fundamental principle in Colorado

2020Whiteside v. Smith, 67 P.3d 1240, 1248 (Colo. 2003) (“The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’”) (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976)).

2004See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 , 96 S.Ct. 893 , 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976) (“The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’ ”) (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 , 85 S.Ct. 1187 , 14 L.Ed.2d 62 (1965)); Whiteside v. Smith, 67 P.3d 1240, 1248 (Colo.2003).

2010See Johnston v. City Council, 177 Colo. 223 , 228, 493 P.2d 651 , 654 (1972) (it is a fundamental rule of construction to give effect to every word of a statute if possible).

2009However, that would render meaningless the first clause of subsection (5), which provides that "[alny action brought pursuant to this article shall be commenced within the time period provided [by the applicable statute of limitations] or it shall be forever barred." See Johnston v. City Council, 177 Colo. 223 , 228, 498 P.2d 651, 654 (1972) (it is a fundamental rule of construction to give effect to every word of a statute if possible).

2010See Johnston v. City Council, 177 Colo. 223 , 228, 493 P.2d 651 , 654 (1972) (it is a fundamental rule of construction to give effect to every word of a statute if possible).

2009See Johnston v. City Council, 177 Colo. 223 , 228, 493 P.2d 651 , 654 (1972) (it is a fundamental rule of construction to give effect to every word of a statute if possible); Hiwan, 215 P.3d at 1273 (the meaning of a word may be ascertained by reference to the meaning of words associated with it).

1999In New York City Transit Authority v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 587-88 , 99 S.Ct. 1355, 1367 , 59 L.Ed.2d 587, 604 (1979), the Supreme Court explains the basis of equal protection: The [equal protection] clause announces a fundamental principle: the State must govern impartially.

1999In New York City Transit Authority v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 587-88 , 99 S.Ct. 1355, 1367 , 59 L.Ed.2d 587, 604 (1979), the Supreme Court explains the basis of equal protection: The [equal protection] clause announces a fundamental principle: the State must govern impartially.

2022Stare decisis is a fundamental principle of the rule of law; it is the “preferred course because it promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial 12 process.” Love v. Klosky, 2018 CO 20, ¶ 14 , 413 P.3d 1267, 1270 (quoting Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991)). ¶78 Throughout this court’s history, “we have explained that stare decisis ‘should be adhered to in the absence of sound reason for rejecting it.’” People v. Blehm, 983 P.2d 779, 7

2022Stare decisis is a fundamental principle of the rule of law; it is the "preferred course because it promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process." Love v. Klosky , 2018 CO 20 , ¶ 14 , 413 P.3d 1267, 1270 ( quoting Payne v. Tennessee , 501 U.S. 808, 827 ( 1991 ) ) . ¶78 Throughout this court 's history, " we have explained that stare decisis 'should be adhered to in the absence of sound reason for rejecting it.' " People v. Blehm , 983 P.

2022Stare decisis is a fundamental principle of the rule of law; it is the “preferred course because it promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial 12 process.” Love v. Klosky, 2018 CO 20, ¶ 14 , 413 P.3d 1267, 1270 (quoting Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991)). ¶78 Throughout this court’s history, “we have explained that stare decisis ‘should be adhered to in the absence of sound reason for rejecting it.’” People v. Blehm, 983 P.2d 779, 7

2022Stare decisis is a fundamental principle of the rule of law; it is the "preferred course because it promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process." Love v. Klosky , 2018 CO 20 , ¶ 14 , 413 P.3d 1267, 1270 ( quoting Payne v. Tennessee , 501 U.S. 808, 827 ( 1991 ) ) . ¶78 Throughout this court 's history, " we have explained that stare decisis 'should be adhered to in the absence of sound reason for rejecting it.' " People v. Blehm , 983 P.

2022Stare decisis is a fundamental principle of the rule of law; it is the “preferred course because it promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial 12 process.” Love v. Klosky, 2018 CO 20, ¶ 14 , 413 P.3d 1267, 1270 (quoting Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991)). ¶78 Throughout this court’s history, “we have explained that stare decisis ‘should be adhered to in the absence of sound reason for rejecting it.’” People v. Blehm, 983 P.2d 779, 7

2022Stare decisis is a fundamental principle of the rule of law; it is the “preferred course because it promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial 12 process.” Love v. Klosky, 2018 CO 20, ¶ 14 , 413 P.3d 1267, 1270 (quoting Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991)). ¶78 Throughout this court’s history, “we have explained that stare decisis ‘should be adhered to in the absence of sound reason for rejecting it.’” People v. Blehm, 983 P.2d 779, 7

2020Whiteside v. Smith, 67 P.3d 1240, 1248 (Colo. 2003) (“The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’”) (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976)).

2004See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 , 96 S.Ct. 893 , 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976) (“The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’ ”) (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 , 85 S.Ct. 1187 , 14 L.Ed.2d 62 (1965)); Whiteside v. Smith, 67 P.3d 1240, 1248 (Colo.2003).

2015"This is an objective inquiry made on a case-by-case basis in light of the totality of the cireum-stances." People v. Null, 233 P.3d 670, 676 (Colo.2010).

2015People v. Elmarr , 181 P.3d 1157, 1161 (Colo. 2008). ¶56        “The fundamental inquiry in determining whether [a defendant was] in custody for purposes of Miranda is whether a reasonable person in the [defendant’s] position would [have] believe[d] himself to be deprived of his freedom of action to the degree associated with a formal arrest.” Mumford , ¶13 (internal quotation marks omitted). “This is an objective inquiry made on a case-by-case basis in light of the totality of the circumstances.” People v. Null , 233 P.3d 670, 676 (Colo. 2010). ¶57        There i

2009Hodges, 158 P.3d at 927 ; Blecha v. People, 962 P.2d 931, 942 (Colo.1998).

2009Hodges, 158 P.3d at 927 ; Blecha v. People, 962 P.2d 931, 942 (Colo. 1998).

2002Such a change would necessarily increase the ultimate consumption from the *247 stream to the detriment of other appropriators."); Danielson v. Kerbs Agric., 646 P.2d 363, 373 (Colo.1982) ("It is a fundamental principle that the consumptive use of water may not be increased to the injury of other appropriators.").

1997See Danielson v. Kerbs Ag., Inc., 646 P.2d 363, 373 (Colo.1982) (“It is a fundamental principle that the consumptive use of water may not be increased to the injury of other appropriators.”).

2013L.A.N. v. L.M.B., 2013 CO 6 , 292 P.3d 942 ; accord In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 480 Mass. 590 , 722 N.E.2d 450, 458 (2000) ("[Tjestimonial privileges are 'exceptions to the general duty imposed on all people to testify.' Such privileges diminish the evidence before the court, and contravene the fundamental principle that 'the pub-lie ... has a right to every man's evidence.'" (citations omitted) (quoting Commonwealth v. Corsetti, 387 Mass. 1 , 438 N.E.2d 805, 808 (1982), and United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 , 70 S.Ct. 724 , 94 L.Ed. 884 (1950))). 1 24 Therefore, we conclude that the di

2013L.A.N. v. L.M.B., 2013 CO 6 , 292 P.3d 942 ; accord In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 480 Mass. 590 , 722 N.E.2d 450, 458 (2000) ("[Tjestimonial privileges are 'exceptions to the general duty imposed on all people to testify.' Such privileges diminish the evidence before the court, and contravene the fundamental principle that 'the pub-lie ... has a right to every man's evidence.'" (citations omitted) (quoting Commonwealth v. Corsetti, 387 Mass. 1 , 438 N.E.2d 805, 808 (1982), and United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 , 70 S.Ct. 724 , 94 L.Ed. 884 (1950))). 1 24 Therefore, we conclude that the di

2013People v. Matheny, 46 P.3d 453, 462 (Colo.2002). ¶ 17 The fundamental inquiry in determining whether a suspect is “in custody” for the purposes of Miranda is “whether a reasonable person in the suspect’s position would believe himself to be deprived of his freedom of action to the degree associated with a formal arrest.” People v. Polander, 41 P.3d 698, 705 (Colo.2001).

2012However, "[wJhether an individual has been subjected to custodial interrogation in violation of Miranda is a question of law that we review de novo." People v. Klinck, 259 P.3d 489, 493 (Colo.2011) (citing Matheny, 46 P.3d at 462 ). 113 The fundamental inquiry in determining whether a suspect is in custody for purposes of Miranda is " 'whether a reasonable person in the suspect's position would believe himself to be deprived of his freedom of action to the degree associated with a formal arrest." People v. Hughes, 252 P .3d 1118, 1121 (Colo.2011) (quoting People v. Hankins, 201 P.3d 1215, 1218

2004See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 , 96 S.Ct. 893 , 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976) (“The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’ ”) (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 , 85 S.Ct. 1187 , 14 L.Ed.2d 62 (1965)); Whiteside v. Smith, 67 P.3d 1240, 1248 (Colo.2003).

2004See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 , 96 S.Ct. 893 , 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976) (“The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’ ”) (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 , 85 S.Ct. 1187 , 14 L.Ed.2d 62 (1965)); Whiteside v. Smith, 67 P.3d 1240, 1248 (Colo.2003).

1991It is a fundamental principle of search and seizure jurisprudence that “except in certain carefully defined classes of cases, a search of private property without proper consent is ‘unreasonable’ unless it has been authorized by a valid search warrant.” Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528-29 , 87 S.Ct. 1727, 1730-31 , 18 L.Ed.2d 930 (1967); see Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 , 98 S.Ct. 2408, 2412 , 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978); People v. Wright, 804 P.2d 866, 869 (Colo.1991).

1991It is a fundamental principle of search and seizure jurisprudence that “except in certain carefully defined classes of cases, a search of private property without proper consent is ‘unreasonable’ unless it has been authorized by a valid search warrant.” Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528-29 , 87 S.Ct. 1727, 1730-31 , 18 L.Ed.2d 930 (1967); see Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 , 98 S.Ct. 2408, 2412 , 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978); People v. Wright, 804 P.2d 866, 869 (Colo.1991).

1990With reference to the obligation of counsel to object to evidence which is admissible for a limited purpose, our supreme court stated in Polster v. Griff's of America, Inc., 184 Colo. 418 , 520 P.2d 745 (1974): "It is a fundamental rule of trial practice, long established in Colorado, that when evidence is admissible for one purpose and not another, the burden is upon counsel opposing the admission of the evidence to object and request limitations on its admission." With reference to the trial court's obligation in these circumstances, our supreme court also stated: "Generally speaking, the tr

1990With reference to the obligation of counsel to object to evidence which is admissible for a limited purpose, our supreme court stated in Polster v. Griff's of America, Inc., 184 Colo. 418 , 520 P.2d 745 (1974): "It is a fundamental rule of trial practice, long established in Colorado, that when evidence is admissible for one purpose and not another, the burden is upon counsel opposing the admission of the evidence to object and request limitations on its admission." With reference to the trial court's obligation in these circumstances, our supreme court also stated: "Generally speaking, the tr

1986As this court observed in Paxson v. Cresson Mining Co., 56 Colo. 206, 212 , 139 P. 531, 533 (1913): The fundamental rule to be followed in construing a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature in adopting it, and give effect, if possible, to every word it contains, and as far as practicable reconcile the terms therein employed so as to render it consistent and harmonious.

1986As this court observed in Paxson v. Cresson Mining Co., 56 Colo. 206, 212 , 139 P. 531, 533 (1913): The fundamental rule to be followed in construing a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature in adopting it, and give effect, if possible, to every word it contains, and as far as practicable reconcile the terms therein employed so as to render it consistent and harmonious.