fundamental principle in Rhode Island

2008In the occasional case, this Court will entertain an allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel, but only when those allegations are “based on specific rulings by the trial justice * * * because such action is ‘consistent with the fundamental principle that only specific rulings of a trial justice are reviewable on direct appeal.’ ” Id. (quoting Levitt, 118 R.I. at 40 , 371 A.2d at 600 ).

2008In the occasional case, this Court will entertain an allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel, but only when those allegations are “based on specific rulings by the trial justice * * * because such action is ‘consistent with the fundamental principle that only specific rulings of a trial justice are reviewable on direct appeal.’ ” Id. (quoting Levitt, 118 R.I. at 40 , 371 A.2d at 600 ).

2013“It is a fundamental principle that ‘[s]ummary judgment is a drastic remedy, and a motion for summary judgment should be dealt with cautiously.’ ” Employers Mutual Casualty Co. v. Arbella Protection Insurance Co., 24 A.3d 544, 553 (R.I.2011) (quoting Estate of Giuliano v. Giuliano, 949 A.2d 386, 390 (R.I.2008)).

2012II Standard of Review “It is a fundamental principle that ‘[s]ummary judgment is a drastic remedy, and a motion for summary judgment should be dealt with cautiously.’” Employers Mutual Casualty Co. v. Arbella Protection Insurance Co., 24 A.3d 544, 553 (R.I.2011) (quoting Estate of Giuliano v. Giuliano, 949 A.2d 386, 390 (R.I.2008)); McPhillips v. Zayre Corp., 582 A.2d 747, 749 (R.I.1990) (citing Commercial Union Companies v. Graham, 495 A.2d 243 (R.I. 1985); Rustigian v. Celona, 478 A.2d 187 (R.I.1984); Steinberg v. State, 427 A.2d 338 (R.I.1981)).

2016“It is a fundamental principle that [sjummary judgment is a drastic remedy, and a motion for summary judgment should be dealt with cautiously.” Id. (quoting Employers Mutual Casualty Co. v. Arbella Protection Insurance Co., 24 A.3d 544, 553 (R.I.2011)), “We will affirm a lower court's decision only if, after reviewing the admissible evidence in the light most favorable' to the nonmoving party, we conclude that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. (quoting Great American E & S Insurance Co., 45 A.3d at 574 ). “[T]he

2016“It is a fundamental principle that [sjummary judgment is a drastic remedy, and a motion for summary judgment should be dealt with cautiously.” Id. (quoting Employers Mutual Casualty Co. v. Arbella Protection Insurance Co., 24 A.3d 544, 553 (R.I.2011)), “We will affirm a lower court's decision only if, after reviewing the admissible evidence in the light most favorable' to the nonmoving party, we conclude that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. (quoting Great American E & S Insurance Co., 45 A.3d at 574 ). “[T]he

2024It is a fundamental principle of tort law that a “defendant cannot be liable under a negligence theory unless the defendant owes a duty to the plaintiff.” Benaski v. Weinberg, 899 A.2d 499, 502 (R.I. 2006) (quoting Lucier v. Impact Recreation, Ltd., 864 A.2d 635, 638 (R.I. 2005)).

2024It is a fundamental principle of tort law that a “defendant cannot be liable under a negligence theory unless the defendant owes a duty to the plaintiff.” Benaski v. Weinberg, 899 A.2d 499, 502 (R.I. 2006) (quoting Lucier v. Impact Recreation, Ltd., 864 A.2d 635, 638 (R.I. 2005)).

2025And this Court has emphasized that “[i]t is a fundamental principle in our jurisprudence that, ‘when the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, this Court must interpret the statute literally and must give the words of the statute their plain and ordinary meanings.’” Shine v. Moreau, 119 A.3d 1 , 9 (R.I. 2015) (quoting State v. Diamante, 83 A.3d 546, 548 (R.I. 2014)).3 It is well settled that “whether there exists a basis for awarding attorneys’ fees generally is legal in nature, and therefore our review of such a ruling is de novo.” Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Rhode Island v. Najaria

2025And this Court has emphasized that “[i]t is a fundamental principle in our jurisprudence that, ‘when the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, this Court must interpret the statute literally and must give the words of the statute their plain and ordinary meanings.’” Shine v. Moreau, 119 A.3d 1 , 9 (R.I. 2015) (quoting State v. Diamante, 83 A.3d 546, 548 (R.I. 2014)).3 It is well settled that “whether there exists a basis for awarding attorneys’ fees generally is legal in nature, and therefore our review of such a ruling is de novo.” Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Rhode Island v. Najaria

2024It is a fundamental principle of tort law that a “defendant cannot be liable under a negligence theory unless the defendant owes a duty to the plaintiff.” Benaski v. Weinberg, 899 A.2d 499, 502 (R.I. 2006) (quoting Lucier v. Impact Recreation, Ltd., 864 A.2d 635, 638 (R.I. 2005)).

2024It is a fundamental principle of tort law that a “defendant cannot be liable under a negligence theory unless the defendant owes a duty to the plaintiff.” Benaski v. Weinberg, 899 A.2d 499, 502 (R.I. 2006) (quoting Lucier v. Impact Recreation, Ltd., 864 A.2d 635, 638 (R.I. 2005)).

2026See Resendes v. Brown, 966 A.2d 1249, 1254 (R.I. 2009); see also Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (“The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’”) (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)).

2005"The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard `at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.'" Mathews v. Eldgridge, 424 U.S. 319 , 333 (1976).

2025And this Court has emphasized that “[i]t is a fundamental principle in our jurisprudence that, ‘when the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, this Court must interpret the statute literally and must give the words of the statute their plain and ordinary meanings.’” Shine v. Moreau, 119 A.3d 1 , 9 (R.I. 2015) (quoting State v. Diamante, 83 A.3d 546, 548 (R.I. 2014)).3 It is well settled that “whether there exists a basis for awarding attorneys’ fees generally is legal in nature, and therefore our review of such a ruling is de novo.” Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Rhode Island v. Najaria

2019In focusing on this statutory provision, we are guided by the following important axiom: "It is a fundamental principle that, when the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, this Court must interpret the statute literally and must give the words of the statute their plain and ordinary meanings." State v. Diamante , 83 A.3d 546 , 548 (R.I. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted).

2023“It is a fundamental principle that summary judgment is a drastic remedy, and a motion for summary judgment should be dealt with cautiously.” Botelho v. City of Pawtucket School Department, 130 A.3d 172, 176 (R.I. 2016) (brackets omitted) (quoting The Law Firm of Thomas A. Tarro, III v. Checrallah, 60 A.3d 598, 601 (R.I. 2013)).

2021“It is a fundamental principle that summary judgment is a drastic remedy, and a motion for summary judgment should be dealt with cautiously.” Lehigh Cement Co., 173 A.3d at 1275 (brackets omitted) (quoting Botelho v. City of Pawtucket School Department, 130 A.3d 172, 176 (R.I. 2016)).

2021“In construing statutes or court rules, it is a fundamental principle of our jurisprudence that when the language of a rule is clear and unambiguous, this Court must give the words of the rule their plain and ordinary meanings.” Id. (quoting Cashman Equipment Corporation, Inc. v. Cardi Corporation, Inc., 139 A.3d 379, 382 (R.I. 2016)).

2019When interpreting court rules, "it is a fundamental principle of our jurisprudence that '[w]hen the language of a rule is clear and unambiguous, this Court must give the words of the rule their plain and ordinary meanings.' " Cashman , 139 A.3d at 382 (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Brown , 88 A.3d 1101 , 1110 (R.I. 2014) ).

2021This Court has further observed that “the raise-or- waive rule is a fundamental principle in this state that is ‘staunchly adhered to’ by this Court.” State v. Doyle, 235 A.3d 482 , 493 (R.I. 2020) (quoting Cusick v. Cusick, 210 A.3d 1199, 1203 (R.I. 2019)).

2020Cusick v. Cusick, 210 A.3d 1199, 1203 (R.I. 2019) (quoting Rohena v. City of Providence, 154 A.3d 935, 938 (R.I. 2017)). “[I]t is well settled that a litigant cannot raise an objection or advance a new theory on appeal if it was not raised before the trial court.” Id. (quoting Rohena, 154 A.3d at 938 ).

2012It is a fundamental principle of contract law, and the settled law of this state, that “clear and unambiguous language set out in a contract is controlling in regard to the intent of the parties to such contract and governs the legal consequences of its provisions.” Elias v. Youngken, 493 A.2d 158, 163 (R.I.1985).

2010Ltd., 116 R.I. 108 , 111 n. 2, 352 A.2d 625 , 627 n. 2 (1976)); Dovenmuehle Mortgage, Inc. v. Antonelli, 790 A.2d 1113, 1115 (R.I.2002) ("clear and unambiguous language set out in a contract is controlling in regard to the intent of the parties to such contract and governs the legal consequences of its provisions”) (quoting Burke v. Potter, 771 A.2d 895, 895 (R.I.2001) (mem.)); Elias v. Youngken, 493 A.2d 158, 163 (R.I.1985) ("It is a fundamental principle of contract law, as well as being well settled in this state, that ‘clear and unambiguous language set out in a contract is controlling in

2009Gorman v. Gorman, 883 A.2d 732 , 738 n. 8 (R.I.2005) (“It is a fundamental principle of contract law that the existence of ambiguity vel non in a contract is an issue of law to be determined by the court.”); see also Merrimack Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Dufault, 958 A.2d 620, 625 (R.I.2008); National Refrigeration, Inc. v. Standen Contracting Co., 942 A.2d 968, 971 (R.I.2008); Rotelli v. Catanzaro, 686 A.2d 91, 94 (R.I.1996) (“Whether the terms of a contract are clear and unambiguous is itself a question of law * * *.”). 6 Accordingly, a trial court’s ruling as to that issue is reviewed by t

2009Gorman v. Gorman, 883 A.2d 732 , 738 n. 8 (R.I.2005) (“It is a fundamental principle of contract law that the existence of ambiguity vel non in a contract is an issue of law to be determined by the court.”); Rotelli v. Catanzaro, 686 A.2d 91, 94 (R.I.1996) (“Whether the terms of a contract are clear and unambiguous is itself a question of law * * *.”); see also Merrimack Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Dufault, 958 A.2d 620, 625 (R.I.2008). 2 Accordingly, a trial court’s ruling as to that issue is reviewed by this Court on a de novo basis.

1978Due Process Nobody questions the fundamental principle which says that the state may not hold an individual "`criminally responsible for conduct which he could not reasonably understand to be proscribed.'" State v. Levitt, R.I., 371 A.2d 596, 598 (1977), quoting Rose v. Locke, 423 U.S. 48, 49 , 96 S.Ct. 243, 244 , 46 L.Ed.2d 185, 188 (1975), and United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 , 74 S.Ct. *644 808, 812, 98 L.Ed. 989, 996 (1954).

1978Due Process Nobody questions the fundamental principle which says that the state may not hold an individual "`criminally responsible for conduct which he could not reasonably understand to be proscribed.'" State v. Levitt, R.I., 371 A.2d 596, 598 (1977), quoting Rose v. Locke, 423 U.S. 48, 49 , 96 S.Ct. 243, 244 , 46 L.Ed.2d 185, 188 (1975), and United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 , 74 S.Ct. *644 808, 812, 98 L.Ed. 989, 996 (1954).

1978Due Process Nobody questions the fundamental principle which says that the state may not hold an individual “ ‘criminally responsible for conduct which he could not reasonably understand to be proscribed.’ ” State v. Levitt, 118 R.I. 32, 36 , 371 A.2d 596, 598 (1977), quoting Rose v. Locke, 423 U.S. 48, 49 , 96 S. Ct. 243, 244 , 46 L.

1978Due Process Nobody questions the fundamental principle which says that the state may not hold an individual “ ‘criminally responsible for conduct which he could not reasonably understand to be proscribed.’ ” State v. Levitt, 118 R.I. 32, 36 , 371 A.2d 596, 598 (1977), quoting Rose v. Locke, 423 U.S. 48, 49 , 96 S. Ct. 243, 244 , 46 L.

2023Gorman v. Gorman, 883 A.2d 732 , 738 n.8 (R.I. 2005) (“It is a fundamental principle of contract law that the existence of ambiguity vel non in a contract is an issue of law to be determined by -9- the court.”); see also Irene Realty Corp. v. Travelers Property Casualty Company of America, 973 A.2d 1118, 1122 (R.I. 2009).

2022It is also well settled that the issue of “[w]hether the terms of a contract are ambiguous is a question of law.” Sturbridge Home Builders, Inc. v. Downing Seaport, Inc., 890 A.2d 58, 62 (R.I. 2005); see also Gorman v. Gorman, 883 A.2d 732 , 738 n.8 (R.I. 2005) (“It is a fundamental principle of contract law that the existence of ambiguity vel non in a contract is an issue of law to be determined by the court.”).

2011Before proceeding, we note that “this Court has consistently explained that we shall only consider a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal if the claim is ‘based on specific rulings by the trial justice,’ * * * inasmuch as this rule ‘is consistent with the fundamental principle that only specific rulings of a trial justice are reviewable on direct appeal.’ ” State v. Page, 709 A.2d 1042, 1046 (R.I.1998) (quoting State v. Gonsalves, 476 A.2d 108, 112 (R.I.1984)).

1998Accordingly, this Court has consistently explained that we shall only consider a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal if the claim is “based on specific rulings by the trial justice,” State v. Gonsalves, 476 A.2d 108, 112 (R.I.1984), inasmuch as this rule “is ‘consistent with the fundamental principle that only specific rulings of a trial justice are reviewable on direct appeal.’” Id. (quoting State v. Levitt, 118 R.I. 32, 40 , 371 A.2d 596, 600 (1977)).

2023“It is a fundamental principle that summary judgment is a drastic remedy, and a motion for summary judgment should be dealt with cautiously.” Botelho v. City of Pawtucket School Department, 130 A.3d 172, 176 (R.I. 2016) (brackets omitted) (quoting The Law Firm of Thomas A. Tarro, III v. Checrallah, 60 A.3d 598, 601 (R.I. 2013)).

2019"It is a fundamental principle that summary judgment is a drastic remedy, and a motion for summary judgment should be dealt with cautiously." Botelho v. City of Pawtucket School Department , 130 A.3d 172 , 176 (R.I. 2016) (alteration omitted) (quoting Tarro v. Checrallah , 60 A.3d 598 , 601 (R.I. 2013) ). 2 Freedom of Speech and Expression Felkner's first claim alleges that defendants deprived him of his rights to freedom of speech and expression secured by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and article 1, section 21 of the Rhode Island Constitution. 11 He seeks redress unde

2010It is a fundamental principle of procedural due process "that a court may not issue a judgment or order against a person in the absence of personal jurisdiction." In re Stephanie B ., 826 A.2d 985 , 993 (R.I. 2003) .

2008See In re Stephanie B. , 826 A.2d 985 , 993 (R.I. 2003) ("A fundamental principle of procedural due process is that a court may not issue a judgment or order against a person in the absence of personal jurisdiction.").

2006See Kells v. Town of Lincoln , 874 A.2d 204 , 212 (R.I. 2005) ("When confronted with statutory provisions that are in pari materia , this Court will `construe them in a manner that attempts to harmonize them and that is consistent with their general objective scope.'") (quoting State v. Dearmas , 841 A.2d 659 , 666 (R.I. 2004)); see also DelSanto v. Hyundai Motor Finance Co. , 882 A.2d 561 , 562 n. 2 (R.I. 2005) ("It is a fundamental principle of statutory interpretation that every effort is to be made to harmonize statutes.") Thus, "[w]here there are two acts upon the same subject, effect sho

2006See Kells v. Town of Lincoln , 874 A.2d 204 , 212 (R.I. 2005) ("When confronted with statutory provisions that are in pari materia , this Court will `construe them in a manner that attempts to harmonize them and that is consistent with their general objective scope.`") (quoting State v. Dearmas , 841 A.2d 659 , 666 (R.I. 2004)); see also DelSanto v. Hyundai Motor Finance Co., 882 A.2d 561 , 562 n. 2 (R.I. 2005) " I t is a fundamental principle of statutory interpretation that every effort is to be made to harmonize statutes." ) Thus, "[w]here there are two acts upon the same subject, effect sh

2024“Rhode Island follows the ‘Connecticut Rule’ when determining the duty of care to keep a premises safe from naturally occurring accumulations of ice and snow.” Berardis v. Louangxay, 969 A.2d 1288, 1291 (R.I. 2009).

2024“Rhode Island follows the ‘Connecticut Rule’ when determining the duty of care to keep a premises safe from naturally occurring accumulations of ice and snow.” Berardis v. Louangxay, 969 A.2d 1288, 1291 (R.I. 2009).

2024See, e.g., In re Shy C., 126 A.3d 433 , 434 (R.I. 2015) (“This Court has long adhered to an important jurisprudential principle commonly referred to as ‘the raise or waive rule.’”); Federal National Mortgage Association v. Malinou, 101 A.3d 860, 865 (R.I. 2014) (“According to this Court’s well settled raise-or-waive rule, issues not properly presented before the trial court may not be raised for the first time on appeal.”) (emphasis added); State v. Figuereo, 31 A.3d 1283, 1289 (R.I. 2011) (“This Court staunchly adheres to the ‘raise or waive’ rule, which requires parties to raise an issue fir

2021It is well settled that “a litigant cannot raise an objection or advance a new theory on appeal if it was not raised before the trial court.” State v. Haffner, 242 A.3d 468 , 478 (R.I. 2020) (quoting State v. Bido, 941 A.2d 822, 829 (R.I. 2008)).

2024Our caselaw is clear that “[a] police officer has ‘seized’ a person, within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, when he restrains that person’s freedom to walk away.” Foster, 842 A.2d at 1050 ; see State v. Jimenez, 33 A.3d 724, 732 (R.I. 2011) (“It is a fundamental principle that a person is seized * * * for Fourth Amendment purposes if, in view of all the circumstances, a reasonable person would believe that he or she was not free to leave.” (brackets omitted) (quoting State v. Vieira, 913 A.2d 1015, 1020 (R.I. 2007))).

2011“It is a fundamental principle that ‘[a] person is seized or under arrest for Fourth Amendment purposes if, in view of all the circumstances, a reasonable person would believe that he or she was not free to leave.’ ” State v. Vieira, 913 A.2d 1015, 1020 (R.I.2007) (quoting State v. Diaz, 654 A.2d 1195, 1204 (R.I.1995)).