fundamental principle in Maryland

1995In interpreting the meaning of the applicable statutes, we first take note of our discussion of the principles of statutory construction contained in Frost v. State, 336 Md. 125 , 647 A.2d 106 (1994), where we said: “In analyzing a statute, we must always be cognizant of the fundamental principle that statutory construction is approached from a ‘ “commensensical” ’ perspective.

1995In Frost v. State, 336 Md. 125 , 647 A.2d 106 (1994), we discussed the considerations involved in construing a statute: “In analyzing a statute, we must always be cognizant of the fundamental principle that statutory construction is approached from a ‘ “commonsensical” ’ perspective.

2021Dep’t of Employment Sec., 251 Md. 458, 466 (1968) (observing that “a fundamental requirement of due process of law in a quasi-judicial proceeding is the right of the parties to be apprised of the facts relied upon by the tribunal in its decision”).

2020OPC specifically cites Blue Bird Cab for this language the Court used: “A fundamental requirement of due process of law in a quasi-judicial proceeding is the right of the parties to be apprised of the facts relied upon by the tribunal in its decision.” Id. at 466 .

2022Accord Sadler v. Dimensions Healthcare Corp., 378 Md. 509, 530 (2003) (“[J]udicial review of the actions of an administrative agency is restricted primarily because of the fundamental doctrine of separation of powers as set forth in Article 8 of the Declaration of Rights of the Maryland Constitution.”). 5 Appellees note that, although COMCOR 27A.00.01.07.G provides that “[a]ll systems treating 5,000 gallon daily flows or more require review and approval by the Maryland Department of the Environment and must be included in The Comprehensive Water and Sewerage Systems Plan,” this requirement “ap

2005See Sadler v. Dimensions, 378 Md. 509, 530 , 836 A.2d 655, 667-668 (2003), where Judge Raker for the Court recently emphasized that “judicial review of the actions of an administrative *420 agency is restricted primarily because of the fundamental doctrine of separation of powers as set forth in Article 8 of the Declaration of Rights of the Maryland Constitution.” See also, e.g., Bell Atlantic v. Intercom, 366 Md. 1, 21-22 , 782 A.2d 791, 803 (2001); Dep’t of Nat.

1998In a criminal case, the test for determining whether error by the trial court was harmless is whether, upon an independent review of the record, we are able to “declare a belief, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error in no way influenced the verdict....” Dorsey v. State, 276 Md. 638, 659 , 350 A.2d 665, 678 (1976); see also Johnson v. State, 303 Md. 487, 528-29 , 495 A.2d 1, 22 (1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1093 , 106 S.Ct. 868 , 88 L.Ed.2d 907 (1986) (stating, “It is a fundamental rule of appellate procedure that a reviewing court will not reverse upon rulings on evidence where the rulin

1998In a criminal case, the test for determining whether error by the trial court was harmless is whether, upon an independent review of the record, we are able to “declare a belief, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error in no way influenced the verdict....” Dorsey v. State, 276 Md. 638, 659 , 350 A.2d 665, 678 (1976); see also Johnson v. State, 303 Md. 487, 528-29 , 495 A.2d 1, 22 (1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1093 , 106 S.Ct. 868 , 88 L.Ed.2d 907 (1986) (stating, “It is a fundamental rule of appellate procedure that a reviewing court will not reverse upon rulings on evidence where the rulin

2020See, e.g., Hunter v. 27 State, 397 Md. 580, 588 (2007) (“‘In a criminal case tried before a jury, a fundamental principle is that the credibility of a witness and the weight to be accorded the witness’ testimony are solely within the province of the jury.’”) (quoting Bohnert v. State, 312 Md. 266, 277 (1988)); Turner v. State, 192 Md.

2018Whether Expert Testimony Concerning Signs of Fabrication by Another Witness is Admissible As outlined earlier, 10 a fundamental principle underlying trial by jury is that "the credibility of a witness and the weight to be accorded the witness' testimony are solely within the province of the jury." Bohnert , 312 Md. at 277 , 539 A.2d 657 .

2024“It is a fundamental principle of contract law that it is ‘improper for the court to rewrite the terms of a contract, or draw a new contract for the parties, when the terms thereof are clear and unambiguous, simply to avoid hardships.’” Calomiris v. Woods, 353 Md. 425, 445 (1999) (quoting Canaras v. Lift Truck Servs., 272 Md. 337, 350 (1974)).

2009Moreover, “[i]t is a fundamental principle of contract law that it is ‘improper for the court to rewrite the terms of a contract, or draw a new contract for the parties, when the terms thereof are clear and unambiguous, simply to avoid hardships.’ ” Calomiris v. Woods, 353 Md. 425, 445 , 727 A.2d 358 (1999) (quoting Canoras v. Lift Truck Services, 272 Md. 337, 350 , 322 A.2d 866 (1974)).

2021As this Court explained in Waters v. State, 51 Md. 430, 436 (1879): It is a fundamental principle underlying the trial by jury, that each juror shall so far as it is possible be entirely impartial and unbiased, in order that he may hear the evidence, and decide the matter in controversy uninfluenced by any extraneous considerations whatever.

2010It follows, therefore, that, for purposes of discharging counsel, voir dire is not a "meaningful trial proceeding;" while it is critical that the jury not be tainted before it begins to hear a case, see Waters v. State, 51 Md. 430, 436 (1879) ("It is a fundamental principle underlying the trial by jury, that each juror shall so far as it is possible be entirely impartial and unbiased, in order that he may hear the evidence, and decide the matter in controversy uninfluenced by any *926 extraneous considerations whatever.

1998In a criminal case, the test for determining whether error by the trial court was harmless is whether, upon an independent review of the record, we are able to “declare a belief, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error in no way influenced the verdict....” Dorsey v. State, 276 Md. 638, 659 , 350 A.2d 665, 678 (1976); see also Johnson v. State, 303 Md. 487, 528-29 , 495 A.2d 1, 22 (1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1093 , 106 S.Ct. 868 , 88 L.Ed.2d 907 (1986) (stating, “It is a fundamental rule of appellate procedure that a reviewing court will not reverse upon rulings on evidence where the rulin

1998In a criminal case, the test for determining whether error by the trial court was harmless is whether, upon an independent review of the record, we are able to “declare a belief, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error in no way influenced the verdict....” Dorsey v. State, 276 Md. 638, 659 , 350 A.2d 665, 678 (1976); see also Johnson v. State, 303 Md. 487, 528-29 , 495 A.2d 1, 22 (1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1093 , 106 S.Ct. 868 , 88 L.Ed.2d 907 (1986) (stating, “It is a fundamental rule of appellate procedure that a reviewing court will not reverse upon rulings on evidence where the rulin

2010Id. (footnote deleted); see also State Roads Comm’n v. Halle, 228 Md. 24, 26-27 , 178 A.2d 319, 320 (1962) (holding that the Court had no obligation to search large record extract); 1 Pulte Home Corp. v. Parex, Inc., 174 Md.App. 681, 760 , 923 A.2d 971, 1016 (2007) (stating “We decline to comb through the eight-volume, 3,876-page record extract to ascertain information that Parex should have provided[.]”).

2010Id. (footnote deleted); see also State Roads Comm’n v. Halle, 228 Md. 24, 26-27 , 178 A.2d 319, 320 (1962) (holding that the Court had no obligation to search large record extract); 1 Pulte Home Corp. v. Parex, Inc., 174 Md.App. 681, 760 , 923 A.2d 971, 1016 (2007) (stating “We decline to comb through the eight-volume, 3,876-page record extract to ascertain information that Parex should have provided[.]”).

2023“The fundamental test of incompatibility . . . is whether there is a present or prospective conflict of interest, as where one office is subordinate to the other or subject to supervision by the other, or where the incumbent of one office has the power to appoint or remove or to set the salary of the other.” Hetrich, 222 Md. at 308 .

2023“The fundamental test of incompatibility . . . is whether there is a present or prospective conflict of interest, as where one office is subordinate to the other or subject to supervision by the other, or where the incumbent of one office has the power to appoint or remove or to set the salary of the other.” Hetrich, 222 Md. at 308 .

2011We held that “the clerk’s failure to hearken the verdict was fatal and rendered the jury’s verdict defective____ The failure to hearken the verdict rendered the verdict a nullity.” Santiago, 412 Md. at 41-42 , 985 A.2d at 563 ; see also Heinze v. State, 184 Md. 613, 616 , 42 A.2d 128, 130 (1945) (“It is a fundamental principle that the verdict of a jury in a criminal case has no effect in law until it is recorded and finally accepted by the court.”).

2011We held that “the clerk’s failure to hearken the verdict was fatal and rendered the jury’s verdict defective____ The failure to hearken the verdict rendered the verdict a nullity.” Santiago, 412 Md. at 41-42 , 985 A.2d at 563 ; see also Heinze v. State, 184 Md. 613, 616 , 42 A.2d 128, 130 (1945) (“It is a fundamental principle that the verdict of a jury in a criminal case has no effect in law until it is recorded and finally accepted by the court.”).

2001“Perhaps the most fundamental rule in the history of double jeopardy jurisprudence has been that ‘[a] verdict of *505 acquittal ... could not be reviewed, on error or otherwise, without putting [a defendant] twice in jeopardy, and thereby violating the Constitution.’ ” United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 571 , 97 S.Ct. 1349, 1354 , 51 L.Ed.2d 642, 651 (1977), quoting United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 671 , 16 S.Ct. 1192, 1195 , 41 L.Ed. 300, 303 (1896).

2001“Perhaps the most fundamental rule in the history of double jeopardy jurisprudence has been that ‘[a] verdict of *505 acquittal ... could not be reviewed, on error or otherwise, without putting [a defendant] twice in jeopardy, and thereby violating the Constitution.’ ” United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 571 , 97 S.Ct. 1349, 1354 , 51 L.Ed.2d 642, 651 (1977), quoting United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 671 , 16 S.Ct. 1192, 1195 , 41 L.Ed. 300, 303 (1896).

2026Kopp v. State, ___ Md. ___, No. 34, September Term 2025 (filed May 26, 2026), slip op. at 32 (“An officer’s testimony about a location being a ‘high-crime area’ or there being any volume of crime in an area, like testimony concerning any other factor in the reasonable suspicion analysis, must be based on information known to the officer at the time of the stop.”), 37 (the officer’s “testimony about the level of crime in the [particular area] does not satisfy the fundamental requirement that the reasonable suspicion analysis be based on information known by a police officer at the time of the s

2026See Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22 .

2005See Sadler v. Dimensions, 378 Md. 509, 530 , 836 A.2d 655, 667-668 (2003), where Judge Raker for the Court recently emphasized that “judicial review of the actions of an administrative *420 agency is restricted primarily because of the fundamental doctrine of separation of powers as set forth in Article 8 of the Declaration of Rights of the Maryland Constitution.” See also, e.g., Bell Atlantic v. Intercom, 366 Md. 1, 21-22 , 782 A.2d 791, 803 (2001); Dep’t of Nat.

2005See Sadler v. Dimensions, 378 Md. 509, 530 , 836 A.2d 655, 667-668 (2003), where Judge Raker for the Court recently emphasized that “judicial review of the actions of an administrative *420 agency is restricted primarily because of the fundamental doctrine of separation of powers as set forth in Article 8 of the Declaration of Rights of the Maryland Constitution.” See also, e.g., Bell Atlantic v. Intercom, 366 Md. 1, 21-22 , 782 A.2d 791, 803 (2001); Dep’t of Nat.

2003“It is a fundamental principle of statutory construction that criminal statutes are to be construed narrowly so that ‘courts will not extend the punishment to cases not plainly within the language used.’ ” Farris, 351 Md. at 36 , 716 A.2d at 243 (quoting Tapscott v. State, 343 Md. 650, 654 , 684 A.2d 439, 441 (1996))(internal citation omitted).

2003“It is a fundamental principle of statutory construction that criminal statutes are to be construed narrowly so that ‘courts will not extend the punishment to cases not plainly within the language used.’ ” Farris, 351 Md. at 36 , 716 A.2d at 243 (quoting Tapscott v. State, 343 Md. 650, 654 , 684 A.2d 439, 441 (1996))(internal citation omitted).

2016The Court of Appeals explained that “the object of all pleading, civil and criminal, is to present a single issue in regard to the same subject-matter, and it would be against this fundamental rule to permit two or more distinct offenses to be joined in the same count.” Cooksey v. State, 359 Md. 1, 7 , 752 A.2d 606, 609 (2000) (citing State v. Warren, 77 Md. 121, 121-22 , 26 A. 500, 500 (1893)).

2016The Court of Appeals explained that “the object of all pleading, civil and criminal, is to present a single issue in regard to the same subject-matter, and it would be against this fundamental rule to permit two or more distinct offenses to be joined in the same count.” Cooksey v. State, 359 Md. 1, 7 , 752 A.2d 606, 609 (2000) (citing State v. Warren, 77 Md. 121, 121-22 , 26 A. 500, 500 (1893)).

1975As the legal domicile of a wife is that of her husband, Rumbel v. Schueler, 236 Md. 25, 27 , 2 the question is where was John domiciled on the date of the accident. *303 As we have indicated, “It is a fundamental rule that, in order to effect a change of domicile, there must be an actual removal to another habitation, coupled with an intention of remaining there permanently or at least for an unlimited time.” Shenton, supra, at 530 .

1974This Court in Wagner v. Scurlock, supra, 166 Md. at 292-293 , explained as follows: “When one takes up a new residence, in order to avail himself of the rights which such change of domicile confers, it must be not so much with the intention of there remaining, but of the abandonment of his former domicile as a place of residence, and ‘excludes any definite intention to return to the place of the previous domicile.’ ” And in Shenton v. Abbott, supra, 178 Md. at 530 , it was stated: “It is a fundamental rule that, in order to effect a change of domicile, there must be an actual removal to anothe

2007Discussion A. “In a criminal case tried before a jury, a fundamental principle is that the credibility of a -witness and the weight to be accorded the -witness’ testimony are solely -within the province of the jury.” Bohnert v. State, 312 Md. 266, 277 , 539 A.2d 657, 662 (1988) (citing Battle v. State, 287 Md. 675, 685 , 414 A.2d 1266, 1271 (1980)); Ware v. State, 360 Md. 650, 678-679 , 759 A.2d 764, 779 (2000); Conyers v. State, 354 Md. 132, 153 , 729 A.2d 910, 921 (1999).

2007Discussion A. “In a criminal case tried before a jury, a fundamental principle is that the credibility of a -witness and the weight to be accorded the -witness’ testimony are solely -within the province of the jury.” Bohnert v. State, 312 Md. 266, 277 , 539 A.2d 657, 662 (1988) (citing Battle v. State, 287 Md. 675, 685 , 414 A.2d 1266, 1271 (1980)); Ware v. State, 360 Md. 650, 678-679 , 759 A.2d 764, 779 (2000); Conyers v. State, 354 Md. 132, 153 , 729 A.2d 910, 921 (1999).

2006This being so, the principle ‘that doubt must be resolved in favor of the alienability of land,’ free and unfettered, was modified and does not always control; ‘[tjhis rule of construction bows always to the more fundamental rule that wherever possible effect will be given to an ascertained intention of the parties.’ Turner, 206 Md. at 352 , 111 A.2d at 864 .

2006This being so, the principle ‘that doubt must be resolved in favor of the alienability of land,’ free and unfettered, was modified and does not always control; ‘[tjhis rule of construction bows always to the more fundamental rule that wherever possible effect will be given to an ascertained intention of the parties.’ Turner, 206 Md. at 352 , 111 A.2d at 864 .

2001“Perhaps the most fundamental rule in the history of double jeopardy jurisprudence has been that ‘[a] verdict of *505 acquittal ... could not be reviewed, on error or otherwise, without putting [a defendant] twice in jeopardy, and thereby violating the Constitution.’ ” United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 571 , 97 S.Ct. 1349, 1354 , 51 L.Ed.2d 642, 651 (1977), quoting United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 671 , 16 S.Ct. 1192, 1195 , 41 L.Ed. 300, 303 (1896).

2001“Perhaps the most fundamental rule in the history of double jeopardy jurisprudence has been that ‘[a] verdict of *505 acquittal ... could not be reviewed, on error or otherwise, without putting [a defendant] twice in jeopardy, and thereby violating the Constitution.’ ” United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 571 , 97 S.Ct. 1349, 1354 , 51 L.Ed.2d 642, 651 (1977), quoting United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 671 , 16 S.Ct. 1192, 1195 , 41 L.Ed. 300, 303 (1896).

2024“It is a fundamental principle of contract law that it is ‘improper for the court to rewrite the terms of a contract, or draw a new contract for the parties, when the terms thereof are clear and unambiguous, simply to avoid hardships.’” Calomiris v. Woods, 353 Md. 425, 445 (1999) (quoting Canaras v. Lift Truck Servs., 272 Md. 337, 350 (1974)).

2009Moreover, “[i]t is a fundamental principle of contract law that it is ‘improper for the court to rewrite the terms of a contract, or draw a new contract for the parties, when the terms thereof are clear and unambiguous, simply to avoid hardships.’ ” Calomiris v. Woods, 353 Md. 425, 445 , 727 A.2d 358 (1999) (quoting Canoras v. Lift Truck Services, 272 Md. 337, 350 , 322 A.2d 866 (1974)).

2023Incompatibility is determined by “the character and relation of the offices,” id. (quoting Lilly, 158 Md. at 266 ), and “whether there is a present or prospective conflict of interest,” Hetrich, 222 Md. at 308 .

2023Incompatibility is determined by “the character and relation of the offices,” id. (quoting Lilly, 158 Md. at 266 ), and “whether there is a present or prospective conflict of interest,” Hetrich, 222 Md. at 308 .

2009"Testimonial exclusionary rules and privileges contravene the fundamental principle that `the public... has a right to every man's evidence.'" Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 50 , 100 S.Ct. 906, 912 , 63 L.Ed.2d 186 (1980) (quoting United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 , 70 S.Ct. 724, 730 , 94 L.Ed. 884 (1950)).

2009"Testimonial exclusionary rules and privileges contravene the fundamental principle that `the public... has a right to every man's evidence.'" Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 50 , 100 S.Ct. 906, 912 , 63 L.Ed.2d 186 (1980) (quoting United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 , 70 S.Ct. 724, 730 , 94 L.Ed. 884 (1950)).

2008“It is a fundamental principle of statutory construction that criminal statutes are to be construed narrowly so that courts will not extend the punishment to cases not plainly within the language used.” Farris v. State, 351 Md. 24, 36 , 716 A.2d 237, 243 (1998), superceded by statute on other grounds as stated in Boffen v. State, 372 Md. 724 , 816 A.2d 88 (2003) (internal quotation omitted).

2008“It is a fundamental principle of statutory construction that criminal statutes are to be construed narrowly so that courts will not extend the punishment to cases not plainly within the language used.” Farris v. State, 351 Md. 24, 36 , 716 A.2d 237, 243 (1998), superceded by statute on other grounds as stated in Boffen v. State, 372 Md. 724 , 816 A.2d 88 (2003) (internal quotation omitted).