fundamental error in Arkansas

2020Id. (citing Rowbottom v. State, 341 Ark. 33 , 13 S.W.3d 4 904 (2000) (double-jeopardy claim was a fundamental claim that appellant could raise for the first time in Rule 37 proceedings); Collins v. State, 324 Ark. 322 , 920 S.W.2d 846 (1996) (right to twelve-member jury is such a fundamental right that it could be raised for the first time in a Rule 37 proceeding); Jeffers v. State, 301 Ark. 590, 591 , 786 S.W.2d 114, 114 (1990) (“A ground sufficient to void a conviction must be one so basic that it renders the judgment a complete nullity, [as,] for example, a judgment obtained in a court lack

2014Halfacre v. State, 2010 Ark. 377 (per curiam); Travis v. State, 286 Ark. 26 , 688 S.W.2d 935 (1985); Collins v. State, 271 Ark. 825 , 611 S.W.2d 182 (1981) (per curiam), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 973 (1981); see Howard v. State, 367 Ark. 18 , 238 S.W.3d 24 (2006); Rowbottom v. State, 341 Ark. 33 , 13 S.W.3d 904 (2000) (double-jeopardy claim was a fundamental claim that appellant could raise for the first time in Rule 37.1 proceedings); see also Collins v. State, 324 Ark. 322 , 920 S.W.2d 846 (1996) (right to twelve-member jury is such a fundamental right that it could be raised for the first time

2020Id. (citing Rowbottom v. State, 341 Ark. 33 , 13 S.W.3d 4 904 (2000) (double-jeopardy claim was a fundamental claim that appellant could raise for the first time in Rule 37 proceedings); Collins v. State, 324 Ark. 322 , 920 S.W.2d 846 (1996) (right to twelve-member jury is such a fundamental right that it could be raised for the first time in a Rule 37 proceeding); Jeffers v. State, 301 Ark. 590, 591 , 786 S.W.2d 114, 114 (1990) (“A ground sufficient to void a conviction must be one so basic that it renders the judgment a complete nullity, [as,] for example, a judgment obtained in a court lack

2014Halfacre v. State, 2010 Ark. 377 (per curiam); Travis v. State, 286 Ark. 26 , 688 S.W.2d 935 (1985); Collins v. State, 271 Ark. 825 , 611 S.W.2d 182 (1981) (per curiam), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 973 (1981); see Howard v. State, 367 Ark. 18 , 238 S.W.3d 24 (2006); Rowbottom v. State, 341 Ark. 33 , 13 S.W.3d 904 (2000) (double-jeopardy claim was a fundamental claim that appellant could raise for the first time in Rule 37.1 proceedings); see also Collins v. State, 324 Ark. 322 , 920 S.W.2d 846 (1996) (right to twelve-member jury is such a fundamental right that it could be raised for the first time

2020Id. (citing Rowbottom v. State, 341 Ark. 33 , 13 S.W.3d 4 904 (2000) (double-jeopardy claim was a fundamental claim that appellant could raise for the first time in Rule 37 proceedings); Collins v. State, 324 Ark. 322 , 920 S.W.2d 846 (1996) (right to twelve-member jury is such a fundamental right that it could be raised for the first time in a Rule 37 proceeding); Jeffers v. State, 301 Ark. 590, 591 , 786 S.W.2d 114, 114 (1990) (“A ground sufficient to void a conviction must be one so basic that it renders the judgment a complete nullity, [as,] for example, a judgment obtained in a court lack

2014Halfacre v. State, 2010 Ark. 377 (per curiam); Travis v. State, 286 Ark. 26 , 688 S.W.2d 935 (1985); Collins v. State, 271 Ark. 825 , 611 S.W.2d 182 (1981) (per curiam), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 973 (1981); see Howard v. State, 367 Ark. 18 , 238 S.W.3d 24 (2006); Rowbottom v. State, 341 Ark. 33 , 13 S.W.3d 904 (2000) (double-jeopardy claim was a fundamental claim that appellant could raise for the first time in Rule 37.1 proceedings); see also Collins v. State, 324 Ark. 322 , 920 S.W.2d 846 (1996) (right to twelve-member jury is such a fundamental right that it could be raised for the first time

2018Garrison v. Kelley , 2018 Ark. 8 , 534 S.W.3d 136 ; see also Howard v. State , 367 Ark. 18 , 238 S.W.3d 24 (2006) (holding that prosecutorial misconduct was trial error that did not rise to the level of fundamental error). *859 Claims of actual innocence, which are effectively challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence, are due-process claims that are not cognizable in habeas proceedings that are not brought under Act 1780.

2018Garrison v. Kelley , 2018 Ark. 8 , 534 S.W.3d 136 ; see also Howard v. State , 367 Ark. 18 , 238 S.W.3d 24 (2006) (holding that prosecutorial misconduct was trial error that did not rise to the level of fundamental error). *859 Claims of actual innocence, which are effectively challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence, are due-process claims that are not cognizable in habeas proceedings that are not brought under Act 1780.

2020Id. (citing Rowbottom v. State, 341 Ark. 33 , 13 S.W.3d 4 904 (2000) (double-jeopardy claim was a fundamental claim that appellant could raise for the first time in Rule 37 proceedings); Collins v. State, 324 Ark. 322 , 920 S.W.2d 846 (1996) (right to twelve-member jury is such a fundamental right that it could be raised for the first time in a Rule 37 proceeding); Jeffers v. State, 301 Ark. 590, 591 , 786 S.W.2d 114, 114 (1990) (“A ground sufficient to void a conviction must be one so basic that it renders the judgment a complete nullity, [as,] for example, a judgment obtained in a court lack

2020Id. (citing Rowbottom v. State, 341 Ark. 33 , 13 S.W.3d 4 904 (2000) (double-jeopardy claim was a fundamental claim that appellant could raise for the first time in Rule 37 proceedings); Collins v. State, 324 Ark. 322 , 920 S.W.2d 846 (1996) (right to twelve-member jury is such a fundamental right that it could be raised for the first time in a Rule 37 proceeding); Jeffers v. State, 301 Ark. 590, 591 , 786 S.W.2d 114, 114 (1990) (“A ground sufficient to void a conviction must be one so basic that it renders the judgment a complete nullity, [as,] for example, a judgment obtained in a court lack

2010In considering the relationship between existing law and your proposed measure, which you characterize as changing existing law, I must draw your attention to the principle of construction set forth in Gazaway v. Greene County Equalization Bd. , 314 Ark. 569 , 575 , 864 S.W.2d 233 (1993): "The phrase expressio unius est exclusio alterius is a fundamental principle of statutory construction that the express designation of one thing may properly be construed to mean the exclusion of another." Chem-Ash, Inc. v. Arkansas Power Light Co. , 296 Ark. 83 , 751 S.W.2d 353 (1988); Venhaus v. Hale , 281

2010In considering the relationship between existing law and your proposed measure, which you characterize as changing existing law, I must draw your attention to the principle of construction set forth in Gazaway v. Greene County Equalization Bd. , 314 Ark. 569 , 575 , 864 S.W.2d 233 (1993): "The phrase expressio unius est exclusio alterius is a fundamental principle of statutory construction that the express designation of one thing may properly be construed to mean the exclusion of another." Chem-Ash, Inc. v. Arkansas Power Light Co. , 296 Ark. 83 , 751 S.W.2d 353 (1988); Venhaus v. Hale , 281

2021Id.

2020See Green, 2016 Ark. 386 , 502 S.W.3d 524 (Erroneous advice regarding parole-eligibility status did not support a claim of a coerced plea and thus did not provide a basis for coram nobis relief.).

2020See, e.g., Howard v. State, 2012 Ark. 177, at 4 , 403 S.W.3d 38, 42 (“For the writ to issue following the affirmance of a conviction and sentence, the petitioner must show a fundamental error of fact extrinsic to the record.”). 8 However, an evidentiary hearing is warranted for Smith’s claims concerning whether there was an undisclosed arrangement between the prosecutor and witness Gonzalez for Gonzalez’s testimony against Smith.

2020See, e.g., Howard v. State, 2012 Ark. 177, at 4 , 403 S.W.3d 38, 42 (“For the writ to issue following the affirmance of a conviction and sentence, the petitioner must show a fundamental error of fact extrinsic to the record.”). 8 However, an evidentiary hearing is warranted for Smith’s claims concerning whether there was an undisclosed arrangement between the prosecutor and witness Gonzalez for Gonzalez’s testimony against Smith.

2010See Donoho v. Donoho, 318 Ark. 637 , 887 S.W.2d 290 (1994) (“This court has held that as a basic and fundamental rule when considering the effect of statutes is that repeal by implication is not favored and is never allowed except where there is such an invincible repugnancy between the former and the latter provisions that both cannot stand together.”).

2010See Donoho v. Donoho, 318 Ark. 637 , 887 S.W.2d 290 (1994) (“This court has held that as a basic and fundamental rule when considering the effect of statutes is that repeal by implication is not favored and is never allowed except where there is such an invincible repugnancy between the former and the latter provisions that both cannot stand together.”).

2010The fundamental rule is that the words of the constitution or statute should ordinarily be given their obvious and natural meaning.” Hodges v. Huckabee, 338 Ark. 454, 458 , 995 S.W.2d 341, 345 (1999).

2010The fundamental rule is that the words of the constitution or statute should ordinarily be given their obvious and natural meaning.” Hodges v. Huckabee, 338 Ark. 454, 458 , 995 S.W.2d 341, 345 (1999).

2019The petitioner has the burden of demonstrating a fundamental error of fact extrinsic to the record. *114 Roberts , 2013 Ark. 56 , 425 S.W.3d 771 .

2019The petitioner has the burden of demonstrating a fundamental error of fact extrinsic to the record. *114 Roberts , 2013 Ark. 56 , 425 S.W.3d 771 .

2010See n. 1, supra . 9 The term "private agency" is defined in the Act as meaning "any person, firm, association, organization, or entity, other than a public agency doing business with or providing accommodations for the public, whose customary and normal operations include the providing of parking spaces as a means of accommodating the general public or a select clientele or membership[.]" I do not consider the legislature's acknowledgment in this statute of a city's authority to enforce the Act on private property as being an exercise of the principle expressio unius est exclusio alterius , wh

2010See n. 1, supra . 9 The term "private agency" is defined in the Act as meaning "any person, firm, association, organization, or entity, other than a public agency doing business with or providing accommodations for the public, whose customary and normal operations include the providing of parking spaces as a means of accommodating the general public or a select clientele or membership[.]" I do not consider the legislature's acknowledgment in this statute of a city's authority to enforce the Act on private property as being an exercise of the principle expressio unius est exclusio alterius , wh

2021Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).

2021Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).

2006"No one doubts the fundamental rule of exclusion, which forbids the prosecution from proving the commission of one crime by proof of the commission of another." Alford v. State, 223 Ark. 330, 333 , 266 S.W.2d 804, 806 (1954).

2006"No one doubts the fundamental rule of exclusion, which forbids the prosecution from proving the commission of one crime by proof of the commission of another." Alford v. State, 223 Ark. 330, 333 , 266 S.W.2d 804, 806 (1954).

2018Accordingly, Henington did not meet his threshold burden of demonstrating a fundamental error of fact extrinsic to the record that was concealed from the defense. 2 See Williams v. State , 2017 Ark. 313 , 530 S.W.3d 844 .

2018Accordingly, Henington did not meet his threshold burden of demonstrating a fundamental error of fact extrinsic to the record that was concealed from the defense. 2 See Williams v. State , 2017 Ark. 313 , 530 S.W.3d 844 .

2020See id.

2019Id.

2015See Marks v. State, 375 Ark. 265, 273 , 289 S.W.3d 923, 929 (2008) (stating the fundamental principle of criminal law that the State has the burden of proving, the defendant guilty beyond, a reasonable doubt).

2015See Marks v. State, 375 Ark. 265, 273 , 289 S.W.3d 923, 929 (2008) (stating the fundamental principle of criminal law that the State has the burden of proving, the defendant guilty beyond, a reasonable doubt).