fundamental principle in Puerto Rico

2010Véanse, por los tribunales estatales: Jackson Mills, Inc. v. BT Capital Corp., 440 S.E.2d 877, 879 (1994); Quirk v. Data Terminal Systems, Inc., 400 N.E.2d 858, 861 (1980); Two Sisters, Inc. v. Gosch & Co., 370 A.2d 1020 (1976); Flightways Corp. v. Keystone Helicopter Corp., 331 A.2d 184, 186 (1975).

2001Legal Prof. 351 , 352 (1998). (27) Existen otros tribunales que han reafirmado los pronunciamientos de In re ■ Ruffalo, supra. Por ejemplo, el Tribunal de Apelaciones para el Octavo Circuito en In re Jones, 506 F.2d 527, 528-529 (8vo Cir. 1974), determinó: “It is elementary that a fundamental requirement of due process is notice that apprises the interested parties of the pendency of the action and affords them an opportunity to present their objections.

1982Pueblo v. Hernández Olmo, 105 D.P.R. 237 (1976). (2) A igual conclusión ha llegado el Tribunal Supremo de Estados Unidos al interpretar la cláusula federal de doble exposición igualmente aplicable a Puerto Rico: That “ ‘[a] verdict of acquittal. . .[may] not be reviewed. . . without putting [the defendant] twice in jeopardy, and thereby violating the Constitution,’ ” has recently been described as “the most fundamental rule in the history of double jeopardy jurisprudence.” United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 571 (1977), quoting United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 671 (1896

1972In answer to the argument that it is ridiculous to require an instruction on presumption of innocence when defendant has admitted the circumstances of the crime, the court, in Edwards, supra, on p. 314 said that: “History has demonstrated that there have been many so-called ridiculous cases in which innocent persons have been accused of crime and often unjustly convicted.” It added that: “But it must still be left to the jury to decide whether an admitted slayer had or did not have justification or excuse for what he did. “. . .

1945But the Fifth Amendment was not intended to do away with what in the civil law is a fundamental principle of justice (Jeter v. Hewitt, 22 How. 352, 364 ), in order, when a man once has been acquitted on the merits, to enable the Government to prosecute him, a second time. ’ ’ Bnt the plea of former adjudication has the aforesaid sweeping effect in civil cases only if interposed in a subsequent suit involving the same claim or cause of action.

1945Mr. Justice Brandéis puts it as follows in Collins v. Loisel, supra, at p. 430: “ . . . . the Fifth Amendment in providing against double jeopardy, was not intended to supplant the fundamental principle of res judicata in criminal cases . . .

1940The very authorities cited by the plaintiff and appellant — 62 C.J. 520; Larned v. Jenkins, 169 N.W. 723, 724 , 102 Neb. 796 — require as a condition precedent for the issuance of the injunction the existence of an injury, and the injury was alleged and is claimed to ■exist by the plaintiff.

1940The very authorities cited by the plaintiff and appellant — 62 C.J. 520; Larned v. Jenkins, 169 N.W. 723, 724 , 102 Neb. 796 — require as a condition precedent for the issuance of the injunction the existence of an injury, and the injury was alleged and is claimed to ■exist by the plaintiff.

1933In the case of People v. Williams, supra, the judgment was not reversed because the lower court had used the word “victim.” The appellate court specifically stated that it revoked the judgment of the lower court because of the last error analyzed in the opinion delivered in that case, which referred to the refusal of the court to submit to the jury an instruction requested by the defendant.

1929As a more specific expression of the legislator’s mind in-this connection, it is provided in section 82 of the code: “Section 82. — If the district in which the action is commenced is not the proper district for the trial thereof, the action may, nevertheless, be tried therein, unless the defendant, at the time he appears and answers or demurs, files an affidavit of merits, and demands, in writing, that the trial be had in the proper district. ’ ’ The conclusion we have reached above is not opposed to, nor does it detract in any manner from, the fundamental principle which inspired the decisio

1929The Supreme Court of California in Howell v. Foster, 65 Cal. 169 -173, cited with approval the opinion of the text-writer Drake, as follows: “ ‘It is a fundamental principle,’ says Drake on Attachment, section 245, ‘that an attaching creditor can acquire no greater right in attached property than the defendant had at the time of the attachment.

1917But, however this may be, 'the’conclusive answer to the argument of plaintiff-appellee is found in the peculiar nature and primary purpose of the present Mortgage Law, in Barnitz v. Beverly, 163 U. S. 118 , which, like the Ochoa case, is binding on this court regardless of our own opinion, and in other cases to the same effect cited in 6 Ruling Case Law at pages 355, 365, sections 352 and 360, in support of the following text: “It is a fundamental principle of constitutional law in reference to the obligation of contract that the laws in force at the time of making a contract and the right to

1917R. 168, we expressed serious doubt as to whether the doctrine of Ochoa v. Hernández, 230 U. S. 139 , should .control the question now properly raised for the first time in this court. .Perhaps the district court was unduly influenced by such obiter dictum, but neither the trial judge nor the parties hei'ein have succeeded in developing to any marked degree the thought then suggested; and, indeed, on further reflection we find no satisfactory ground upon which to base any clear distinction as to the fundamental principle involved.

1916Be that as it may, we think a sound and common-sense application of the fundamental principle of pleading involved, as well as most of the adjudicated cases directly in point, fully sustain us in the conclusion that under the definition of rape contained in our Penal Code the information must allege, at least in substance, that the act charged was “accomplished with a female not the wife of the perpetrator.” Rice v. State, 38 S. W. 801 ; Rice v. State, 38 S. W. 803 Edwards v. State, 39 S. W. 368 ; Dudley v. State, 40 S. W. 269 ; Cadenas v. State, 40 S. W. 980 ; Young v. Territory, 58 Pac. 724

1916Be that as it may, we think a sound and common-sense application of the fundamental principle of pleading involved, as well as most of the adjudicated cases directly in point, fully sustain us in the conclusion that under the definition of rape contained in our Penal Code the information must allege, at least in substance, that the act charged was “accomplished with a female not the wife of the perpetrator.” Rice v. State, 38 S. W. 801 ; Rice v. State, 38 S. W. 803 Edwards v. State, 39 S. W. 368 ; Dudley v. State, 40 S. W. 269 ; Cadenas v. State, 40 S. W. 980 ; Young v. Territory, 58 Pac. 724

1916Be that as it may, we think a sound and common-sense application of the fundamental principle of pleading involved, as well as most of the adjudicated cases directly in point, fully sustain us in the conclusion that under the definition of rape contained in our Penal Code the information must allege, at least in substance, that the act charged was “accomplished with a female not the wife of the perpetrator.” Rice v. State, 38 S. W. 801 ; Rice v. State, 38 S. W. 803 Edwards v. State, 39 S. W. 368 ; Dudley v. State, 40 S. W. 269 ; Cadenas v. State, 40 S. W. 980 ; Young v. Territory, 58 Pac. 724

1916Be that as it may, we think a sound and common-sense application of the fundamental principle of pleading involved, as well as most of the adjudicated cases directly in point, fully sustain us in the conclusion that under the definition of rape contained in our Penal Code the information must allege, at least in substance, that the act charged was “accomplished with a female not the wife of the perpetrator.” Rice v. State, 38 S. W. 801 ; Rice v. State, 38 S. W. 803 Edwards v. State, 39 S. W. 368 ; Dudley v. State, 40 S. W. 269 ; Cadenas v. State, 40 S. W. 980 ; Young v. Territory, 58 Pac. 724

1916Be that as it may, we think a sound and common-sense application of the fundamental principle of pleading involved, as well as most of the adjudicated cases directly in point, fully sustain us in the conclusion that under the definition of rape contained in our Penal Code the information must allege, at least in substance, that the act charged was “accomplished with a female not the wife of the perpetrator.” Rice v. State, 38 S. W. 801 ; Rice v. State, 38 S. W. 803 Edwards v. State, 39 S. W. 368 ; Dudley v. State, 40 S. W. 269 ; Cadenas v. State, 40 S. W. 980 ; Young v. Territory, 58 Pac. 724

1916Be that as it may, we think a sound and common-sense application of the fundamental principle of pleading involved, as well as most of the adjudicated cases directly in point, fully sustain us in the conclusion that under the definition of rape contained in our Penal Code the information must allege, at least in substance, that the act charged was “accomplished with a female not the wife of the perpetrator.” Rice v. State, 38 S. W. 801 ; Rice v. State, 38 S. W. 803 Edwards v. State, 39 S. W. 368 ; Dudley v. State, 40 S. W. 269 ; Cadenas v. State, 40 S. W. 980 ; Young v. Territory, 58 Pac. 724

1916Be that as it may, we think a sound and common-sense application of the fundamental principle of pleading involved, as well as most of the adjudicated cases directly in point, fully sustain us in the conclusion that under the definition of rape contained in our Penal Code the information must allege, at least in substance, that the act charged was “accomplished with a female not the wife of the perpetrator.” Rice v. State, 38 S. W. 801 ; Rice v. State, 38 S. W. 803 Edwards v. State, 39 S. W. 368 ; Dudley v. State, 40 S. W. 269 ; Cadenas v. State, 40 S. W. 980 ; Young v. Territory, 58 Pac. 724