fundamental principle in Massachusetts

2026"It is a fundamental rule of practice that where a party alleges error in a charge he must bring the alleged error to the attention of the judge in specific terms in order to give the judge an opportunity to rectify the error, if any." Commonwealth v. McDuffee, 379 Mass. 353, 357 (1979).

2025See Commonwealth v. McDuffee, 379 Mass. 353, 357 (1979) ("It is a fundamental rule of practice that where a party alleges error in a charge he must bring the alleged error to the attention of the judge in specific terms in order to give the judge an opportunity to rectify the error, if any"). 8 v. Palermo, 482 Mass. 620, 630-631 (2019) (two threats, although close in time, were made to separate victims; specific unanimity instruction required); Conefrey, 420 Mass. at 514 (eight assaults occurring over one-year period in three apartments; specific unanimity instruction required).

2024Let's just move on." And during a particularly contentious back-and- 36 The judge indicated that the prosecutor's questions that no witness besides the defendant testified to seeing anyone in Parker's car with a gun "did at least come close to asking [the] [d]efendant to comment on the credibility of other witnesses." See Commonwealth v. Fahey, 99 Mass. App. Ct. 304 , 310 (2021), quoting Commonwealth v. Triplett, 398 Mass. 561, 567 (1986) ("[i]t is a fundamental principle that a witness cannot be asked to assess the credibility of his testimony or that of other witnesses" [quotation omitted]).

2005However, “[i]t is a fundamental principle that ‘a witness cannot be asked to assess the credibility of his testimony or that of other witnesses.’ ” Commonwealth v. Triplett, 398 Mass. 561, 567 (1986), quoting Commonwealth v. Dickinson, supra at 706 .

2016“It is a fundamental principle of statutory construction that ‘statutory language should be given effect consistent with its plain meaning and in light of the aim of the Legislature unless to do so would achieve an illogical result.’ ” Commonwealth v. Hatch, 438 Mass. 618, 622 (2003), quoting from Sullivan v. Brookline, 435 Mass. 353, 360 (2001).

2016"It is a fundamental principle of statutory construction that 'statutory language should be given effect consistent with its plain meaning and in light of the aim of the Legislature unless to do so would achieve an illogical result.'" Commonwealth v. Hatch, 438 Mass. 618, 622 (2003), quoting from Sullivan v. Brookline, 435 Mass. 353, 360 (2001).

2017It is a fundamental principle that a "witness cannot be asked to assess the credibility of his testimony or that of other witnesses." Commonwealth v. Dickinson , 394 Mass. 702 , 706 (1985).

2005However, “[i]t is a fundamental principle that ‘a witness cannot be asked to assess the credibility of his testimony or that of other witnesses.’ ” Commonwealth v. Triplett, 398 Mass. 561, 567 (1986), quoting Commonwealth v. Dickinson, supra at 706 .

2015“The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’ ” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976), quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965).

2011See Mathews v. Eldridge, supra. “The fundamental requirement of due process is notice and the opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’ ” Matter of Angela, 445 Mass. 55, 62 (2005), quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965).

2006“The fundamental principle of law upon which damages for breach of contract are assessed is that the injured party shall be placed in the same position [that it] would have been in[] if the contract had been performed, so far as loss can be ascertained to have followed as a natural consequence and to have been within the contemplation of the parties[,] as reasonable [people] [,] as a probable result of the breach . . . .” John Hetherington & Sons, Ltd. v. William Firth Co., 210 Mass. 8, 21 (1911).

1983“The fundamental principle of law upon which damages for breach of contract are assessed is that the injured party shall be placed in the same position he would have been in, if the contract had been performed, so far as loss can be ascertained to have followed as a natural consequence and to have been within the contemplation of the parties as reasonable men as a probable result of the breach, and so far as compensation therefor in money can be computed by rational methods upon a firm basis of facts.” John Hetherington & Sons v. William Firth Co., 210 Mass. 8, 21 (1911).

2016“The fundamental requirement of due process is notice and the opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’ ” Matter of Angela, 445 Mass. 55, 62 (2005), quoting *641 from Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965).

2015“The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’ ” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976), quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965).

2025They contravene "the fundamental principle that 'the public . . . has a right to every [person's] evidence,'" id., quoting United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950), and they "diminish the evidence before the court," Three Juveniles v. Commonwealth, 390 Mass. 357, 359 (1983), cert. denied sub nom.

2006“Such privileges diminish the evidence before the court, and contravene the fundamental principle that ‘the public . . . has a right to every man’s evidence.’ ” United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950), quoting 8 J.

2023"A fundamental principle of statutory interpretation 'is that a statute must be interpreted according to the intent of the Legislature ascertained from all its words construed by the ordinary and approved usage of the language, considered in connection with the cause of its enactment, the mischief or imperfection to be remedied and the main object to be accomplished, to the end that the purpose of its framers may be effectuated.'" Harvard Crimson, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard College, 445 Mass. 745, 749 (2006), quoting Hanlon v. Rollins, 286 Mass. 444, 447 (1934).

2021Further, official statements are prepared on behalf of the issuer. 21 "A fundamental principle of statutory interpretation 'is that a statute must be interpreted according to the intent of the Legislature ascertained from all its words construed by the ordinary and approved usage of the language, considered in connection with the cause of its enactment, the mischief or imperfection to be remedied and the main object to be accomplished, to the end that the purpose of its framers may be effectuated." Harvard Crimson, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard College, 445 Mass. 745, 749 (2006), quot

2019As the defendant points out, "[i]t is a fundamental principle of appellate review that a prompt objection at trial is a prerequisite to the presentation of an issue for appellate review." Commonwealth v. Andrade, 481 Mass. 139, 141-142 (2018), quoting Commonwealth v. Gallison, 383 Mass. 659, 669 (1981).

2018As the defendant did not object to the admission of the grand jury testimony for substantive purposes when it was read by the prosecutor in posing his questions, and waited to object until after the close of evidence, we review any error for a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice. 2 See Commonwealth v. Comtois , 399 Mass. 668 , 674, 506 N.E.2d 503 (1987), quoting **142 Commonwealth v. Gallison , 383 Mass. 659 , 669, 421 N.E.2d 757 (1981) ("It is a fundamental principle of appellate review that a prompt objection at trial is a prerequisite to the presentation of an issue for appel

2015“Because the privilege against self-incrimination is ‘a fundamental principle of our system of justice,’ it ‘is to be construed liberally in favor of the claimant.’ ” Commonwealth v. Leclair, 469 Mass. at 782, quoting from Commonwealth v. Borans, 388 Mass. 453, 455 (1983). “[A] refusal to testify on Fifth Amendment grounds must be upheld unless it is ‘perfectly clear, from a careful consideration of all the circumstances in the case, that the witness is mistaken, and that the answer[s] cannot possibly have such tendency’ to incriminate” (emphasis in original).

2014Because the privilege against self-incrimination is “a fundamental principle of our system of justice,” it “is to be construed liberally in favor of the claimant.” Commonwealth v. Borans, 388 Mass. 453, 455 (1983).

2011“It is a fundamental rule that the prosecution may not introduce evidence that a defendant previously has misbehaved, indictably or not, for the purpose of showing his bad character or propensity to commit the crime charged.” Commonwealth v. Baker, 440 Mass. 519, 529 (2003), quoting from Commonwealth v. Trapp, 396 Mass. 202, 206 (1985), S.C., 423 Mass. 356 , cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1045 (1996).

2005“It is a fundamental rule that the prosecution may not introduce evidence that a defendant previously has misbehaved, indictably or not, for the purpose of showing his bad character or propensity to commit the crime charged.” Commonwealth v. Trapp, 396 Mass. 202, 206 (1985), S.C., 423 Mass. 356 , cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1045 (1996).

2023"The fundamental rule for the construction of wills 'is to ascertain the intention of the testator from the whole instrument, attributing due weight to all its language, considered in the light of the circumstances known to him at the time of its execution and to give effect to that intent unless some positive rule of law forbids.'" Hershman-Tcherepnin v. Tcherepnin, 452 Mass. 77, 84 (2008), quoting Fitts v. Powell, 307 Mass. 449, 454 (1940).

2008The fundamental rule for the construction of wills “is to ascertain the intention of the testator from the whole instrument, attributing due weight to all its language, considered in the light of the circumstances known to him at the time of its execution and to give effect to that intent unless some positive rule of law forbids.” Fitts v. Powell, 307 Mass. 449, 454 (1940).

2023"A fundamental principle of statutory interpretation 'is that a statute must be interpreted according to the intent of the Legislature ascertained from all its words construed by the ordinary and approved usage of the language, considered in connection with the cause of its enactment, the mischief or imperfection to be remedied and the main object to be accomplished, to the end that the purpose of its framers may be effectuated.'" Harvard Crimson, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard College, 445 Mass. 745, 749 (2006), quoting Hanlon v. Rollins, 286 Mass. 444, 447 (1934).

2021Further, official statements are prepared on behalf of the issuer. 21 "A fundamental principle of statutory interpretation 'is that a statute must be interpreted according to the intent of the Legislature ascertained from all its words construed by the ordinary and approved usage of the language, considered in connection with the cause of its enactment, the mischief or imperfection to be remedied and the main object to be accomplished, to the end that the purpose of its framers may be effectuated." Harvard Crimson, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard College, 445 Mass. 745, 749 (2006), quot

1996While errors not objected to at trial may provide a basis for reversal, this “power ... is rarely exercised,” Commonwealth v. Pares-Ramirez, 400 Mass. 604, 609 (1987), and only where a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice is posed, see Commonwealth v. Freeman, 352 Mass. 556, 563-564 (1967).

1987“It is a fundamental rule of practice that where a party alleges error in a charge he must bring the alleged error to the attention of the judge in specific terms in order to give the judge an opportunity to rectify the error, if any.” Commonwealth v. McDuffee, 379 Mass. 353, 357 (1979), citing Commonwealth v. Freeman, 352 Mass. 556, 563 (1967).

2018"The fundamental requirement of due process is notice and the opportunity to be heard." Matter of Angela , 445 Mass. 55 , 62 (2005).

2016“The fundamental requirement of due process is notice and the opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’ ” Matter of Angela, 445 Mass. 55, 62 (2005), quoting *641 from Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965).

2016Where the text is unclear or ambiguous, "a statute must be interpreted according to the intent of the Legislature ascertained from all its words construed by the ordinary and approved usage of the language, considered in connection with the cause of its enactment, the mischief or imperfection to be remedied and the main object to be accomplished, to the end that the purpose of its framers may be effectuated." Telesetsky v. Wight, 395 Mass. 868, 872 (1985), quoting from Commonwealth v. Galvin, 388 Mass. 326, 328 (1983).

2000The court proceeds, however, to interpret the statute in such a way to cover only “heterosexual coitus.” This result is in direct contravention to the fundamental principle of statutory interpretation, that is, the court should construe a statute in order to effectuate its purpose or purposes, see Commonwealth v. Galvin, 388 Mass. 326, 328 (1983); ante at 421; and disregards dictionary definitions of the term, ante at 422, on which we have traditionally relied to help us determine the ordinary and common usage of a word.

2015Cf. Commonwealth v. Torres, 420 Mass. 479, 482-483 (1995), quoting from Commonwealth v. Keevan, 400 Mass. 557, 564 (1987) (“It is a fundamental rule of practice that where a party alleges error in a [jury] charge he must bring the alleged error to the attention of the judge in specific *754 terms in order to give the judge an opportunity to rectify the error, if any”).

1998“It is a fundamental rule of practice that where a party alleges error in a charge he must bring the alleged error to the attention of the judge in specific terms in order to give the judge an opportunity to rectify the error, if any.” Ibid.., quoting from Commonwealth v. Keevan, 400 Mass. 557, 564 (1987).

2005The rule exists because “[sjuch evidence compels the defendant to meet charges of which the indictment gives him no information, confuses him in his defence, raises a variety of issues, and thus diverts the attention of the jury from the [issue] immediately before [them]; and, by showing the defendant to have been a knave on other occasions, creates a prejudice which may cause injustice to be done him.” Commonwealth v. Jackson, 132 Mass. 16, 20-21 (1882).

2003Such evidence may be admissible for other relevant purposes, such as to prove a “common scheme, pattern of operation, absence of accident or mistake, identity, intent, or motive,” Commonwealth v. Triplett, 398 Mass. 561, 563 (1986), quoting Commonwealth v. Helfant, 398 Mass. 214, 224 (1986), but these exceptions “are not without limitation.” Commonwealth v. Trapp, supra. The inherent danger in improperly admitting evidence of a defendant’s prior bad acts is that it “diverts the attention of the jury from the [crime] immediately before it; and, by showing the defendant to have been a knave on o

2000When immunity arises in the context of statutory interpretation, the Supreme Judicial Court has said that “[i]t is a fundamental principle of our jurisprudence, that the Commonwealth cannot be impleaded in its own courts, except by its own consent clearly manifested by act of the Legislature.” Morash & Sons v. Commonwealth, 363 Mass. 612, 615 (1973), quoting Troy & Greenfield R.R. v. Commonwealth, 127 Mass. 43, 46 (1869).

1992In 1977, the Supreme Judicial Court observed, “Massachusetts is one of only five remaining States which retain the common law *78 [governmental] immunity at both the State and local levels.” Whitney v. Worcester, 373 Mass. 208, 212 (1977). 10 Where, as here, the immunity issue arises in the context of statutory interpretation, the Supreme Judicial Court, in 1973, quoting from Troy & Greenfield R.R. v. Commonwealth, 127 Mass. 43, 46 (1869), said that “[i]t is a fundamental principle of our jurisprudence, that the Commonwealth cannot be im-pleaded in its own courts, except by its own consent cle

2025They contravene "the fundamental principle that 'the public . . . has a right to every [person's] evidence,'" id., quoting United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950), and they "diminish the evidence before the court," Three Juveniles v. Commonwealth, 390 Mass. 357, 359 (1983), cert. denied sub nom.

2004“Such privileges diminish the evidence before the court . . . and contravene the fundamental principle that ‘the public . . . has a right to every man’s evidence.’ ” Three Juveniles, supra, quoting United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950).

2017In fact, we have said, "A felony-murder rule that punishes all homicides committed in the perpetration of a felony whether the death is intentional, unintentional or accidental, without the necessity of proving the relation of the perpetrator's state of mind to the homicide, violates the most fundamental principle of the criminal law -- 'criminal liability for causing a particular result is not justified in the absence of some culpable mental state in respect to that result.'" Matchett, 386 Mass. at 506 - 507, quoting Aaron, 409 Mich. at 708 .

2017In fact, we have said, “A felony-murder rule that punishes all homicides committed in the perpetration of a felony whether the death is intentional, unintentional or accidental, without the necessity of proving the relation of the perpetrator’s state of mind to the homicide, violates the most fundamental principle of the criminal law — ‘criminal liability for causing a particular result is not justified in the absence of some culpable mental state in respect to that result.’ ” Matchett, 386 Mass. at 506-507 , quoting Aaron, 409 Mich. at 708 .

1977“The fundamental rule for the construction of wills is to ascertain the intention of the testator from the whole instrument, attributing due weight to all its language, considered in the light of the circumstances known to him at the time of its execution, and to give effect to that intent unless some positive rule of law forbids.” Hill v. Aldrich, 326 Mass. 630, 632 (1951).

1977"The fundamental rule for the construction of wills is to ascertain the intention of the testator from the whole instrument, attributing due weight to all its language, considered in the light of the circumstances known to him at the time of its execution, and to give effect to that intent unless some positive rule of law forbids." Hill v. Aldrich, 326 Mass. 630, 632 (1951).

2018We reasoned that the common-law rules of sovereign immunity were incompatible with the fundamental principle in tort "that if there is tortious injury there is liability." Morash & Sons, Inc ., supra at 621, 296 N.E.2d 461 .

2000When immunity arises in the context of statutory interpretation, the Supreme Judicial Court has said that “[i]t is a fundamental principle of our jurisprudence, that the Commonwealth cannot be impleaded in its own courts, except by its own consent clearly manifested by act of the Legislature.” Morash & Sons v. Commonwealth, 363 Mass. 612, 615 (1973), quoting Troy & Greenfield R.R. v. Commonwealth, 127 Mass. 43, 46 (1869).

2011“It is a fundamental principle of the law of defamation that a plaintiff must show, inter alia, that the allegedly defamatory words published by a defendant were of and concerning the plaintiff.” New England Tractor-Trailer Training of Conn., Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co., 395 Mass. 471, 474 (1985). “ [E]xtrinsic facts tending to show that the words could be so interpreted” may be considered.

1985However, “[i]t is a fundamental principle of the law of defamation that a plaintiff must show, inter alla, that the allegedly defamatory words published by a defendant were of and concerning the plaintiff.” New England Tractor-Trailer Training of Conn., Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co., 395 Mass. 471 , 474 *264 (1985).