fundamental principle in Washington

2024Additionally, we adhere to “the fundamental principle that if a case can be decided on nonconstitutional grounds, an appellate court should refrain from deciding constitutional issues.” Isla Verde Int’l Holdings, Inc. v. City of Camas, 146 Wn.2d 740, 752 , 49 P.3d 867 (2002), abrogated on other grounds by Yim v. City of Seattle, 194 Wn.2d 682 , 451 P.3d 694 (2019).

2021We adhere to “the fundamental principle that if a case can be decided on nonconstitutional grounds, an appellate court should refrain from deciding constitutional issues.” 6 No. 53558-1-II Isla Verde Int’l Holdings, Inc. v. City of Camas, 146 Wn.2d 740, 752 , 49 P.3d 867 (2002), abrogated on other grounds by Yim v. City of Seattle, 194 Wn.2d 682 , 451 P.3d 694 (2019).

2024Additionally, we adhere to “the fundamental principle that if a case can be decided on nonconstitutional grounds, an appellate court should refrain from deciding constitutional issues.” Isla Verde Int’l Holdings, Inc. v. City of Camas, 146 Wn.2d 740, 752 , 49 P.3d 867 (2002), abrogated on other grounds by Yim v. City of Seattle, 194 Wn.2d 682 , 451 P.3d 694 (2019).

2021We adhere to “the fundamental principle that if a case can be decided on nonconstitutional grounds, an appellate court should refrain from deciding constitutional issues.” 6 No. 53558-1-II Isla Verde Int’l Holdings, Inc. v. City of Camas, 146 Wn.2d 740, 752 , 49 P.3d 867 (2002), abrogated on other grounds by Yim v. City of Seattle, 194 Wn.2d 682 , 451 P.3d 694 (2019).

2016Smith v. Shannon, 100 Wn.2d 26, 37 , 666 P.2d 351 (1983). ¶10 RAP 2.5(a) formalizes a fundamental principle of appellate review.

2016Smith v. Shannon, 100 Wn.2d 26, 37 , 666 P.2d 351 (1983). ¶10 RAP 2.5(a) formalizes a fundamental principle of appellate review.

2024Groff v. Dep’t of Lab. & Indus., 65 Wn.2d 35, 44 , 395 P.2d 633 (1964); Miller v. Dep’t of Lab. & Indus., 200 Wash. 674, 682-83 , 94 P.2d 764 (1939): 4 No. 39935-4-III James v. City of Spokane It is a fundamental principle which most, if not all, courts accept, that if the accident or injury complained of is the proximate cause of the disability for which compensation is sought, the previous physical condition of the workman is immaterial and recovery may be had for the full disability independent of any preexisting or congenital weakness; the theory upon which that principle is founded is tha

2024Groff v. Dep’t of Lab. & Indus., 65 Wn.2d 35, 44 , 395 P.2d 633 (1964); Miller v. Dep’t of Lab. & Indus., 200 Wash. 674, 682-83 , 94 P.2d 764 (1939): 4 No. 39935-4-III James v. City of Spokane It is a fundamental principle which most, if not all, courts accept, that if the accident or injury complained of is the proximate cause of the disability for which compensation is sought, the previous physical condition of the workman is immaterial and recovery may be had for the full disability independent of any preexisting or congenital weakness; the theory upon which that principle is founded is tha

2021A fundamental principle of our constitutional system is that “the governmental powers are divided among three branches—the legislative, the executive, and the judicial—and that each is separate from the other.” State v. Osloond, 60 Wn.

2020A fundamental principle of our constitutional system is that “the governmental powers are divided among three branches—the legislative, the executive, and the judicial—and that each is separate from the other.” State v. Osloond, 60 Wn.

2013App. 929, 936-37 , 214 P.3d 962 (2009) (holding that failure to credit time served in electronic home monitoring to misdemeanor sentence was not a violation of defendant's equal protection rights because there is a rational basis for treating misdemeanants differently than felons). 36 State v. Humphrey. 139 Wn.2d 53, 57 , 983 P.2d 1118 (1999); Howell v. Spokane & Inland Empire Blood Bank. 114 Wn.2d 42, 47 , 785 P.2d 815 (1990) ("Statutory amendments are ... presumed to be prospective unless there is a legislative intent to the contrary or the amendment is clearly curative."); State v. Doutv. 9

2013App. 929, 936-37 , 214 P.3d 962 (2009) (holding that failure to credit time served in electronic home monitoring to misdemeanor sentence was not a violation of defendant's equal protection rights because there is a rational basis for treating misdemeanants differently than felons). 36 State v. Humphrey. 139 Wn.2d 53, 57 , 983 P.2d 1118 (1999); Howell v. Spokane & Inland Empire Blood Bank. 114 Wn.2d 42, 47 , 785 P.2d 815 (1990) ("Statutory amendments are ... presumed to be prospective unless there is a legislative intent to the contrary or the amendment is clearly curative."); State v. Doutv. 9

2007However, “[w]e adhere to the fundamental principle that if a case can be decided on nonconstitutional grounds, an appellate court should refrain from deciding constitutional issues.” Isla Verde Int’l Holdings, Inc. v. City of Camas, 146 Wn.2d 740, 752 , 49 P.3d 867 (2002); accord Tunstall v. Bergeson, 141 Wn.2d 201, 210 , 5 P.3d 691 (2000) (where issue may be resolved on statutory grounds, court will avoid deciding issue on constitutional grounds); Tropiano v. City of Tacoma, 105 Wn.2d 873, 877 , 718 P.2d 801 (1986) (“This court will not decide an issue on constitutional grounds if the issue c

2007However, “[w]e adhere to the fundamental principle that if a case can be decided on nonconstitutional grounds, an appellate court should refrain from deciding constitutional issues.” Isla Verde Int’l Holdings, Inc. v. City of Camas, 146 Wn.2d 740, 752 , 49 P.3d 867 (2002); accord Tunstall v. Bergeson, 141 Wn.2d 201, 210 , 5 P.3d 691 (2000) (where issue may be resolved on statutory grounds, court will avoid deciding issue on constitutional grounds); Tropiano v. City of Tacoma, 105 Wn.2d 873, 877 , 718 P.2d 801 (1986) (“This court will not decide an issue on constitutional grounds if the issue c

2025Accordingly, the elements under the general statute are the same that need to be proven under the specific statute.4 Further, “[i[t is a fundamental rule that where the general statute, if standing alone, would include the same matter as the special act and thus conflict with it, the special act will be considered as an exception to, or qualification of, the general statute, whether it was passed before or after such general enactment.” Wark v. Wash. Nat’l Guard, 87 Wn.2d 864, 867 , 557 P.2d 844 (1976).

2025Accordingly, the elements under the general statute are the same that need to be proven under the specific statute.4 Further, “[i[t is a fundamental rule that where the general statute, if standing alone, would include the same matter as the special act and thus conflict with it, the special act will be considered as an exception to, or qualification of, the general statute, whether it was passed before or after such general enactment.” Wark v. Wash. Nat’l Guard, 87 Wn.2d 864, 867 , 557 P.2d 844 (1976).

2025“The fundamental principle when balancing these competing policies is ‘whether or not justice is being done.’” Id. (quoting Griggs v. Averbeck Reality, Inc., 92 Wn.2d 576, 582 , 599 P.2d 1289 (1979)).

2025“The fundamental principle when balancing these competing policies is ‘whether or not justice is being done.’” Id. (quoting Griggs v. Averbeck Reality, Inc., 92 Wn.2d 576, 582 , 599 P.2d 1289 (1979)).

2010The court next held that, even assuming Pirtle’s attorney discussed legal matters in conferences outside his presence, Pirtle did not demonstrate that his absence from conferences reflected a substantive error that met the standard of “being actually and substantially prejudiced by a violation of his constitutional rights or by a fundamental error of law.” Pirtle, 136 Wn.2d at 491 .

2010The court next held that, even assuming Pirtle's attorney discussed legal matters in conferences outside his presence, Pirtle did not demonstrate that his absence from conferences reflected a substantive error that met the standard of "being actually and substantially prejudiced by a violation of his constitutional rights or by a fundamental error of law." Pirtle, 136 Wash.2d at 491 , 965 P.2d 593 .

2001Id.

2001Id.

2024SMITH, C.J. — “A fundamental principle of the First Amendment is that all persons have access to places where they can speak and listen, and then, after reflection, speak and listen once more.” Packingham v. North Carolina, 582 U.S. 98, 104 , 137 S. Ct. 1730 , 198 L.

2024SMITH, C.J. — “A fundamental principle of the First Amendment is that all persons have access to places where they can speak and listen, and then, after reflection, speak and listen once more.” Packingham v. North Carolina, 582 U.S. 98, 104 , 137 S. Ct. 1730 , 198 L.

1976As the court stated in Riblet v. Spokane-Portland Cement Co., 41 Wn.2d 249, 254 , 248 P.2d 380 (1952): In a nuisance case, the fundamental inquiry always appears to be whether the use of certain land can be considered as reasonable in relation to all the facts and surrounding circumstances.

1976As the court stated in Riblet v. Spokane-Portland Cement Co., 41 Wn.2d 249, 254 , 248 P.2d 380 (1952): In a nuisance case, the fundamental inquiry always appears to be whether the use of certain land can be considered as reasonable in relation to all the facts and surrounding circumstances.

2009Therefore, the people of the state of Washington intend that: Qualifying patients with terminal or debilitating illnesses who, in the judgment of their physicians, would benefit from the medical use of marijuana, shall not be found guilty of a crime under state law for their possession and limited use of marijuana; Persons who act as primary caregivers to such patients shall also not be found guilty of a crime under state law for assisting with the medical use of marijuana. ¶22 “A fundamental rule of statutory construction is that the court must interpret legislation consistently with its stat

2009Therefore, the people of the state of Washington intend that: Qualifying patients with terminal or debilitating illnesses who, in the judgment of their physicians, would benefit from the medical use of marijuana, shall not be found guilty of a crime under state law for their possession and limited use of marijuana; Persons who act as primary caregivers to such patients shall also not be found guilty of a crime under state law for assisting with the medical use of marijuana. ¶22 “A fundamental rule of statutory construction is that the court must interpret legislation consistently with its stat

2007However, “[w]e adhere to the fundamental principle that if a case can be decided on nonconstitutional grounds, an appellate court should refrain from deciding constitutional issues.” Isla Verde Int’l Holdings, Inc. v. City of Camas, 146 Wn.2d 740, 752 , 49 P.3d 867 (2002); accord Tunstall v. Bergeson, 141 Wn.2d 201, 210 , 5 P.3d 691 (2000) (where issue may be resolved on statutory grounds, court will avoid deciding issue on constitutional grounds); Tropiano v. City of Tacoma, 105 Wn.2d 873, 877 , 718 P.2d 801 (1986) (“This court will not decide an issue on constitutional grounds if the issue c

2007However, “[w]e adhere to the fundamental principle that if a case can be decided on nonconstitutional grounds, an appellate court should refrain from deciding constitutional issues.” Isla Verde Int’l Holdings, Inc. v. City of Camas, 146 Wn.2d 740, 752 , 49 P.3d 867 (2002); accord Tunstall v. Bergeson, 141 Wn.2d 201, 210 , 5 P.3d 691 (2000) (where issue may be resolved on statutory grounds, court will avoid deciding issue on constitutional grounds); Tropiano v. City of Tacoma, 105 Wn.2d 873, 877 , 718 P.2d 801 (1986) (“This court will not decide an issue on constitutional grounds if the issue c

2007However, “[w]e adhere to the fundamental principle that if a case can be decided on nonconstitutional grounds, an appellate court should refrain from deciding constitutional issues.” Isla Verde Int’l Holdings, Inc. v. City of Camas, 146 Wn.2d 740, 752 , 49 P.3d 867 (2002); accord Tunstall v. Bergeson, 141 Wn.2d 201, 210 , 5 P.3d 691 (2000) (where issue may be resolved on statutory grounds, court will avoid deciding issue on constitutional grounds); Tropiano v. City of Tacoma, 105 Wn.2d 873, 877 , 718 P.2d 801 (1986) (“This court will not decide an issue on constitutional grounds if the issue c

2007However, “[w]e adhere to the fundamental principle that if a case can be decided on nonconstitutional grounds, an appellate court should refrain from deciding constitutional issues.” Isla Verde Int’l Holdings, Inc. v. City of Camas, 146 Wn.2d 740, 752 , 49 P.3d 867 (2002); accord Tunstall v. Bergeson, 141 Wn.2d 201, 210 , 5 P.3d 691 (2000) (where issue may be resolved on statutory grounds, court will avoid deciding issue on constitutional grounds); Tropiano v. City of Tacoma, 105 Wn.2d 873, 877 , 718 P.2d 801 (1986) (“This court will not decide an issue on constitutional grounds if the issue c