fundamental rule in Maine

2026See In re Guardianship of Chamberlain, 2015 ME 76, ¶¶ 17-20 , 118 A.3d 229 (noting that due process protections apply to guardianship determinations and applying the due process test set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976)); Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 333 (“The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.”) (quotation marks omitted)); Thomas v. Humfield, 916 F.2d 1032, 1033-34 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that a party to litigation is entitled to notice and a hearing before the court declares him incompetent and app

2026See In re Guardianship of Chamberlain, 2015 ME 76, ¶¶ 17-20 , 118 A.3d 229 (noting that due process protections apply to guardianship determinations and applying the due process test set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976)); Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 333 (“The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.”) (quotation marks omitted)); Thomas v. Humfield, 916 F.2d 1032, 1033-34 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that a party to litigation is entitled to notice and a hearing before the court declares him incompetent and app

2001The emphasis of the dissenting opinion, however, was on the fundamental rule of statutory construction that statutes are presumed to have a prospective application unless a legislative intent to the contrary “is clearly expressed or necessarily implied in the language used.” Id. (quoting Miller v. Fallon, 134 Me. 145, 148 , 183 A. 416, 417 (1936)).

2001The emphasis of the dissenting opinion, however, was on the fundamental rule of statutory construction that statutes are presumed to have a prospective application unless a legislative intent to the contrary “is clearly expressed or necessarily implied in the language used.” Id. (quoting Miller v. Fallon, 134 Me. 145, 148 , 183 A. 416, 417 (1936)).

1983Such a construction ought to be put upon a statute as may best answer the intent which the Legislators had in view, and when determinable and ascertained, the courts must give effect to it." In Re Spring Valley Development, 300 A.2d 736, 741 (Me.1973) (quoting King Resources Co. v. Environmental Improvement Commission, 270 A.2d 863, 869 (Me.1970)); W.S. *718 Libbey Co. v. Johnson, 148 Me. 410, 414 , 94 A.2d 907, 909 (1953).

1977While, generally, we endeavor to give effect to the “plain meaning” of legislation as objectively manifested on its face, Chase v. Edgar, Me., 259 A.2d 30 (1969), we have nevertheless emphasized that: “Legislative intent is the fundamental rule in the construction or interpretation of statutes.” King Resources Company v. Environmental Improvement Commission, Me., 270 A.2d 863, 869 (1970).

2024This fundamental requirement necessitates “an opportunity to be heard upon such notice and proceedings as are adequate to safeguard the right which the particular pertinent constitutional provision purports to protect.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). [¶9] Here, Moser’s debt to Citibank is a property interest protected by procedural due process.

2022See Doe, 2018 ME 164 , ,r 17, 198 A.3d 782 ("In general, the fundamental requirement of due process is that a party must be given notice and an opportunity to be heard." (citing Kirkpatrick v. City of Bangor, 1999 ME 73 , ,r 15, 728 A.2d 1268 )).

1988See Faucher v. City of Auburn, 465 A.2d 1120, 1124 (Me.1983) (“It is a fundamental rule of statutory construction that in order to determine the legislative intent in relation to a particular section of a comprehensive statute, courts should consider the statutory scheme in its entirety.”); Freeport Minerals Co. v. Town of Bucksport, 437 A.2d 642, 644 (Me.1981).

1988See Faucher v. City of Auburn, 465 A.2d 1120, 1124 (Me. 1983) ("It is a fundamental rule of statutory construction that in order to determine the legislative intent in relation to a particular section of a comprehensive statute, courts should consider the statutory scheme in its entirety."); Freeport Minerals Co. v. Town of Bucksport, 437 A.2d 642, 644 (Me.1981).

2013“The fundamental requirement of due process is an opportunity to be heard upon such notice and proceedings as are adequate to safeguard the right which the particular pertinent constitutional provision purports to protect.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). 1.

2003“It is essential to a party’s right to procedural due process that he be given notice of and an opportunity to be heard at any proceeding in which [his] property rights are at stake.” Hamill v. Bay Bridge Assoc., 1998 ME 181 , { 5, 714 A.2d 829, 831 (quoting Senty v. Board of Osteopathic Examination & Registration, 594 A.2d 1068, 1072 (Me. 1991)); see also In Re Christmas C., 1998 ME 258 , { 5, 714 A.2d 629, 631 (“the fundamental requirement of due process is an opportunity to be heard upon such notice and proceedings as are adequate to safeguard the right which the particular pertinent consti

1992“The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the legislature.” State v. Hudson, 470 A.2d 786, 788 (Me.1984); see also Raymond v. State, 467 A.2d 161, 164 (Me.1983) (“the intent of the legislature as divined from the statutory language itself controls”); Mundy v. Simmons, 424 A.2d 135, 137 (Me.1980) (“the fundamental rule of statutory construction is to ascertain the real purpose and intent of the Legislature which, when discovered, must be made to prevail”).

1987Although we look first to its language when interpreting a statute, “we do recognize that the fundamental rule of statutory construction to ascertain the real purpose and intent of the Legislature.... ” Mundy v. Simmons, 424 A.2d 135, 137 (Me.1980).

2017Because this entire system of government is founded on the people’s choice of who will represent them, the right to vote is regarded as “preservative of all rights.” Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886). [¶49] Although it need hardly be said, we reiterate that “[v]oting is a fundamental right, it is at the heart of our democratic process.” Crafts v. Quinn, 482 A.2d 825, 830 (Me. 1984).

2017Because this, entire system of government is founded on the people’s choice of who will represent them, the right to vote is regarded as “preservative of all rights.” Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 , 6 S.Ct. 1064 , 30 L.Ed. 220 (1886). [¶ 49] Although it need hardly be said, we reiterate that “[v]oting is a fundamental right, it is at the heart of our democratic process.” Crafts v. Quinn, 482 A.2d 825, 830 (Me. 1984).

2017See Jabar v. Jabar, 2006 ME 74, ¶ 17 , 899 A.2d 796 .

2017See Jabar v. Jabar, 2006 ME 74, ¶ 17 , 899 A.2d 796 .

2015“The fundamental rule in the interpretation of any statute is that the intent of the legislature, as divined from the statutory language itself, controls.” State v. Butt, 656 A.2d 1225, 1227 (Me.1995).

1997State v. Butt, 656 A.2d 1225, 1227 (Me.1995) (citation omitted). [¶ 7] Section 618 operates to validate agreements that would be unenforceable under traditional notions of acceptable corporate practice. 2 In short, the statute provides that written agreements between shareholders are enforceable even if they (1) relate to a phase of affairs of the corporation, such as the management of the corporation, payment of dividends, or employment of shareholders, (2) restrict director discretion, or (3) transfer management duties to shareholders, as long as such agreements satisfy certain conditions. 1

2000As to whether the Legislature intended a retroactive application, the court is aided by "the fundamental rule of statutory construction strictly followed by . . . [the Law Court] that all statutes will be considered to have a prospective operation only, unless the legislative intent to the contrary is clearly expressed or necessarily implied from the language used." Coates v. Maine Employment Comm'n et al., 406 A.2d 94 (Me. 1979) (quoting Miller v. Fallon,, 183 A. 416, 417 (Me. 1936)); see also Bowman v. Geyer, 143 A. 272, 273-74 (Me. 1928).

1979See Bowman v. Geyer, 127 Me. 351, 354 , 143 A. 272, 273-74 (1928).

1993It is a fundamental rule of statutory interpretation that words in a statute must be given their plain and ordinary meanings, see Mahaney v. State, 610 A.2d 738, 741 (Me.1992), and, without an express inclusion of a limiting adverb such as “solely,” we refuse to imply such a restriction.

1993It is a fundamental rule of statutory interpretation that words in a statute must be given their plain and ordinary meanings, see Mahaney v. State, 610 A.2d 738, 741 (Me.1992), and, without an express inclusion of a limiting adverb such as "solely," we refuse to imply such a restriction.

1997"In construing a statute, we must bear in mind the fundamental rule that such a construction ought to be put upon a statute as may best answer the intention which the Legislators had in view, and when determinable and ascertained, the courts must give effect to it.” Town of Arundel v. Swain, 374 A.2d 317, 319 (Me.1977) (citations omitted).

1997"In construing a statute, we must bear in mind the fundamental rule that such a construction ought be put upon a statute as may best answer the intention which the legislators had in view, and when determinable and ascertained, the courts must give effect to it." Town of Arundel v. Swain, 374 A.2d 317, 319 (Me. 1977) (citations omitted). [¶ 11] Pursuant to 24 M.R.S.A. § 2502(6), an "action for professional negligence" is "any action for damages for injury or death... whether based upon tort or breach of contract or otherwise, arising out of the provision of failure to provide health care servi

1996Capitol Bank & Trust Co. v. City of Waterville, 343 A.2d 213, 218 (Me.1975); see Camp Walden v. Johnson, 156 Me. 160, 165 , 163 A.2d 356, 358 (1960); see also Blaney v. Town of Shapleigh, 455 A.2d 1381, 1386 (Me. 1983) (recognizing principle that when tax statute is susceptible of more than one interpretation courts will interpret statute in light most favorable to citizen).

1996Capitol Bank & Trust Co. v. City of Waterville, 343 A.2d 213, 218 (Me.1975); see Camp Walden v. Johnson, 156 Me. 160, 165 , 163 A.2d 356, 358 (1960); see also Blaney v. Town of Shapleigh, 455 A.2d 1381, 1386 (Me.1983) (recognizing principle that when tax statute is susceptible of more than one interpretation courts will interpret statute in light most favorable to citizen).

1996“The fundamental rule in statutory construction is that words must be given their plain meaning,” Paradis v. Webber Hospital, 409 A.2d 672, 675 (Me.1979), and that “[a]ny statute must be construed as a whole in order to effectuate the legislative intent.” Fernald v. Maine State Parole Bd., 447 A.2d 1236, 1238 (Me.1982).

1991Paradise v. Webber Hospital, 409 A.2d 672, 675 (Me. 1979).

1967The fundamental rule of construction of statutory provisions is that language shall be interpreted in accordance with the intention with which it was used, if that result may be accomplished by giving words their ordinary and usual significance, their common and popular sense. 1 M.R.S.A. § 72 (3); In re Opinion of the Justices, 1947, 142 Me. 409 , 60 A.2d 903 ; Depositors Trust Company of Augusta v. Johnson, 1966, Me., 222 A.2d 49 .

1967The fundamental rule of construction of statutory provisions is that language shall be interpreted in accordance with the intention with which it was used, if that result may be accomplished by giving words their ordinary and usual significance, their common and popular sense. 1 M.R.S.A. § 72 (3); In re Opinion of the Justices, 1947, 142 Me. 409 , 60 A.2d 903 ; Depositors Trust Company of Augusta v. Johnson, 1966, Me., 222 A.2d 49 .

2017Because this, entire system of government is founded on the people’s choice of who will represent them, the right to vote is regarded as “preservative of all rights.” Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 , 6 S.Ct. 1064 , 30 L.Ed. 220 (1886). [¶ 49] Although it need hardly be said, we reiterate that “[v]oting is a fundamental right, it is at the heart of our democratic process.” Crafts v. Quinn, 482 A.2d 825, 830 (Me. 1984).

2017Because this, entire system of government is founded on the people’s choice of who will represent them, the right to vote is regarded as “preservative of all rights.” Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 , 6 S.Ct. 1064 , 30 L.Ed. 220 (1886). [¶ 49] Although it need hardly be said, we reiterate that “[v]oting is a fundamental right, it is at the heart of our democratic process.” Crafts v. Quinn, 482 A.2d 825, 830 (Me. 1984).

1970“The fundamental principle concerning parties is, that all persons in whose favor or against whom there might be a recovery, however partial, and also all persons who are so interested, although indirectly, in the subject matter and the relief granted that their rights or duties might be affected by the decree, although no substantial recovery can be obtained either for or against them, shall be made parties to the suit.” Angell v. Gilman, 1949, 144 Me. 202, 206 , 67 A.2d 15, 16 .

1970“The fundamental principle concerning parties is, that all persons in whose favor or against whom there might be a recovery, however partial, and also all persons who are so interested, although indirectly, in the subject matter and the relief granted that their rights or duties might be affected by the decree, although no substantial recovery can be obtained either for or against them, shall be made parties to the suit.” Angell v. Gilman, 1949, 144 Me. 202, 206 , 67 A.2d 15, 16 .

1988A fundamental rule of statutory construction is that “[sjtatutes imposing taxes are construed most strongly against the government and in the citizen’s favor and may not be extended by implication beyond the clear import of the language used.” Camp Walden v. Johnson, 156 Me. at 165 , 163 A.2d at 358 .

1988A fundamental rule of statutory construction is that “[sjtatutes imposing taxes are construed most strongly against the government and in the citizen’s favor and may not be extended by implication beyond the clear import of the language used.” Camp Walden v. Johnson, 156 Me. at 165 , 163 A.2d at 358 .

1991In previous decisions we have held that “[i]t is a fundamental rule that a judgment [entered on an arbitration award] must be sufficiently clear and definite so that is susceptible of enforcement.” Lisbon School Committee v. Lisbon Educational Association, 438 A.2d 239, 245 (Me.1981).

1984It is a fundamental rule that to confirm an award under 14 M.R.S.A. § 5937 (1980), the award must be “sufficiently clear and definite so that it is susceptible of enforcement and those called upon to enforce it must not be misled nor called upon to pay more than is due.” Lisbon School Committee, 438 A.2d at 245 .