fundamental principle in New Hampshire

2025Part I, Article 12 of the New Hampshire Constitution provides that “[e]very member of the community has a right to be protected by it, in the enjoyment of his life, liberty, and property; he is therefore bound to contribute his share in the expense of such protection.” Part II, Article 5 of the New Hampshire Constitution provides that the legislature has the power to “impose and levy proportional and reasonable assessments, rates, and taxes, upon all the inhabitants of, and residents within, the said state.” It has long been understood that when applying this taxing authority, a law “shall not

2000“It is a fundamental principle in taxation that the same property shall not be subject to a double tax, payable by the same party either directly or indirectly.” Opinion of the Justices, 76 N.H. 588, 590 , 79 A. 31, 32 (1911) (quotation omitted).

2023Rather, the plaintiff 3 argued that the court had overlooked the affidavit filed by the Town that contained the Board’s denial of his petition, noting that the court had not mentioned it in its order.1 To find the argument unpreserved simply because the plaintiff did not formally amend his complaint after the Board’s denial would undermine the fundamental principle that, in New Hampshire, a party should not lose a case on a “procedural technicality.” In re Proposed Rules of Civil Procedure, 139 N.H. 512, 515 (1995) (quotation omitted).

2023To dismiss a party’s suit with prejudice because the party violates this rule would undermine the fundamental principle that, in New Hampshire, a party should not lose a case on a “procedural technicality.” In re Proposed Rules of Civil Procedure, 139 N.H. 512, 515 (1995) (quotation omitted).

2013The rationale for our firmly-established rule is equally as strong in such a situation as in any other: the insurer controls the language of the policy and the insurance contract aims “to provide protection for the insured.” Trombly v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield, 120 N.H. 764, 771 (1980) (adopting the majority rule of construction because “[t]his rule reflects the fundamental principle of contract law that doubtful language is to be construed most strongly against the party who used it in drafting the contract” (quotation omitted)); cf. Northern Sec.

1992Any determination of intent is generally made by this court.” Trombly v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield, 120 N.H. 764, 770 , 423 A.2d 980, 984 (1980) (citations omitted).

2003Ev. 804(b)(6); see also Perry v. Parker, 101 N.H. 295, 297 (1958) (“The fundamental inquiry is not the name or number of the exceptions to the hearsay rule but whether under the circumstances [the hearsay] satisfies the reasons which lie behind the exceptions.” (quotations and citation omitted)).

1993What Chief Justice Kenison wrote remains true: “The fundamental inquiry is not the name or number of the exceptions to the hearsay rule but whether under the circumstances [the evidence] satisfies the reasons which lie behind the exceptions.” Perry v. Parker, 101 N.H. 295, 297 , 141 A.2d 883, 884 (1958) (quotation omitted).

2019See In the Matter of Larue & Bedard, 156 N.H. 378, 381 (2007) (“It is a fundamental principle of contract law that one party to a contract cannot alter its terms without the assent of the other party.” (quotation omitted)).

2015Nevertheless, “[i]t is a fundamental principle of contract law that one party to a contract cannot alter its terms without the assent of the other party; the minds of the parties must meet as to the proposed modification.” Id. (quotation omitted).

2010It is a fundamental requirement in this state that “[a]t the conclusion of the sentencing proceeding, a defendant and the society which brought him to court must know in plain and certain terms what punishment has been exacted by the court.” Stapleford, 122 N.H. at 1087 .

1984It is a fundamental rule that “[a]t the conclusion of the sentencing proceeding, a defendant and the society which brought him to court must know in plain and certain terms what punishment has been exacted by the court as well as the extent to which the court retained discretion to impose punishment at a later date and under what conditions the sentence may be modified.” Stapleford v. Perrin, 122 N.H. 1083, 1087 , 453 A.2d 1304, 1306 (1982); see United States v. Daugherty, 269 U.S. 360, 363 (1926).

2025Part I, Article 12 of the New Hampshire Constitution provides that “[e]very member of the community has a right to be protected by it, in the enjoyment of his life, liberty, and property; he is therefore bound to contribute his share in the expense of such protection.” Part II, Article 5 of the New Hampshire Constitution provides that the legislature has the power to “impose and levy proportional and reasonable assessments, rates, and taxes, upon all the inhabitants of, and residents within, the said state.” It has long been understood that when applying this taxing authority, a law “shall not

2023The court’s interpretation therefore violates a fundamental rule of statutory interpretation: “[t]he legislature is not presumed to waste words or enact redundant provisions and whenever possible, every word of a statute should be given effect.” Dietz v. Town of Tuftonboro, 171 N.H. 614, 619 (2019) (quotation omitted).

2022“The fundamental inquiry . . . is 6 whether the employer has chosen to deal with the Union through the employees, rather than with the employees through the Union.” N.L.R.B. v. Pratt & Whitney Air Craft Div., 789 F.2d 121, 134 (2d Cir. 1986) (quotation omitted).

2022“The fundamental inquiry . . . is 6 whether the employer has chosen to deal with the Union through the employees, rather than with the employees through the Union.” N.L.R.B. v. Pratt & Whitney Air Craft Div., 789 F.2d 121 , 134 (2d Cir. 1986) (quotation omitted).

2019Indeed, “[i]t is a fundamental rule of that doctrine that a decision is not authority for what is said in the opinion but only for the points actually involved and actually decided.” Childers v. Childers, 168 P.2d 218, 221 (Cal. Dist.

2018See United States v. Kim, 884 F.2d 189, 191-92 (5th Cir. 1989) (“When defendant repudiates the plea bargain, either by withdrawing the plea or by successfully challenging his conviction on appeal, there is no double jeopardy (or other) obstacle to restoring the relationship between defendant and state as it existed prior to the defunct bargain.” (quotation and brackets omitted)); see also Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377, 393 (1975) (noting “the fundamental principle that an accused must suffer jeopardy before he can suffer double jeopardy”).

2018See United States v. Kim, 884 F.2d 189, 191-92 (5th Cir. 1989) (“When defendant repudiates the plea bargain, either by withdrawing the plea or by successfully challenging his conviction on appeal, there is no double jeopardy (or other) obstacle to restoring the relationship between defendant and state as it existed prior to the defunct bargain.” (quotation and brackets omitted)); see also Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377, 393 (1975) (noting “the fundamental principle that an accused must suffer jeopardy before he can suffer double jeopardy”).

2017Thus, as between a reasonable and unreasonable meaning of the language used, the reasonable meaning is to be adopted.” Appeal of Marti, 169 N.H. 185, 190 (2016) (quotations omitted).

2016It is a fundamental principle of statutory construction that we “do not construe statutes in isolation; instead, we attempt to do so in harmony with the overall statutory scheme.” Holt v. Keer, 167 N.H. 232, 241 (2015) (quotation omitted).

2016It is a fundamental principle of statutory construction that we “do not construe statutes in isolation; instead, we attempt to do so in harmony with the overall statutory scheme.” Holt v. Keer, 167 N.H. 232, 241 (2015) (quotation omitted).

2006In Bretton Woods Co. v. Carroll, after reviewing our prior decisions regarding tax abatement law, we clarified the fundamental principle of abatement law by stating, “[T]he true line of demarcation between what can and cannot be taken advantage of in [an abatement proceeding] ... is whether the petitioner is unlawfully or unjustly taxed as between him and the other taxpayers.” Bretton Woods Co. v. Carroll, 84 N.H. 428, 431 (1930).

2002“It is a fundamental rule that jurors may not receive evidence out of court.” Brigham v. Hudson Motors, Inc., 118 N.H. 590, 595-96 (1978) (quotation omitted).

2000We have held that the dispositive inquiry in determining whether double taxation exists is “whether the two taxes are determined by separate and distinct factors.” First Financial Group of N.H., Inc. v. State, 121 N.H. 381, 386 , 430 A.2d 162, 165 (1981) (quotation omitted).

2000We have held that the dispositive inquiry in determining whether double taxation exists is “whether the two taxes are determined by separate and distinct factors.” First Financial Group of N.H., Inc. v. State, 121 N.H. 381, 386 , 430 A.2d 162, 165 (1981) (quotation omitted).

1988See City of Claremont v. Truell, 126 N.H. 30, 35 , 489 A.2d 581, 585 (1985); Sununu v. Clamshell Alliance, 122 N.H. 668, 672 , 448 A.2d 431, 434 (1982).

1988See City of Claremont v. Truell, 126 N.H. 30, 35 , 489 A.2d 581, 585 (1985); Sununu v. Clamshell Alliance, 122 N.H. 668, 672 , 448 A.2d 431, 434 (1982).

1988See City of Claremont v. Truell, 126 N.H. 30, 35 , 489 A.2d 581, 585 (1985); Sununu v. Clamshell Alliance, 122 N.H. 668, 672 , 448 A.2d 431, 434 (1982).

1988See City of Claremont v. Truell, 126 N.H. 30, 35 , 489 A.2d 581, 585 (1985); Sununu v. Clamshell Alliance, 122 N.H. 668, 672 , 448 A.2d 431, 434 (1982).

1986The fundamental principle underlying the commerce clause as it relates to taxation is that “[n]o State . . . may ‘impose a tax which discrimi nates against interstate commerce ... by providing a direct commercial advantage to local business.’” Boston Stock Exchange v. State Tax Comm’n, 429 U.S. 318, 329 (1977).

1986An analysis under the commerce clause must balance “the national interest in free and open trade and the legitimate interest of the individual States in exercising their taxing powers.” Id.

1984We agree with this reasoning, because “[w]e are inclined to believe that the legislature did not so waste its words.” Blue Mountain Forest Ass’n v. Town of Croydon, 117 N.H. 365, 372 , 373 A.2d 1313, 1317 (1977).

1984We agree with this reasoning, because “[w]e are inclined to believe that the legislature did not so waste its words.” Blue Mountain Forest Ass’n v. Town of Croydon, 117 N.H. 365, 372 , 373 A.2d 1313, 1317 (1977).

1984Such a reading, argue the plaintiffs, offends a fundamental rule of statutory construction: “It is an elementary rule of construction that effect must be given, if possible, to every word, clause and sentence of a statute.” State v. Bartley, 39 Neb. 353, 358 , 58 N.W. 172, 174 (1894); 2A Sutherland, Statutes and Statutory Construction § 46.06 (4th ed. 1973).

1984Such a reading, argue the plaintiffs, offends a fundamental rule of statutory construction: “It is an elementary rule of construction that effect must be given, if possible, to every word, clause and sentence of a statute.” State v. Bartley, 39 Neb. 353, 358 , 58 N.W. 172, 174 (1894); 2A Sutherland, Statutes and Statutory Construction § 46.06 (4th ed. 1973).