fundamental principle in Oregon

2016In Mock , the court explained the reason for choosing that measure of damages: “In determining a just measure of damages we have examined the problem from the standpoint of both the plaintiff and defendant. “'*** While the fundamental rule of the law is to award compensation, yet rules for ascertaining the amount of compensation to be awarded are formed with reference to the just rights of both parties, and the standard fixed for estimating damages ought to be determined not only by what might be right for an injured person to receive in order to afford just compensation, but also by what is j

2016In Mock , the court explained the reason for choosing that measure of damages: “In determining a just measure of damages we have examined the problem from the standpoint of both the plaintiff and defendant. “'*** While the fundamental rule of the law is to award compensation, yet rules for ascertaining the amount of compensation to be awarded are formed with reference to the just rights of both parties, and the standard fixed for estimating damages ought to be determined not only by what might be right for an injured person to receive in order to afford just compensation, but also by what is j

2016In Mock , the court explained the reason for choosing that measure of damages: “In determining a just measure of damages we have examined the problem from the standpoint of both the plaintiff and defendant. “'*** While the fundamental rule of the law is to award compensation, yet rules for ascertaining the amount of compensation to be awarded are formed with reference to the just rights of both parties, and the standard fixed for estimating damages ought to be determined not only by what might be right for an injured person to receive in order to afford just compensation, but also by what is j

2016In Mock, the court explained the reason for choosing that measure of damages: “In determining a just measure of damages we have exam- ined the problem from the standpoint of both the plaintiff and defendant. “ ‘* * * While the fundamental rule of the law is to award compensation, yet rules for ascertaining the amount of compensation to be awarded are formed with reference to the just rights of both parties, and the standard fixed for estimating damages ought to be determined not only by what might be right for an injured person to receive in order to afford just compensation, but also by what

2006The fundamental inquiry regarding issues of legislative delegation is “whether the procedure established for the exercise of the power furnishes adequate safeguards to those who are affected by the administrative action.” Warren v. Marion County et al, 222 Or 307, 314 , 353 P2d 257 (1960) (emphasis in original).

2006The fundamental inquiry regarding issues of legislative delegation is “whether the procedure established for the exercise of the power furnishes adequate safeguards to those who are affected by the administrative action.” Warren v. Marion County et al, 222 Or 307, 314 , 353 P2d 257 (1960) (emphasis in original).

1994Bev., 496 US 18, 35-36 , 110 S Ct 2238 , 110 L Ed 2d 17 (1990): “Because exaction of a tax constitutes a deprivation of property, the State must provide procedural safeguards against unlawful exactions in order to satisfy the commands of the Due Process Clause.” The fundamental requirement of due process is an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.

1994Bev., 496 US 18, 35-36 , 110 S Ct 2238 , 110 L Ed 2d 17 (1990): “Because exaction of a tax constitutes a deprivation of property, the State must provide procedural safeguards against unlawful exactions in order to satisfy the commands of the Due Process Clause.” The fundamental requirement of due process is an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.

2007“It is a fundamental principle of administrative law that an administrative body possesses only those powers that the legislature grants, and that it cannot exercise authority that it does not possess. * * * Instead, [its] powers are restricted to those conferred expressly by statute or by necessary implication.” Gaynor v. Board of Parole, 165 Or App 609, 612 , 996 P2d 1020 (2000) (citing SAIF v. Shipley, 326 Or 557, 561 , 955 P2d 244 (1998), and Campbell v. Bd. of Medical Exam., 16 Or App 381, 391-92 , 518 P2d 1042 , rev den (1974)).

2007“It is a fundamental principle of administrative law that an administrative body possesses only those powers that the legislature grants, and that it cannot exercise authority that it does not possess. * * * Instead, [its] powers are restricted to those conferred expressly by statute or by necessary implication.” Gaynor v. Board of Parole, 165 Or App 609, 612 , 996 P2d 1020 (2000) (citing SAIF v. Shipley, 326 Or 557, 561 , 955 P2d 244 (1998), and Campbell v. Bd. of Medical Exam., 16 Or App 381, 391-92 , 518 P2d 1042 , rev den (1974)).

2025As the term “commence” suggests, the question whether the right applies at all has a significant temporal component; the fundamental requirement is that the right to counsel under Article I, section 11, “commences upon the initiation of a ‘criminal prosecution.’ ” Id. at 478 .

2025As the term “commence” suggests, the question whether the right applies at all has a significant temporal component; the fundamental requirement is that the right to counsel under Article I, section 11, “commences upon the initiation of a ‘criminal prosecution.’ ” Id. at 478 .

2024As noted, in Dowling, the Supreme Court started from the premise that it is a fundamental principle of justice that a defendant is entitled to a fair trial and to the exclusion of the type of evidence that “is so extremely unfair that its admission violates fundamental conceptions of justice.” 493 US at 352 .

2024As noted, in Dowling, the Supreme Court started from the premise that it is a fundamental principle of justice that a defendant is entitled to a fair trial and to the exclusion of the type of evidence that “is so extremely unfair that its admission violates fundamental conceptions of justice.” 493 US at 352 .

2023Brady, 373 US at 87 .6 We agree with youth that, once the police executed the search warrant for D’s phones, the state’s failure to disclose its possession of the phones during the factfinding proceeding violated due process, because they likely contained content that was material to youth’s self-defense claim.

2023Brady, 373 US at 87 .6 We agree with youth that, once the police executed the search warrant for D’s phones, the state’s failure to disclose its possession of the phones during the factfinding proceeding violated due process, because they likely contained content that was material to youth’s self-defense claim.

2022The “touchstone of due process” is “fundamental fairness.” Gagnon, 411 US at 790 ; see also Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 US 545, 552 , 85 S Ct 1187 , 14 L Ed 2d 62 (1965) (“A fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard.

2021In the context of defendant’s right to confront witnesses, this means a meaningful opportunity to test the veracity of the evidence via cross examination to ensure that any revocation of probation is based on “verified 2 Although Morrissey was concerned with parole revocation proceedings, the Supreme Court recognized that the same protections apply to probation revocation proceedings in Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 US 778, 782 , 93 S Ct 1756 , 36 L Ed 2d 656 (1973). *581 facts.” See Morrissey, 408 US at 484 .

2017ORS .19.245(2) (“[a] party to a judgment given by confession * * * may not appeal from the judgment” except as otherwise specified); Russell v. Sheahan, 324 Or 445, 454 , 927 P2d 591 (1996) (concluding that ORS 19.245 6 embodies “the fundamental principle that a party may not take an appeal from a judgment to which that party consented”).

2017ORS .19.245(2) (“[a] party to a judgment given by confession * * * may not appeal from the judgment” except as otherwise specified); Russell v. Sheahan, 324 Or 445, 454 , 927 P2d 591 (1996) (concluding that ORS 19.245 6 embodies “the fundamental principle that a party may not take an appeal from a judgment to which that party consented”).

2014Ry., 293 US 102, 111 , 55 S Ct 55 , 79 L Ed 222 (1934)).

1976Ry., 293 US 102, 111 , 55 S Ct 55 , 79 L Ed 222 (1934); Southland Mall, Inc. v. Garner, supra at 889.

2014Ry., 293 US 102, 111 , 55 S Ct 55 , 79 L Ed 222 (1934)).

2014Ry., 293 US 102, 111 , 55 S Ct 55 , 79 L Ed 222 (1934)).

2010Such restraint comports with the fundamental principle that the power to civilly commit a person must not be used "as a `paternalistic vehicle' to `save people from themselves.'" Olsen, 208 Or.App. at 692 , 145 P.3d 350 (quoting State v. Powell, 178 Or.App. 89, 95 , 35 P.3d 1084 (2001)).

2010Such restraint comports with the fundamental principle that the power to civilly commit a person must not be used “as a ‘paternalistic vehicle’ to ‘save people from themselves.’ ” Olsen, 208 Or App at 692 (quoting State v. Powell, 178 Or App 89, 95 , 35 P3d 1084 (2001)).

2010Such restraint comports with the fundamental principle that the power to civilly commit a person must not be used “as a ‘paternalistic vehicle’ to ‘save people from themselves.’ ” Olsen, 208 Or App at 692 (quoting State v. Powell, 178 Or App 89, 95 , 35 P3d 1084 (2001)).

2010Such restraint comports with the fundamental principle that the power to civilly commit a person must not be used “as a ‘paternalistic vehicle’ to ‘save people from themselves.’ ” Olsen, 208 Or App at 692 (quoting State v. Powell, 178 Or App 89, 95 , 35 P3d 1084 (2001)).

2007“It is a fundamental principle of administrative law that an administrative body possesses only those powers that the legislature grants, and that it cannot exercise authority that it does not possess. * * * Instead, [its] powers are restricted to those conferred expressly by statute or by necessary implication.” Gaynor v. Board of Parole, 165 Or App 609, 612 , 996 P2d 1020 (2000) (citing SAIF v. Shipley, 326 Or 557, 561 , 955 P2d 244 (1998), and Campbell v. Bd. of Medical Exam., 16 Or App 381, 391-92 , 518 P2d 1042 , rev den (1974)).

2007“It is a fundamental principle of administrative law that an administrative body possesses only those powers that the legislature grants, and that it cannot exercise authority that it does not possess. * * * Instead, [its] powers are restricted to those conferred expressly by statute or by necessary implication.” Gaynor v. Board of Parole, 165 Or App 609, 612 , 996 P2d 1020 (2000) (citing SAIF v. Shipley, 326 Or 557, 561 , 955 P2d 244 (1998), and Campbell v. Bd. of Medical Exam., 16 Or App 381, 391-92 , 518 P2d 1042 , rev den (1974)).

2003However, it is also true that “ ‘[i]t is a fundamental principle of the law of agency that the power of every agent to bind his principal rests upon the authority conferred * * * by that principal. * * * A principal will not be bound by an act of his agent in excess of his *43 actual authority, where the third person has knowledge of the extent of the agent’s authority, or where the facts and circumstances of the case * * * put [the third person] upon inquiry as to the authority and good faith of the agent, as where a third person deals with an agent who is acting for himself as well as for hi

2003However, it is also true that “ ‘[i]t is a fundamental principle of the law of agency that the power of every agent to bind his principal rests upon the authority conferred * * * by that principal. * * * A principal will not be bound by an act of his agent in excess of his *43 actual authority, where the third person has knowledge of the extent of the agent’s authority, or where the facts and circumstances of the case * * * put [the third person] upon inquiry as to the authority and good faith of the agent, as where a third person deals with an agent who is acting for himself as well as for hi