower court is presumed to be correct on appeal, and all 7 intendments and presumptions are indulged in favor of its correctness.” (In re Marriage of Arceneaux (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1130, 1133 (Arceneaux).) In reviewing a judgment based upon a statement of decision issued after a bench trial, we apply well-established standards of review.

2025“The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’ [Citations.]” (Mathews v. Eldridge (1976) 424 U.S. 319, 333 (Mathews).) “Due process requires ‘notice, an opportunity to respond, and a hearing.’ ” (Shenefield v. Shenefield (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 619 , 632 (Shenefield).) The key here is that Michael was given notice of the hearing and a fair opportunity to be heard on the renewal issue.

2025Due Process and the Standard of Review “The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’ ” (Mathews v. Eldridge (1976) 424 U.S. 319, 333 .) In a dependency case, “due process focuses on the right to notice and the right to be heard.” (In re Matthew P. (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 841, 851 ; accord In re Armando L. (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 606 , 620–621; see also Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.534(g)(1)(D)8 [court must advise child, parent, or guardian of the right to present evidence to the court].) The right to present evidence, ho

1994We begin with the fundamental rule that a “court should ascertain the intent of the Legislature so as to effectuate the purpose of the law. [Citation.]” (Select Base Materials v. Board of Equal. (1959) 51 Cal.2d 640, 645 [ 335 P.2d 672 ].) In determining such intent, “[t]he court turns first to the *1432 words themselves for the answer.” (People v. Knowles (1950) 35 Cal.2d 175, 182 [ 217 P.2d 1 ].) We are required to give effect to statutes “according to the usual, ordinary import of the language employed in framing them.” {In re Alpine (1928) 203 Cal. 731, 737 [ 265 P. 947 , 58 A.L.R. 1500 ].

1994We begin with the fundamental rule that a “court should ascertain the intent of the Legislature so as to effectuate the purpose of the law. [Citation.]” (Select Base Materials v. Board of Equal. (1959) 51 Cal.2d 640, 645 [ 335 P.2d 672 ].) In determining such intent, “[t]he court turns first to the *1432 words themselves for the answer.” (People v. Knowles (1950) 35 Cal.2d 175, 182 [ 217 P.2d 1 ].) We are required to give effect to statutes “according to the usual, ordinary import of the language employed in framing them.” {In re Alpine (1928) 203 Cal. 731, 737 [ 265 P. 947 , 58 A.L.R. 1500 ].

2026“It is a fundamental principle of appellate practice that an appeal will not be entertained unless it presents a justiciable issue.” (In re I.A. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1484, 1489 .) The juvenile court asserts jurisdiction when one parent’s conduct has triggered the statutory bases for jurisdiction listed in section 300.

2026Mootness and dependency jurisdiction “It is a fundamental principle of appellate practice that an appeal will not be entertained unless it presents a justiciable issue.” (In re I.A. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1484, 1489.) “An important requirement for justiciability is the availability of ‘effective’ relief—that is, the prospect of a remedy that can have a practical, tangible impact on the parties’ conduct or legal status.” (Id. at p. 1490.) Thus, “ ‘[w]hen a dependency petition alleges multiple grounds for its assertion that a minor comes within the dependency court’s jurisdiction, a reviewing co

2002In assessing the meaning of particular legislation, "`[w]e begin with the fundamental rule that our primary task is to determine the lawmakers' intent. [Citation.] In the case of a constitutional provision adopted by the voters, their intent governs. [Citations.] To determine intent, "`The court turns first to the words themselves for the answer.'"'" ( People v. Jones (1993) 5 Cal.4th 1142, 1146 , 22 Cal. Rptr.2d 753 , 857 P.2d 1163 , quoting Delaney v. Superior Court (1990) 50 Cal.3d 785, 798 , 268 Cal.Rptr. 753 , 789 P.2d 934 , quoting Brown v. Kelly Broadcasting Co. (1989) 48 Cal.3d 711, 72

2002In assessing the meaning of particular legislation, "`[w]e begin with the fundamental rule that our primary task is to determine the lawmakers' intent. [Citation.] In the case of a constitutional provision adopted by the voters, their intent governs. [Citations.] To determine intent, "`The court turns first to the words themselves for the answer.'"'" ( People v. Jones (1993) 5 Cal.4th 1142, 1146 , 22 Cal. Rptr.2d 753 , 857 P.2d 1163 , quoting Delaney v. Superior Court (1990) 50 Cal.3d 785, 798 , 268 Cal.Rptr. 753 , 789 P.2d 934 , quoting Brown v. Kelly Broadcasting Co. (1989) 48 Cal.3d 711, 72

2025Appeals Bd. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 382, 387 (DuBois).) In interpreting a statute, the text of the statutory language is typically the best and most reliable indicator of the Legislature’s intended purpose.

2014Appeals Bd. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 382, 387-388 [ 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 523 , 853 P.2d 978 ].) By its plain terms, “[s]ection 4850 provides for a leave of absence at full salary in lieu of temporary disability payments for public safety employees . . . who become disabled in the course of employment.” 4 (City of Sacramento v. Workers’ Comp.

2026DISCUSSION I Appellant’s Burden “[I]t is a fundamental principle of appellate procedure that a trial court judgment is ordinarily presumed to be correct and the burden is on an appellant to demonstrate, on the basis of the record presented to the appellate court, that the trial court committed an error that justifies reversal of the judgment.” (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594 , 608- 609.) “To demonstrate error, appellant must present meaningful legal analysis supported by citations to authority and citations to facts in the record that support the claim of error.” (In re S.C. (2006) 138

2026On both of those dates, jurisdiction had already reverted to the trial court through issuance of the remittitur.6 6 We acknowledge that “[t]he order of the reviewing court is contained in its remittitur, which defines the scope of the jurisdiction of the court to which the matter is 5 “[I]t is a fundamental principle of appellate procedure that a trial court judgment is ordinarily presumed to be correct and the burden is on an appellant to demonstrate, on the basis of the record presented to the appellate court, that the trial court committed an error that justifies reversal of the judgment. [

2026Asi cannot establish any error in the trial court’s interpretation of the parties’ stipulation as he has failed to preserve that stipulation in the record on appeal. “[I]t is a fundamental principle of appellate procedure that a trial court judgment is ordinarily presumed to be correct and the burden is on an appellant to demonstrate, on the basis of the record presented to the 6 HFPA’s request for judicial notice is denied. 22 appellate court, that the trial court committed an error that justifies reversal of the judgment.” (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594 , 608–609 (Jameson); Ballard v

2025Proc., § 437c, subd. (d) [objections to affidavits or declarations that are not made at the summary judgment hearing “shall be deemed waived”]; Collin v. CalPortland Co. (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 582, 599, fn. 5 [objections to documentary evidence are forfeited if not raised in summary judgment papers or at the hearing]; People v. Jones (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1229, 1255 [defendant waived any challenge to evidence on appeal by withdrawing evidentiary objections].) Quijano does not contend the trial court erred in interpreting section 17000 or raise any other claims of error below. “[I]t is a fundamenta

2009(In re Clarissa H., supra, 105 Cal.App.4th at p. 125 .) “ ‘A fundamental rule of statutory construction is that a court should ascertain the intent of the Legislature so as to effectuate the purpose of the law.’ ” (Phelps v. Stostad (1997) 16 Cal.4th 23, 32 [ 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 360 , 939 P.2d 760 ].) First and foremost, we look for that purpose in the actual language of the statute.

2009(In re Clarissa H., supra, 105 Cal.App.4th at p. 125 .) “ ‘A fundamental rule of statutory construction is that a court should ascertain the intent of the Legislature so as to effectuate the purpose of the law.’ ” (Phelps v. Stostad (1997) 16 Cal.4th 23, 32 [ 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 360 , 939 P.2d 760 ].) First and foremost, we look for that purpose in the actual language of the statute.

2025First, Mirabella is representing herself on appeal.5 “Under the law, a party may choose to act as his or her own attorney. [Citations.] ‘[S]uch a party is to be treated like any other party and is entitled to the same, but no greater consideration than other litigants and attorneys.’ ” (Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1246-1247 .) Mirabella, thus, “ ‘must be prepared to be treated as having[] the qualifications and responsibilities concomitant with the role [she] has undertaken; [she] is not entitled either to privileges and indulgences not accorded attorneys or to privileges and ind

2025“It is a fundamental rule of appellate review that the judgment appealed from is presumed correct and ‘ “ ‘all intendments and presumptions are indulged in favor of its correctness.’ ” [Citation.]’ ” (Benach, supra, 149 Cal.App.4th at p. 852 .) To overcome this presumption, the “appellant must provide an argument and legal authority to support his 26 contentions.

2024The one final judgment rule is “a fundamental principle of appellate practice that prohibits review of intermediate rulings by appeal until final resolution of the case. ‘The theory is that piecemeal disposition and multiple appeals in a single action would be oppressive and costly, and that a review of intermediate rulings should await the final disposition of the case.’ [Citation.]” (Griset, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 697 .) “ ‘[E]xceptions to the one final judgment rule should not be allowed unless clearly mandated.’ [Citation.]” (In re Baycol Cases I & II (2011) 51 Cal.4th 751, 757 (Baycol Ca

2024The first such filing, with exceptions not relevant here, is “a judgment, except an interlocutory judgment.” (§ 904.1, subd. (a)(1).) This means an appeal must be taken “from a judgment that is not intermediate or nonfinal but is the one final judgment.” (Morehart v. County of Santra Barbara (1994) 7 Cal.4th 725, 741 (Morehart); Dhillon v. John Muir Health (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1111 , 1112 (Dhillon) [“As a general rule, a litigant may appeal an adverse ruling only after the trial court renders a final judgment”].) This “one final judgment rule is ‘a fundamental principle of appellate practice’ ” (B

2026(Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229 , 1246–1247.) “‘[I]t is a fundamental principle of appellate procedure that a trial court judgment is ordinarily presumed to be correct and the burden is on an appellant to demonstrate, on the basis of the record presented to the appellate court, that the trial court committed an error that justifies reversal of the judgment. [Citations.]’ [Citation.] ‘This means that an appellant must do more than assert error and leave it to the appellate court to search the record and the law books to test his claim.

2026(Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1246-1247 .) A party acting as their own attorney is “entitled to the same, but no greater consideration than other litigants and attorneys.” (Barton v. New United Motor Manufacturing, Inc. (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 1200, 1210 .) As such, appellant is bound to follow the most fundamental rule of 2 appellate review, which is that a judgment or order challenged on appeal is presumed to be correct, and “it is the appellant’s burden to affirmatively demonstrate error.” (People v. Sanghera (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1567, 1573 .) To overcome this presumption, an a

2025“The most fundamental rule of appellate review is that a judgment is presumed correct, all intendments and presumptions are indulged in its favor, and ambiguities are resolved in favor of affirmance.” (City of Santa Maria v. Adam (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 266, 286 .) “Rather than scour the record unguided, we may decide that the appellant has waived a point urged on appeal when it is not supported by accurate citations to the record.” (Id. at p. 287.) Further, “ ‘[f]ailure to provide an adequate record on an issue requires that the issue be resolved against [the appellant]’ ” (Jameson v. Desta (2

2024Nonetheless, Appellants do not challenge the amount of the damages award; instead, they contend “Maple and Romine had no obligations to MDO under the 2021 Settlement and, therefore, simply could not have breached the agreement.” (Italics added.) What is lacking from their brief is any authority for the assertion that we may reach this merits issue on appeal of a default judgment. “[I]t is a fundamental principle of appellate procedure that a trial court judgment is ordinarily presumed to be correct and the burden is on an appellant to demonstrate, on the basis of the record presented to the ap