fundamental principle in District of Columbia

2023See generally, e.g., In re Bright Ideas Co., 284 A.3d 1037 , 1049 (D.C. 2022) (“[C]onstitutional adjudication is a matter of great gravity and delicacy, so our practice is to avoid ruling on constitutional questions unless we have no other choice.”) (internal quotation marks 14 omitted); Olevsky v. District of Columbia, 548 A.2d 78, 81 (D.C. 1988) (“The practice of avoiding constitutional issues if it is reasonably possible to do so is predicated on a fundamental rule of judicial restraint, which is perhaps more deeply rooted than any other doctrine of constitutional adjudication.”).

2011Cf. In re L.L., 974 A.2d 859 , 866 n. 3 (D.C.2009) (quoting Olevsky v. District of Columbia, 548 A.2d 78, 81 (D.C.1988)) (“The practice of avoiding constitutional issues if it is reasonably possible to do so is predicated on a fundamental rule of judicial restraint, which is perhaps more deeply rooted than any other doctrine of constitutional adjudication.”).

2019See, e.g., Gamble v. United States, 30 A.3d 161 , 167 n.11 (D.C. 2011) (“The practice of avoiding constitutional issues if it is reasonably possible to do so is predicated on a fundamental rule of judicial restraint, which is perhaps more deeply rooted than any other doctrine of constitutional adjudication.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).

2019See, e.g., Gamble v. United States, 30 A.3d 161 , 167 n.11 (D.C. 2011) (“The practice of avoiding constitutional issues if it is reasonably possible to do so is predicated on a fundamental rule of judicial restraint, which is perhaps more deeply rooted than any other doctrine of constitutional adjudication.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).

2025Servs., 583 U.S. 17 , 19 (2017))). 11 Although it is a fundamental rule in our jurisprudence that “no division of this court will overrule a prior decision of this court,” Washington v. Guest Servs., 718 A.2d 1071, 1075 (D.C. 1998) (quoting M.A.P. v. Ryan, 285 A.2d 310, 312 (D.C. 1971)), “we do not believe that M.A.P. v. Ryan obliges us to follow, inflexibly, a ruling whose philosophical basis has been substantially undermined by subsequent Supreme Court decisions.” Thomas v. United States, 731 A.2d 415, 420-21 (D.C. 1999) (alterations and ellipses omitted). 21 III.

2022The court later explained that it was a fundamental rule “that one who can look from the front of his house with an unobstructed view upon a park” may bring suit, even if he is not the “abutting owner.” Id. (discussing Douglass v. City Council, 24 So. 745 (Ala. 1898)).

2014While “it is clear that only the probability, and not a prima facie showing, of criminal activity is the standard of probable cause[,]” id. (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 235 , 103 S.Ct. 2317 , 76 L.Ed.2d, 527 (1983)), in evaluating whether this standard has been met, we keep in mind the fundamental principle that “[t]he history of the use, and not infrequent abuse, of the power to arrest cautions that a relaxation of the fundamental requirements of probable cause would ‘leave law-abiding citizens at the mercy of the officers’ whim or caprice.” Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 47

2014While “it is clear that only the probability, and not a prima facie showing, of criminal activity is the standard of probable cause[,]” id. (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 235 , 103 S.Ct. 2317 , 76 L.Ed.2d, 527 (1983)), in evaluating whether this standard has been met, we keep in mind the fundamental principle that “[t]he history of the use, and not infrequent abuse, of the power to arrest cautions that a relaxation of the fundamental requirements of probable cause would ‘leave law-abiding citizens at the mercy of the officers’ whim or caprice.” Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 47

2009Appellant Was Entitled to Participate in the Hearing The District of Columbia concedes that, as D.T.'s biological parent, D.F. had a constitutional right "to meaningful participation in a proceeding that terminates his parental rights." See Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 , 85 S.Ct. 1187 , 14 L.Ed.2d 62 (1965) ("A fundamental requirement of due process is `the opportunity to be heard' ... which must be granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.") (citation omitted).

2009Appellant Was Entitled to Participate in the Hearing The District of Columbia concedes that, as D.T.'s biological parent, D.F. had a constitutional right "to meaningful participation in a proceeding that terminates his parental rights." See Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 , 85 S.Ct. 1187 , 14 L.Ed.2d 62 (1965) ("A fundamental requirement of due process is `the opportunity to be heard' ... which must be granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.") (citation omitted).

2005P’ship, 684 A.2d 1284, 1289 (D.C.1996); In re D.R.M., 570 A.2d 796, 803 (D.C.1990); Johnson v. United States, 398 A.2d 354, 363-65 (D.C.1979)).

2004In the present case, the trial court treated the grounds for reconsidering plaintiffs motion (ie., the denial of due process to defendant as a result of having been denied notice of the motion in the first place) as a presumptive basis upon which to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint. 13 In so doing, the court mistakenly conflated separate analyses, and did not give consideration to the factors we identified in Cameron as being necessarily relevant to the trial court’s discretionary decision on a. motion to vacate a dismissal entered for failure to file timely proof of service. 649 A.2d at 294 ; se

1998Comm’n, 685 A.2d 1166, 1167 (D.C.1996) (quoting Totz v. District of Columbia Rental Accommodations Comm’n, 412 A.2d 44,46 (D.C.1980) (per curiam)), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 1478 , 137 L.Ed.2d 690 (1997).

1998Comm'n, 685 A.2d 1166, 1167 (D.C.1996) (quoting Totz v. District of Columbia Rental Accommodations Comm'n, 412 A.2d 44, 46 (D.C.1980) (per curiam)), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 117 S.Ct. 1478 , 137 L.Ed.2d 690 (1997).

1998Comm’n, 685 A.2d 1166, 1167 (D.C.1996) (quoting Totz v. District of Columbia Rental Accommodations Comm’n, 412 A.2d 44,46 (D.C.1980) (per curiam)), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 1478 , 137 L.Ed.2d 690 (1997).

1998Comm'n, 685 A.2d 1166, 1167 (D.C.1996) (quoting Totz v. District of Columbia Rental Accommodations Comm'n, 412 A.2d 44, 46 (D.C.1980) (per curiam)), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 117 S.Ct. 1478 , 137 L.Ed.2d 690 (1997).

1995In re S.G., 581 A.2d 771, 781, 785 (D.C.1990); In re A.C., 597 A.2d 920, 925 (D.C.1991) (citing In re S.G., supra, 581 A.2d at 784-85 ); In re D.G., 583 A.2d 160, 164 (D.C.1990) (“In the District of Columbia, the fundamental presumption is that children and their natural parents should remain together”) (citations omitted).

1995In re S.G., 581 A.2d 771, 781, 785 (D.C.1990); In re A.C., 597 A.2d 920, 925 (D.C.1991) (citing In re S.G., supra, 581 A.2d at 784-85 ); In re D.G., 583 A.2d 160, 164 (D.C.1990) ("In the District of Columbia, the fundamental presumption is that children and their natural parents should remain together") (citations omitted).

1995In re S.G., 581 A.2d 771, 781, 785 (D.C.1990); In re A.C., 597 A.2d 920, 925 (D.C.1991) (citing In re S.G., supra, 581 A.2d at 784-85 ); In re D.G., 583 A.2d 160, 164 (D.C.1990) (“In the District of Columbia, the fundamental presumption is that children and their natural parents should remain together”) (citations omitted).

1995In re S.G., 581 A.2d 771, 781, 785 (D.C.1990); In re A.C., 597 A.2d 920, 925 (D.C.1991) (citing In re S.G., supra, 581 A.2d at 784-85 ); In re D.G., 583 A.2d 160, 164 (D.C.1990) ("In the District of Columbia, the fundamental presumption is that children and their natural parents should remain together") (citations omitted).

1995In re S.G., 581 A.2d 771, 781, 785 (D.C.1990); In re A.C., 597 A.2d 920, 925 (D.C.1991) (citing In re S.G., supra, 581 A.2d at 784-85 ); In re D.G., 583 A.2d 160, 164 (D.C.1990) (“In the District of Columbia, the fundamental presumption is that children and their natural parents should remain together”) (citations omitted).

1995In re S.G., 581 A.2d 771, 781, 785 (D.C.1990); In re A.C., 597 A.2d 920, 925 (D.C.1991) (citing In re S.G., supra, 581 A.2d at 784-85 ); In re D.G., 583 A.2d 160, 164 (D.C.1990) (“In the District of Columbia, the fundamental presumption is that children and their natural parents should remain together”) (citations omitted).

1990When a claim is *720 made that the District negligently failed to protect someone from harm, the person advancing that claim must reckon at the outset with “the fundamental principle that a government and its agents are under no general duty to provide public services, such as police protection, to any particular individual citizen.” Id. at 4 (citations omitted).

1990We have acknowledged “the fundamental principle that a government and its agents are under no general duty to provide public services, such as police protection, to any particular individual citizen.” Warren v. District of Columbia, 444 A.2d 1, 4 (D.C.1981) (en banc).

1990Cf. Shelton v. Bradley, 526 A.2d 579, 580 (D.C.1987) (construing D.C.Code § 21-101(a) (1989) as "creat[ing] a strong presumption that, upon the death of one parent, the surviving parent will have custody of any minor children").

1990Cf. Shelton v. Bradley, 526 A.2d 579, 580 (D.C.1987) (construing D.C.Code § 21-101(a) (1989) as “creating] a strong presumption that, upon the death of one parent, the surviving parent will have custody of any minor children”).

1974As this court pointed out in Nelson v. United States, D.C.Mun.App., 142 A.2d 604, 605 (1958): There is a fundamental requirement in every prosecution that the Government must, directly or circumstantially, prove the essential elements of the crime charged. . . .

1965As we stated in Nelson v. United States, D.C.Mun.App., 142 A.2d 604, 605 (1958): "* * * There is a fundamental requirement in every prosecution that the Government must, directly or circumstantially, prove the essential elements of the crime charged.

2025Inst. 2000)); see also duty to the client”); Herbin v. Hoeffel, 806 A.2d 186 , 195 & n.14, 197 n.17 (D.C. 2002) (citing the Rules of Professional Conduct for the standard of the fiduciary duty of confidentiality); id. at 197 (quoting a lawyer discipline case for the proposition that “disclosure of client confidences is ‘contrary to the fundamental principle that the attorney owes a fiduciary duty to [her] client and must serve the client’s interest with the utmost loyalty and devotion’” (quoting In re Gonzalez, 773 A.2d 1026, 1031 (D.C. 2001))).

2002We have recently observed that disclosure of client confidences is “contrary to the fundamental principle that the attorney owes a fiduciary duty to [her] client and must serve the client’s interest with the utmost loyalty and devotion.” In re Gonzalez, 773 A.2d at 1031 .

2013See Clement v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Human Servs., 629 A.2d 1215, 1218 (D.C.1993) (“A fundamental principle of litigation that has been stressed in a variety of contexts is the importance of finality.”).

1994To reopen the trial’s determination of scientific truth, however, runs squarely into the fundamental principle of certainty. 11 We recently had occasion to examine and reassert this principle in Clement v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Human Servs., 629 A.2d 1215 (D.C.1993) (trial court without basis in law to reopen case after final judgment in circumstances presented).

2010The District argues, nonetheless, that we should ignore that plain language because House and Senate Reports accompanying that section allegedly show that the Act was “not designed to prevent the operation of educational institutions that are clearly not defrauding the public by using ‘deception by way of implying official connection with the United States Government.’ ” But “[b]y delving into the legislative history before establishing that the statutory language is ambiguous, [the District] violate[s] a fundamental principle of statutory interpretation. ‘In interpreting a statute, we first l

2010The District argues, nonetheless, that we should ignore that plain language because House and Senate Reports accompanying that section allegedly show that the Act was " not designed to prevent the operation of educational institutions that are clearly not defrauding the public by using `deception by way of implying official connection with the United States Government.'" But "[b]y delving into the legislative history before establishing that the statutory language is ambiguous, [the District] violate[s] a fundamental principle of statutory interpretation. `In interpreting a statute, we first l

2005Area Transit Auth., 649 A.2d 291, 294 (D.C.1994)), we have also noted that this discretion is not unlimited. “[I]t is a fundamental principle of appellate deference to the exercise of discretion that it must be undertaken with a proper appreciation of all relevant factors, including the range of such discretion.” Id. (citing Smith v. Alder Branch Realty Ltd.

2005Area Transit Auth., 649 A.2d 291, 294 (D.C.1994)), we have also noted that this discretion is not unlimited. “[I]t is a fundamental principle of appellate deference to the exercise of discretion that it must be undertaken with a proper appreciation of all relevant factors, including the range of such discretion.” Id. (citing Smith v. Alder Branch Realty Ltd.

2000Second, the defendant's due process right to make decisions "central to the defense" necessarily encompasses the choice of representative in the courtroom. [4] "Because the selection of an attorney is often `the most important decision a defendant makes in shaping his defense,' [ United States v. Laura, 607 F.2d 52, 56 (3rd Cir.1979)], we conclude that a defendant's choice of counsel is among the fundamental defense decisions constitutionally protected under Faretta [ [5] ' and Frendak. [ [6] ]" Douglas, 488 A.2d at 142 .

2000Second, the defendant’s due process right to make decisions “central to the defense” necessarily encompasses the choice of representative in the courtroom. 4 “Because the selection of an attorney is often ‘the most important decision a defendant makes in shaping his defense,’ [United States v. Laura, 607 F.2d 52, 56 (3rd Cir.1979) ], we conclude that a defendant’s choice of counsel is among the fundamental defense decisions constitutionally protected under Farettal 5 ] and FrendaJc. 6 ” Douglas, 488 A.2d at 142 .

1981United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 339 , 95 S.Ct. 1013, 1019 , 43 L.Ed.2d 232 (1975); Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 , 78 S.Ct. 221, 223 , 2 L.Ed.2d 199 (1957).

1981United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 339 , 95 S.Ct. 1013, 1019 , 43 L.Ed.2d 232 (1975); Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 , 78 S.Ct. 221, 223 , 2 L.Ed.2d 199 (1957).

2025Servs., 583 U.S. 17 , 19 (2017))). 11 Although it is a fundamental rule in our jurisprudence that “no division of this court will overrule a prior decision of this court,” Washington v. Guest Servs., 718 A.2d 1071, 1075 (D.C. 1998) (quoting M.A.P. v. Ryan, 285 A.2d 310, 312 (D.C. 1971)), “we do not believe that M.A.P. v. Ryan obliges us to follow, inflexibly, a ruling whose philosophical basis has been substantially undermined by subsequent Supreme Court decisions.” Thomas v. United States, 731 A.2d 415, 420-21 (D.C. 1999) (alterations and ellipses omitted). 21 III.

2025Servs., 583 U.S. 17 , 19 (2017))). 11 Although it is a fundamental rule in our jurisprudence that “no division of this court will overrule a prior decision of this court,” Washington v. Guest Servs., 718 A.2d 1071, 1075 (D.C. 1998) (quoting M.A.P. v. Ryan, 285 A.2d 310, 312 (D.C. 1971)), “we do not believe that M.A.P. v. Ryan obliges us to follow, inflexibly, a ruling whose philosophical basis has been substantially undermined by subsequent Supreme Court decisions.” Thomas v. United States, 731 A.2d 415, 420-21 (D.C. 1999) (alterations and ellipses omitted). 21 III.

2025See generally, e.g., Herbin v. Hoeffel, 806 A.2d 186, 197 (D.C. 2002) (“[D]isclosure of client confidences is contrary to the fundamental principle that the attorney owes a fiduciary duty to [the attorney’s] client.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).

2025Inst. 2000)); see also duty to the client”); Herbin v. Hoeffel, 806 A.2d 186 , 195 & n.14, 197 n.17 (D.C. 2002) (citing the Rules of Professional Conduct for the standard of the fiduciary duty of confidentiality); id. at 197 (quoting a lawyer discipline case for the proposition that “disclosure of client confidences is ‘contrary to the fundamental principle that the attorney owes a fiduciary duty to [her] client and must serve the client’s interest with the utmost loyalty and devotion’” (quoting In re Gonzalez, 773 A.2d 1026, 1031 (D.C. 2001))).

2024See, e.g., Mitchell, 61 A.3d at 684 (“A fundamental principle of litigation that has been stressed in a variety of contexts is the importance of finality.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also, e.g., Clement v. D.C.

2023The practice of avoiding constitutional issues if it is reasonably possible to do so is predicated on a fundamental rule of judicial restraint, which is perhaps more deeply rooted than any other doctrine of constitutional adjudication.” Gaynor v. United States, 16 A.3d 944, 948 (D.C. 2001) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).