fundamental rule in Georgia

1997"It is a fundamental rule in Georgia that jury instructions must be read and considered as a whole in determining whether the charge contained error. [Cits.]" Williams v. State, 249 Ga. 822, 825 (3), 295 S.E.2d 293 (1982).

1997"It is a fundamental rule in Georgia that jury instructions must be read and considered as a whole in determining whether the charge contained error. [Cits.]" Williams v. State, 249 Ga. 822, 825 (3), 295 S.E.2d 293 (1982).

2010“Inasmuch as a jury charge on [accessory after the fact] was not warranted, trial counsel cannot be found ineffective for failing to request it. [Cit.]” Williams v. State, 279 Ga. 600, 603 (3) (b) ( 619 SE2d 649 ) (2005). (b) “It is a fundamental rule in Georgia that jury instructions must be read and considered as a whole in determining whether the charge contained error.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Hambrick v. State, 256 Ga. 688, 690 (3) ( 353 SE2d 177 ) (1987).

2010“Inasmuch as a jury charge on [accessory after the fact] was not warranted, trial counsel cannot be found ineffective for failing to request it. [Cit.]” Williams v. State, 279 Ga. 600, 603 (3) (b) ( 619 SE2d 649 ) (2005). (b) “It is a fundamental rule in Georgia that jury instructions must be read and considered as a whole in determining whether the charge contained error.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Hambrick v. State, 256 Ga. 688, 690 (3) ( 353 SE2d 177 ) (1987).

2012“In order to protect an accused and to insure him of a fair and impartial trial before an unbiased jury, we have long embraced the fundamental principle that the general character of an accused is inadmissible unless the accused chooses to put his character in issue.” (Citation omitted.) Williams v. State, 261 Ga. 640, 641 (2) (a) ( 409 SE2d 649 ) (1991).

2012“In order to protect an accused and to insure him of a fair and impartial trial before an unbiased jury, we have long embraced the fundamental principle that the general character of an accused is inadmissible unless the accused chooses to put his character in issue.” (Citation omitted.) Williams v. State, 261 Ga. 640, 641 (2) (a) ( 409 SE2d 649 ) (1991).

2003Dodd, for appellee. “ ‘ “It is a fundamental rule in Georgia that jury instructions must be read and considered as a whole in determining whether the charge contained error. . . .” [Cit.]’ ” Roker v. State, 262 Ga. 220, 222 ( 416 SE2d 281 ) (1992).

2003Dodd, for appellee. “ ‘ “It is a fundamental rule in Georgia that jury instructions must be read and considered as a whole in determining whether the charge contained error. . . .” [Cit.]’ ” Roker v. State, 262 Ga. 220, 222 ( 416 SE2d 281 ) (1992).

1998Since the turn of the century, the judiciary has recognized as "a fundamental principle in our system of jurisprudence" ( Bacon v. State, 209 Ga. 261, 262 , 71 S.E.2d 615 (1952)) that, with few exceptions, proof of a distinct, independent, and separate offense is never admissible in a criminal trial.

1998Since the turn of the century, the judiciary has recognized as "a fundamental principle in our system of jurisprudence" ( Bacon v. State, 209 Ga. 261, 262 , 71 S.E.2d 615 (1952)) that, with few exceptions, proof of a distinct, independent, and separate offense is never admissible in a criminal trial.

1998It is a fundamental rule that jury instructions must be considered as a whole in determining whether there was error in the charge (Hambrick v. State, 256 Ga. 688, 690 ( 353 SE2d 177 ); Dept. of Transp. v. Hillside Motors, 192 Ga. App. 637, 640 ( 385 SE2d 746 )) and it is not error to fail to charge in the exact language of a requested charge if the principles of law embodied in the request are included in the charge given.

1998It is a fundamental rule that jury instructions must be considered as a whole in determining whether there was error in the charge (Hambrick v. State, 256 Ga. 688, 690 ( 353 SE2d 177 ); Dept. of Transp. v. Hillside Motors, 192 Ga. App. 637, 640 ( 385 SE2d 746 )) and it is not error to fail to charge in the exact language of a requested charge if the principles of law embodied in the request are included in the charge given.

2025Cf. Olevik v. State, 302 Ga. 228, 235 (806 SE2d 505) (2017) (explaining that “there are few principles of Georgia law more 19 venerable than the fundamental principle that a constitutional provision means today what it meant at the time that it was enacted”).

2025Cf. Olevik v. State, 302 Ga. 228, 235 (806 SE2d 505) (2017) (explaining that “there are few principles of Georgia law more 19 venerable than the fundamental principle that a constitutional provision means today what it meant at the time that it was enacted”).

1999“It is a fundamental rule of statutory construction that where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, the terms used therein should be given their common and ordinary meaning.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Sledge v. Employees’ Retirement System &c., 196 Ga. App. 597, 598 ( 396 SE2d 550 ) (1990).

1999“It is a fundamental rule of statutory construction that where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, the terms used therein should be given their common and ordinary meaning.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Sledge v. Employees’ Retirement System &c., 196 Ga. App. 597, 598 ( 396 SE2d 550 ) (1990).

1981The dissent's conclusion violates the fundamental rule "that where the provision of a statute is clear and unambiguous it must be taken to mean what has been clearly expressed and no occasion for construction exists." Forrester v. Continental Gin Co., 67 Ga. App. 119, 128 ( 19 SE2d 807 ) (1942).

1981The dissent's conclusion violates the fundamental rule "that where the provision of a statute is clear and unambiguous it must be taken to mean what has been clearly expressed and no occasion for construction exists." Forrester v. Continental Gin Co., 67 Ga. App. 119, 128 ( 19 SE2d 807 ) (1942).

2013“It is a fundamental rule . . . that jury instructions must be read and considered as a whole in determining whether the charge contained error.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Vergara v. State, 287 Ga. 194 (3) (b) ( 695 SE2d 215 ) (2010).

2013“It is a fundamental rule . . . that jury instructions must be read and considered as a whole in determining whether the charge contained error.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Vergara v. State, 287 Ga. 194 (3) (b) ( 695 SE2d 215 ) (2010).

2025“A fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice that is reasonably calculated to inform interested parties of an impending hearing and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.” Wright v. Wright, 270 Ga. 229, 230 ( 509 SE2d 902 ) (1998).

2025“A fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice that is reasonably calculated to inform interested parties of an impending hearing and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.” Wright v. Wright, 270 Ga. 229, 230 ( 509 SE2d 902 ) (1998).

2023“It is a fundamental rule in Georgia that jury instructions must be read and considered as a whole in determining whether the charge contained error.” (Citation omitted.) Henderson v. State, 320 Ga. App. 553, 562 (8) ( 740 SE2d 280 ) (2013).

2023“It is a fundamental rule in Georgia that jury instructions must be read and considered as a whole in determining whether the charge contained error.” (Citation omitted.) Henderson v. State, 320 Ga. App. 553, 562 (8) ( 740 SE2d 280 ) (2013).

2021We do not allow a defendant to resuscitate a waived claim of trial counsel ineffectiveness on appeal by recasting the claim as one of ineffective assistance of motion for new trial counsel, because allowing “‘such bootstrapping would eviscerate the fundamental rule that ineffectiveness claims must be raised at the earliest practicable moment and would promote serial appellate proceedings.’” Elkins, 306 Ga. at 362 (citation omitted).

2021We do not allow a defendant to resuscitate a waived claim of trial counsel ineffectiveness on appeal by recasting the claim as one of ineffective assistance of motion for new trial counsel, because allowing “‘such bootstrapping would eviscerate the fundamental rule that ineffectiveness claims must be raised at the earliest practicable moment and would promote serial appellate proceedings.’” Id. at 362 (citation omitted).

2021Co. v. Woodard, 300 Ga. 848, 853 ( 797 SE2d 814 ) (2017) (“[I]t is . . . a fundamental principle of contract law that an offeror is the master of his or her offer[]and free to set the terms thereof.”) (punctuation omitted), quoting Atkinson v. Cook, 271 Ga. 57, 58 ( 518 SE2d 413 ) (1999). 6 OCGA § 13-2-3. 7 Because the trial court’s order varied from those terms, we vacate the entry of that order.

2021Co. v. Woodard, 300 Ga. 848, 853 ( 797 SE2d 814 ) (2017) (“[I]t is . . . a fundamental principle of contract law that an offeror is the master of his or her offer[]and free to set the terms thereof.”) (punctuation omitted), quoting Atkinson v. Cook, 271 Ga. 57, 58 ( 518 SE2d 413 ) (1999). 6 OCGA § 13-2-3. 7 Because the trial court’s order varied from those terms, we vacate the entry of that order.

2013Nevertheless, “[i]t is a fundamental rule of law that jury instructions must be viewed as a whole.” Felts v. State, 244 Ga. 503, 504-505 ( 260 SE2d 887 ) (1979).

2013Nevertheless, “[i]t is a fundamental rule of law that jury instructions must be viewed as a whole.” Felts v. State, 244 Ga. 503, 504-505 ( 260 SE2d 887 ) (1979).

2003See Marshall v. State, 197 Ga. App. 762, 763 (2) ( 399 SE2d 555 ) (1990) (“It is a fundamental rule in Georgia that jury instructions must be read and considered as a whole in determining whether the charge contained error.”) (citations and punctuation omitted).

2003See Marshall v. State, 197 Ga. App. 762, 763 (2) ( 399 SE2d 555 ) (1990) (“It is a fundamental rule in Georgia that jury instructions must be read and considered as a whole in determining whether the charge contained error.”) (citations and punctuation omitted).

1986We find particularly persuasive the language of Smallwood v. Bickers, 139 Ga. App. 720, 723 ( 229 SE2d 525 ) (1976): “In construing an instrument to determine whether it constitutes a release or a covenant not to sue, the intention of the parties is controlling. [Cit.] ‘The fundamental rule, the rule which swallows up almost all others in construing a paper, is to give it that meaning which will best carry into effect the intent of the parties.

1986We find particularly persuasive the language of Smallwood v. Bickers, 139 Ga. App. 720, 723 ( 229 SE2d 525 ) (1976): “In construing an instrument to determine whether it constitutes a release or a covenant not to sue, the intention of the parties is controlling. [Cit.] ‘The fundamental rule, the rule which swallows up almost all others in construing a paper, is to give it that meaning which will best carry into effect the intent of the parties.

2023See, e.g., Ringold v. State, 304 Ga. 875, 878 (823 SE2d 342) (2019) (explaining that “it is a fundamental principle that this Court is ‘bound by the Constitution of the United States as its provisions are construed and applied by the Supreme Court of the United States’” and that “‘[e]ven the venerable doctrine of stare decisis does not permit us to persist in an error of federal constitutional law’”) (emphasis in original; citations omitted). 23 constitutional rights “depends on the totality of the circumstances[,]” the Court continued on by saying that “the question of waiver must be analyzed

2023See, e.g., Ringold v. State, 304 Ga. 875, 878 (823 SE2d 342) (2019) (explaining that “it is a fundamental principle that this Court is ‘bound by the Constitution of the United States as its provisions are construed and applied by the Supreme Court of the United States’” and that “‘[e]ven the venerable doctrine of stare decisis does not permit us to persist in an error of federal constitutional law’”) (emphasis in original; citations omitted). 23 constitutional rights “depends on the totality of the circumstances[,]” the Court continued on by saying that “the question of waiver must be analyzed

2019See id. "[I]ndulging such bootstrapping would eviscerate the fundamental rule that ineffectiveness claims must be raised at the earliest practicable moment and would promote serial appellate proceedings." King , 304 Ga. at 352 , 818 S.E.2d 612 (citation and punctuation omitted).

2019See id. “[I]ndulging such bootstrapping would eviscerate the fundamental rule that ineffectiveness claims must be raised at the earliest practicable moment and would promote serial appellate proceedings.” King, 304 Ga. at 351 (citation and punctuation omitted).

2020The fundamental inquiry when making that assessment is whether the identical conduct would support a conviction under either of two crimes with differing penalties.17 15 Id. (punctuation and footnotes omitted). 16 See id.; Wilson v. State, 336 Ga. App. 60, 63 (2) (b) ( 783 SE2d 662 ) (2016). 17 McNair v. State, 326 Ga. App. 516, 518-519 ( 757 SE2d 141 ) (2014) (punctuation and footnotes omitted). 10 In applying the traditional canons of statutory construction, our charge as an appellate court is to presume that the General Assembly meant what it said and said what it meant.

2020The fundamental inquiry when making that assessment is whether the identical conduct would support a conviction under either of two crimes with differing penalties.17 15 Id. (punctuation and footnotes omitted). 16 See id.; Wilson v. State, 336 Ga. App. 60, 63 (2) (b) ( 783 SE2d 662 ) (2016). 17 McNair v. State, 326 Ga. App. 516, 518-519 ( 757 SE2d 141 ) (2014) (punctuation and footnotes omitted). 10 In applying the traditional canons of statutory construction, our charge as an appellate court is to presume that the General Assembly meant what it said and said what it meant.

2020“The fundamental inquiry when making this assessment, then, is whether the identical conduct would support a conviction under either of two crimes with differing penalties, i.e., whether the statutes define the same offense such that an ambiguity is created by different punishments being set forth for the same crime.” Gordon v. State, 334 Ga. App. 633, 635 ( 780 SE2d 376 ) (2015) (citations and punctuation omitted; emphasis in original). “[T]he essential requirement of the rule of lenity is that both crimes could be proved with the same evidence.” Id. at 637 (citations and punctuation omitted)

2020“The fundamental inquiry when making this assessment, then, is whether the identical conduct would support a conviction under either of two crimes with differing penalties, i.e., whether the statutes define the same offense such that an ambiguity is created by different punishments being set forth for the same crime.” Gordon v. State, 334 Ga. App. 633, 635 ( 780 SE2d 376 ) (2015) (citations and punctuation omitted; emphasis in original). “[T]he essential requirement of the rule of lenity is that both crimes could be proved with the same evidence.” Id. at 637 (citations and punctuation omitted)

2019See id. "[I]ndulging such bootstrapping would eviscerate the fundamental rule that ineffectiveness claims must be raised at the earliest practicable moment and would promote serial appellate proceedings." King , 304 Ga. at 352 , 818 S.E.2d 612 (citation and punctuation omitted).

2019See id. "[I]ndulging such bootstrapping would eviscerate the fundamental rule that ineffectiveness claims must be raised at the earliest practicable moment and would promote serial appellate proceedings." King , 304 Ga. at 352 , 818 S.E.2d 612 (citation and punctuation omitted).

1996Brooke v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 113 Ga. App. 742, 744 (2) ( 149 SE2d 511 ) (1966).

1996Brooke v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 113 Ga. App. 742, 744 (2) ( 149 SE2d 511 ) (1966).

2025While “[i]t is the role of [the Supreme Court of Georgia], not the United States Supreme Court, … to construe the meaning of the Georgia Constitution[,]” Elliott v. State, 305 Ga. 179, 202 (III) (B) (iv) ( 824 SE2d 265 ) (2019), the same cannot be said about the United States Constitution. “[I]t is a fundamental principle that this Court is bound by the Constitution of the United States as its provisions are construed and applied by the Supreme Court of the United States.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Nordahl v. State, 306 Ga. 15, 20 (1) ( 829 SE2d 99 ) (2019).

2025While “[i]t is the role of [the Supreme Court of Georgia], not the United States Supreme Court, … to construe the meaning of the Georgia Constitution[,]” Elliott v. State, 305 Ga. 179, 202 (III) (B) (iv) ( 824 SE2d 265 ) (2019), the same cannot be said about the United States Constitution. “[I]t is a fundamental principle that this Court is bound by the Constitution of the United States as its provisions are construed and applied by the Supreme Court of the United States.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Nordahl v. State, 306 Ga. 15, 20 (1) ( 829 SE2d 99 ) (2019).

2025Dr. Womack also complains the trial court’s jury instruction on gross negligence was confusing and allowed the jury to return a verdict against him even if the jury found only that he was “negligent,” rather than “grossly negligent.” “It is a fundamental rule in Georgia that jury instructions must be read and considered as a whole in determining whether the charge contained error.”32 “[W]here the charge as a whole substantially presents issues in such a way as is not likely to confuse the jury even though a portion of the charge may not be as clear and precise as could be desired, we will not

2025Dr. Womack also complains the trial court’s jury instruction on gross negligence was confusing and allowed the jury to return a verdict against him even if the jury found only that he was “negligent,” rather than “grossly negligent.” “It is a fundamental rule in Georgia that jury instructions must be read and considered as a whole in determining whether the charge contained error.”32 “[W]here the charge as a whole substantially presents issues in such a way as is not likely to confuse the jury even though a portion of the charge may not be as clear and precise as could be desired, we will not

2025See Floam, 319 Ga. at 94 (1) (noting that “cases post- dating the 1983 Constitution” could not “change the meaning of the Judicial Power Paragraph[,]” which had a “fixed meaning based on consistent and definitive precedent”); see also Olevik, 302 Ga. at 235 (2) (c) (i) (“[T]here are few principles of Georgia law more venerable 69 than the fundamental principle that a constitutional provision means today what it meant at the time that it was enacted.”).

2025See Floam, 319 Ga. at 94 (1) (noting that “cases post- dating the 1983 Constitution” could not “change the meaning of the Judicial Power Paragraph[,]” which had a “fixed meaning based on 69 consistent and definitive precedent”); see also Olevik, 302 Ga. at 235 (2) (c) (i) (“[T]here are few principles of Georgia law more venerable than the fundamental principle that a constitutional provision means today what it meant at the time that it was enacted.”).