fundamental error in Idaho

2019See State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 571 , 165 P.3d 273, 285 (2007); State v. Haggard, 94 Idaho 249, 251 , 486 P.2d 260, 262 (1971).

2019See State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 571 , 165 P.3d 273, 285 (2007); State v. Haggard, 94 Idaho 249, 251 , 486 P.2d 260, 262 (1971).

2007In Idaho, the genesis of what became known as the doctrine of fundamental error was our opinion in State v. Haggard, 94 Idaho 249 , 486 P.2d 260 (1971).

2007In Idaho, the genesis of what became known as the doctrine of fundamental error was our opinion in State v. Haggard, 94 Idaho 249 , 486 P.2d 260 (1971).

2025To obtain relief under the fundamental error doctrine, a defendant must demonstrate: (1) “one or more of the defendant’s unwaived constitutional rights were violated”; (2) the error is “clear or obvious” on the record “without the need for any additional information,” including information “as to whether the failure to object was a tactical decision”; and (3) “the error affected the defendant’s substantial rights,” by showing a reasonable possibility that the error “affected the outcome of the trial proceedings.” Perry, 150 Idaho at 226 , 245 P.3d at 978 .

2025To obtain relief under the fundamental error doctrine, a defendant must demonstrate: (1) “one or more of the defendant’s unwaived constitutional rights were violated”; (2) the error is “clear or obvious” on the record “without the need for any additional information,” including information “as to whether the failure to object was a tactical decision”; and (3) “the error affected the defendant’s substantial rights,” by showing a reasonable possibility that the error “affected the outcome of the trial proceedings.” Perry, 150 Idaho at 226 , 245 P.3d at 978 .

2025Mother cites our decision in State v. Miller, 165 Idaho 115, 119 , 443 P.3d 129, 133 (2019), to assert that Father’s situation fails to meet two of the conditions that must be met before we will apply the fundamental error doctrine: (1) the party must demonstrate that one or more of his unwaived constitutional rights were violated; and (2) the error must be clear or obvious without the need for any additional information not contained in the appellate record.

2025Mother cites our decision in State v. Miller, 165 Idaho 115, 119 , 443 P.3d 129, 133 (2019), to assert that Father’s situation fails to meet two of the conditions that must be met before we will apply the fundamental error doctrine: (1) the party must demonstrate that one or more of his unwaived constitutional rights were violated; and (2) the error must be clear or obvious without the need for any additional information not contained in the appellate record.

2017“Prosecu-torial misconduct rises to the level of fundamental error if it is ‘calculated to inflame the minds of jurors and arouse passion or prejudice against the defendant, or is so inflammatory that the jurors may be influenced to determine guilt on factors outside the evidence.’” State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 280 , 77 P.3d 956, 969 (2003) (quoting State v. Babb, 125 Idaho 934, 942 , 877 P.2d 905, 913 (1994)).

2017“Prosecu-torial misconduct rises to the level of fundamental error if it is ‘calculated to inflame the minds of jurors and arouse passion or prejudice against the defendant, or is so inflammatory that the jurors may be influenced to determine guilt on factors outside the evidence.’” State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 280 , 77 P.3d 956, 969 (2003) (quoting State v. Babb, 125 Idaho 934, 942 , 877 P.2d 905, 913 (1994)).

2011It is also noted that while I.C.R. 30(b) normally prohibits a defendant from challenging a jury instruction for the first time on appeal, “even absent a timely objection to the trial court, claims of instructional error are reviewable for the first time on appeal under the fundamental error doctrine.” State v. Hansen, 148 Idaho 442, 444 , 224 P.3d 509, 511 (Ct.App.2009) (citing State v. Anderson, 144 Idaho 743, 748 , 170 P.3d 886, 891 (2007)).

2011It is also noted that while I.C.R. 30(b) normally prohibits a defendant from challenging a jury instruction for the first time on appeal, “even absent a timely objection to the trial court, claims of instructional error are reviewable for the first time on appeal under the fundamental error doctrine.” State v. Hansen, 148 Idaho 442, 444 , 224 P.3d 509, 511 (Ct.App.2009) (citing State v. Anderson, 144 Idaho 743, 748 , 170 P.3d 886, 891 (2007)).

2017Fundamental error is an error that “so profoundly distorts the trial that it produces manifest injustice and deprives the accused of his fundamental right to due process.” State v. Lavy, 121 Idaho 842, 844 , 828 P.2d 871, 873 (1992).

2017Fundamental error is an error that “so profoundly distorts the trial that it produces manifest injustice and deprives the accused of his fundamental right to due process.” State v. Lavy, 121 Idaho 842, 844 , 828 P.2d 871, 873 (1992).

2014Despite determining that the prosecutor committed misconduct, the court held that the misconduct did not rise “to the level of a fundamental error warranting reversal.” Id.

2014Because the record supported the prosecutor’s statements and the misconduct was not as egregious as that in Sheahan , the court concluded “that the comments were not so inflammatory that the jurors were influenced to determine Kuhn’s guilt on factors outside the evidence and, thus, the prosecutor’s actions did not rise to the level of fundamental error.” Id. *873 Here, unlike the prosecutors in Sheahan or Kuhn, the prosecutor did not directly call the witness a liar nor expressly accuse him of perjury.

2020See State v. Carter, 155 Idaho 170, 174 , 307 P.3d 187, 191 (2013) (holding that the fundamental error test is the proper standard for determining whether an appellate court may hear claims based upon unobjected-to error in all phases of criminal proceedings in the trial courts of this state).

2020See State v. Carter, 155 Idaho 170, 174 , 307 P.3d 187, 191 (2013) (holding that the fundamental error test is the proper standard for determining whether an appellate court may hear claims based upon unobjected-to error in all phases of criminal proceedings in the trial courts of this state).

2012Even prior to Perry, although the fundamental error was eventually routinely applied to post-trial proceedings by both this Court and our Supreme Court, see, e.g., State v. Robbins, 123 Idaho 527, 529 , 850 P.2d 176, 178 (1993) (addressing, pursuant to fundamental error, the constitutionality of the defendant’s sentence); State v. Rutherford, 107 Idaho 910, 915 , 693 P.2d 1112 , 1117 (Ct. App. 1985) (addressing the defendant’s claim of breach of the plea agreement under the fundamental error doctrine), this Court continued to 10 apply the manifest disregard standard in this particular context,

1986Before a fundamental error can be held harmless, “the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Rutherford, 107 Idaho at 916, 693 P.2d at 1118, quoting LePage, 102 Idaho at 393 , 630 P.2d at 680 .

1982While it is not open to question that the primary responsibility for sentencing rests with the trial judge, and that its discretion in the matter will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of a showing of an abuse of discretion, State v. Delin, 102 Idaho 151 , 627 P.2d 330 (1981); State v. Dillon, 100 Idaho 723 , 604 P.2d 737 (1979), nevertheless, as was recently observed in State v. Nice, Idaho, 645 P.2d 323 (1982), it is also true that in exercising that discretion reasonableness *641 is a fundamental requirement, State v. Dillon, 100 Idaho 723 , 604 P.2d 737 (1979), and this Court shoul

1982While it is not open to question that the primary responsibility for sentencing rests with the trial judge, and that its discretion in the matter will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of a showing of an abuse of discretion, State v. Delin, 102 Idaho 151 , 627 P.2d 330 (1981); State v. Dillon, 100 Idaho 723 , 604 P.2d 737 (1979), nevertheless, as was recently observed in State v. Nice, Idaho, 645 P.2d 323 (1982), it is also true that in exercising that discretion rea sonableness is a fundamental requirement, State v. Dillon, 100 Idaho 723 , 604 P.2d 737 (1979), and this Court should ex

2015He argues that the application of the fundamental error standard in capital cases (1) disregards the plain language of Idaho Code section 19-2827, which requires the Court to review “all claims of error the defendant raises on appeal” in a capital case, Dunlap, 155 Idaho at 362 , 313 P.3d at 18 ; (2) violates separation of powers principles; (3) violates Eighth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment principles of meaningful appellate review of death sentences; and (4) violates his due process rights.

2015He argues that the application of the fundamental error standard in capital cases (1) disregards the plain language of Idaho Code section 19-2827, which requires the Court to review “all claims of error the defendant raises on appeal” in a capital case, Dunlap, 155 Idaho at 362 , 313 P.3d at 18 ; (2) violates separation of powers principles; (3) violates Eighth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment principles of meaningful appellate review of death sentences; and (4) violates his due process rights.

2023Relying heavily on State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694 , 215 P.3d 414 (2009), the district court dismissed Hall’s claim because “the prosecutor’s comments here were not made to appeal to the jury’s sympathies but to explain the evidence the jurors were going to hear.” The district court concluded that, “[b]ecause the prosecutor’s comments were proper, there was no due process violation and, therefore, Hall would not have been able to satisfy the fundamental error test had the claim been raised on appeal.” The district court further noted that, even if the comments were improper, the trial court h

2023Relying heavily on State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694 , 215 P.3d 414 (2009), the district court dismissed Hall’s claim because “the prosecutor’s comments here were not made to appeal to the jury’s sympathies but to explain the evidence the jurors were going to hear.” The district court concluded that, “[b]ecause the prosecutor’s comments were proper, there was no due process violation and, therefore, Hall would not have been able to satisfy the fundamental error test had the claim been raised on appeal.” The district court further noted that, even if the comments were improper, the trial court h

2026Middleton v. McNeil, 541 U.S. 433, 437 , (2004); Anderson, 144 Idaho at 749 , 170 P.3d at 892 .

2017In State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 228 , 245 P.3d 961, 980 (2010), this Court stated that in order to constitute fundamental error the defendant must show that the error: “(1) violates one or more of the defendant’s unwaived constitutional rights; (2) plainly exists (without the need for any additional information not contained in the appellate record, including information as to whether the failure to object was a tactical decision); and (3) was not harmless.” In addition, this Court has held that errors in jury instructions are fundamental if the error functions to “relieve[] the State of its

2011Cf. Cannady, 137 Idaho at 72-73 , 44 P.3d at 1127 -28 (see above); State v. Gertsch, 137 Idaho 387 , 49 P.3d 392 (2002) (concluding that neither the presence of victim/witnesses during trial, nor the un-objected to testimony of an expert witness testifying regarding securities law and its application to the facts of the case, constituted fundamental error as it did not affect the foundation or basis of the defendant’s rights); State v. Moore, 131 Idaho 814 , 965 P.2d 174 (1998) (concluding that the admission of the State’s experts’ testimony that the victim had been sexually abused would not b

2011Cf. Cannady, 137 Idaho at 72-73 , 44 P.3d at 1127 -28 (see above); State v. Gertsch, 137 Idaho 387 , 49 P.3d 392 (2002) (concluding that neither the presence of victim/witnesses during trial, nor the un-objected to testimony of an expert witness testifying regarding securities law and its application to the facts of the case, constituted fundamental error as it did not affect the foundation or basis of the defendant’s rights); State v. Moore, 131 Idaho 814 , 965 P.2d 174 (1998) (concluding that the admission of the State’s experts’ testimony that the victim had been sexually abused would not b

2017Standard of Review “Where prosecutorial misconduct was not objected to during trial, this Court may only reverse when that misconduct constitutes a fundamental error.” State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 480 , 272 P.3d 417, 452 (2012) (citing State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227 , 245 P.3d 961, 979 (2010)).

2017Standard of Review “Where prosecutorial misconduct was not objected to during trial, this Court may only reverse when that misconduct constitutes a fundamental error.” State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 480 , 272 P.3d 417, 452 (2012) (citing State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227 , 245 P.3d 961, 979 (2010)).

2023“Fundamental error is error that: ‘(1) violates one or more of the defendant’s unwaived constitutional rights; (2) plainly exists (without the need for any additional information not contained in the appellate record, including information as to whether the failure to object was a tactical decision); and (3) was not harmless.’ ” State v. Lankford, 162 Idaho 477, 494 , 399 P.3d 804, 821 (2017) (citing Perry, 150 Idaho at 228 , 245 P.3d at 980 ).

2023As a result, when vouching occurs, “the improper statements will not rise to the level of fundamental error.” Id.

2013Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504 , 508-09 (1984); State v. Rutherford, 107 Idaho 910, 913 , 693 P.2d 1112 , 1115 (Ct. App. 1985).

2012Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 508-09 , 104 S.Ct. 2543, 2546-47 , 81 L.Ed.2d 437, 442-43 (1984); State v. Rutherford, 107 Idaho 910, 913 , 693 P.2d 1112, 1115 (Ct.App.1985).

2020State v. Gross, 146 Idaho 15, 18 , 189 P.3d 477, 480 (Ct. App. 2008); see also State v. Parker, 157 Idaho 132, 146 , 334 P.3d 806, 820 (2014); State v. Cortez, 135 Idaho 561, 565 , 21 P.3d 498, 502 (Ct. App. 2001).

2020State v. Gross, 146 Idaho 15, 18 , 189 P.3d 477, 480 (Ct. App. 2008); see also State v. Parker, 157 Idaho 132, 146 , 334 P.3d 806, 820 (2014); State v. Cortez, 135 Idaho 561, 565 , 21 P.3d 498, 502 (Ct. App. 2001).

2019"Whether comments during closing arguments rise to the level of fundamental error is a question that must be analyzed in the context of the trial as a whole." State v. Carson , 151 Idaho 713 , 718, 264 P.3d 54 , 59 (2011) (citing Severson , 147 Idaho at 720 , 215 P.3d at 440 (2009) ).

2019"Whether comments during closing arguments rise to the level of fundamental error is a question that must be analyzed in the context of the trial as a whole." State v. Carson , 151 Idaho 713 , 718, 264 P.3d 54 , 59 (2011) (citing Severson , 147 Idaho at 720 , 215 P.3d at 440 (2009) ).

2000However, in exercising that discretion];,] reasonableness is a fundamental requirement, State v. Dillon, 100 Idaho 723 , 604 P.2d 737 (1979), and this Court must examine the circumstances of each case to determine whether the punishment imposed is excessive.

2000However, in exercising that discretion];,] reasonableness is a fundamental requirement, State v. Dillon, 100 Idaho 723 , 604 P.2d 737 (1979), and this Court must examine the circumstances of each case to determine whether the punishment imposed is excessive.

2025“Fundamental error . . . is error which ‘so profoundly distorts the trial that it produces manifest injustice and deprives the accused of his constitutional right to due process.’ ” John Doe, 144 Idaho at 536, 164 P.3d at 816 (quoting State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 281 , 77 P.3d 956, 970 (2003)).

2025“Fundamental error . . . is error which ‘so profoundly distorts the trial that it produces manifest injustice and deprives the accused of his constitutional right to due process.’ ” John Doe, 144 Idaho at 536, 164 P.3d at 816 (quoting State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 281 , 77 P.3d 956, 970 (2003)).

2003Fundamental error is that error which “so profoundly distorts the trial that it produces manifest injustice and deprives the accused of his constitutional right to due process.” State v. Mauro, 121 Idaho 178, 180 , 824 P.2d 109, 111 (1991) (quoting State v. Morris, 116 Idaho 834, 836 , 780 P.2d 156, 158 (Ct.App.1989)).

2003Fundamental error is that error which “so profoundly distorts the trial that it produces manifest injustice and deprives the accused of his constitutional right to due process.” State v. Mauro, 121 Idaho 178, 180 , 824 P.2d 109, 111 (1991) (quoting State v. Morris, 116 Idaho 834, 836 , 780 P.2d 156, 158 (Ct.App.1989)).

2023Id. at 165 , 983 P.2d at 238 .

2023Id. at 165 , 983 P.2d at 238 .

1994In exercising that discretion, reasonableness is a fundamental requirement." State v. Broadhead, 120 Idaho 141, 144 , 814 P.2d 401, 404 (1991) (quoting State v. Dillon, 100 Idaho 723, 724 , 604 P.2d 737, 738 (1979), overruled on other grounds, *135 State v. Brown, 121 Idaho 385, 394 , 825 P.2d 482, 491 (1992).

1994In exercising that discretion, reasonableness is a fundamental requirement." State v. Broadhead, 120 Idaho 141, 144 , 814 P.2d 401, 404 (1991) (quoting State v. Dillon, 100 Idaho 723, 724 , 604 P.2d 737, 738 (1979), overruled on other grounds, *135 State v. Brown, 121 Idaho 385, 394 , 825 P.2d 482, 491 (1992).

2020See State v. Alwin, 164 Idaho 160 , 173, 426 P.3d 1260, 1273 (2018) (highlighting trial court’s jury instruction cured any resulting prejudice from prosecutorial almost entirely on the third prong of the fundamental error analysis; its analysis of whether the error was clear from the appellate record consisted entirely of the sentence “Branigh has also shown that the error plainly exists.” Id. at 418, 313 P.3d at 746.

2019“Thus, even where a prosecutor impermissibly vouches for a witness, the improper statements will not rise to the level of fundamental error.” Id.

2009Fundamental error has also been described as “error which ‘so profoundly distorts the trial that it produces manifest injustice and deprives the accused of his constitutional right to due process.’ ” State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 281 , 77 P.3d 956, 970 (2003) (quoting State v. Mauro, 121 Idaho 178, 180 , 824 P.2d 109, 111 (1991)).

2009Fundamental error has also been described as “error which ‘so profoundly distorts the trial that it produces manifest injustice and deprives the accused of his constitutional right to due process.’ ” State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 281 , 77 P.3d 956, 970 (2003) (quoting State v. Mauro, 121 Idaho 178, 180 , 824 P.2d 109, 111 (1991)).