fundamental doctrine in Iowa

2026See Meier v. Senecaut, 641 N.W.2d 532, 537 (Iowa 2002) (“It is a fundamental doctrine of appellate review that issues must ordinarily be both raised and decided by the district court before we will decide them on appeal.”).

2026See Meier v. Senecaut, 641 N.W.2d 532, 537 (Iowa 2002) (“It is a fundamental doctrine of appellate review that issues must ordinarily be both raised and decided by the district court before we will decide them on appeal.”). 3 This provision states that an actor in a special relationship with another, which includes “a business or other possessor of land that holds its premises open to the public,” “owes the other a duty of reasonable care with regard to risks that arise within the scope of the relationship.” Restatement (Third) § 40(a), (b)(3). 11 For these reasons, we affirm the district court’

2026“It is a fundamental doctrine of appellate review that issues must ordinarily be both raised and decided by the district court before we will decide them on appeal.” Lamasters v. State, 821 N.W.2d 856, 862 (Iowa 2012) (citation omitted).

2026See Lamasters v. State, 821 N.W.2d 856, 862 (Iowa 2012) (“It is a fundamental doctrine of appellate review that issues must ordinarily be both raised and decided by the district court before we will decide them on appeal.” (citation omitted)).

2021See Bank of Am., N.A. v. Schulte, 843 N.W.2d 876, 883 (Iowa 2014) (“It is a fundamental doctrine of appellate review that issues must ordinarily be both raised and decided by the district court before we will decide them on appeal.” (citation omitted)). 3.

2021See Bank of Am., N.A. v. Schulte, 843 N.W.2d 876, 883 (Iowa 2014) (“It is a fundamental doctrine of appellate review that issues must ordinarily be both raised and decided by the district court before we will decide them on appeal.” (citation omitted)).

2021See Meier v. Senecaut, 641 5 N.W.2d 532 , 537 (Iowa 2002) (“It is a fundamental doctrine of appellate review that issues must ordinarily be both raised and decided by the district court before we will decide them on appeal.”); see also State v. Mulvaney, 600 N.W.2d 291, 293 (Iowa 1999) (“[W]e require error preservation even on constitutional issues.”).

2020See Meier v. Senecaut, 5 641 N.W.2d 532, 537 (Iowa 2002) (“It is a fundamental doctrine of appellate review that issues must ordinarily be both raised and decided by the district court before we will decide them on appeal.”); see also State v. Mulvany, 600 N.W.2d 291, 293 (Iowa 1999) (“[W]e require error preservation even on constitutional issues.”).

2025“It is a fundamental doctrine of appellate review that issues must ordinarily be both raised and decided by the district court before we will decide them on appeal.” Meier v. Senecaut, 641 N.W.2d 532, 537 (Iowa 2002); see also A.B., 815 N.W.2d at 773 (“[T]he general rule that appellate arguments must first be raised in the trial court applies to [child in need of assistance] and termination of parental rights cases.”).

2025See Meier v. Senecaut, 641 N.W.2d 532, 537 (Iowa 2002) (“It is a fundamental doctrine of appellate review that issues must ordinarily be both raised and decided by the district court before we will decide them on appeal.”); see also In re A.B., 815 N.W.2d 764, 773 (Iowa 2012) (applying this doctrine to termination proceedings).

2025In doing so, the majority accelerates our journey down the slippery slope of undermining error-preservation rules that serve “a fundamental principle of law with roots that extend to the basic constitutional function of appellate courts.” State v. Harrington, 893 N.W.2d 36, 42 (Iowa 2017).

2023“Error preservation is a fundamental principle of law with roots that extend to the basic constitutional function of appellate courts.” State v. Harrington, 893 N.W.2d 36, 42 (Iowa 2017)).

2023“It is a fundamental doctrine of appellate review that issues must ordinarily be both raised and decided by the district court before we will decide them on appeal.” Meier v. Senecaut, 641 N.W.2d 532, 537 (Iowa 2002) (citing Metz v. Amoco Oil Co., 581 N.W.2d 597, 600 (Iowa 1998) (en banc)).

2023“It is a fundamental doctrine of appellate review that issues 22 must ordinarily be both raised and decided by the district court before we will decide them on appeal.” Meier v. Senecaut, 641 N.W.2d 532, 537 (Iowa 2002) (citing Metz v. Amoco Oil Co., 581 N.W.2d 597, 600 (Iowa 1998) (en banc)); see also Peters v. Burlington N. R.R., 492 N.W.2d 399, 401 (Iowa 1992).

2017“It is a fundamental doctrine of appellate review that issues must ordinarily be both raised and decided by the district court before we will decide them on appeal.” Meier v. Senecaut, 641 N.W.2d 532, 537 (Iowa 2002). “[O]ne purpose of our error preservation rules is to ensure that the opposing party and the district court are alerted to an issue at a time when corrective action can be taken or another alternative pursued.” Top of Iowa Coop. v. Sime Farms, Inc., 608 N.W.2d 454, 470 (Iowa 2000); see also Office of Consumer Advocate v. Iowa State Commerce Comm’n, 465 N.W.2d 280, 283 (Iowa 1991).

2017“It is a fundamental doctrine of appellate review that issues must ordinarily be both raised and decided by the district court before we will decide them on appeal.” Meier v. Senecaut, 641 N.W.2d 532, 537 (Iowa 2002). “[O]ne purpose of our error preservation rules is to ensure that the opposing party and the district court are alerted to an issue at a time when corrective action can be taken or another alternative pursued.” Top of Iowa Coop. v. Sime Farms, Inc., 608 N.W.2d 454, 470 (Iowa 2000); see also Office of Consumer Advocate v. Iowa State Commerce Comm’n, 465 N.W.2d 280, 283 (Iowa 1991).

2017Ct., 744 N.W.2d 327, 331 (Iowa 2008) (“It is a fundamental rule of law that a trial court is required to honor and respect the rulings and mandates by appellate courts in a case.”).

2016“It is a fundamental rule of law that a trial court is required to honor and respect the rulings and mandates by appellate courts in a 8 case.” City of Okoboji, 744 N.W.2d at 331 .

2019“Even issues implicating constitutional rights must be presented to and ruled upon by the district court in order to preserve error for appeal.” In re K.C., 660 N.W.2d 29, 38 (Iowa 2003); see also Meier v. Senecaut, 641 N.W.2d 532, 537 (Iowa 2002) (“It is a fundamental doctrine of appellate review that issues must ordinarily be both raised and decided by the district court before we will decide them on appeal.”).

2019First, we find the father has failed to preserve the lack-of-consent issue for our review as he raises it for the first time on appeal. “[T]he general rule that appellate arguments must first be raised in the trial court applies to CINA and termination of parental rights cases.” In re A.B., 815 N.W.2d 764, 773 (Iowa 2012); accord In re K.C., 660 N.W.2d 29, 38 (Iowa 2003) (“Even issues implicating constitutional rights must be presented to and ruled upon by the district court in order to preserve error for appeal.”); Meier v. Senecaut, 641 N.W.2d 532, 537 (Iowa 2002) (“It is a fundamental doctr

2021“It is a fundamental principle that our review of district court rulings is limited to the record made before the district court.” State v. Boggs, 741 N.W.2d 492 , 505 n.2 (Iowa 2007).

2020See State v. Boggs, 741 N.W.2d 492 , 505 n.2 (Iowa 2007) (“It is a fundamental principle that our review of district court rulings is limited to the record made before the district court.”); Keith, 513 N.W.2d at 771 (“We are limited to the record before us and any matters outside the record on appeal are disregarded.”).

2024Facial challenges are disfavored because they “run contrary to the fundamental principle of judicial restraint.” Kluender, 985 N.W.2d at 470 (quoting Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 450 (2008)).

2024Facial challenges are disfavored because they “run contrary to the fundamental principle of judicial restraint.” Kluender, 985 N.W.2d at 470 (quoting Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 450 (2008)).

2024Accord Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (“The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’ ” (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965))).

2016“The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’” Id. (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976)).

2012“It is a fundamental doctrine of appellate review that issues must ordinarily be both raised and decided by the district court before we will decide them on appeal.” Meier v. Senecaut, 641 N.W.2d 532, 537 (Iowa 2002). “[I]t is not a sensible exercise of appellate review to analyze facts of an issue ‘without the benefit of a full record or lower court determination[ ].’ ” Id. (quoting Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 538 , 112 S.Ct. 1522, 1534 , 118 L.Ed.2d 153, 172 (1992)).

2012“It is a fundamental doctrine of appellate review that issues must ordinarily be both raised and decided by the district court before we will decide them on appeal.” Meier v. Senecaut, 641 N.W.2d 532, 537 (Iowa 2002). “[I]t is not a sensible exercise of appellate review to analyze facts of an issue ‘without the benefit of a full record or lower court determination[ ].’ ” Id. (quoting Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 538 , 112 S.Ct. 1522, 1534 , 118 L.Ed.2d 153, 172 (1992)).

2023“It is a fundamental doctrine of appellate review that issues 22 must ordinarily be both raised and decided by the district court before we will decide them on appeal.” Meier v. Senecaut, 641 N.W.2d 532, 537 (Iowa 2002) (citing Metz v. Amoco Oil Co., 581 N.W.2d 597, 600 (Iowa 1998) (en banc)); see also Peters v. Burlington N. R.R., 492 N.W.2d 399, 401 (Iowa 1992).

2007Co., 492 N.W.2d 399, 401 (Iowa 1992))). 9 v. City of Iowa City, 703 N.W.2d 180, 184 (Iowa 2005) (quoting Iowa R.

2010Co., 606 N.W.2d 301, 305 (Iowa 2000) (recognizing a fundamental rule of statutory construction is that a statute will not be construed to make any part of it superfluous unless no other construction is reasonably possible).

2010Co., 606 N.W.2d 301, 305 (Iowa 2000) (recognizing a fundamental rule of statutory construction is that a statute will not be construed to make any part of it superfluous unless no other construction is reasonably possible).

2026We focus instead on the standard’s qualifying phrase: “under similar facts and circumstances.” Iowa Code § 232.68 (2)(a)(4)(b); accord In re Chapman, 890 N.W.2d 853, 857 (Iowa 2017) (“[W]e apply the fundamental rule of statutory construction that we should not construe a statute to make any part of it superfluous.”).

2024Id.; see also In re Chap- man, 890 N.W.2d 853, 857 (Iowa 2017) (“[W]e apply the fundamental rule of statutory construction that we should not construe a statute to make any part of it superfluous.”).

2025See Sandoval v. State, 975 N.W.2d 434 , 438 (Iowa 2022); Goode v. State, 920 N.W.2d 520, 526 (Iowa 2018) (“As a general rule, we do not address issues presented on appeal for the first 3 time . . . .”); Lamasters v. State, 821 N.W.2d 856, 862 (Iowa 2012) (“It is a fundamental doctrine of appellate review that issues must ordinarily be both raised and decided by the district court before we will decide them on appeal.” (quoting Meier v. Senecaut, 641 N.W.2d 532, 537 (Iowa 2002))).

2023See Meier v. Senecaut, 641 N.W.2d 532, 537 (Iowa 2002) (“It is a fundamental doctrine of appellate review that issues must ordinarily be both raised and decided by the district court before we will decide them on appeal.”); see also Goode v. State, 920 N.W.2d at 526 (“As a general rule, we do not address issues presented on appeal for the first time, and we do not remand cases to the district court for evidence on issues not raised and decided by the district court.”). 4.

2024Accord Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (“The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’ ” (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965))).

1996The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard “at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 , 96 S.Ct. 893, 902 , 47 L.Ed.2d 18, 32 (1976) (citing Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 , 85 S.Ct. 1187, 1191 , 14 L.Ed.2d 62, 66 (1965)).

2022Servs., 923 N.W.2d 225, 238 (Iowa 2019) (“It is a fundamental principle of our jurisprudence that a court has the inherent power to decide if it has subject matter jurisdiction over a matter.”).

2022Servs., 923 N.W.2d 225, 238 (Iowa 2019) (“It is a fundamental principle of our jurisprudence that a court has the inherent power to decide if it has subject matter jurisdiction over a matter.”); State v. Stark, No. 20–1503, 2021 WL 4592246 , at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 6, 2021) (stating pro se notice of appeal was a nullity but granting delayed appeal); cf. Boring v. State, No. 20–0129, 2021 WL 2453045 , at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. June 16, 2021) (“However, the notice of appeal was again filed pro se while Boring was still represented by counsel.

1970It is frequently stated, “The fundamental doctrine controlling this question of joint adventure or common enterprise is not controlled by the fact that the parties are going to the same place on the same mission, but by whether or not the complaining party bore such relation to his associate as that he had the right of control in some manner over the means of locomotion.” Stingley v. Crawford, 219 Iowa 509, 512 , 258 N.W. 316, 318 .

1970It is frequently stated, “The fundamental doctrine controlling this question of joint adventure or common enterprise is not controlled by the fact that the parties are going to the same place on the same mission, but by whether or not the complaining party bore such relation to his associate as that he had the right of control in some manner over the means of locomotion.” Stingley v. Crawford, 219 Iowa 509, 512 , 258 N.W. 316, 318 .

2023Facial challenges also run contrary to the fundamental principle of judicial restraint that courts should neither “anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it” nor “formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied.” Id. (quoting Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288 , 346–47 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring)).

2020Facial challenges are disfavored because they “often rest on speculation” and run contrary to the fundamental principle of judicial restraint that courts should neither “anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it” nor “formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied.” 8 Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 450 , 128 S. Ct. 1184, 1191 (2008) (quoting Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288 , 346–47, 56 S. Ct. 466, 483 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring))

2022“The intention of the owner to set apart the lands for the use of the public as a highway—the animus dedicandi—is the fundamental principle, the very life of dedication.” Tott, 60 N.W.2d at 516 (quoting Davis v. Town of Bonaparte, 114 N.W. 896, 898 (Iowa 1908)).

2022“The intention of the owner to set apart the lands for the use of the public as a highway—the animus dedicandi—is the fundamental principle, the very life of dedication.” Tott, 60 N.W.2d at 516 (quoting Davis v. Town of Bonaparte, 114 N.W. 896, 898 (Iowa 1908)).

2026See, e.g., State v. Treptow, 960 N.W.2d 98 , 109 (Iowa 2021) (“We have repeatedly rejected plain error review and will not adopt it now.”); Meier v. Senecaut, 641 N.W.2d 532, 537 (Iowa 2002) (“It is a fundamental doctrine of appellate review that issues must ordinarily be both raised and decided by the district court before we will decide them on appeal.”); State v. Rutledge, 600 N.W.2d 324, 326 (Iowa 1999) (“[S]imple justice demands rigid adherence to the [error-preservation] rule.”).

2020“It is a fundamental doctrine of appellate review that issues must ordinarily be both raised and decided by the district court before we will decide them on appeal.” Meier v. Senecaut, 641 N.W.2d 532, 537 (Iowa 2002); see also State v. Rutledge, 600 N.W.2d 324, 325 (Iowa 1999) (“Nothing is more basic in the law of appeal and error than the axiom that a party cannot sing a song to us that was not first sung in trial court.”).

2022“Generally, the fundamental requirement of due process is an opportunity to be heard.” Id.

2019We reject the mother’s claim she was denied due process.3 See In re A.M.H., 516 N.W.2d 867, 870 (Iowa 1994) (“Generally, the fundamental requirement of due process is an opportunity to be heard.”).4 The mother had proper notice of the hearing.