fundamental rule in Vermont

2021See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 333 (“The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” (quotation omitted)).

2021“The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (quotation omitted).

2021See Hill v. Conway, 143 Vt. 91, 93 , 463 A.2d 232, 233 (1983) (per curiam) (explaining that even plain-meaning rule “is no more than an aid in our efforts to determining legislative intent,” and like all other rules of construction, is undergirded by “the fundamental rule that we must ascertain and give effect to the true intent of the legislature, for it is that intent which constitutes the law”). ¶ 29.

2021See Hill v. Conway, 143 Vt. 91, 93 , 463 A.2d 232, 233 (1983) (per curiam) (explaining that even plain-meaning rule “is no more than an aid in our efforts to determining legislative intent,” and like all other rules of construction, is undergirded by “the fundamental rule that we must ascertain and give effect to the true intent of the legislature, for it is that intent which constitutes the law”). ¶ 29.

2001“The fundamental rule of statutory interpretation is to give effect to the intent of the Legislature.” Roddy v. Roddy, 168 Vt. 343, 348 , 721 A.2d 124, 128 (1998).

2001“The fundamental rule of statutory interpretation is to give effect to the intent of the Legislature.” Roddy v. Roddy, 168 Vt. 343, 348 , 721 A.2d 124, 128 (1998).

1989Section 1091(c) imposes criminal penalties on any “person who, while engaged in the violation of any law, ordinance or regulation applying to the operation or use of a motor vehicle or to the regulation of traffic, causes, as a result of the violation, the death of any person . . . ,” 1 Though 23 V.S.A. § 4(27) provides a definition *627 of the word “person,” it does not aid in the resolution of the issue at hand. 2 Thus, when interpreting the meaning of the statute, this Court is compelled to give eifect to the apparent intent of the legislature, State v. Baldwin, 140 Vt. 501, 509 , 438 A.2d

1989Section 1091(c) imposes criminal penalties on any “person who, while engaged in the violation of any law, ordinance or regulation applying to the operation or use of a motor vehicle or to the regulation of traffic, causes, as a result of the violation, the death of any person . . . ,” 1 Though 23 V.S.A. § 4(27) provides a definition *627 of the word “person,” it does not aid in the resolution of the issue at hand. 2 Thus, when interpreting the meaning of the statute, this Court is compelled to give eifect to the apparent intent of the legislature, State v. Baldwin, 140 Vt. 501, 509 , 438 A.2d

1984“It is„a fundamental rule in regard to any statute that no unjust or unreasonable result is presumed to have been contemplated by the Legislature.” Nolan, supra, 134 Vt. at 299, 357 A.2d. at 132 .

1984“It is„a fundamental rule in regard to any statute that no unjust or unreasonable result is presumed to have been contemplated by the Legislature.” Nolan, supra, 134 Vt. at 299, 357 A.2d. at 132 .

2024See In re C.L.S., 2020 VT 1, ¶ 25 (“The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” (quotation omitted)).

2023Brown v. Brown, 154 Vt. 625, 629 (1990); see also In re C.L.S., 2020 VT 1, ¶ 25 , 211 Vt. 344 (“The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” (quotation omitted)).

2015The “essential principle” of the Due Process Clause is that the government, before effecting a deprivation of a “constitutionally protected property interest,” is required to furnish “notice and opportunity for [a] hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.” Loudermill , 470 U.S. at 542 (quotations omitted). “[D]ue process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.” Mathews , 424 U.S. at 334 (quoting Morrissey , 408 U.S. at 481 ). ¶ 13.

2015The “essential principle” of the Due Process Clause is that the government, before effecting a deprivation of a “constitutionally protected property interest,” is required to furnish “notice and opportunity for [a] hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.” Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 542 (quotations omitted). “ ‘[D]ue process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.’ ” Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334 (quoting Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 481 ). ¶ 13.

2012See Bolling v. Sharpe , 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954) (observing that “the concepts of equal protection and due process, both stemming from our American ideal of fairness, are not mutually exclusive” and that “discrimination may be so unjustifiable as to be violative of due process”); In re JLD Properties of St.

2012See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954) (observing that “the concepts of equal protection and due process, both stemming from our American ideal of fairness, are not mutually exclusive” and that “discrimination may be so unjustifiable as to be violative of due process”); In re JLD Properties of St.

2009See Fletcher Hill, Inc. v. Crosbie, 2005 VT 1, ¶ 17 , 178 Vt. 77 , 872 A.2d 292 (“[W]e presume that legislative language is inserted advisedly and not intended to create surplusage.” (quotation omitted)); Robes v. Town of Hartford, 161 Vt. 187, 193 , 636 A.2d 342, 346-47 (1993) (declining to interpret portions of a statute as redundant).

2009See Fletcher Hill, Inc. v. Crosbie, 2005 VT 1, ¶ 17 , 178 Vt. 77 , 872 A.2d 292 (“[W]e presume that legislative language is inserted advisedly and not intended to create surplusage.” (quotation omitted)); Robes v. Town of Hartford, 161 Vt. 187, 193 , 636 A.2d 342, 346-47 (1993) (declining to interpret portions of a statute as redundant).

2009See Fletcher Hill, Inc. v. Crosbie, 2005 VT 1, ¶ 17 , 178 Vt. 77 , 872 A.2d 292 (“[W]e presume that legislative language is inserted advisedly and not intended to create surplusage.” (quotation omitted)); Robes v. Town of Hartford, 161 Vt. 187, 193 , 636 A.2d 342, 346-47 (1993) (declining to interpret portions of a statute as redundant).

2009See Fletcher Hill, Inc. v. Crosbie, 2005 VT 1, ¶ 17 , 178 Vt. 77 , 872 A.2d 292 (“[W]e presume that legislative language is inserted advisedly and not intended to create surplusage.” (quotation omitted)); Robes v. Town of Hartford, 161 Vt. 187, 193 , 636 A.2d 342, 346-47 (1993) (declining to interpret portions of a statute as redundant).

2002“The fundamental rule, underlying all other rules of statutory construction, is that this Court must give effect to the intent of the Legislature.” Viskup v. Viskup, 150 Vt. 208, 210 , 552 A.2d 400, 401 (1988).

2002“The fundamental rule, underlying all other rules of statutory construction, is that this Court must give effect to the intent of the Legislature.” Viskup v. Viskup, 150 Vt. 208, 210 , 552 A.2d 400, 401 (1988).

2000This Court has repeatedly stated that the fundamental rule and paramount goal of statutory construction is “to discern and give effect to the intent of the Legislature.” State v. O’Neill, 165 Vt. 270, 275 , 682 A.2d 943, 946 (1996); see Roddy v. Roddy, 168 Vt. 343, 348 , 721 A.2d 124, 128 (1998); Shea v. Metcalf, 167 Vt. 494, 498 , 712 A.2d 887, 889 (1998).

2000This Court has repeatedly stated that the fundamental rule and paramount goal of statutory construction is “to discern and give effect to the intent of the Legislature.” State v. O’Neill, 165 Vt. 270, 275 , 682 A.2d 943, 946 (1996); see Roddy v. Roddy, 168 Vt. 343, 348 , 721 A.2d 124, 128 (1998); Shea v. Metcalf, 167 Vt. 494, 498 , 712 A.2d 887, 889 (1998).

2000This Court has repeatedly stated that the fundamental rule and paramount goal of statutory construction is “to discern and give effect to the intent of the Legislature.” State v. O’Neill, 165 Vt. 270, 275 , 682 A.2d 943, 946 (1996); see Roddy v. Roddy, 168 Vt. 343, 348 , 721 A.2d 124, 128 (1998); Shea v. Metcalf, 167 Vt. 494, 498 , 712 A.2d 887, 889 (1998).

2000This Court has repeatedly stated that the fundamental rule and paramount goal of statutory construction is “to discern and give effect to the intent of the Legislature.” State v. O’Neill, 165 Vt. 270, 275 , 682 A.2d 943, 946 (1996); see Roddy v. Roddy, 168 Vt. 343, 348 , 721 A.2d 124, 128 (1998); Shea v. Metcalf, 167 Vt. 494, 498 , 712 A.2d 887, 889 (1998).

1995We have recognized “a fundamental rule of statutory construction that statutes dealing with the same subject matter should be construed with reference to each other as parts of one system.” Emmons v. Emmons, 141 Vt. 508, 512 , 450 A.2d 1113, 1115 (1982).

1995We have recognized “a fundamental rule of statutory construction that statutes dealing with the same subject matter should be construed with reference to each other as parts of one system.” Emmons v. Emmons, 141 Vt. 508, 512 , 450 A.2d 1113, 1115 (1982).

1988In re G.F., 142 Vt. 273, 279 , 455 A.2d 805, 808 (1982).

1988In re G.F., 142 Vt. 273, 279 , 455 A.2d 805, 808 (1982).

1982Noble v. Fleming’s Estate, 121 Vt. 57, 59 , 147 A.2d 889, 890 (1959).

1982Noble v. Fleming’s Estate, 121 Vt. 57, 59 , 147 A.2d 889, 890 (1959).

2025Apr. 3, 2020) (unpub. mem.) (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976)). ‘To “prove a violation of due process, [she] must show that [she] suffered actual prejudice to the conduct of [her] defense and that the delay was intentional and caused by a desire to gain tactical advantage.” State v. Elis, 149 Vt. 264, 268 (1988) (citing United States v. Marion, 404 USS. 307, 324 (1971)). “[R]evocation of parole is not part of a criminal prosecution and thus the full panoply of rights due a defendant in such a proceeding does not apply to parole revocations.” Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 4

2025Apr. 3, 2020) (unpub. mem.) (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976)). ‘To “prove a violation of due process, [she] must show that [she] suffered actual prejudice to the conduct of [her] defense and that the delay was intentional and caused by a desire to gain tactical advantage.” State v. Elis, 149 Vt. 264, 268 (1988) (citing United States v. Marion, 404 USS. 307, 324 (1971)). “[R]evocation of parole is not part of a criminal prosecution and thus the full panoply of rights due a defendant in such a proceeding does not apply to parole revocations.” Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 4

1983Underlying all other rules of construction is the fundamental rule that we must ascertain and give effect to the true intent of the legislature, Verrill v. Daley, 126 Vt. 444, 446 , 236 A.2d 238, 240 (1967), for it is that intent which constitutes the law.

1983Underlying all other rules of construction is the fundamental rule that we must ascertain and give effect to the true intent of the legislature, Verrill v. Daley, 126 Vt. 444, 446 , 236 A.2d 238, 240 (1967), for it is that intent which constitutes the law.

1961Even though the actual notice given by the board in a particular instance may be open to challenge on review, this Court will not strike down a statute as unconstitutional for failing to spell out in words a fundamental requirement of due process implicit in a meaningful use of the word “notice.” To do so would violate the very rule of construction set out in Elliott v. Fish and Game Commission, supra, 117 Vt. 61, 68 , 84 A.2d 588 .

1961Even though the actual notice given by the board in a particular instance may be open to challenge on review, this Court will not strike down a statute as unconstitutional for failing to spell out in words a fundamental requirement of due process implicit in a meaningful use of the word “notice.” To do so would violate the very rule of construction set out in Elliott v. Fish and Game Commission, supra, 117 Vt. 61, 68 , 84 A.2d 588 .

1976The fundamental test which must be met under the Sixth Amendment is whether the right claimed is a “fundamental right, essential to a fair trial.” Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343-44 (1963).

1965He urges that his confinement in the Vermont State Prison made preparation for trial difficult, that the ruling was unfair and contrary to the fundamental principle of Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335 , 9 L.Ed 799, 83 S.Ct. 792 , 93 A.L.R. 2d 733 .