fundamental principle in Rhode Island

2008In the occasional case, this Court will entertain an allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel, but only when those allegations are “based on specific rulings by the trial justice * * * because such action is ‘consistent with the fundamental principle that only specific rulings of a trial justice are reviewable on direct appeal.’ ” Id. (quoting Levitt, 118 R.I. at 40 , 371 A.2d at 600 ).

2008In the occasional case, this Court will entertain an allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel, but only when those allegations are “based on specific rulings by the trial justice * * * because such action is ‘consistent with the fundamental principle that only specific rulings of a trial justice are reviewable on direct appeal.’ ” Id. (quoting Levitt, 118 R.I. at 40 , 371 A.2d at 600 ).

2013“It is a fundamental principle that ‘[s]ummary judgment is a drastic remedy, and a motion for summary judgment should be dealt with cautiously.’ ” Employers Mutual Casualty Co. v. Arbella Protection Insurance Co., 24 A.3d 544, 553 (R.I.2011) (quoting Estate of Giuliano v. Giuliano, 949 A.2d 386, 390 (R.I.2008)).

2012II Standard of Review "It is a fundamental principle that `[s]ummary judgment is a drastic remedy, and a motion for summary judgment should be dealt with cautiously.'" Employers Mutual Casualty Co. v. Arbella Protection Insurance Co., 24 A.3d 544, 553 (R.I.2011) (quoting Estate of Giuliano v. Giuliano, 949 A.2d 386, 390 (R.I.2008)); McPhillips v. Zayre Corp., 582 A.2d 747, 749 (R.I.1990) (citing Commercial Union Companies v. Graham, 495 A.2d 243 (R.I. 1985); Rustigian v. Celona, 478 A.2d 187 (R.I.1984); Steinberg v. State, 427 A.2d 338 (R.I.1981)).

2016“It is a fundamental principle that [sjummary judgment is a drastic remedy, and a motion for summary judgment should be dealt with cautiously.” Id. (quoting Employers Mutual Casualty Co. v. Arbella Protection Insurance Co., 24 A.3d 544, 553 (R.I.2011)), “We will affirm a lower court's decision only if, after reviewing the admissible evidence in the light most favorable' to the nonmoving party, we conclude that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. (quoting Great American E & S Insurance Co., 45 A.3d at 574 ). “[T]he

2016“It is a fundamental principle that [sjummary judgment is a drastic remedy, and a motion for summary judgment should be dealt with cautiously.” Id. (quoting Employers Mutual Casualty Co. v. Arbella Protection Insurance Co., 24 A.3d 544, 553 (R.I.2011)), “We will affirm a lower court's decision only if, after reviewing the admissible evidence in the light most favorable' to the nonmoving party, we conclude that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. (quoting Great American E & S Insurance Co., 45 A.3d at 574 ). “[T]he

2025And this Court has emphasized that “[i]t is a fundamental principle in our jurisprudence that, ‘when the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, this Court must interpret the statute literally and must give the words of the statute their plain and ordinary meanings.’” Shine v. Moreau, 119 A.3d 1 , 9 (R.I. 2015) (quoting State v. Diamante, 83 A.3d 546, 548 (R.I. 2014)).3 It is well settled that “whether there exists a basis for awarding attorneys’ fees generally is legal in nature, and therefore our review of such a ruling is de novo.” Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Rhode Island v. Najaria

2019In focusing on this statutory provision, we are guided by the following important axiom: "It is a fundamental principle that, when the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, this Court must interpret the statute literally and must give the words of the statute their plain and ordinary meanings." State v. Diamante , 83 A.3d 546 , 548 (R.I. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted).

2023“It is a fundamental principle that summary judgment is a drastic remedy, and a motion for summary judgment should be dealt with cautiously.” Botelho v. City of Pawtucket School Department, 130 A.3d 172, 176 (R.I. 2016) (brackets omitted) (quoting The Law Firm of Thomas A. Tarro, III v. Checrallah, 60 A.3d 598, 601 (R.I. 2013)).

2021“It is a fundamental principle that summary judgment is a drastic remedy, and a motion for summary judgment should be dealt with cautiously.” Lehigh Cement Co., 173 A.3d at 1275 (brackets omitted) (quoting Botelho v. City of Pawtucket School Department, 130 A.3d 172, 176 (R.I. 2016)).

2012It is a fundamental principle of contract law, and the settled law of this state, that “clear and unambiguous language set out in a contract is controlling in regard to the intent of the parties to such contract and governs the legal consequences of its provisions.” Elias v. Youngken, 493 A.2d 158, 163 (R.I.1985).

2010Ltd., 116 R.I. 108 , 111 n. 2, 352 A.2d 625 , 627 n. 2 (1976)); Dovenmuehle Mortgage, Inc. v. Antonelli, 790 A.2d 1113, 1115 (R.I.2002) ("clear and unambiguous language set out in a contract is controlling in regard to the intent of the parties to such contract and governs the legal consequences of its provisions”) (quoting Burke v. Potter, 771 A.2d 895, 895 (R.I.2001) (mem.)); Elias v. Youngken, 493 A.2d 158, 163 (R.I.1985) ("It is a fundamental principle of contract law, as well as being well settled in this state, that ‘clear and unambiguous language set out in a contract is controlling in

2009Gorman v. Gorman, 883 A.2d 732 , 738 n. 8 (R.I.2005) ("It is a fundamental principle of contract law that the existence of ambiguity vel non in a contract is an issue of law to be determined by the court."); see also Merrimack Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Dufault, 958 A.2d 620, 625 (R.I.2008); National Refrigeration, Inc. v. Standen Contracting Co., 942 A.2d 968, 971 (R.I.2008); Rotelli v. Catanzaro, 686 A.2d 91, 94 (R.I. 1996) ("Whether the terms of a contract are clear and unambiguous is itself a question of law * * *."). [6] Accordingly, a trial court's ruling as to that issue is reviewed b

2009Gorman v. Gorman, 883 A.2d 732 , 738 n. 8 (R.I.2005) (“It is a fundamental principle of contract law that the existence of ambiguity vel non in a contract is an issue of law to be determined by the court.”); see also Merrimack Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Dufault, 958 A.2d 620, 625 (R.I.2008); National Refrigeration, Inc. v. Standen Contracting Co., 942 A.2d 968, 971 (R.I.2008); Rotelli v. Catanzaro, 686 A.2d 91, 94 (R.I.1996) (“Whether the terms of a contract are clear and unambiguous is itself a question of law * * *.”). 6 Accordingly, a trial court’s ruling as to that issue is reviewed by t

1978Due Process Nobody questions the fundamental principle which says that the state may not hold an individual "`criminally responsible for conduct which he could not reasonably understand to be proscribed.'" State v. Levitt, R.I., 371 A.2d 596, 598 (1977), quoting Rose v. Locke, 423 U.S. 48, 49 , 96 S.Ct. 243, 244 , 46 L.Ed.2d 185, 188 (1975), and United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 , 74 S.Ct. *644 808, 812, 98 L.Ed. 989, 996 (1954).

1978Due Process Nobody questions the fundamental principle which says that the state may not hold an individual "`criminally responsible for conduct which he could not reasonably understand to be proscribed.'" State v. Levitt, R.I., 371 A.2d 596, 598 (1977), quoting Rose v. Locke, 423 U.S. 48, 49 , 96 S.Ct. 243, 244 , 46 L.Ed.2d 185, 188 (1975), and United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 , 74 S.Ct. *644 808, 812, 98 L.Ed. 989, 996 (1954).

1978Due Process Nobody questions the fundamental principle which says that the state may not hold an individual “ ‘criminally responsible for conduct which he could not reasonably understand to be proscribed.’ ” State v. Levitt, 118 R.I. 32, 36 , 371 A.2d 596, 598 (1977), quoting Rose v. Locke, 423 U.S. 48, 49 , 96 S. Ct. 243, 244 , 46 L.

1978Due Process Nobody questions the fundamental principle which says that the state may not hold an individual “ ‘criminally responsible for conduct which he could not reasonably understand to be proscribed.’ ” State v. Levitt, 118 R.I. 32, 36 , 371 A.2d 596, 598 (1977), quoting Rose v. Locke, 423 U.S. 48, 49 , 96 S. Ct. 243, 244 , 46 L.

2023Gorman v. Gorman, 883 A.2d 732 , 738 n.8 (R.I. 2005) (“It is a fundamental principle of contract law that the existence of ambiguity vel non in a contract is an issue of law to be determined by -9- the court.”); see also Irene Realty Corp. v. Travelers Property Casualty Company of America, 973 A.2d 1118, 1122 (R.I. 2009).

2022It is also well settled that the issue of “[w]hether the terms of a contract are ambiguous is a question of law.” Sturbridge Home Builders, Inc. v. Downing Seaport, Inc., 890 A.2d 58, 62 (R.I. 2005); see also Gorman v. Gorman, 883 A.2d 732 , 738 n.8 (R.I. 2005) (“It is a fundamental principle of contract law that the existence of ambiguity vel non in a contract is an issue of law to be determined by the court.”).

2011Before proceeding, we note that “this Court has consistently explained that we shall only consider a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal if the claim is ‘based on specific rulings by the trial justice,’ * * * inasmuch as this rule ‘is consistent with the fundamental principle that only specific rulings of a trial justice are reviewable on direct appeal.’ ” State v. Page, 709 A.2d 1042, 1046 (R.I.1998) (quoting State v. Gonsalves, 476 A.2d 108, 112 (R.I.1984)).

1998Accordingly, this Court has consistently explained that we shall only consider a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal if the claim is “based on specific rulings by the trial justice,” State v. Gonsalves, 476 A.2d 108, 112 (R.I.1984), inasmuch as this rule “is ‘consistent with the fundamental principle that only specific rulings of a trial justice are reviewable on direct appeal.’” Id. (quoting State v. Levitt, 118 R.I. 32, 40 , 371 A.2d 596, 600 (1977)).

2026See Resendes v. Brown, 966 A.2d 1249, 1254 (R.I. 2009); see also Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (“The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’”) (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)).

2005"The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard `at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.'" Mathews v. Eldgridge, 424 U.S. 319 , 333 (1976).

2023“It is a fundamental principle that summary judgment is a drastic remedy, and a motion for summary judgment should be dealt with cautiously.” Botelho v. City of Pawtucket School Department, 130 A.3d 172, 176 (R.I. 2016) (brackets omitted) (quoting The Law Firm of Thomas A. Tarro, III v. Checrallah, 60 A.3d 598, 601 (R.I. 2013)).

2019"It is a fundamental principle that summary judgment is a drastic remedy, and a motion for summary judgment should be dealt with cautiously." Botelho v. City of Pawtucket School Department , 130 A.3d 172 , 176 (R.I. 2016) (alteration omitted) (quoting Tarro v. Checrallah , 60 A.3d 598 , 601 (R.I. 2013) ). 2 Freedom of Speech and Expression Felkner's first claim alleges that defendants deprived him of his rights to freedom of speech and expression secured by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and article 1, section 21 of the Rhode Island Constitution. 11 He seeks redress unde

2021“In construing statutes or court rules, it is a fundamental principle of our jurisprudence that when the language of a rule is clear and unambiguous, this Court must give the words of the rule their plain and ordinary meanings.” Id. (quoting Cashman Equipment Corporation, Inc. v. Cardi Corporation, Inc., 139 A.3d 379, 382 (R.I. 2016)).

2019"In construing statutes or court rules, it is a fundamental principle of our jurisprudence that 'when the language of a rule is clear and unambiguous, this Court must give the words of the rule their plain and ordinary meanings.' " Cashman Equipment Corporation, Inc. v. Cardi Corporation, Inc. , 139 A.3d 379 , 382 (R.I. 2016) (brackets omitted) (quoting State v. Brown , 88 A.3d 1101 , 1110 (R.I. 2014) ).

2010It is a fundamental principle of procedural due process "that a court may not issue a judgment or order against a person in the absence of personal jurisdiction." In re Stephanie B ., 826 A.2d 985 , 993 (R.I. 2003) .

2008See In re Stephanie B. , 826 A.2d 985 , 993 (R.I. 2003) ("A fundamental principle of procedural due process is that a court may not issue a judgment or order against a person in the absence of personal jurisdiction.").

2006See Kells v. Town of Lincoln , 874 A.2d 204 , 212 (R.I. 2005) ("When confronted with statutory provisions that are in pari materia , this Court will `construe them in a manner that attempts to harmonize them and that is consistent with their general objective scope.`") (quoting State v. Dearmas , 841 A.2d 659 , 666 (R.I. 2004)); see also DelSanto v. Hyundai Motor Finance Co., 882 A.2d 561 , 562 n. 2 (R.I. 2005) " I t is a fundamental principle of statutory interpretation that every effort is to be made to harmonize statutes." ) Thus, "[w]here there are two acts upon the same subject, effect sh

2006See Kells v. Town of Lincoln , 874 A.2d 204 , 212 (R.I. 2005) ("When confronted with statutory provisions that are in pari materia , this Court will `construe them in a manner that attempts to harmonize them and that is consistent with their general objective scope.'") (quoting State v. Dearmas , 841 A.2d 659 , 666 (R.I. 2004)); see also DelSanto v. Hyundai Motor Finance Co. , 882 A.2d 561 , 562 n. 2 (R.I. 2005) ("It is a fundamental principle of statutory interpretation that every effort is to be made to harmonize statutes.") Thus, "[w]here there are two acts upon the same subject, effect sho

2024Our caselaw is clear that “[a] police officer has ‘seized’ a person, within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, when he restrains that person’s freedom to walk away.” Foster, 842 A.2d at 1050 ; see State v. Jimenez, 33 A.3d 724, 732 (R.I. 2011) (“It is a fundamental principle that a person is seized * * * for Fourth Amendment purposes if, in view of all the circumstances, a reasonable person would believe that he or she was not free to leave.” (brackets omitted) (quoting State v. Vieira, 913 A.2d 1015, 1020 (R.I. 2007))).

2011“It is a fundamental principle that ‘[a] person is seized or under arrest for Fourth Amendment purposes if, in view of all the circumstances, a reasonable person would believe that he or she was not free to leave.’ ” State v. Vieira, 913 A.2d 1015, 1020 (R.I.2007) (quoting State v. Diaz, 654 A.2d 1195, 1204 (R.I.1995)).

2024See, e.g., In re Shy C., 126 A.3d 433 , 434 (R.I. 2015) (“This Court has long adhered to an important jurisprudential principle commonly referred to as ‘the raise or waive rule.’”); Federal National Mortgage Association v. Malinou, 101 A.3d 860, 865 (R.I. 2014) (“According to this Court’s well settled raise-or-waive rule, issues not properly presented before the trial court may not be raised for the first time on appeal.”) (emphasis added); State v. Figuereo, 31 A.3d 1283, 1289 (R.I. 2011) (“This Court staunchly adheres to the ‘raise or waive’ rule, which requires parties to raise an issue fir

2021It is well settled that “a litigant cannot raise an objection or advance a new theory on appeal if it was not raised before the trial court.” State v. Haffner, 242 A.3d 468 , 478 (R.I. 2020) (quoting State v. Bido, 941 A.2d 822, 829 (R.I. 2008)).

2024Our caselaw is clear that “[a] police officer has ‘seized’ a person, within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, when he restrains that person’s freedom to walk away.” Foster, 842 A.2d at 1050 ; see State v. Jimenez, 33 A.3d 724, 732 (R.I. 2011) (“It is a fundamental principle that a person is seized * * * for Fourth Amendment purposes if, in view of all the circumstances, a reasonable person would believe that he or she was not free to leave.” (brackets omitted) (quoting State v. Vieira, 913 A.2d 1015, 1020 (R.I. 2007))).

2013Before statements made by a defendant during a custodial interrogation may be admitted into evidence, the state “must first prove by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his [or her] constitutional rights expressed in Miranda v. Arizona.” State v. Jimenez, 33 A.3d 724, 733-34 (R.I.2011) (internal quotation marks omitted).

2023Gorman v. Gorman, 883 A.2d 732 , 738 n.8 (R.I. 2005) (“It is a fundamental principle of contract law that the existence of ambiguity vel non in a contract is an issue of law to be determined by -9- the court.”); see also Irene Realty Corp. v. Travelers Property Casualty Company of America, 973 A.2d 1118, 1122 (R.I. 2009).

2011And, since the law of contracts is implicated, we note that “[i]t is a fundamental principle of contract law that the existence of ambiguity vel non in a contract is an issue of law to be determined by the court.” Gorman v. Gorman, 883 A.2d 732 , 738 n. 8 (R.I.2005); see also Irene Realty Corp. v. Travelers Property Casualty Co. of America, 973 A.2d 1118, 1122 (R.I.2009).

2022We also note that “[i]t is a fundamental principle that summary judgment is a drastic remedy, and a motion for summary judgment should be dealt with cautiously.” Shorr, 248 A.3d at 636 (quoting Lehigh Cement Co. v. Quinn, 173 A.3d 1272, 1275 (R.I. 2017)).

2021“It is a fundamental principle that summary judgment is a drastic remedy, and a motion for summary judgment should be dealt with cautiously.” Lehigh Cement Co., 173 A.3d at 1275 (brackets omitted) (quoting Botelho v. City of Pawtucket School Department, 130 A.3d 172, 176 (R.I. 2016)).