fundamental error (Indiana) · Go Syfert
← Indiana issues

fundamental error in Indiana

1,774 Indiana opinions name it 3 courts 1868–2026 54 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Indiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (77)

CaseFollowedCited
Mathews v. Stategreen
ind · 2006 · cited in 115 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2007–2025
2 sentences

2025The Court explained: The fundamental error exception is “extremely narrow, and applies only when the error constitutes a blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or potential for harm is substantial, and the resulting error denies the defendant fundamental due process.” Mathews v. State, 849 N.E.2d 578, 587 (Ind. 2006).

2025Specifically, the State argues that “[q]uestions of double jeopardy implicate fundamental rights and, as such, may be raised for the first time on appeal, or even by this [C]ourt sua sponte.” Id. (quoting Howell v. State, 97 N.E.3d 253, 263 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), trans. denied). [20] Under the fundamental error doctrine, we may review an issue raised by a party for the first time on appeal if the alleged error “‘constitutes a blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or potential for harm is substantial, and the resulting error denies the defendant fundamental due process.’” Halliburton,

108115
Benson v. Stategreen
ind · 2002 · cited in 101 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2004–2024
2 sentences

2024Ryan v. State, 9 N.E.3d 663, 667-68 (Ind. 2014). [57] “Fundamental error is an extremely narrow exception to the waiver rule where the defendant faces the heavy burden of showing that the alleged errors are so prejudicial to the defendant’s rights as to ‘make a fair trial impossible.’” Ryan, 9 N.E.3d at 668 (quoting Benson v. State, 762 N.E.2d 748, 756 (Ind. 2002)).

2020“Fundamental error is an extremely narrow exception to the waiver rule where the defendant faces the heavy burden of showing that the alleged errors are so prejudicial to the defendant’s rights as to ‘make a fair trial impossible.’” Id. at 668 (quoting Benson v. State, 762 N.E.2d 748, 756 (Ind. 2002)).

91101
Brown v. Stategreen
ind · 2010 · cited in 127 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2010–2025
2 sentences

2023The fundamental error exception to the contemporaneous-objection requirement applies only “when the error Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-917| April 24, 2023 Page 12 of 17 constitutes a blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or potential for harm is substantial, and the resulting error denies the defendant fundamental due process.” Brown v. State, 929 N.E.2d 204, 207 (Ind. 2010) (quotation omitted).

2021Acknowledging that he did not preserve the issue below, Smith claims that the error was fundamental because it brought attention to his absence and violated “his right against self-incrimination without any adverse comment at trial.” Appellant’s Brief at 10. [12] The fundamental error exception is exceedingly narrow and applies only where “the error constitutes a blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or potential for harm is substantial, and the resulting error denies the defendant fundamental due process.” Brown v. State, 929 N.E.2d 204, 207 (Ind. 2010) (quoting Mathews v. State, 84

85127
Bruce Ryan v. State of Indianagreen
ind · 2014 · cited in 118 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2014–2026
2 sentences

2026Fundamental error is meant to permit appellate courts a means to correct the most egregious and blatant trial errors that otherwise would have been procedurally barred, “not to provide a second bite at the apple for defense counsel who ignorantly, carelessly, or strategically fail to preserve an error.” Id.

2026Foster must, therefore, show that the alleged prosecutorial misconduct constituted fundamental error. [22] “Fundamental error is an extremely narrow exception to the waiver rule where the defendant faces the heavy burden of showing that the alleged errors are so prejudicial to the defendant’s rights as to make a fair trial impossible.” Ryan, 9 N.E.3d at 668 .

78118
Clark v. Stategreen
ind · 2009 · cited in 50 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2010–2025
2 sentences

2024Fundamental error “occurs only when the error ‘makes a fair trial impossible or constitutes clearly blatant violations of basic and elementary principles of due process presenting an undeniable and substantial potential for harm.’” Strack v. State, 186 N.E.3d 99 , 103 (Ind. 2022) (quoting Clark v. State, 915 N.E.2d 126, 131 (Ind. 2009)).

2024“Fundamental error is an error that makes a fair trial impossible or constitutes clearly blatant violations of basic and elementary principles of due process presenting an undeniable and substantial potential for harm.” Clark v. State, 915 N.E.2d 126, 131 (Ind. 2009).

4550
Cooper v. Stategreen
ind · 2006 · cited in 75 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2008–2026
2 sentences

2025See Ind. Evidence Rule 103; Sampson v. State, 38 N.E.3d 985, 992 (Ind. 2015). [10] “Fundamental error is an extremely narrow exception that allows a defendant to avoid waiver of an issue.” Cooper v. State, 854 N.E.2d 831, 835 (Ind. 2006).

2019Fundamental error is an extremely narrow exception to the waiver rule where the defendant faces the heavy burden of showing that the alleged errors are so prejudicial to the defendant’s rights as to “make a fair trial impossible.” Benson v. State, 762 N.E.2d 748, 756 (Ind. 2002), quoted in Castillo, 974 N.E.2d at 468 and Cooper, 854 N.E.2d at 835 . . . .

2975
Jewell v. Stategreen
ind · 2008 · cited in 40 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2009–2025
2 sentences

2025Rather, a fundamental error is such a gross error that it renders any possibility of a fair trial “impossible.” Jewell v. State, 887 N.E.2d 939, 942 (Ind. 2008).

2020The fundamental error doctrine is extremely narrow and “‘available only when the record reveals a clearly blatant violation of basic elementary principles, where the harm or potential for harm cannot be denied, and which violation is so prejudicial to the rights of the defendant as to make a fair trial impossible.’” Matter of Eq.W, 124 N.E.3d 1201, 1214-1215 (quoting Jewell v. State, 887 N.E.2d 939, 942 (Ind. 2008)).

2640
Delarosa v. Stategreen
ind · 2010 · cited in 35 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2011–2024
2 sentences

2024“The fundamental error exception is ‘extremely narrow, and applies only when the error constitutes a blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or potential for harm is substantial, and the resulting error denies the defendant fundamental due process.’” Delarosa v. State, 938 N.E.2d 690, 694 (Ind. 2010) (quoting Matthews v. State, 849 N.E.2d Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-783 | January 24, 2024 Page 23 of 33 578, 587 (Ind. 2006)).

2020Id. [45] The fundamental error exception to the waiver rule is “extremely narrow.” Benson v. State, 762 N.E.2d 748, 755 (Ind. 2002).

2635
Taylor v. Stategreen
ind · 1999 · cited in 25 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2000–2020
2 sentences

2020Taylor v. State, 717 N.E.2d 90, 93 (Ind. 1999). [9] Booker argues the trial court committed fundamental error when it admitted his confession to Officer Montgomery at the scene because Officer Montgomery did not first advise Booker of his Miranda rights.

2013“A fundamental error is a substantial, blatant violation of basic principles of due process rendering the trial unfair to the 10 defendant.” Taylor v. State, 717 N.E.2d 90, 93 (Ind. 1999).

2525
Tyrice J. Halliburton v. State of Indianagreen
ind · 2013 · cited in 32 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2014–2025
2 sentences

2025Specifically, the State argues that “[q]uestions of double jeopardy implicate fundamental rights and, as such, may be raised for the first time on appeal, or even by this [C]ourt sua sponte.” Id. (quoting Howell v. State, 97 N.E.3d 253, 263 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), trans. denied). [20] Under the fundamental error doctrine, we may review an issue raised by a party for the first time on appeal if the alleged error “‘constitutes a blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or potential for harm is substantial, and the resulting error denies the defendant fundamental due process.’” Halliburton,

2025Specifically, the State argues that “[q]uestions of double jeopardy implicate fundamental rights and, as such, may be raised for the first time on appeal, or even by this [C]ourt sua sponte.” Id. (quoting Howell v. State, 97 N.E.3d 253, 263 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), trans. denied). [20] Under the fundamental error doctrine, we may review an issue raised by a party for the first time on appeal if the alleged error “‘constitutes a blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or potential for harm is substantial, and the resulting error denies the defendant fundamental due process.’” Halliburton,

2432
Barany v. Stategreen
ind · 1995 · cited in 20 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 1997–2020
2 sentences

2020A fundamental error is such a gross error that it renders a fair trial “‘impossible.’” Hardley, 905 N.E.2d at 402 (quoting Barany v. State, 658 N.E.2d 60, 64 (Ind. 1995)).

2020Rather, a fundamental error is such a gross error that it renders any possibility of a fair trial “‘impossible.’” Hardley, 905 N.E.2d at 402 (quoting Barany v. State, 658 N.E.2d 60, 64 (Ind. 1995)). [6] Deputy Ranke testified that had been familiar with Luther previous to March 22, 2019, testimony that Luther claims prevented him from receiving a fair trial.

2020
Brown v. Stategreen
ind · 2003 · cited in 22 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2007–2020
2 sentences

2020The fundamental error exception is “available only in ‘egregious circumstances.’” Brown v. State, 929 N.E.2d 204, 207 (Ind. 2010) (quoting Brown v. State, 799 N.E.2d 1064, 1068 (Ind. 2003)), reh’g denied.

2019The fundamental error exception is available only in “‘egregious circumstances.’” Id. at 207 (quoting Brown v. State, 799 N.E.2d 1064, 1068 (Ind. 2003)). [21] A recording is admissible when, “taken as a whole, [it is] of such clarity that it does not lead the jury to speculate about its contents.” Hall v. State, 897 N.E.2d 979, 981 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008).

1922
Mathews v. Eldridgegreen
scotus · 1976 · cited in 33 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 1994–2026
2 sentences

2026See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 333 (noting that the fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner).3 Conclusion [34] The trial court's proceedings did not comport with due process.

2026Indiana Code Section 31-32-2-3(b) provides that, in proceedings to terminate the parent-child relationship, “[a] parent, guardian, or custodian is entitled: (1) to cross-examine witnesses; (2) to obtain witnesses or tangible evidence by compulsory process; and (3) to introduce evidence on behalf of the parent, guardian, or custodian.” [20] The United States Supreme Court has stated that “‘the fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-JT-3154 | May 11, 2026 Page 11 of 14 and in a meaningful manner.’” C.G.

1733
Booher v. Stategreen
ind · 2002 · cited in 24 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2008–2020
2 sentences

2020Booher v. State, 773 N.E.2d 814, 818 (Ind. 2002). [18] Fundamental error is an extremely narrow exception to waiver, and a defendant faces the heavy burden of demonstrating that the alleged error was so prejudicial to his rights that it rendered a fair trial impossible.

2020Booher v. State, 773 N.E.2d 814, 818 (Ind. 2002). [12] Fundamental error is an extremely narrow exception to waiver, and a defendant faces the heavy burden of demonstrating that the alleged error was so prejudicial to his rights that it rendered a fair trial impossible.

1624
Mitchell v. Stategreen
ind · 2000 · cited in 17 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2000–2016
2 sentences

2016See Garrett, 737 N.E.2d at 391 ; Mitchell, 726 N.E.2d at 1235 . [13] Furthermore, in Decker, the court simply applied the fundamental error exception to the general rule requiring a contemporaneous objection.

2010The fundamental error doctrine has been described as "extremely narrow," and to qualify as fundamental error " 'an error must be so prejudicial to the rights of the defendant as to make a fair trial impossible."" Id. at 684 (quoting Mitchell v. State, 726 N.E.2d 1228, 1236 (Ind.2000), overruled on other grounds by Robinson v. State, 805 N.E2d 783, 787 (Ind.2004)).

1617
Bailey v. Stategreen
ind · 1985 · cited in 19 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 1986–2010
2 sentences

2010Moreover, we note that application of the fundamental error doctrine is particularly appropriate when the error asserted is deprivation of the constitutional right to counsel: While concerns over due process do sometimes merit invocation of a fundamental error exception to the contemporaneous objection rule on direct appeal, we think its availability as an exception to the waiver rule in post-conviction proceedings is generally limited to those circumstances we set forth in Bailey v. State, 472 N.E.2d 1260, 1263 (Ind.1985): "Deprivation of the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of c

2008While concerns over due process do sometimes merit invocation of a fundamental error exception to the contemporaneous objection rule on direct appeal, we think its availability as an exception to the waiver rule in post-conviction proceedings is generally limited to those circumstances we set forth in Bailey v. State, 472 N.E.2d 1260, 1263 (Ind.1985): “Deprivation of the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel, or ... an issue demonstrably unavailable to the petitioner at the time of his [or her] trial and direct appeal.” Here, as noted in the text, Canaan did not raise these

1519
Randy L. Knapp v. State of Indianagreen
ind · 2014 · cited in 16 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2014–2023
2 sentences

2019Waiver notwithstanding, we will review the alleged error under the fundamental error analysis. 2 [9] “An error is fundamental. . . if it ‘made a fair trial impossible or constituted a clearly blatant violation of basic and elementary principles of due process presenting an undeniable and substantial potential for harm.’” Durden v. State, 99 N.E.3d 645, 652 (Ind. 2018) (quoting Knapp v. State, 9 N.E.3d 1274, 1281 (Ind. 2014)).

2019The fundamental error exception is “extremely narrow,” Matthews v. State, 849 N.E.2d 578, 587 (Ind. 2006), and a “daunting standard[,]” applicable only in Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-94 | November 20, 2019 Page 18 of 30 egregious circumstances, Knapp v. State, 9 N.E.3d 1274, 1281 (Ind. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S.Ct. 978 (2015). [21] Indiana Code section 35-37-3-1 provides the proper procedure when a witness refuses to testify: (a) If a witness, in any hearing or trial occurring after an indictment or information has been filed, refuses to answer any question . . .

1516
Hayworth v. Stategreen
indctapp · 2009 · cited in 16 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2009–2019
2 sentences

2009The fundamental error exception "applies only when the error constitutes a blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or potential for harm is substantial, and the resulting error denies the defendant fundamental due process." Hayworth v. State, 904 N.E.2d 684, 694 (Ind.Ct.App.2009) (quoting McQueen, 862 N.E.2d at 1241 ).

2009The fundamental error exception "applies only when the error constitutes a blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or potential for harm is substantial, and the resulting error denies the defendant fundamental due process." Hayworth v. State, 904 N.E.2d 684, 694 (Ind.Ct.App.2009) (quoting McQueen, 862 N.E.2d at 1241 ).

1516
Sanders v. Stategreen
ind · 2002 · cited in 20 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2002–2018
2 sentences

2018See Reed v. State , 866 N.E.2d 767 , 768 (Ind. 2007) (holding that only issues not known at the time of the original trial or issues not available on direct appeal may be properly raised through post-conviction proceedings); Sanders v. State , 765 N.E.2d 591 , 592 (Ind. 2002) (holding that in "post-conviction proceedings, complaints that something went awry at trial are generally cognizable only when they show deprivation of the right to effective counsel or issues demonstrably unavailable at the time of trial or direct appeal" and that it is wrong to review the petitioner's fundamental error

2017Conclusion [28] For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of Eldridge’s petition for post-conviction relief. [29] Affirmed. 4 To the extent Eldridge asserts fundamental error, the Indiana Supreme Court has stated that it is wrong to review a fundamental error claim in a post-conviction proceeding, that “the fundamental error exception to the contemporaneous objection rule applies to direct appeals,” and that “[i]n post-conviction proceedings, complaints that something went awry at trial are generally cognizable only when they show deprivation of the right to effec

1420
Townsend v. Stategreen
ind · 1994 · cited in 16 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 1995–2014
2 sentences

1996Fundamental error is error that is a "substantial blatant violation of basic principles rendering the trial unfair to the defendant." Townsend v. State, 632 N.E.2d 727, 7830 (Ind.1994); see Faulisi v. State, 602 N.E.2d 1082 , 1088 (Ind.Ct.App.1992), trans. denied (defining fundamental error as error so blatant and prejudicial that if not corrected would deny the defendant due process).

1996James v. State, 613 N.E.2d 15, 25 (Ind.1993) (holding that a party may not fail to object to a court’s action and then raise the court’s action as error on appeal unless the error is fundamental.) Fundamental error is error that is a “substantial blatant violation of basic principles rendering the trial unfair to the defendant.” Townsend v. State, 632 N.E.2d 727, 730 (Ind.1994).

1416
Wilson v. Stategreen
ind · 1987 · cited in 14 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 1999–2020
2 sentences

2013A fundamental error “must constitute a blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or potential for harm must be substantial, and the resulting error must deny the defendant fundamental due process.” Wilson v. State, 514 N.E.2d 282, 284 (Ind. 1987).

2013Although other panels of this Court have applied this standard in addition to a fundamental error analysis when the defendant failed to preserve the error, see Sobolewski v. State, 889 N.E.2d 849, 857 (Ind.Ct.App.2008), trans. denied, and Herron v. State, 801 N.E.2d 761, 766 (Ind.Ct.App.2004), our supreme court has stated that the *791 "mere fact that an alleged error implicates constitutional issues does not establish that fundamental error has occurred.” Baird v. State, 688 N.E.2d 911, 917 (Ind.1997); Wilson v. State, 514 N.E.2d 282, 284 (Ind.1987), cert. denied (1998). 6 .

1414
Warriner v. Stategreen
ind · 1982 · cited in 18 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 1982–2019
2 sentences

2019The fundamental error doctrine is very narrow, and it arises only when there are “clearly blatant violations of basic and elementary principles, and the harm or potential for harm could not be denied.” Warriner v. State, 435 N.E.2d 562, 563 (Ind. 1982).

2019See Tharpe v. State, 955 N.E.2d 836, 839 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (appellant can argue fundamental error to overcome waiver of issue), trans. denied. [9] Fundamental error occurs when a decision violates “basic and elementary principles, and the harm or potential for harm [can] not be denied.” Warriner v. State, 435 N.E.2d 562, 563 (Ind. 1982).

1318
Boesch v. Stategreen
ind · 2002 · cited in 15 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2004–2020
2 sentences

2020Thus, to prevail on appeal, Littleton must demonstrate that the court committed fundamental error. [20] The fundamental error rule is “extremely narrow” and occurs “only when the error ‘constitutes a blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or potential for harm is substantial, and the resulting error denies the defendant fundamental due process.’” Kimbrough v. State, 911 N.E.2d 621, 634 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (quoting Boesch v. State, 778 N.E.2d 1276, 1279 (Ind. 2002)). [21] On appeal, Littleton makes thorough and cogent argument on the question of whether the trial court abused its disc

2019In Boesch, upon which we rely for the foregoing standard, the petitioner claimed that an erroneous jury instruction rose to the level of fundamental error. 778 N.E.2d at 1279 .

1215
Trice v. Stategreen
ind · 2002 · cited in 13 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2010–2018
1213
Benefield v. Stategreen
indctapp · 2011 · cited in 12 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2012–2020
1212
Maul v. Stategreen
ind · 2000 · cited in 12 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2001–2019
1212
Armstrong v. Stategreen
ind · 2006 · cited in 12 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2009–2017
1212
Wallace v. Stategreen
ind · 2009 · cited in 16 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2009–2024
2 sentences

2024The purpose of our prohibition against ex post facto laws “is to give effect to the fundamental principle that persons have a right to fair warning of that conduct which will give rise to criminal penalties.” Wallace v. State, 905 N.E.2d 371, 377 (Ind. 2009). [7] Shibli acknowledges that, after he had been convicted in 1998, Indiana law had required him to register as a sex offender in Indiana for ten years and that Florida law had required him to register for life.

2023“The underlying purpose of the Ex Post Facto Clause is to give effect to the fundamental principle that persons have a right to a fair warning of that conduct which will give rise to criminal penalties.” Wallace v. State, 905 N.E.2d 371, 377 (Ind. 2009). [13] As Holladay admits, his Kentucky offense and subsequent move to Indiana both occurred in 2008.

1116
Hall v. Stategreen
indctapp · 2010 · cited in 11 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2012–2016
1111
Whiting v. Stategreen
ind · 2012 · cited in 14 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2014–2025
2 sentences

2025The Whiting Court also declined to extend the fundamental-error exception to preserve incentives for counsel “to exercise peremptory challenges curatively[.]” Id.

2025However, our Supreme Court declined to extend the fundamental-error exception to procedural defaults under the exhaustion rule, as doing so would “both weaken the exhaustion rule and utilize fundamental error not as a ‘narrow exception’ but as Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-2330 | May 15, 2025 Page 7 of 12 the general rule.” Whiting v. State, 969 N.E.2d 24, 34 (Ind. 2012).

1014
Lehman v. Stategreen
indctapp · 2010 · cited in 13 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2011–2020
1013
Charlton v. Stategreen
ind · 1998 · cited in 13 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 1999–2004
1013
Carter v. Stategreen
ind · 2001 · cited in 10 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2002–2017
1010
Reginald Harris v. State of Indianagreen
ind · 2017 · cited in 10 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2017–2020
910
Willey v. Stategreen
ind · 1999 · cited in 10 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2000–2015
910
Adrian Durden v. State of Indianagreen
ind · 2018 · cited in 16 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2018–2025
2 sentences

2025Fundamental error is “extremely narrow” and “encompasses only errors so blatant that the trial judge should have acted independently to correct the situation.” Id. (emphasis added; quotation marks omitted).

2025Further, if the trial judge “could recognize a viable reason why an effective attorney might not object, the error is not blatant enough to constitute fundamental error.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). [19] As we summarized in Willoughby: Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-2232 | March 19, 2025 Page 12 of 26 if the trial court can imagine any viable reason for defense counsel to not object or otherwise to proceed in a certain manner at trial, the trial court has no obligation under the fundamental error doctrine to interject itself into the proceedings on the defendant’s behalf.

816
Ramsey v. Stategreen
ind · 2000 · cited in 9 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2000–2024
89
Boatright v. Stategreen
ind · 2001 · cited in 9 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2002–2019
89
Davis v. Stategreen
indctapp · 2005 · cited in 8 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2012–2017
88
Sasser v. Stategreen
indctapp · 2011 · cited in 8 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2011–2015
88

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Indiana. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (3)

CaseCitedYears
Johnson v. State green
ind · 1979
2 sentences

1993"Fundamental error is error that, if not rectified, would deny a defendant fundamental due process." Warriner v. State (1982), Ind., 435 N.E.2d 562, 563 , citing Johnson v. State (1979), 271 Ind. 145 , 390 N.E.2d 1005 , cert. denied sub nom. 444 U.S. 944 , 100 S.Ct. 302 , 62 LEd.2d 312.

1993"Fundamental error is error that, if not rectified, would deny a defendant fundamental due process." Warriner v. State (1982), Ind., 435 N.E.2d 562, 563 , citing Johnson v. State (1979), 271 Ind. 145 , 390 N.E.2d 1005 , cert. denied sub nom. 444 U.S. 944 , 100 S.Ct. 302 , 62 LEd.2d 312.

161982–1997
Canaan v. Indiana green
scotus · 1998
72000–2012
Call v. United States green
scotus · 1998
71998–2008

Statutes the citing opinions construe

IN § Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1 (173) IN § Ind. Code § 35-42-4-3 (120) IN § Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1 (88) IN § Ind. Code § 35-42-5-1 (79) IN § Ind. Code § 35-50-2-8 (72) IN § Ind. Code § 35-50-2-4 (61) IN § Ind. Code § 35-41-5-1 (60)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

CA 2851 (1859–2026) IN 1774 (1868–2026) FL 1771 (1926–2026) TX 1721 (1867–2026) IL 1588 (1871–2026) PA 1300 (1864–2026) IA 977 (1879–2026) NY 938 (1815–2026) KS 901 (1895–2026) NM 857 (1914–2026) NC 724 (1876–2026) AZ 704 (1908–2026) CT 693 (1899–2026) OH 653 (1876–2026) ID 554 (1905–2026) AL 485 (1876–2026) MI 474 (1851–2026) AR 430 (1899–2026) OK 424 (1893–2026) WA 388 (1890–2026) NJ 378 (1881–2026) LA 344 (1859–2026) GA 337 (1901–2026) MO 321 (1884–2025) MD 297 (1884–2026) MA 280 (1855–2026) SD 271 (1897–2026) WI 248 (1849–2026) KY 245 (1860–2026) NE 243 (1885–2026) TN 217 (1897–2026) WV 199 (1870–2026) OR 185 (1881–2026) MS 178 (1909–2026) MN 177 (1891–2026) VA 177 (1843–2025) CO 173 (1890–2026) ME 171 (1839–2026) MT 166 (1891–2026) SC 165 (1911–2026) RI 154 (1895–2026) UT 148 (1905–2026) HI 141 (1920–2026) VT 120 (1844–2026) WY 116 (1898–2025) DC 111 (1933–2026) ND 99 (1898–2025) DE 90 (1930–2026) NV 56 (1878–2023) NH 43 (1902–2025) AK 40 (1977–2025) VI 16 (1968–2025) PR 12 (1916–2010) MP 4 (1986–1993)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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