116 Wyoming opinions name it 1 courts 1898–2025 6 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Wyoming courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
McCreary v. Weastgreen2 sentences2012"The fundamental rule we invoke in the interpretation of a statute is that we must ascertain, if possible, what the legislature intended by the language it used." Juarez, ¶ 5, 256 P.3d at 518 (citing McCreary v. Weast, 971 P.2d 974, 979 (Wyo.1999)). 2011"The fundamental rule we invoke in the interpretation of a statute is that we must ascertain, if possible, what the legislature intended by the language it used." McCreary v. Weast, 971 P.2d 974, 979 (Wyo.1999). | 4 | 4 |
Granzer v. Stategreen2 sentences2019Noting our earlier opinions which held this to be a fundamental error, we concluded the error was "not a structural or fundamental error, but rather a trial error" to which "we will not apply an 'error per se' type analysis." Id . ¶ 18, 193 P.3d at 271 -72 . 2016Where the trial court fails to instruct the jury on an essential element of a crime, we have held that "a trial court's failure to instruct on an element of a crime is not a fundamental error requiring automatic reversal, but rather a trial-type error subject to harmless error analysis." Jones v. State, 2011 WY 114, ¶ 14 , 256 P.3d 527, 532 (Wyo.2011) (citing Granzer v. State, 2008 WY 118, ¶ 18 , 193 P.3d 266, 271-72 (Wyo.2008)). | 3 | 6 |
Stringer v. Board of County Com'rs of Big Horn Countygreen2 sentences1985“It is a fundamental principle of statutory construction that to ascertain the meaning of a given law all statutes relating to the same subject or having the same general purpose shall be read in connection with it as constituting one law. * ⅜ * ” Stringer v. Board of County Commissioners of Big Horn County, Wyo., 347 P.2d 197, 200 (1959). 1985"It is a fundamental principle of statutory construction that to ascertain the meaning of a given law all statutes relating to the same subject or having the same general purpose shall be read in connection with it as constituting one law. * * *" Stringer v. Board of County Commissioners of Big Horn County, Wyo., 347 P.2d 197, 200 (1959). | 2 | 4 |
Jones v. Stategreen2 sentences2018An erroneous instruction on an essential element *263 of the charged offense "is not a fundamental error requiring automatic reversal, but rather a trial-type error subject to harmless error analysis." Bean v. State , 2016 WY 48 , ¶ 61 n.6, 373 P.3d 372 , 391 n.6 (Wyo. 2016) (quoting Jones v. State , 2011 WY 114 , ¶ 14, 256 P.3d 527 , 532 (Wyo. 2011) ). [¶22] Subsection (a)(i) defines the crime of attempted battery as follows: (a) A person is guilty of aggravated assault and battery if he: (i) Causes or attempts to cause serious bodily injury to another intentionally, knowingly or recklessly u 2018An erroneous instruction on an essential element *263 of the charged offense "is not a fundamental error requiring automatic reversal, but rather a trial-type error subject to harmless error analysis." Bean v. State , 2016 WY 48 , ¶ 61 n.6, 373 P.3d 372 , 391 n.6 (Wyo. 2016) (quoting Jones v. State , 2011 WY 114 , ¶ 14, 256 P.3d 527 , 532 (Wyo. 2011) ). [¶22] Subsection (a)(i) defines the crime of attempted battery as follows: (a) A person is guilty of aggravated assault and battery if he: (i) Causes or attempts to cause serious bodily injury to another intentionally, knowingly or recklessly u | 2 | 3 |
Hunt v. Thompsongreen2 sentences1964But as there indicated, the rule *135 is not entirely inflexible and consideration must always be given to the basic fundamental principle “that the person injured shall receive a compensation commensurate with his loss and no more.” Hunt v. Thompson, 19 Wyo. 523 , 120 P. 181, 184 , rehearing denied 122 P. 624 . 1964But as there indicated, the rule *135 is not entirely inflexible and consideration must always be given to the basic fundamental principle “that the person injured shall receive a compensation commensurate with his loss and no more.” Hunt v. Thompson, 19 Wyo. 523 , 120 P. 181, 184 , rehearing denied 122 P. 624 . | 2 | 3 |
Bader v. Mills & Baker Co.green2 sentences2023See Bader v. Mills & Baker Co., 28 Wyo. 191 , 201 P. 1012, 1014 (1921) (“It is a fundamental rule of the law of tort, including trespass, that all who participate in the wrong are equally liable). 2023See Bader v. Mills & Baker Co., 28 Wyo. 191 , 201 P. 1012, 1014 (1921) (“It is a fundamental rule of the law of tort, including trespass, that all who participate in the wrong are equally liable). | 2 | 2 |
Hernandez v. New Yorkgreen2 sentences2020It implies that the decisionmaker . . . selected . . . a particular course of action at least in part ‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects upon an identifiable group.” Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 359–60, 111 S.Ct. at 1866 (internal citations omitted). 2020It implies that the decisionmaker . . . selected . . . a particular course of action at least in part ‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects upon an identifiable group.” Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 359–60, 111 S.Ct. at 1866 (internal citations omitted). | 2 | 2 |
U. States v. Job L. Barbergreen2 sentences2018See also The Adeline , 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 244, 253 , 3 L.Ed. 719 (1815) ("Now the construction must depend on the evident meaning and intent of the legislature, as clearly to be gathered from a view of the whole provision; and it may be adopted as a fundamental rule, that where there is an express provision, there shall not be a provision by implication; expressio unius est exclusio alterius ."). 2013See also The Adeline, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 244, 253 , 3 L.Ed. 719 (1815) ("Now the construction must depend on the evident meaning and intent of the legislature, as clearly to be gathered from a view of the whole provision; and it may be adopted as a fundamental rule, that where there is an express provision, there shall not be a provision by implication; ex-pressio unius est exclusio alterius."). [119] The legislature rationally chose to require the advisements listed in § 31-6-102(a)(ii), and the arresting officer complied with the statute by giving them. | 2 | 2 |
The Schooner Adeline & Cargogreen2 sentences2018See also The Adeline , 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 244, 253 , 3 L.Ed. 719 (1815) ("Now the construction must depend on the evident meaning and intent of the legislature, as clearly to be gathered from a view of the whole provision; and it may be adopted as a fundamental rule, that where there is an express provision, there shall not be a provision by implication; expressio unius est exclusio alterius ."). 2013See also The Adeline, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 244, 253 , 3 L.Ed. 719 (1815) ("Now the construction must depend on the evident meaning and intent of the legislature, as clearly to be gathered from a view of the whole provision; and it may be adopted as a fundamental rule, that where there is an express provision, there shall not be a provision by implication; ex-pressio unius est exclusio alterius."). [119] The legislature rationally chose to require the advisements listed in § 31-6-102(a)(ii), and the arresting officer complied with the statute by giving them. | 2 | 2 |
RME Petroleum Co. v. Wyoming Department of Revenuegreen2 sentences2014Dep't of Revenue, 2007 WY 16, ¶¶ 25, 28 , 150 P.3d 673, 683-84 (Wyo.2007)) (internal citations omitted). "[I]t is a fundamental rule of statutory interpretation that all portions of an act must be read in pari materia, and every word, clause, and sentence must be construed so that no part is inoperative or superfluous." State ex rel. 2014Dep't of Revenue, 2007 WY 16, ¶¶ 25, 28 , 150 P.3d 673, 683-84 (Wyo.2007)) (internal citations omitted). "[I]t is a fundamental rule of statutory interpretation that all portions of an act must be read in pari materia, and every word, clause, and sentence must be construed so that no part is inoperative or superfluous." State ex rel. | 2 | 2 |
UNC Teton Exploration Drilling, Inc. v. Peytongreen2 sentences1993UNC Teton Exploration Drilling, Inc. v. Peyton, 774 P.2d 584, 592 (Wyo.1989). 1993UNC Teton Exploration Drilling, Inc. v. Peyton, 774 P.2d 584, 592 (Wyo.1989). | 2 | 2 |
Matter of Paternity of JRWgreen2 sentences1992Furthermore, it is a fundamental rule of statutory interpretation that all portions of an act must be read in pari materia, and every word, clause, and sentence must be construed so that no part is inoperative or superfluous.'" Matter of Paternity of JRW, 814 P.2d 1256, 1262-63 (Wyo.1991), quoting Deloges v. State ex rel. 1992Furthermore, it is a fundamental rule of statutory interpretation that all portions of an act must be read in pari materia, and every word, clause, and sentence must be construed so that no part is inoperative or superfluous.’ ” Matter of Paternity of JRW, 814 P.2d 1256, 1262-63 (Wyo.1991), quoting Deloges v. State ex rel. | 2 | 2 |
Rocky Mountain Packing Co. v. Branneygreen2 sentences1989Rocky Mountain Packing Co. v. Branney, Wyo., 393 P.2d 131, 135 (1964); Hunt v. Thompson, 19 Wyo. 523 , 120 P. 181, 184 (1912). 1988Rocky Mountain Packing Co. v. Branney, Wyo., 393 P.2d 131, 135 (1964); Hunt v. Thompson, 19 Wyo. 523 , 120 P. 181, 184 (1912). | 2 | 2 |
Hughes v. Stategreen2 sentences2025When a defendant refuses to speak to authorities, the prosecutor may not refer to his silence to infer that he is guilty.” (citations omitted)); Hughes v. State, 658 P.2d 1294 , 1295–96 (Wyo. 1983) (“It is a fundamental rule that it is 4 impermissible to penalize an individual for exercising his Fifth Amendment privilege to remain silent . . . . 2025When a defendant refuses to speak to authorities, the prosecutor may not refer to his silence to infer that he is guilty.” (citations omitted)); Hughes v. State, 658 P.2d 1294 , 1295–96 (Wyo. 1983) (“It is a fundamental rule that it is 4 impermissible to penalize an individual for exercising his Fifth Amendment privilege to remain silent . . . . | 1 | 3 |
Thompson v. Stategreen2 sentences2021Thompson, ¶ 24, 408 P.3d at 763 (“Generally, in the absence of a fundamental error affecting a substantial right of the appellant, an issue raised for the first time on appeal will not be considered. 2018Thompson v. State , 2018 WY 3 , ¶ 24, 408 P.3d 756 , 763 (Wyo. 2018) (quoting Belden v. State , 2003 WY 89 , ¶ 55, 73 P.3d 1041 (Wyo. 2003) ). | 1 | 2 |
Batson v. Kentuckygreen2 sentences2020Batson, 476 U.S. at 93, 96 , 106 S.Ct. 1721 , 1723 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). [¶19] The court must keep in mind the fundamental principle that . . . “[p]roof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose is required to show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.” “‘Discriminatory purpose’ . . . implies more than intent as volition or intent as awareness of consequences. 2018It implies that the decisionmaker ... selected ... a particular course of action at least in part 'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse effects upon an identifiable group." Hernandez , 500 U.S. at 359 -60 , 111 S.Ct. at 1866 (internal citations omitted). [¶18] A trial court's determination of discriminatory intent "largely will turn on evaluation of credibility." Hernandez , 500 U.S. at 365 , 111 S.Ct. at 1869 (quoting Batson , 476 U.S. at 98 , n.21 , 106 S.Ct. at 1724 , n.21 ). | 1 | 2 |
Lopez v. Stategreen2 sentences1987The method of determining if a juror is qualified and can reasonably be expected to be fair and impartial is through voir dire examination.” Lopez v. State, Wyo., 544 P.2d 855, 860 (1976): “This Court does not question the fundamental principle that parties to any action are entitled to a fair and impartial jury. 1987The method of determining if a juror is qualified and can reasonably be expected to be fair and impartial is through voir dire examination." Lopez v. State, Wyo., 544 P.2d 855, 860 (1976): "This Court does not question the fundamental principle that parties to any action are entitled to a fair and impartial jury. | 1 | 2 |
Alexander v. Stategreen1 sentence2021Others have criticized it because it discourages an onlooker from coming to the aid of one being violently assaulted for fear of “legal peril.” Id. at 159; see also Alexander v. State, 447 A.2d 880, 881 (Md. | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Piersongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Kindred Healthcare Operating, Inc. v. Boydgreen | 1 | 1 |
Baird v. Stategreen1 sentence2020State v. Almaguer, 303 P.3d 84, 91 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2013) (“An instruction that the state must prove the defendant committed a voluntary act is appropriate only if there is evidence to support a finding of bodily movement performed unconsciously and without effort and determination . . . .”); State v. Pierson, 514 A.2d 724, 728 (Conn. 1986) (“Our acknowledgement of the fundamental principle that a criminal act must be volitional does not mean that a charge to a jury that omits reference to this principle is constitutionally defective where the evidence at trial contains no suggestion that the d | 1 | 1 |
| State of Arizona v. Jesus Xavier Almaguergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Lane v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| FGL & L Property Corp. v. City of Ryegreen | 1 | 1 |
| In Re Loberggreen | 1 | 1 |
| Collins v. Loiselgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Jennings v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. The Denver and Rio Grande Western Railroad Companygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Kuntz v. Kinnegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Hede v. Gilstrapgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Leiker v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Reilly v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Heywood v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Compton v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Ex Parte Slavingreen | 1 | 1 |
| Southwest Gas Corp. v. FLINTKOTE CO.-US LIMEgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Maldonadogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Union Pacific Resources Co. v. Dolencgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Puig Morales v. Redemptorist Fathers of Porto Ricogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Stephens v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Clenin v. Statered2 sentences2025The prosecution, therefore, may not use at trial the fact that an accused remained silent or claimed his Fifth Amendment right in the face of accusation.”). [¶12] In Clenin v. State, 573 P.2d 844, 846 (Wyo. 1978), overruled by Richter v. State, 642 P.2d 1269 (Wyo. 1982), we held an improper comment on a defendant’s constitutional right to remain silent is prejudicial per se and requires reversal of the defendant’s conviction. 2025The prosecution, therefore, may not use at trial the fact that an accused remained silent or claimed his Fifth Amendment right in the face of accusation.”). [¶12] In Clenin v. State, 573 P.2d 844, 846 (Wyo. 1978), overruled by Richter v. State, 642 P.2d 1269 (Wyo. 1982), we held an improper comment on a defendant’s constitutional right to remain silent is prejudicial per se and requires reversal of the defendant’s conviction. | 2 | 2 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Richter v. State
red
2 sentences2025The prosecution, therefore, may not use at trial the fact that an accused remained silent or claimed his Fifth Amendment right in the face of accusation.”). [¶12] In Clenin v. State, 573 P.2d 844, 846 (Wyo. 1978), overruled by Richter v. State, 642 P.2d 1269 (Wyo. 1982), we held an improper comment on a defendant’s constitutional right to remain silent is prejudicial per se and requires reversal of the defendant’s conviction. 2025The prosecution, therefore, may not use at trial the fact that an accused remained silent or claimed his Fifth Amendment right in the face of accusation.”). [¶12] In Clenin v. State, 573 P.2d 844, 846 (Wyo. 1978), overruled by Richter v. State, 642 P.2d 1269 (Wyo. 1982), we held an improper comment on a defendant’s constitutional right to remain silent is prejudicial per se and requires reversal of the defendant’s conviction. | 2 | 2025–2025 |
Chapman v. California
red
2 sentences2010If a proper objection is made at trial, as in this case, an instructional error is evaluated in accordance with the harmless constitutional error standard described in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23-24 , 87 S.Ct. 824, 827-28 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967). 2010If a proper objection is made at trial, as in this case, an instructional error is evaluated in accordance with the harmless constitutional error standard described in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23-24 , 87 S.Ct. 824, 827-28 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967). | 2 | 2010–2010 |
Lapp v. State
green
2 sentences2008Lapp, ¶ 10, 100 P.3d at 865 ; Reilly v. State, 2002 WY 156, ¶ 20 , 55 P.3d 1259, 1267 (Wyo.2002). 2008Lapp, ¶10, 100 P.3d at 865 ; Reilly v. State, 2002 WY 156, 20 , 55 P.3d 1259, 1267 (Wyo.2002). | 2 | 2007–2008 |
Crowley v. Christensen
green
2 sentences2001Crowley v. Christensen, 137 U.S. 86 , 11 S.Ct. 13 , 34 L.Ed. 620 ; Ex parte Levy, 48 Ark. 42 . 2001Crowley v. Christensen, 137 U.S. 86 , 11 S.Ct. 13 , 34 L.Ed. 620 ; Ex parte Levy, 48 Ark. 42 . | 2 | 1898–2001 |
State v. Stovall
green
2 sentences1999Id. at 545 . 1985State Board of Equalization v. Tenneco Oil Company, supra; State v. Stovall, Wyo., 648 P.2d 543 (1982). | 2 | 1985–1999 |
Hamlin v. Transcon Lines
green
2 sentences1988Hamlin v. Transcon Lines, Wyo., 701 P.2d 1139 (1985). 1988Hamlin v. Transcon Lines, Wyo., 701 P.2d 1139 (1985). | 2 | 1988–1988 |
Vivion v. Brittain
green
2 sentences1987Vivion v. Brittain, [supra]; and Redwine v. Fitzhugh, [supra]. 1987Vivion v. Brittain, [supra]; and Redwine v. Fitzhugh, [supra]. | 2 | 1976–1987 |
SCHOOL DISTRICTS NOS. 2, 3, 6, 9, AND 10 v. Cook
green
2 sentences1982School Districts Nos. 2, 3, 6, 9, and 10, in County of Campbell v. Cook, Wyo., 424 P.2d 751 (1967). 1977In School Districts Nos. 2, 3, 6, 9, and 10 v. Cook, Wyo., 424 P.2d 751, 756-757 , we observed: “In pursuing this matter we need scarcely^ remind that the fundamental rule in the construction of a statute is to ascertain, if possible, what the legislature intended by the language used, viewed in the light of the objects and purposes to be accomplished. | 2 | 1977–1982 |
Hoffmeister v. McIntosh
neutral
2 sentences1977Hoffmeister v. McIntosh, Wyo., 361 P.2d 678, 679 , rehearing denied 364 P.2d 823 . 1967Hoffmeister v. McIntosh, Wyo., 361 P.2d 678, 679 , rehearing denied 364 P.2d 823 . | 2 | 1967–1977 |
Hoffmeister v. McIntosh
green
2 sentences1977Hoffmeister v. McIntosh, Wyo., 361 P.2d 678, 679 , rehearing denied 364 P.2d 823 . 1967Hoffmeister v. McIntosh, Wyo., 361 P.2d 678, 679 , rehearing denied 364 P.2d 823 . | 2 | 1967–1977 |
| Belden v. State green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| Lance David Bean v. State green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| State v. Juarez green | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| Miller v. State green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Neder v. United States green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Deloges v. STATE EX REL. WKR'S COMP. DIV. green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Stevie Cole v. Warren Young, Superintendent and the Attorney General of the State of Wisconsin green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| Pedro/Aspen, Ltd. v. Board of County Commissioners green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Commonwealth v. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| O'Bryan v. State neutral | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| Harper v. State green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Rasmussen v. Baker green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Corkill v. Knowles green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Sturgis v. Mississippi green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Andrews v. United States green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Koennecke v. Seaboard Air Line Railway green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Dean v. State green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Sorrells v. United States green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| New Hampshire v. Louisiana green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| United States v. Beebe green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| Miller v. State green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| In re Cameron green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| Twing v. Schott green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.