fundamental principle in Nevada

2020Blake, 121 Nev. at 790 , 121 P.3d at 574 ("It is a fundamental principle in our jurisprudence to allow an opposing party to explore and challenge through cross-examination the basis of an expert witness's opinion."); see also Singleton v. State, 90 Nev. 216, 219 , 522 P.2d 1221, 1222-23 (1974) (holding that the credibility of a source used by an expert witness in arriving at an opinion is an underlying fact properly pursued in cross-examination).

2020Blake, 121 Nev. at 790 , 121 P.3d at 574 ("It is a fundamental principle in our jurisprudence to allow an opposing party to explore and challenge through cross-examination the basis of an expert witness's opinion."); see also Singleton v. State, 90 Nev. 216, 219 , 522 P.2d 1221, 1222-23 (1974) (holding that the credibility of a source used by an expert witness in arriving at an opinion is an underlying fact properly pursued in cross-examination).

2022By imposing the duty on residential landlords but omitting it from the list of duties owed by a commercial landlord, "we can imply that the Legislature's exclusion . . . was intentional." In re Estate of Prestie, 122 Nev. 807, 814, 138 P.3d 520, 524 (2006) (recognizing "the fundamental rule of statutory construction that lt]he mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another" (quoting State v. Wyatt, 84 Nev. 731, 734, 448 P.2d 827, 829 (1968))).

2022By imposing the duty on residential landlords but omitting it from the list of duties owed by a commercial landlord, "we can imply that the Legislature's exclusion . . . was intentional." In re Estate of Prestie, 122 Nev. 807, 814, 138 P.3d 520, 524 (2006) (recognizing "the fundamental rule of statutory construction that lt]he mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another" (quoting State v. Wyatt, 84 Nev. 731, 734, 448 P.2d 827, 829 (1968))).

2016It is a fundamental principle of criminal law that the State "has the burden of proving the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt and that the defendant is not SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 6 (0) 1947A e obligated to take the stand or produce any evidence whatsoever." Barron v. State, 105 Nev. 767, 778 , 783 P.2d 444, 451 (1989).

2016It is a fundamental principle of criminal law that the State "has the burden of proving the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt and that the defendant is not SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 6 (0) 1947A e obligated to take the stand or produce any evidence whatsoever." Barron v. State, 105 Nev. 767, 778 , 783 P.2d 444, 451 (1989).

2023See Matheivs, 424 U.S. at 333 ("The fundamental requirement of tlue process is the opportunity to be heard 'at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner." (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 TJ.S. 545, 552 (1965))).

2023See Matheivs, 424 U.S. at 333 ("The fundamental requirement of tlue process is the opportunity to be heard 'at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner." (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 TJ.S. 545, 552 (1965))).

2020Blake, 121 Nev. at 790 , 121 P.3d at 574 ("It is a fundamental principle in our jurisprudence to allow an opposing party to explore and challenge through cross-examination the basis of an expert witness's opinion."); see also Singleton v. State, 90 Nev. 216, 219 , 522 P.2d 1221, 1222-23 (1974) (holding that the credibility of a source used by an expert witness in arriving at an opinion is an underlying fact properly pursued in cross-examination).

2020Blake, 121 Nev. at 790 , 121 P.3d at 574 ("It is a fundamental principle in our jurisprudence to allow an opposing party to explore and challenge through cross-examination the basis of an expert witness's opinion."); see also Singleton v. State, 90 Nev. 216, 219 , 522 P.2d 1221, 1222-23 (1974) (holding that the credibility of a source used by an expert witness in arriving at an opinion is an underlying fact properly pursued in cross-examination).

2017"The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard 'at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner." Mathews, 424 U.S. at 333 (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)).

1993"A fundamental requirement of due process is `the opportunity to be heard.'" Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 , 85 S.Ct. 1187, 1191 , 14 L.Ed.2d 62 (1965) (citing Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385 , 34 S.Ct. 779 , 58 L.Ed. 1363 (1914)).

1995Sheriff v. Smith, 91 Nev. 729, 733 , 542 P.2d 440, 443 (1975) (“A fundamental rule of statutory interpretation is that the unreasonableness of the result produced by one among alternative possible interpretations of a statute is reason for rejecting that interpretation in favor of another that would produce a reasonable result.”).

1995Sheriff v. Smith, 91 Nev. 729, 733 , 542 P.2d 440, 443 (1975) (“A fundamental rule of statutory interpretation is that the unreasonableness of the result produced by one among alternative possible interpretations of a statute is reason for rejecting that interpretation in favor of another that would produce a reasonable result.”).

2022By imposing the duty on residential landlords but omitting it from the list of duties owed by a commercial landlord, "we can imply that the Legislature's exclusion . . . was intentional." In re Estate of Prestie, 122 Nev. 807, 814, 138 P.3d 520, 524 (2006) (recognizing "the fundamental rule of statutory construction that lt]he mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another" (quoting State v. Wyatt, 84 Nev. 731, 734, 448 P.2d 827, 829 (1968))).

2022By imposing the duty on residential landlords but omitting it from the list of duties owed by a commercial landlord, "we can imply that the Legislature's exclusion . . . was intentional." In re Estate of Prestie, 122 Nev. 807, 814, 138 P.3d 520, 524 (2006) (recognizing "the fundamental rule of statutory construction that lt]he mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another" (quoting State v. Wyatt, 84 Nev. 731, 734, 448 P.2d 827, 829 (1968))).

2016Because arbitration is fundamentally a matter of contract, "[w]hether enforcing an agreement to arbitrate or construing an arbitration clause, courts and arbitrators must 'give effect to the contractual rights and expectations of the parties." Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Intl Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 682 (2010) (quoting Volt Info.

2016Because arbitration is fundamentally a matter of contract, "[w]hether enforcing an agreement to arbitrate or construing an arbitration clause, courts and arbitrators must 'give effect to the contractual rights and expectations of the parties." Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Intl Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 682 (2010) (quoting Volt Info.

2015The prosecutor's question did not constitute misconduct because opposing parties are allowed to explore and challenge the basis of an expert witness's opinion See NRS 50.285(2) (an expert may base his opinion on facts and data that are not admissible in evidence); Blake v. State, 121 Nev. 779, 790 , 121 P.3d 567, 574 (2005) ("It is a fundamental principle in our jurisprudence to allow an opposing party to explore and challenge through cross-examination the basis of an expert witness's opinion."); Anderson v. Berrum, 36 Nev. 463, 469 , 136 P. 973 , 976 (1913) ("On cross-examination it is compet

2015The prosecutor's question did not constitute misconduct because opposing parties are allowed to explore and challenge the basis of an expert witness's opinion See NRS 50.285(2) (an expert may base his opinion on facts and data that are not admissible in evidence); Blake v. State, 121 Nev. 779, 790, 121 P.3d 567, 574 (2005) ("It is a fundamental principle in our jurisprudence to allow an opposing party to explore and challenge through cross-examination the basis of an expert witness's opinion."); Anderson v. Berrum, 36 Nev. 463, 469, 136 P. 973, 976 (1913) ("On cross-examination it is competent

1996If the statute lacks clear meaning on its face, "[i]t is well established that the court must interpret [the statute] consistent with the intent of the legislature." Steward v. Steward, 111 Nev. 295, 302 , 890 P.2d 777, 781 (1995); see Sheriff v. Morris, 99 Nev. 109, 117 , 659 P.2d 852, 858 (1983) (concluding that it is "a fundamental principle of statutory construction that where at all possible, statutes should be construed so as to give effect to the legislative intent").

1996If the statute lacks clear meaning on its face, "[i]t is well established that the court must interpret [the statute] consistent with the intent of the legislature." Steward v. Steward, 111 Nev. 295, 302 , 890 P.2d 777, 781 (1995); see Sheriff v. Morris, 99 Nev. 109, 117 , 659 P.2d 852, 858 (1983) (concluding that it is "a fundamental principle of statutory construction that where at all possible, statutes should be construed so as to give effect to the legislative intent").

1996If the statute lacks clear meaning on its face, "[i]t is well established that the court must interpret [the statute] consistent with the intent of the legislature." Steward v. Steward, 111 Nev. 295, 302 , 890 P.2d 777, 781 (1995); see Sheriff v. Morris, 99 Nev. 109, 117 , 659 P.2d 852, 858 (1983) (concluding that it is "a fundamental principle of statutory construction that where at all possible, statutes should be construed so as to give effect to the legislative intent").

1996If the statute lacks clear meaning on its face, "[i]t is well established that the court must interpret [the statute] consistent with the intent of the legislature." Steward v. Steward, 111 Nev. 295, 302 , 890 P.2d 777, 781 (1995); see Sheriff v. Morris, 99 Nev. 109, 117 , 659 P.2d 852, 858 (1983) (concluding that it is "a fundamental principle of statutory construction that where at all possible, statutes should be construed so as to give effect to the legislative intent").

2016Under the FAA, arbitration agreements "shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." 9 U.S.C. § 2 This provision expresses "both a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration, and the fundamental principle that arbitration is a matter of contract." 3 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 , 339 (2011) (quotations and internal citations omitted).

2016Under the FAA, arbitration agreements "shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." 9 U.S.C. § 2 This provision expresses "both a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration, and the fundamental principle that arbitration is a matter of contract." 3 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 , 339 (2011) (quotations and internal citations omitted).

1984Woofter v. O’Donnell, 91 Nev. 756, 762 , 542 P.2d 1396, 1400 (1975). *298 “A fundamental rule of statutory interpretation is that the unreasonableness of the result produced by one among alternative possible interpretations of a statute is reason for rejecting that interpretation in favor of another that would produce a reasonable result.” Sheriff v. Smith, 91 Nev. at 733 , 542 P.2d at 443 .

1984Woofter v. O’Donnell, 91 Nev. 756, 762 , 542 P.2d 1396, 1400 (1975). *298 “A fundamental rule of statutory interpretation is that the unreasonableness of the result produced by one among alternative possible interpretations of a statute is reason for rejecting that interpretation in favor of another that would produce a reasonable result.” Sheriff v. Smith, 91 Nev. at 733 , 542 P.2d at 443 .

2023"A fundamental principle of the First Amen.dmentis that all persons have access to places where they can speak and listen, and then, after reflection, speak and listen once inOre." Packingham v..North Carolina, 582 U.S. 98, 104. (2017).

2023"A fundamental principle of the First Amen.dmentis that all persons have access to places where they can speak and listen, and then, after reflection, speak and listen once inOre." Packingham v..North Carolina, 582 U.S. 98, 104 . (2017).

2022Moreover, the majority's reasoning also ignores our recognition that the Legislature must maintain a "flooe in the education system, Schwartz, 132 Nev. at 750, 382 P.3d at 898, and renders such duty illusory, as the Legislature can refuse to fund education at a basic threshold level with no remedy for those left without the fundamental education needed to be successful adults, see Wyphoski v. Sparks Nugget, Inc., 112 Nev. 413, 416 , 915 P.2d 261, 263 (1996) (Steffen, C.J., dissenting) (explaining "the fundamental principle of our civil justice system that 'where there is a wrong, there is a re

2022Moreover, the majority's reasoning also ignores our recognition that the Legislature must maintain a "flooe in the education system, Schwartz, 132 Nev. at 750, 382 P.3d at 898, and renders such duty illusory, as the Legislature can refuse to fund education at a basic threshold level with no remedy for those left without the fundamental education needed to be successful adults, see Wyphoski v. Sparks Nugget, Inc., 112 Nev. 413, 416 , 915 P.2d 261, 263 (1996) (Steffen, C.J., dissenting) (explaining "the fundamental principle of our civil justice system that 'where there is a wrong, there is a re

2022Moreover, the majority's reasoning also ignores our recognition that the Legislature must maintain a "flooe in the education system, Schwartz, 132 Nev. at 750, 382 P.3d at 898, and renders such duty illusory, as the Legislature can refuse to fund education at a basic threshold level with no remedy for those left without the fundamental education needed to be successful adults, see Wyphoski v. Sparks Nugget, Inc., 112 Nev. 413, 416, 915 P.2d 261, 263 (1996) (Steffen, C.J., dissenting) (explaining "the fundamental principle of our civil justice system that 'where there is a wrong, there is a rem

2022Moreover, the majority's reasoning also ignores our recognition that the Legislature must maintain a "flooe in the education system, Schwartz, 132 Nev. at 750, 382 P.3d at 898, and renders such duty illusory, as the Legislature can refuse to fund education at a basic threshold level with no remedy for those left without the fundamental education needed to be successful adults, see Wyphoski v. Sparks Nugget, Inc., 112 Nev. 413, 416 , 915 P.2d 261, 263 (1996) (Steffen, C.J., dissenting) (explaining "the fundamental principle of our civil justice system that 'where there is a wrong, there is a re

2021VI, cl. 2; Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372 (2000) ("A fundamental principle of the Constitution is that Congress has the power to preempt state law.").

2021VI, cl. 2; Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372 (2000) ("A fundamental principle of the Constitution is that Congress has the power to preempt state law.").

2016See In re Estate of Prestie, 122 Nev. 807, 814 , 138 P.3d 520, 524 (2006) ("We have previously recognized the fundamental rule of statutory construction that the mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another." (internal alterations and quotation marks omitted)); Waite v. Burgess, 69 Nev. 230 , 233-34 245 P.2d 994, 996 (1952) (indicating that the legislature may set fixed time limits for individuals' actions but not for the actions of courts); cf. Urshan v. Musicians' Credit Union, 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d 839, 843-44 (Ct. App. 2004) (noting that courts do not have authority to shorten statutor

2016See In re Estate of Prestie, 122 Nev. 807, 814 , 138 P.3d 520, 524 (2006) ("We have previously recognized the fundamental rule of statutory construction that the mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another." (internal alterations and quotation marks omitted)); Waite v. Burgess, 69 Nev. 230 , 233-34 245 P.2d 994, 996 (1952) (indicating that the legislature may set fixed time limits for individuals' actions but not for the actions of courts); cf. Urshan v. Musicians' Credit Union, 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d 839, 843-44 (Ct. App. 2004) (noting that courts do not have authority to shorten statutor

2016See In re Estate of Prestie, 122 Nev. 807, 814 , 138 P.3d 520, 524 (2006) ("We have previously recognized the fundamental rule of statutory construction that the mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another." (internal alterations and quotation marks omitted)); Waite v. Burgess, 69 Nev. 230 , 233-34 245 P.2d 994, 996 (1952) (indicating that the legislature may set fixed time limits for individuals' actions but not for the actions of courts); cf. Urshan v. Musicians' Credit Union, 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d 839, 843-44 (Ct. App. 2004) (noting that courts do not have authority to shorten statutor

2013NRS 174.035(5)(a)(2) permits use of the insanity defense by persons who do not "appreciate that his or her conduct was wrong, meaning not authorized by law." We conclude that this definition does not offend equal protection because our decision in Finger v. State only requires that the defense is not abolished or "defined in such a way that undermines a fundamental principle of our system of justice." 117 Nev. 548, 575 , 27 P.3d 66, 84 (2001); see M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng.

2013NRS 174.035(5)(a)(2) permits use of the insanity defense by persons who do not "appreciate that his or her conduct was wrong, meaning not authorized by law." We conclude that this definition does not offend equal protection because our decision in Finger v. State only requires that the defense is not abolished or "defined in such a way that undermines a fundamental principle of our system of justice." 117 Nev. 548, 575 , 27 P.3d 66, 84 (2001); see M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng.

2012The rule of lenity teaches that, “Ambiguity in a statute defining a crime or imposing a penalty should be resolved in the defendant’s favor.” Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 296 (Thomson/West 2012); Lucero, 127 Nev. at 99 , 249 P.3d at 1230 (the “ ‘rule of lenity demands that ambiguities in criminal statutes be liberally interpreted in the accused’s favor’ ” (quoting Moore v. State, 122 Nev. 27, 32 , 126 P.3d 508, 511 (2006))); see United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 514 (2008) (“[tjhis venerable rule . . . vindicates the fundamental principl

2012The rule of lenity teaches that, “Ambiguity in a statute defining a crime or imposing a penalty should be resolved in the defendant’s favor.” Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 296 (Thomson/West 2012); Lucero, 127 Nev. at 99 , 249 P.3d at 1230 (the “ ‘rule of lenity demands that ambiguities in criminal statutes be liberally interpreted in the accused’s favor’ ” (quoting Moore v. State, 122 Nev. 27, 32 , 126 P.3d 508, 511 (2006))); see United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 514 (2008) (“[tjhis venerable rule . . . vindicates the fundamental principl

2012The rule of lenity teaches that, “Ambiguity in a statute defining a crime or imposing a penalty should be resolved in the defendant’s favor.” Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 296 (Thomson/West 2012); Lucero, 127 Nev. at 99 , 249 P.3d at 1230 (the “ ‘rule of lenity demands that ambiguities in criminal statutes be liberally interpreted in the accused’s favor’ ” (quoting Moore v. State, 122 Nev. 27, 32 , 126 P.3d 508, 511 (2006))); see United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 514 (2008) (“[tjhis venerable rule . . . vindicates the fundamental principl

2012The rule of lenity teaches that, “Ambiguity in a statute defining a crime or imposing a penalty should be resolved in the defendant’s favor.” Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 296 (Thomson/West 2012); Lucero, 127 Nev. at 99 , 249 P.3d at 1230 (the “ ‘rule of lenity demands that ambiguities in criminal statutes be liberally interpreted in the accused’s favor’ ” (quoting Moore v. State, 122 Nev. 27, 32 , 126 P.3d 508, 511 (2006))); see United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 514 (2008) (“[tjhis venerable rule . . . vindicates the fundamental principl

2012The rule of lenity teaches that, “Ambiguity in a statute defining a crime or imposing a penalty should be resolved in the defendant’s favor.” Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 296 (Thomson/West 2012); Lucero, 127 Nev. at 99 , 249 P.3d at 1230 (the “ ‘rule of lenity demands that ambiguities in criminal statutes be liberally interpreted in the accused’s favor’ ” (quoting Moore v. State, 122 Nev. 27, 32 , 126 P.3d 508, 511 (2006))); see United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 514 (2008) (“[tjhis venerable rule . . . vindicates the fundamental principl

2011They “are in derogation of the search for truth,” United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974), cited in Ashokan v. State, Dep’t of Ins., 109 Nev. 662, 668 , 856 P.2d 244, 247 (1993), “contraven[e] ... the fundamental principle that ‘the public . . . has the right to every man’s evidence,’ ” Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 19 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 50 (1980)), and often their “benefits are, at best, ‘indirect and speculative.’” Whitehead v. Comm’n on Jud.

2011They “are in derogation of the search for truth,” United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974), cited in Ashokan v. State, Dep’t of Ins., 109 Nev. 662, 668 , 856 P.2d 244, 247 (1993), “contraven[e] ... the fundamental principle that ‘the public . . . has the right to every man’s evidence,’ ” Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 19 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 50 (1980)), and often their “benefits are, at best, ‘indirect and speculative.’” Whitehead v. Comm’n on Jud.

2011Discipline, 110 Nev. *328 380, 415, 873 P.2d 946, 968 (1994) (quoting In re Grand Jury Investigations, 599 F.2d 1224, 1235 (3d Cir. 1979)).