fundamental error in Texas

2026“A material breach by one party to a contract can excuse the other party from any obligation to perform.” Id.; see Mustang Pipeline Co. v. Driver Pipeline Co., 134 S.W.3d 195, 196 (Tex. 2004) (“It is a fundamental principle of contract law that when one party to a contract commits a material breach of that contract, the other party is discharged or excused from further performance.”).

2026“It is a fundamental principle of contract law that when one party to a contract commits a material breach of that contract, the other party is discharged or excused from further performance.” Mustang Pipeline Co. v. Driver Pipeline Co., 134 S.W.3d 195, 196 (Tex. 2004); Kongvongsay v. Sayasane, No. 07-21- 00195-CV, 2022 Tex. App. LEXIS 4251 , at *12 (Tex. App.—Amarillo June 22, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.).

2022In In re Guardianship of Stokley, we discussed fundamental error and changed circumstances in the context of injunctive relief: Fundamental error exists “in those rare circumstances in which the record shows the court lacked jurisdiction or that the public interest is directly and adversely affected as that interest is declared in the statutes or the Constitution of Texas.” Pirtle v. Gregory, 629 S.W.2d 919, 920 (Tex.1982); see also In re C.O.S., 988 S.W.2d 760, 765 (Tex.1999); Universal Health Servs., 24 S.W.3d at 580 .

2022See Dueitt v. Dueitt, 802 S.W.2d 859, 861 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, no writ); Love, 737 S.W.2d at 52 ; Sherrill v. Plumley’s Estate, 514 S.W.2d 286, 298 (Tex.Civ.App.— Houston [1st Dist.] 1974, writ ref’d n.r.e.)(citing Petroleum Anchor Equipment, Inc., 406 S.W.2d at 892 ); 12 see also Pirtle v. Gregory, 629 S.W.2d 919, 920 (Tex. 1982)(“Fundamental error 11 Inexplicably, neither party moved to join Lane or Weston as third-party defendants, nor does the record reflect the trial court ordering either side to do so sua sponte. 12 Petroleum Anchor Equipment, Inc. was overruled in par

2026Id. at 349, 354 (“As a general rule, due process does not mandate that appellate courts review unpreserved complaints of charge error in parental rights termination cases.”) “A limited exception to our procedural preservation rules is the fundamental-error doctrine.” Id. at 350 .

2026Id. at 349, 354 (“As a general rule, due process does not mandate that appellate courts review unpreserved complaints of charge error in parental rights termination cases.”) “A limited exception to our procedural preservation rules is the fundamental-error doctrine.” Id. at 350 .

2021See Hernandez v. Gulf Group Lloyds, 875 S.W.2d 691, 692 (Tex. 1994); see also Mustang Pipeline Co., Inc. v. Driver Pipeline Co., Inc., 134 S.W.3d 195, 196 (Tex. 2004) (“It is a fundamental principle of contract law that when one party to a contract commits a material breach of that contract, the other party is discharged or excused from further performance.”).

2019See Mustang Pipeline Co. v. Driver Pipeline Co., 134 S.W.3d 195, 196 (Tex. 2004); Hernandez v. Gulf Group Lloyds, 875 S.W.2d 691, 692 (Tex. 1994) (“A fundamental principle of contract law is that when one party to a contract commits 9 a material breach of that contract, the other party is discharged or excused from any obligation to perform.”).

2021According to Thompson, “where a court’s charge authorizes a jury to convict upon a lesser showing than what was alleged it contains a fundamental error and the cause must be remanded.” We review claims of jury-charge error under the two-pronged test set out in Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex. Crim.

2015“Fundamental error must be so egregious it prevents a fair and impartial trial.” Beltran, 99 S.W.3d at 811 (citing Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex.Crim.App.1984)).

2019The court of criminal appeals had seemingly applied the predecessor of this rule as support for a fundamental error doctrine in Jasper v. State, 61 S.W.3d 413, 420 (Tex.Crim.App. 2001).

2018However, Texas Rule of Evidence 103(e) provides that, “In criminal cases, a court may take notice of a fundamental error affecting a substantial right, even if the claim of error was not properly preserved.” TEX.R.EVID. 103(e); see Jasper v. State, 61 S.W.3d 413, 420 (Tex.Crim.App. 2001)(where appellant claimed that his right to fair trial by impartial jury was violated by comments of the trial judge, but appellant did not object at trial, it is within province Court to “take notice of fundamental errors affecting substantial rights although they were not presented to the court,” pursuant to T

2018In support of the fundamental- error analysis, appellant relied upon the plurality opinion in Blue v. State, 41 S.W.3d 129, 131 (Tex. Crim.

2016The Court of Criminal Appeals upheld the general rule that a timely objection is necessary to preserve error, but held that, under the facts presented, the trial judge’s comments vitiated the presumption of the defendant’s innocence and therefore constituted a fundamental error, rendering an objection unnecessary. 1 Id. at 132-33 .

2018Citing Ramsey and McCauley, we have since repeatedly explained that the fundamental-error doctrine applies only in those two “rare instances,” in which “the record shows the court lacked jurisdiction or that the public interest is directly and adversely affected as that interest is declared in the statutes or the Constitution of Texas.” In re L.D.C., 400 S.W.3d 572, 574 (Tex. 2013) (quoting In re C.O.S., 988 S.W.2d 760, 765 (Tex. 1999)).34 Although we have not hesitated to apply the doctrine when the error is jurisdictional35 or adversely affects the public’s 34 See also Mack Trucks, 206 S.W.3

2013Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Tamez, 206 S.W.3d 572, 577 (Tex.2006) (citing In re B.L.D., 113 S.W.3d 340, 350-52 (Tex.2003)). ■ Fundamental error exists in those instances in which error directly and adversely affects the interest of the public generally, as that interest is declared by the statutes or Constitution of Texas, or instances in which the record affirmatively and conclusively shows that the court rendering the judgment was without jurisdiction of the subject matter.

2024And, as the State correctly points out, the fundamental error doctrine is rarely applied in civil cases. –15– See USAA Tex. Lloyds Co. v. Menchaca, 545 S.W.3d 479 , 510–15 (Tex. 2018); Cox v. Johnson, 638 S.W.2d 867, 868 (Tex. 1982) (per curiam).

2022See Cox v. Johnson, 638 S.W.2d 867, 868 (Tex. 1982) (per curiam) (“Fundamental error survives today only in those rare instances in which the record shows on its face that the court lacked jurisdiction or that the public interest is directly and adversely affected as that interest is declared in the statutes and constitution of this state.”); see also In re K.A.F., 160 S.W.3d 923, 928 (Tex. 2005) (“[R]ules governing error preservation must be followed in cases involving termination of parental rights as in other cases in which a complaint is based on constitutional error.”); In re B.L.D., 113

2015Declining to create an "all-inclusive" definition of the term, we held that, for purposes of the Ramsey election dispute, "an error which directly and adversely affects the interest of the public generally, as that interest is declared in the statutes or Constitution of this state, is a fundamental error." Id. at 983.

2015Declining to create an "all-inclusive" definition of the term, we held that, for purposes of the Ramsey election dispute, "an error which directly and adversely affects the interest of the public generally, as that interest is declared in the statutes or Constitution of this state, is a fundamental error." Id. at 983.

2018Tex., Inc. , 975 S.W.2d 546 , 569 (Tex. 1998) ("Fundamental error exists 'in those rare instances in which the record shows the court lacked jurisdiction or that the public interest is directly and adversely affected as that interest is declared in the statutes or the Constitution of Texas.' ") (quoting Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Alexander , 868 S.W.2d 322 , 328 (Tex. 1993) (same) ); Cox v. Johnson , 638 S.W.2d 867 , 868 (Tex. 1982) (per curiam) (same); Pirtle , 629 S.W.2d at 920 (same); Douthit v. McLeroy , 539 S.W.2d 351 , 352 n.2 (Tex. 1976) ("Ordinarily fundamental errors are those errors wh

2018Tex., Inc., 975 S.W.2d 546, 569 (Tex. 1998) (“Fundamental error exists ‘in those rare instances in which the record shows the court lacked jurisdiction or that the public interest is directly and adversely affected as that interest is declared in the statutes or the Constitution of Texas.’”) (quoting Wal- Mart Stores, Inc. v. Alexander, 868 S.W.2d 322, 328 (Tex. 1993) (same)); Cox v. Johnson, 638 S.W.2d 867, 868 (Tex. 1982) (per curiam) (same); Pirtle, 629 S.W.2d at 920 (same); Douthit v. McLeroy, 539 S.W.2d 351 , 352 n.2 (Tex. 1976) (“Ordinarily fundamental errors are those errors which direc

2025The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard "at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner." Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U. S. 545 , 380 U. S. 552 (1965).

2025“The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)).

2026The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard “at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Mathews, 424 U.S. at 333 .

2025“The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)).

2023See id. § 501.019(e) (“This section applies to a monetary obligation arising from a judgment against the state, an agency of the state, or an officer or employee of the state or an agency of the state . . . .” (emphasis added)); id. § 501.019(a) (“The state may deduct from any monetary obligation owed to an incarcerated person . . . .”); Deduct, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 324 (11th ed. 2020) (“to take away (an amount) from a total”); see also TGS–NOPEC Geophysical, 340 S.W.3d at 441 (“It is a fundamental principle of statutory construction and indeed of language itself that words’

2020Greater Houston P’ship v. Paxton, 468 S.W.3d 51, 58 (Tex. 2015); see Combs, 340 S.W.3d at 441 (“It is a fundamental principle of statutory construction and indeed of language itself that words’ meanings cannot be determined in isolation but must be drawn from the context in which they are used.”).

1990Smith v. State, 646 S.W.2d 452, 455 (Tex.Crim.App.1983).

1988It is a fundamental principle of law that an accused is entitled to be tried on the accusation made in the State’s pleading and not for some collateral crime or for being a criminal generally.' Smith v. State, 646 S.W.2d 452, 455 (Tex.Crim.App.1983).

2024“It is a fundamental principle of contract law that when one party to a contract commits a material breach of that contract, the other party is discharged or excused from further performance.” Bartush-Schnitzius Foods Co. v. Cimco Refrigeration, Inc., 518 S.W.3d 432, 436 (Tex. 2017) (quoting Mustang Pipeline Co. v. Driver Pipeline Co., 134 S.W.3d 195, 196 (Tex. 2004)).

2024Bartush-Schnitzius Foods Co. v. Cimco Refrigeration, Inc., 518 S.W.3d 432, 436 (Tex. 2017) (per curiam); Mustang Pipeline Co. v. Driver Pipeline Co., 134 S.W.3d 195, 196 (Tex. 2004) (per curiam) (“It is a fundamental principle of contract law that when one party to a contract commits a material breach of that contract, the other party is discharged or excused from further performance.”).

2019“A fundamental principle of traditional products liability law is that the plaintiff must prove that the defendants supplied the product which caused the injury.” Gaulding v. Celotex Corp., 772 S.W.2d 66, 68 (Tex. 1989).

2008See Gaulding v. Celotex Corp., 772 S.W.2d 66, 68 (Tex. 1989) ("A fundamental principle of traditional products liability law is that the plaintiff must prove that the defendants supplied the product which caused the injury.”); see also Firestone Steel, 927 S.W.2d at 614 ("It is not enough that the seller merely introduced products of similar design and manufacture into the stream of commerce.”). 30 .

2025Appraisal Dist. v. Sebastian Cotton & Grain, Ltd., 555 S.W.3d 29, 39 (Tex. 2018) (“We recognize a fundamental principle of statutory construction that words’ meanings cannot be determined in isolation but must be drawn from the context in which they are used.”).

2020We further recognize “a fundamental principle of statutory construction that words’ meanings cannot be determined in isolation but must be drawn from the context in which they are used.” Willacy County Appraisal District v. Sebastian Cotton & Grain, Ltd., 555 S.W.3d 29, 39 (Tex. 2018).

2025EVID. 103(e) (“In criminal cases, a court may take notice of a fundamental error affecting a substantial right, even if the claim of error was not properly preserved.”); Unkart, 400 S.W.3d at 99 . -5- 04-24-00333-CR Regardless of whether Ortiz’s issue is one that he could not forfeit by inaction, 2 Ortiz’s issue fails on the merits.

2016“Judge Mansfield, who was part of the plurality, also filed a concurring opinion, in which he concluded that the doctrine of procedural default ‘does not apply to statements made by a trial judge that rise to the level of fundamental error.’” Id.

2024Res., Inc. v. Slaughter, 597 S.W.2d 13, 15 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1980, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (“A fundamental rule of equity is that a court will not grant specific performance unless it is shown that no adequate remedy exists at law.”).

2009Adequate Remedy “It is a fundamental rule of equity that a court will not grant specific performance unless it is shown that an adequate remedy does not exist at law.” American Housing Res., Inc. v. Slaughter, 597 S.W.2d 13, 15 (Tex.Civ.App.-Dallas 1980, writ refd n.r.e.); see Cardinal Health Staffing Network v. Bowen, 106 S.W.3d 230, 235 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.) (en banc) (“An adequate remedy at law is one that is as complete, practical, and efficient to the prompt administration of justice as is equitable relief.”).

2025Fundamental error falls into two categories: (1) the denial of absolute, systemic requirements and (2) the violation of rights that are “waivable-only.” Saldano v. State, 70 S.W.3d 873, 888 (Tex. Crim.

2020Fundamental error falls into two categories: (1) the denial of absolute, systemic requirements and (2) the violation of rights that are “waivable- only.” Saldano v. State, 70 S.W.3d 873, 888 (Tex. Crim.

1984In Cumbie v. State, 578 S.W.2d 732, 733-35 (Tex.Crim.App.1979) the Court found that fundamental error existed when the charge (1) authorizes a conviction on a theory not alleged in the indictment; (2) substitutes a theory of the offense different from that alleged in the indictment; (3) authorizes a conviction on a theory alleged in the indictment and on other theories not alleged in the indictment; or (4) authorizes a conviction for non-criminal conduct.

1982In Cumbie v. State, 578 S.W.2d 732 ,(Tex.Cr.App.1979), the Court delineated four ways in which fundamental error can arise when the jury charge is at variance with the allegations contained in the indictment. “[Fundamental error is committed when the charge to the jury authorizes conviction on the theory alleged in the indictment and on one or more other theories not alleged in the indictment.

2018Brewer v. State, 572 S.W.2d 719, 721 (Tex. Crim.

2013Fundamental error “is error that is so egregious and creates such harm that the defendant has not had a fair and impartial trial.” Id.

2020As a fundamental principle, “[t]he parties’ intent, when ascertained, prevails over arbitrary rules.” Id. (citing Luckel, 819 S.W.2d at 462 ).

2019If a deed is unambiguous, “our primary duty when construing [it] . . . is to ascertain the intent of the parties from all of the language in the deed by applying a fundamental rule of construction known as the ‘four corners’ rule.” Id. (citing Luckel v. White, 819 S.W.2d 459, 461 (Tex. 1991)).

2015In one of the first cases to construe the 1846 statute, Wilson v. Johnson, 94 Tex. 272 , 60 S.W. 242 (1900), this Court stated that "it is difficult to tell what is meant by this language; but we incline to think it intended to signify a prominent error, either fundamental in character, or one determining a question upon which the very right of the case depends." Id. at 243; see also Houston Oil Co. of Tex. v. Kimball, 103 Tex. 94, 122 S.W. 533, 537 (1909) ("Perhaps the best expression is that it must be a fundamental error, such error as being readily seen lies at the base and foundation of t

2015In one of the first cases to construe the 1846 statute, Wilson v. Johnson, 94 Tex. 272 , 60 S.W. 242 (1900), this Court stated that "it is difficult to tell what is meant by this language; but we incline to think it intended to signify a prominent error, either fundamental in character, or one determining a question upon which the very right of the case depends." Id. at 243; see also Houston Oil Co. of Tex. v. Kimball, 103 Tex. 94, 122 S.W. 533, 537 (1909) ("Perhaps the best expression is that it must be a fundamental error, such error as being readily seen lies at the base and foundation of t

2022Marin In an attempt to further his argument that preservation is not required, T.B. alternatively argues that this Court should expand the fundamental-error doctrine by using the principles described by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in Marin v. State, 851 S.W.2d 275, 278-79 (Tex. Crim.

2020Instead, Shelton argues that this court should expand the fundamental-error doctrine by looking at the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals’ decision in Marin v. State, 851 S.W.2d 275 , 278–79 (Tex. Crim.

2015In one of the first cases to construe the 1846 statute, Wilson v. Johnson, 94 Tex. 272 , 60 S.W. 242 (1900), this Court stated that "it is difficult to tell what is meant by this language; but we incline to think it intended to signify a prominent error, either fundamental in character, or one determining a question upon which the very right of the case depends." Id. at 243; see also Houston Oil Co. of Tex. v. Kimball, 103 Tex. 94, 122 S.W. 533, 537 (1909) ("Perhaps the best expression is that it must be a fundamental error, such error as being readily seen lies at the base and foundation of t

2015In one of the first cases to construe the 1846 statute, Wilson v. Johnson, 94 Tex. 272 , 60 S.W. 242 (1900), this Court stated that "it is difficult to tell what is meant by this language; but we incline to think it intended to signify a prominent error, either fundamental in character, or one determining a question upon which the very right of the case depends." Id. at 243; see also Houston Oil Co. of Tex. v. Kimball, 103 Tex. 94, 122 S.W. 533, 537 (1909) ("Perhaps the best expression is that it must be a fundamental error, such error as being readily seen lies at the base and foundation of t