fundamental principle in Alaska

2013Cf. VinZant v. Elam, 977 P.2d 84, 86-87 (Alaska 1999) (deciding due process requires notice of issues to be addressed and decided at trial); A.M. v. State, 945 P.2d 296, 302 (Alaska 1997) ("Notice reasonably calculated to afford the parties an opportunity to present objections to a proceeding, and affording them a reasonable time do so, is a fundamental requirement of due process." (quoting Kerr v. Kerr, 779 P.2d 341, 342 (Alaska 1989). 20 . 520 P.2d 1352 (Alaska 1974). 21 .

1997The State replies that A.M. suffered no prejudice, “constitutionally or otherwise.” “Notice reasonably calculated to afford the parties an opportunity to present objections to a proceeding, and affording them a reasonable time to do so, is a fundamental requirement of due process.” Kerr v. Kerr, 779 P.2d 341, 342 (Alaska 1989).

2008More recently, in State v. Gonzalez, 825 P.2d 920 (Alaska App.1992), the court of appeals expressed hesitation to blindly adhere to changes in federal constitutional law where unexpected decisions of the Supreme Court "have forced a serious reevaluation of ... fundamentals." Id. at 981 (internal citations omitted).

2008More recently, in State v. Gonzalez, 825 P.2d 920 (Alaska App.1992), the court of appeals expressed hesitation to blindly adhere to changes in federal constitutional law where unexpected decisions of the Supreme Court "have forced a serious reevaluation of ... fundamentals." Id. at 981 (internal citations omitted).

2004See, e.g., In re State of New York, 256 U.S. 490, 497 , 41 S.Ct. 588 , 65 L.Ed. 1057 (1921) ("That a state may not be sued without its consent is a fundamental rule of jurisprudence. ..."); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 12-19 , 10 S.Ct. 504 , 33 L.Ed. 842 (1890) (basing state sovereign immunity in an interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment grounded on "the old law”); see also William A. Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment: A Narrow Construction of An Affirmative Grant of Jurisdiction Rather Than A Prohibition Against Jurisdiction, 35 Star L.Rev. 1033, 1071 (1983)

2004See, e.g., In re State of New York, 256 U.S. 490, 497 , 41 S.Ct. 588 , 65 L.Ed. 1057 (1921) ("That a state may not be sued without its consent is a fundamental rule of jurisprudence. ..."); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 12-19 , 10 S.Ct. 504 , 33 L.Ed. 842 (1890) (basing state sovereign immunity in an interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment grounded on "the old law”); see also William A. Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment: A Narrow Construction of An Affirmative Grant of Jurisdiction Rather Than A Prohibition Against Jurisdiction, 35 Star L.Rev. 1033, 1071 (1983)

1991See North Slope Borough v. Sohio Petroleum Corp., 585 P.2d 534, 540 (Alaska 1978) (“a fundamental principle of statutory interpretation is that a statute means what its language reasonably conveys to others”).

1989“While a fundamental principle of statutory interpretation is that a statute means what its language reasonably conveys to others, reference to legislative history may provide an insight which is helpful to making a judgment concerning what a statute means.” North Slope Borough v. Sohio Petroleum Co., 585 P.2d 534, 540 (Alaska 1978) (footnote omitted).

1989As indicated in Coleman , the fundamental inquiry in each case is whether "a prompt investigation [was] required ... as a matter of practical necessity." Coleman v. State, 553 P.2d at 46 (quoting Goss v. State, 390 P.2d 220, 224 (Alaska), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 859 , 85 S.Ct. 118 , 13 L.Ed.2d 62 (1964)).

1989As indicated in Coleman , the fundamental inquiry in each case is whether “a prompt investigation [was] required ... as a matter of practical necessity.” Coleman v. State, 553 P.2d at 46 (quoting Goss v. State, 390 P.2d 220, 224 (Alaska), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 859 , 85 S.Ct. 118 , 13 L.Ed.2d 62 (1964)).

1980In Alaska Public Utilities Commission v. Chugach Electric Association, 580 P.2d 687, 692 (Alaska 1978), (quoting Territory of Alaska v. American Can Co., 137 F.Supp. 181, 183 (D.C.Alaska 1956)), we said: “It is a fundamental rule of statutory construction that a general saving clause or statute preserves rights and liabilities which have accrued under the act repealed and that they operate to make applicable in designated situations the law as it existed before the repeal, unless such application is negatived by the express terms or clear implication of a particular repealing act, or where not

1978The law regarding general saving statutes was succinctly stated by the court in Territory of Alaska v. American Can Company, 137 F.Supp. 181 , 16 Alaska 71, 76 (1956), 7 as follows: It is a fundamental rule of statutory construction that a general saving clause or statute preserves rights and liabilities which have accrued under the act repealed and that they operate to make applicable in designated situations the law as it existed before the repeal, unless such application is negatived by the express terms or clear implication of a particular repealing act, or where not otherwise provided by

2013Id. at 1357-58 . 22 .

2013Cf. VinZant v. Elam, 977 P.2d 84, 86-87 (Alaska 1999) (deciding due process requires notice of issues to be addressed and decided at trial); A.M. v. State, 945 P.2d 296, 302 (Alaska 1997) ("Notice reasonably calculated to afford the parties an opportunity to present objections to a proceeding, and affording them a reasonable time do so, is a fundamental requirement of due process." (quoting Kerr v. Kerr, 779 P.2d 341, 342 (Alaska 1989). 20 . 520 P.2d 1352 (Alaska 1974). 21 .

2004L.REV. 1033, 1071 (1983) ("[The Eleventh Amendment] ... affirmed ... the traditional principle of sovereign immunity...."). [13] See Native Village of Stevens v. Alaska Mgmt. & Planning, 757 P.2d 32 , 41 n. 24 (Alaska 1988); Atkinson, 569 P.2d at 160 . [14] See Thebo, 66 F. at 376 (tribe "would soon be impoverished if it was subject to the jurisdiction of the courts"); Adams v. Murphy, 165 F. 304, 308 (8th Cir.1908) ("Upon considerations of public policy ...

2004See Native Village of Stevens v. Alaska Mgmt. & Planning, 757 P.2d 32 , 41 n. 24 (Alaska 1988); Atkinson, 569 P.2d at 160 . .

1994We address this function as the third essential attribute of an administrative proceeding. 17 .See Wickersham v. State, Commercial Fisheries Entry Comm’n, 680 P.2d 1135, 1144 (Alaska 1984) ("An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action.”) (quoting Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 , 70 S.Ct. 652, 657 , 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950)); see also Kerr v. Kerr, 779 P.2d 341, 342 (Alaska 1989) (“N

1994We address this function as the third essential attribute of an administrative proceeding. 17 .See Wickersham v. State, Commercial Fisheries Entry Comm’n, 680 P.2d 1135, 1144 (Alaska 1984) ("An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action.”) (quoting Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 , 70 S.Ct. 652, 657 , 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950)); see also Kerr v. Kerr, 779 P.2d 341, 342 (Alaska 1989) (“N

2023Breadth deals with the requirement that the scope of the warrant be limited by the probable cause on which the warrant is based.”27 “Specificity as to the objects at which a warrant is directed serves to protect against the possibility of a general, exploratory search, to assure that articles of property outside the legitimate scope of the warrant are not subject to mistaken seizure, and to reinforce the fundamental rule that seizure of property cannot be permitted in the absence of probable cause.”28 “As a rule, then, search warrants must describe the property to be seized in a manner that is

2023Breadth deals with the requirement that the scope of the warrant be limited by the probable cause on which the warrant is based.”27 “Specificity as to the objects at which a warrant is directed serves to protect against the possibility of a general, exploratory search, to assure that articles of property outside the legitimate scope of the warrant are not subject to mistaken seizure, and to reinforce the fundamental rule that seizure of property cannot be permitted in the absence of probable cause.”28 “As a rule, then, search warrants must describe the property to be seized in a manner that is

2023Breadth deals with the requirement that the scope of the warrant be limited by the probable cause on which the warrant is based.”27 “Specificity as to the objects at which a warrant is directed serves to protect against the possibility of a general, exploratory search, to assure that articles of property outside the legitimate scope of the warrant are not subject to mistaken seizure, and to reinforce the fundamental rule that seizure of property cannot be permitted in the absence of probable cause.”28 “As a rule, then, search warrants must describe the property to be seized in a manner that is

2023Breadth deals with the requirement that the scope of the warrant be limited by the probable cause on which the warrant is based.”27 “Specificity as to the objects at which a warrant is directed serves to protect against the possibility of a general, exploratory search, to assure that articles of property outside the legitimate scope of the warrant are not subject to mistaken seizure, and to reinforce the fundamental rule that seizure of property cannot be permitted in the absence of probable cause.”28 “As a rule, then, search warrants must describe the property to be seized in a manner that is

2021XIV, § 1; Alaska Const. art. 1, § 7. 15 In re Hospitalization of Daniel G., 320 P.3d 262, 269 (Alaska 2014). 16 Id. at 270 (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976)). 17 Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334-35 ; see also id. at 333 (“The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’ ” (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965))). -10- 7531 and convincing evidence standard because he was being held in a “punitive facility” and his detention had already exceeded 72 hours.18 The State responds that although V

2021XIV, § 1; Alaska Const. art. 1, § 7. 15 In re Hospitalization of Daniel G., 320 P.3d 262, 269 (Alaska 2014). 16 Id. at 270 (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976)). 17 Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334-35 ; see also id. at 333 (“The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’ ” (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965))). -10- 7531 and convincing evidence standard because he was being held in a “punitive facility” and his detention had already exceeded 72 hours.18 The State responds that although V

2021XIV, § 1; Alaska Const. art. 1, § 7. 15 In re Hospitalization of Daniel G., 320 P.3d 262, 269 (Alaska 2014). 16 Id. at 270 (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976)). 17 Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334-35 ; see also id. at 333 (“The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’ ” (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965))). -10- 7531 and convincing evidence standard because he was being held in a “punitive facility” and his detention had already exceeded 72 hours.18 The State responds that although V

2021XIV, § 1; Alaska Const. art. 1, § 7. 15 In re Hospitalization of Daniel G., 320 P.3d 262, 269 (Alaska 2014). 16 Id. at 270 (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976)). 17 Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334-35 ; see also id. at 333 (“The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’ ” (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965))). -10- 7531 and convincing evidence standard because he was being held in a “punitive facility” and his detention had already exceeded 72 hours.18 The State responds that although V

2021XIV, § 1; Alaska Const. art. 1, § 7. 15 In re Hospitalization of Daniel G., 320 P.3d 262, 269 (Alaska 2014). 16 Id. at 270 (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976)). 17 Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334-35 ; see also id. at 333 (“The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’ ” (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965))). -10- 7531 and convincing evidence standard because he was being held in a “punitive facility” and his detention had already exceeded 72 hours.18 The State responds that although V

2014We rejected a sufficient-break test in Whitton when we rejected a "same-transaction test" that would allow "only one punishment if a number of separate statutory violations arise out of a single criminal act or transaction." Whitton v. State, 479 P.2d 302, 307 (Alaska 1970).

2013Cf. VinZant v. Elam, 977 P.2d 84, 86-87 (Alaska 1999) (deciding due process requires notice of issues to be addressed and decided at trial); A.M. v. State, 945 P.2d 296, 302 (Alaska 1997) ("Notice reasonably calculated to afford the parties an opportunity to present objections to a proceeding, and affording them a reasonable time do so, is a fundamental requirement of due process." (quoting Kerr v. Kerr, 779 P.2d 341, 342 (Alaska 1989). 20 . 520 P.2d 1352 (Alaska 1974). 21 .

2013Cf. VinZant v. Elam, 977 P.2d 84, 86-87 (Alaska 1999) (deciding due process requires notice of issues to be addressed and decided at trial); A.M. v. State, 945 P.2d 296, 302 (Alaska 1997) ("Notice reasonably calculated to afford the parties an opportunity to present objections to a proceeding, and affording them a reasonable time do so, is a fundamental requirement of due process." (quoting Kerr v. Kerr, 779 P.2d 341, 342 (Alaska 1989). 20 . 520 P.2d 1352 (Alaska 1974). 21 .

2004L.REV. 1033, 1071 (1983) ("[The Eleventh Amendment] ... affirmed ... the traditional principle of sovereign immunity...."). [13] See Native Village of Stevens v. Alaska Mgmt. & Planning, 757 P.2d 32 , 41 n. 24 (Alaska 1988); Atkinson, 569 P.2d at 160 . [14] See Thebo, 66 F. at 376 (tribe "would soon be impoverished if it was subject to the jurisdiction of the courts"); Adams v. Murphy, 165 F. 304, 308 (8th Cir.1908) ("Upon considerations of public policy ...

2004L.REV. 1033, 1071 (1983) ("[The Eleventh Amendment] ... affirmed ... the traditional principle of sovereign immunity...."). [13] See Native Village of Stevens v. Alaska Mgmt. & Planning, 757 P.2d 32 , 41 n. 24 (Alaska 1988); Atkinson, 569 P.2d at 160 . [14] See Thebo, 66 F. at 376 (tribe "would soon be impoverished if it was subject to the jurisdiction of the courts"); Adams v. Murphy, 165 F. 304, 308 (8th Cir.1908) ("Upon considerations of public policy ...