fundamental rule in Michigan

2003Farrington v Total Petroleum, Inc, 442 Mich 201, 212 ; 501 NW2d 76 (1993).

2003Farrington v Total Petroleum, Inc, 442 Mich 201, 212 ; 501 NW2d 76 (1993).

2025“A fundamental requirement of due process in such proceedings is ‘notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.’ ” Id. at 509 , quoting Mullane v Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co, 339 US 306, 314 ; 70 S Ct 652 ; 94 L Ed 865 (1950).

2025“A fundamental requirement of due process in such proceedings is ‘notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.’ ” Id. at 509 , quoting Mullane v Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co, 339 US 306, 314 ; 70 S Ct 652 ; 94 L Ed 865 (1950).

2025Interested parties are “entitled to have the [government] employ such means ‘as one desirous of actually informing [them] might reasonably adopt’ to notify [them] of the pendency of the proceedings.” Dow v Michigan, 396 Mich 192 ; 240 NW2d 450 (1976), quoting Mullane, [339 US] at 315.

2025Interested parties are “entitled to have the [government] employ such means ‘as one desirous of actually informing [them] might reasonably adopt’ to notify [them] of the pendency of the proceedings.” Dow v Michigan, 396 Mich 192 ; 240 NW2d 450 (1976), quoting Mullane, [339 US] at 315.

2004Our Supreme Court set forth an “absurd result” rule in Salas v Clements, 399 Mich 103, 109 ; 247 NW2d 889 (1976): “[W]e must keep in mind the fundamental rule of statutory construction that departure from the literal construction of a statute is justified when such construction would produce an absurd and unjust result and would be clearly inconsistent with the purposes and policies of the act in question.” Our Supreme Court has since criticized and substantially limited, if not eviscerated, the “absurd result” rule, agreeing “with Justice Scalia’s description of such attempts to divine unexpr

2004Our Supreme Court set forth an "absurd result" rule in Salas v. Clements, 399 Mich. 103, 109 , 247 N.W.2d 889 (1976): "[W]e must keep in mind the fundamental rule of statutory construction that departure from the literal construction of a statute is justified when such construction would produce an absurd and unjust result and would be clearly inconsistent with the purposes and policies of the act in question." Our Supreme Court has since criticized and substantially limited, if not eviscerated, the "absurd result" rule, agreeing "with Justice Scalia's description of such attempts to divine un

2004Our Supreme Court set forth an “absurd result” rule in Salas v Clements, 399 Mich 103, 109 ; 247 NW2d 889 (1976): “[W]e must keep in mind the fundamental rule of statutory construction that departure from the literal construction of a statute is justified when such construction would produce an absurd and unjust result and would be clearly inconsistent with the purposes and policies of the act in question.” Our Supreme Court has since criticized and substantially limited, if not eviscerated, the “absurd result” rule, agreeing “with Justice Scalia’s description of such attempts to divine unexpr

2004Our Supreme Court set forth an "absurd result" rule in Salas v. Clements, 399 Mich. 103, 109 , 247 N.W.2d 889 (1976): "[W]e must keep in mind the fundamental rule of statutory construction that departure from the literal construction of a statute is justified when such construction would produce an absurd and unjust result and would be clearly inconsistent with the purposes and policies of the act in question." Our Supreme Court has since criticized and substantially limited, if not eviscerated, the "absurd result" rule, agreeing "with Justice Scalia's description of such attempts to divine un

1988In White v Ann Arbor, 406 Mich 554, 562 ; 281 NW2d 283 (1979), we succinctly defined our role with regard to legislative interpretation: The primary and fundamental rule of constitutional or statutory construction is that the Court’s duty is to ascertain the purpose and intent as expressed in the constitutional or legislative provision in question.

1988In White v Ann Arbor, 406 Mich 554, 562 ; 281 NW2d 283 (1979), we succinctly defined our role with regard to legislative interpretation: The primary and fundamental rule of constitutional or statutory construction is that the Court’s duty is to ascertain the purpose and intent as expressed in the constitutional or legislative provision in question.

1971Certainly the recent trilogy of Michigan Supreme Court cases, People v. Dunn (1968), 380 Mich 693 , *60 People v. Stearns (1968), 380 Mich 704 , and People v. Winegar (1968), 380 Mich 719 , make it clear that reviewing courts should be concerned with substance, not form, and the fundamental inquiry is whether there has been a miscarriage of justice.

1971Certainly the recent trilogy of Michigan Supreme Court cases, People v. Dunn (1968), 380 Mich 693 , People v. Stearns (1968), 380 Mich 704 , and People v. Winegar (1968), 380 Mich 719 , make it clear that reviewing courts should be concerned with substance, not form, and the fundamental inquiry is whether there has been a miscarriage of justice.

2025“A fundamental rule of statutory interpretation is to determine the purpose and intent of the Legislature in enacting a provision.” People v Cannon, 206 Mich App 653, 655 ; 522 NW2d 716 (1994).

2025“A fundamental rule of statutory interpretation is to determine the purpose and intent of the Legislature in enacting a provision.” People v Cannon, 206 Mich App 653, 655 ; 522 NW2d 716 (1994).

2014As the Love Court noted: “ ‘Testimonial exclusionary rules and privileges contravene the fundamental principle that the public has a right to every man’s evidence.’ ” Love, 425 Mich at 700 , quoting Trammel v United States, 445 US 40, 50 ; 100 S Ct 906 ; 63 L Ed 2d 186 (1980) (quotation marks and ellipses omitted).

2014As the Love Court noted: “ ‘Testimonial exclusionary rules and privileges contravene the fundamental principle that the public has a right to every man’s evidence.’ ” Love, 425 Mich at 700 , quoting Trammel v United States, 445 US 40, 50 ; 100 S Ct 906 ; 63 L Ed 2d 186 (1980) (quotation marks and ellipses omitted).

2022They [the courts] must construe them as the people did in their adoption, if the means of arriving at that construction are within their power.’ ”) (ellipsis omitted), quoting People ex rel Bay City v State Treasurer, 23 Mich 499, 506 (1871) (opinion of the Court by COOLEY, J.); Mich Farm Bureau v Secretary of State, 379 Mich 387, 390-391 ; 151 NW2d 797 (1967) (“[T]he all important duty of the judiciary when constitutional provisions are brought up for interpretation and application . . . is to ascertain as best the Court may the general understanding and therefore the uppermost or dominant pu

2022They [the courts] must construe them as the people did in their adoption, if the means of arriving at that construction are within their power.’ ”) (ellipsis omitted), quoting People ex rel Bay City v State Treasurer, 23 Mich 499, 506 (1871) (opinion of the Court by COOLEY, J.); Mich Farm Bureau v Secretary of State, 379 Mich 387, 390-391 ; 151 NW2d 797 (1967) (“[T]he all important duty of the judiciary when constitutional provisions are brought up for interpretation and application . . . is to ascertain as best the Court may the general understanding and therefore the uppermost or dominant pu

2022They [the courts] must construe them as the people did in their adoption, if the means of arriving at that construction are within their power.’ ”) (ellipsis omitted), quoting People ex rel Bay City v State Treasurer, 23 Mich 499, 506 (1871) (opinion of the Court by COOLEY, J.); Mich Farm Bureau v Secretary of State, 379 Mich 387, 390-391 ; 151 NW2d 797 (1967) (“[T]he all important duty of the judiciary when constitutional provisions are brought up for interpretation and application . . . is to ascertain as best the Court may the general understanding and therefore the uppermost or dominant pu

2022They [the courts] must construe them as the people did in their adoption, if the means of arriving at that construction are within their power.’ ”) (ellipsis omitted), quoting People ex rel Bay City v State Treasurer, 23 Mich 499, 506 (1871) (opinion of the Court by COOLEY, J.); Mich Farm Bureau v Secretary of State, 379 Mich 387, 390-391 ; 151 NW2d 797 (1967) (“[T]he all important duty of the judiciary when constitutional provisions are brought up for interpretation and application . . . is to ascertain as best the Court may the general understanding and therefore the uppermost or dominant pu

2021After all, it is “a fundamental principle of statutory construction that ‘[w]hen the Legislature uses different words, the words are generally intended to connote different meanings.’ ” South Dearborn Environmental Improvement Ass’n, Inc v Dep’t of Environmental Quality, 502 Mich 349, 369 ; 917 NW2d 603 (2018), quoting US Fidelity & Guaranty Co v Mich Catastrophic Claims Ass’n (On Rehearing), 484 Mich 1, 14 , 795 NW2d 101 (2009).

2021After all, it is “a fundamental principle of statutory construction that ‘[w]hen the Legislature uses different words, the words are generally intended to connote different meanings.’ ” South Dearborn Environmental Improvement Ass’n, Inc v Dep’t of Environmental Quality, 502 Mich 349, 369 ; 917 NW2d 603 (2018), quoting US Fidelity & Guaranty Co v Mich Catastrophic Claims Ass’n (On Rehearing), 484 Mich 1, 14 , 795 NW2d 101 (2009).

2019By weighing the evidence and reaching factual inferences contrary to [the plaintiff’s] competent evidence, the court below neglected to adhere to the fundamental principle that at the summary judgment stage, reasonable inferences should be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party. [Tolan v Cotton, 572 US 650, 660 ; 134 S Ct 1861 ; 188 L Ed 2d 895 (2014).] Our Supreme Court has made the same point: It seems that we must constantly remind those interested in negligence law that a motion by the defendant for a directed verdict presents no question of credibility; also that the trial judge may not se

2019By weighing the evidence and reaching factual inferences contrary to [the plaintiff’s] competent evidence, the court below neglected to adhere to the fundamental principle that at the summary judgment stage, reasonable inferences should be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party. [Tolan v Cotton, 572 US 650, 660 ; 134 S Ct 1861 ; 188 L Ed 2d 895 (2014).] Our Supreme Court has made the same point: It seems that we must constantly remind those interested in negligence law that a motion by the defendant for a directed verdict presents no question of credibility; also that the trial judge may not se

2007“The fundamental rule of statutory construction is to discern and give effect to the intent of the Legislature.” People v Venticinque, 459 Mich 90, 99 ; 586 NW2d 732 (1998).

2007“The fundamental rule of statutory construction is to discern and give effect to the intent of the Legislature.” People v Venticinque, 459 Mich 90, 99 ; 586 NW2d 732 (1998).

2004USE TAX EXEMPTION As our Supreme Court explained in In re Certified Question (Kenneth Henes v Continental Biomass), 468 Mich 109, 113 ; 659 NW2d 597 (2003): *258 A fundamental principle of statutory construction is that “a clear and unambiguous statute leaves no room for judicial construction or interpretation.” Coleman v Gurwin, 443 Mich 59, 65 ; 503 NW2d 435 (1993).

2004USE TAX EXEMPTION As our Supreme Court explained in In re Certified Question (Kenneth Henes v Continental Biomass), 468 Mich 109, 113 ; 659 NW2d 597 (2003): *258 A fundamental principle of statutory construction is that “a clear and unambiguous statute leaves no room for judicial construction or interpretation.” Coleman v Gurwin, 443 Mich 59, 65 ; 503 NW2d 435 (1993).

2001To comply with its will, when constitutionally expressed in the statutes, is our duty. [ 459 Mich 392, n 10 .] The third case we were directed to consider, People v Mclntire, supra, again contains similar language (quoting from the dissenting opinion of Judge (now Justice) Young in the Court of Appeals opinion in People v Mclntire, 232 Mich App 71, 119 ; 591 NW2d 231 [1998]): A fundamental principle of statutory construction is that “a clear and unambiguous statute leaves no room for judicial construction or interpretation.” . . .

2001To comply with its will, when constitutionally expressed in the statutes, is our duty. [ 459 Mich 392, n 10 .] The third case we were directed to consider, People v Mclntire, supra, again contains similar language (quoting from the dissenting opinion of Judge (now Justice) Young in the Court of Appeals opinion in People v Mclntire, 232 Mich App 71, 119 ; 591 NW2d 231 [1998]): A fundamental principle of statutory construction is that “a clear and unambiguous statute leaves no room for judicial construction or interpretation.” . . .

1960The controlling case in Michigan is Haynes v. Lapeer Circuit Judge, 201 Mich 138 (LRA1918D, 233).

1960The controlling .case in Michigan is Haynes v. Lapeer Circuit Judge, 201 Mich 138 (LRA1918D, 233).

2019“The obvious reason for this is the fundamental principle that only [the Supreme] Court has the authority to overrule one of its prior decisions.” Paige v City of Sterling Hts, 476 Mich 495, 524 ; 720 NW2d 219 (2006).

2019“The obvious reason for this is the fundamental principle that only [the Supreme] Court has the authority to overrule one of its prior decisions.” Paige v City of Sterling Hts, 476 Mich 495, 524 ; 720 NW2d 219 (2006).

2018However, the Oehmkes could cure their failure to properly assert the usury defense by seeking leave to amend the answer, and the trial court had the general obligation to grant leave: “It is a fundamental rule of civil procedure in this state that leave to amend pleadings should be given freely.” Stanke, 200 Mich App at 321 , citing MCR 2.118(A)(2) and Ben Fyke & Sons, 390 Mich at 656 .

2018However, the Oehmkes could cure their failure to properly assert the usury defense by seeking leave to amend the answer, and the trial court had the general obligation to grant leave: “It is a fundamental rule of civil procedure in this state that leave to amend pleadings should be given freely.” Stanke, 200 Mich App at 321 , citing MCR 2.118(A)(2) and Ben Fyke & Sons, 390 Mich at 656 .

1990As often repeated: A fundamental rule of statutory construction is that the court is obligated to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the Legislature, and it is equally axiomatic that words are to be given their ordinary, normally accepted meaning. [ Town & Country Dodge, Inc v Dep't of Treasury, 420 Mich 226, 240 ; 362 NW2d 618 (1984), reh den 421 Mich 1202 (1985).] Furthermore, where the meaning of a statute is plain and unambiguous, judicial construction or interpretation is precluded.

1990As often repeated: A fundamental rule of statutory construction is that the court is obligated to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the Legislature, and it is equally axiomatic that words are to be given their ordinary, normally accepted meaning. [ Town & Country Dodge, Inc v Dep't of Treasury, 420 Mich 226, 240 ; 362 NW2d 618 (1984), reh den 421 Mich 1202 (1985).] Furthermore, where the meaning of a statute is plain and unambiguous, judicial construction or interpretation is precluded.

1990As often repeated: A fundamental rule of statutory construction is that the court is obligated to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the Legislature, and it is equally axiomatic that words are to be given their ordinary, normally accepted meaning. [Town & Country Dodge, Inc v Dep’t of Treasury, 420 Mich 226, 240 ; 362 NW2d 618 (1984), reh den 421 Mich 1202 (1985).] Furthermore, where the meaning of a statute is plain and unambiguous, judicial construction or interpretation is precluded.

1990As often repeated: A fundamental rule of statutory construction is that the court is obligated to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the Legislature, and it is equally axiomatic that words are to be given their ordinary, normally accepted meaning. [ Town & Country Dodge, Inc v Dep't of Treasury, 420 Mich 226, 240 ; 362 NW2d 618 (1984), reh den 421 Mich 1202 (1985).] Furthermore, where the meaning of a statute is plain and unambiguous, judicial construction or interpretation is precluded.