fundamental principle in Virginia

2025“It is a fundamental principle of jurisprudence that evidence which is not relevant is not admissible.” Perry v. Commonwealth, 61 Va. App. 502, 509 (2013) (quoting McMillan v. Commonwealth, 277 Va. 11, 22 (2009)).

2025“A reviewing court can conclude that an abuse of discretion occurred only when reasonable jurists could not differ about the correct result.” Id. 4 Marsh does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence for any of his convictions. -5- “It is a fundamental principle of jurisprudence that evidence which is not relevant is not admissible.” Warren v. Commonwealth, 76 Va. App. 788 , 802 (2023) (quoting Perry v. Commonwealth, 61 Va. App. 502, 509 (2013)), aff’d, 303 Va. 60 (2024). “‘Relevant evidence’ means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact in issue more probable or le

2017“It is a fundamental principle of statutory construction that expressio unius est exclusio alterius, or ‘where a statute speaks in specific terms, an implication arises that omitted terms were not intended to be included within the scope of the statute.’ ” Conkling v. Commonwealth, 45 Va.App. 518, 522 , 612 S.E.2d 235, 237 (2005) (quoting Commonwealth v. Brown, 259 Va. 697, 704-05 , 529 S.E.2d 96, 100 (2000)).

2017“It is a fundamental principle of statutory construction that expressio unius est exclusio alterius, or ‘where a statute speaks in specific terms, an implication arises that omitted terms were not intended to be included within the scope of the statute.’ ” Conkling v. Commonwealth, 45 Va.App. 518, 522 , 612 S.E.2d 235, 237 (2005) (quoting Commonwealth v. Brown, 259 Va. 697, 704-05 , 529 S.E.2d 96, 100 (2000)).

2025“It is a fundamental principle of jurisprudence that evidence which is not relevant is not admissible.” Perry v. Commonwealth, 61 Va. App. 502, 509 (2013) (quoting McMillan v. Commonwealth, 277 Va. 11, 22 (2009)).

2025“It is a fundamental principle of jurisprudence that evidence which is not relevant is not admissible.” Perry v. Commonwealth, 61 Va. App. 502, 509 (2013) (quoting McMillan v. Commonwealth, 277 Va. 11, 22 (2009)).

2024Bd., 301 Va. 305 , 317 (2022) (“As this Court has repeatedly explained, ‘when the General Assembly includes specific language in one section of a statute, but omits that language from another section of the statute, we must presume that the exclusion of the language was intentional.’” (quoting Halifax Corp. v. First Union Nat’l Bank, 262 Va. 91, 100 (2001))); Wright v. Commonwealth, 49 Va. App. 312, 318 (2007) (“We . . . heed the fundamental principle of statutory construction expressio unius est exclusio alterius, or ‘where a statute speaks in specific terms, an implication arises that omitte

2017“It is a fundamental principle of statutory construction that expressio unius est exclusio alterius, or ‘where a statute speaks in specific terms, an implication arises that omitted terms were not intended to be included within the scope of the statute.’ ” Conkling v. Commonwealth, 45 Va.App. 518, 522 , 612 S.E.2d 235, 237 (2005) (quoting Commonwealth v. Brown, 259 Va. 697, 704-05 , 529 S.E.2d 96, 100 (2000)).

2020“A fundamental rule of statutory construction is that a penal statute ‘must be strictly construed against the State and limited in application to cases falling clearly within the language of the statute.’” Smith v. Commonwealth, 8 Va. App. 109, 113 (1989) (quoting Crews v. Commonwealth, 3 Va. App. 531, 536 (1987)).

2009A fundamental rule of statutory construction provides “that a statute must be construed from its four corners and not by singling out particular words or phrases.” Smith v. Commonwealth, 8 Va.App. 109, 113 , 379 S.E.2d 374, 376 (1989).

2014United States v. Oppenheimer, 242 U.S. 85, 88 (1916) (citation omitted). -4- extremely important principle in our adversary system of justice . . . that when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit.”9 Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 443 (1970).

2014United States v. Oppenheimer, 242 U.S. 85, 88 (1916) (citation omitted). -4- extremely important principle in our adversary system of justice . . . that when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit.”9 Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 443 (1970).

1996The Court later restated in a more concise fashion: “the Fifth Amendment, in providing against double jeopardy, was not intended to supplant the fundamental principle of res judicata in criminal cases.” Collins v. Loisel, 262 U.S. 426 , 43 S. Ct. 618, 619 (1923) citing Oppenheimer, supra. See also Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 , 90 S. Ct. 1189 (1970); Sealfon v. United States, 332 U.S. 575 , 68 S. Ct. 237 (1948).

1996The Court later restated in a more concise fashion: “the Fifth Amendment, in providing against double jeopardy, was not intended to supplant the fundamental principle of res judicata in criminal cases.” Collins v. Loisel, 262 U.S. 426 , 43 S. Ct. 618, 619 (1923) citing Oppenheimer, supra. See also Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 , 90 S. Ct. 1189 (1970); Sealfon v. United States, 332 U.S. 575 , 68 S. Ct. 237 (1948).

2020“A fundamental rule of statutory construction is that a penal statute ‘must be strictly construed against the State and limited in application to cases falling clearly within the language of the statute.’” Smith v. Commonwealth, 8 Va. App. 109, 113 (1989) (quoting Crews v. Commonwealth, 3 Va. App. 531, 536 (1987)).

1993In resolving this question, we are guided by the fundamental principle of statutory construction that penal statutes 4 4 ‘must be strictly construed against the state and limited in application to cases falling clearly within the language of the statute.’ ” Davis v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 246, 248 , 402 S.E.2d 711, 712 (1991) (quoting Crews v. Commonwealth, 3 Va. App. 531, 536 , 352 S.E.2d 1, 3 (1987)); Commonwealth v. Knott, 11 Va. App. 44, 47 , 396 S.E.2d 148, 150 (1990).

2019“It is a fundamental principle that ‘[a]lthough an instruction may correctly state the law, it should not be given if it is inapplicable to the facts in evidence . . . [and] might confuse or distract the jury.’” Morse v. Commonwealth, 17 Va. App. 627, 633 (1994) (quoting King v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. App. 708, 711 (1986)).

2011Indeed, "[i]t is a fundamental principle that `although an instruction may correctly state the law, it should not be given if it is inapplicable to the facts in evidence . . . [and] might confuse or distract the jury.'" Id. at 633 , 440 S.E.2d at 149 (quoting King v. Commonwealth, 2 Va.App. 708, 711 , 347 S.E.2d 530, 531 (1986)).

2025In addition, none of our sister courts, either state or - 11 - federal, have held that such a duty exists when determining the tort liability of casinos.6 Hence, “we will apply the law as it now exists, because we believe that a decision whether to abrogate such a fundamental rule [in creating a special duty not provided in the common law] as the one under consideration is the function of the legislative, not judicial, branch of government.” Williamson v. Old Brogue, Inc., 232 Va. 350, 354 (1986).

2018Co. v. Dowdy , 235 Va. 55 , 61, 365 S.E.2d 751 , 754 (1988) ("[T]here is no duty of reasonable care imposed upon an employer in the supervision of its employees under these circumstances and we will not create one here."); Williamson v. Old Brogue, Inc. , 232 Va. 350 , 354, 350 S.E.2d 621 , 624 (1986) (declining to abrogate the common law rule against dram shop liability because "abrogat[ing] such a fundamental rule ... is the function of the legislative, not judicial, branch of government").

2023“It is a fundamental principle that ‘[a]lthough an instruction may correctly state the law, it should not be given if it is inapplicable to the facts in evidence . . . [and] might confuse or distract the jury.’” Fahringer v. Commonwealth, 70 - 11 - Va. App. 208, 218 (2019) (alterations in original) (quoting Morse v. Commonwealth, 17 Va. App. 627, 633 (1994)).

2019“It is a fundamental principle that ‘[a]lthough an instruction may correctly state the law, it should not be given if it is inapplicable to the facts in evidence . . . [and] might confuse or distract the jury.’” Morse v. Commonwealth, 17 Va. App. 627, 633 (1994) (quoting King v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. App. 708, 711 (1986)).

2006Moreover, “a fundamental rule of statutory construction requires that courts view the entire body of legislation and the statutory scheme to determine the ‘true intention of each part.’ ” Allard v. Commonwealth, 24 Va.App. 57, 67 , 480 S.E.2d 139, 144 (1997) (quoting Virginia Real Estate Bd. v. Clay, 9 Va.App. 152, 157 , 384 S.E.2d 622, 625 (1989)).

2006Moreover, “a fundamental rule of statutory construction requires that courts view the entire body of legislation and the statutory scheme to determine the ‘true intention of each part.’ ” Allard v. Commonwealth, 24 Va.App. 57, 67 , 480 S.E.2d 139, 144 (1997) (quoting Virginia Real Estate Bd. v. Clay, 9 Va.App. 152, 157 , 384 S.E.2d 622, 625 (1989)).

2003Moreover, a fundamental rule of statutory construction requires that courts view the entire body of legislation and the statutory scheme “to determine the true intention of each part.” McDaniel v. Commonwealth, 199 Va. 287, 292 , 99 S.E.2d 623, 627 (1957).

2003Moreover, a fundamental rule of statutory construction requires that courts view the entire body of legislation and the statutory scheme “to determine the true intention of each part.” McDaniel v. Commonwealth, 199 Va. 287, 292 , 99 S.E.2d 623, 627 (1957).

2013“The proponent of the evidence bears the burden of establishing!],] by a preponderance of the evidence, the facts necessary to support its admissibility.” Id. “ ‘It is a fundamental principle of jurisprudence that evidence which is not relevant is not admissible.’ ” McMillan v. Commonwealth, 277 Va. 11, 22 , 671 S.E.2d 396, 401 (2009) (quoting Davis v. Marshall Homes, 265 Va. 159, 166 , 576 S.E.2d 504, 507 (2003)). “ ‘Evidence is relevant if it tends to prove or disprove, or is pertinent to, matters in issue.’ ” Id. (quoting McCloud v. Commonwealth, 269 Va. 242, 257 , 609 S.E.2d 16, 24 (2005))

2013“The proponent of the evidence bears the burden of establishing!],] by a preponderance of the evidence, the facts necessary to support its admissibility.” Id. “ ‘It is a fundamental principle of jurisprudence that evidence which is not relevant is not admissible.’ ” McMillan v. Commonwealth, 277 Va. 11, 22 , 671 S.E.2d 396, 401 (2009) (quoting Davis v. Marshall Homes, 265 Va. 159, 166 , 576 S.E.2d 504, 507 (2003)). “ ‘Evidence is relevant if it tends to prove or disprove, or is pertinent to, matters in issue.’ ” Id. (quoting McCloud v. Commonwealth, 269 Va. 242, 257 , 609 S.E.2d 16, 24 (2005))

2024“The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)).

2024See Mathews, 424 U.S. 319 .

2024We reiterated that despite “whatever practical inconveniences may arise when the Commonwealth seeks multiple convictions for possessing a single mixture, [this Court] cannot dispense with the fundamental requirement for each conviction that ‘knowledge is an essential element of the crime.’” Id. at 441 (quoting Young v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 587, 591 (2008).

2024Camann’s counsel at oral argument suggested other forms of proof.11 In any case, whatever practical inconveniences may arise when the Commonwealth seeks multiple convictions for possessing a single mixture, we cannot dispense with the fundamental requirement for each conviction that “knowledge is an essential element of the crime.” Young, 275 Va. at 591 (emphasis added).

2024Bd., 301 Va. 305 , 317 (2022) (“As this Court has repeatedly explained, ‘when the General Assembly includes specific language in one section of a statute, but omits that language from another section of the statute, we must presume that the exclusion of the language was intentional.’” (quoting Halifax Corp. v. First Union Nat’l Bank, 262 Va. 91, 100 (2001))); Wright v. Commonwealth, 49 Va. App. 312, 318 (2007) (“We . . . heed the fundamental principle of statutory construction expressio unius est exclusio alterius, or ‘where a statute speaks in specific terms, an implication arises that omitte

2010The legislature expressly excluded “fireworks or permissible fireworks” from the definition of “explosive material.” Under the fundamental principle of statutory construction encapsulated by the phrase inclusio unius est exclusio alterius, “‘where a statute speaks in specific terms, an implication arises that omitted terms were not intended to be included within the scope of the statute.’” Wright v. Commonwealth, 49 Va. App. 312, 318 , 641 S.E.2d 119, 122 (2007) (quoting Conkling v. Commonwealth, 45 Va. App. 518, 522 , 612 S.E.2d 235, 237 (2005)).

2023“Furthermore, . . . it is a fundamental principle of equity jurisprudence that a litigant who files an independent action in equity to set aside a judgment must be free of fault or neglect.” Charles v. Precision Tune, Inc., 243 Va. 313, 318 (1992). -6-

2008“In the exercise of its power to set aside a final award upon the ground of fraud or mistake, the Commission applies the same rules applicable to a proceeding in equity to annul a final judgment at law.” J & D Masonry, Inc. v. Kornegay, 224 Va. 292, 295 , 295 S.E.2d 887, 889 (1982) (citing Williamsburg v. Altizer, 220 Va. 9, 13 , 255 S.E.2d 536, 538 (1979)). “[I]t is a fundamental principle of equity jurisprudence that a litigant who files an independent action in equity to set aside a judgment must be free of fault or neglect.” Charles v. Precision Tune, Inc., 243 Va. 313, 318 , 414 S.E.2d 83

2006Moreover, “a fundamental rule of statutory construction requires that courts view the entire body of legislation and the statutory scheme to determine the ‘true intention of each part.’ ” Allard v. Commonwealth, 24 Va.App. 57, 67 , 480 S.E.2d 139, 144 (1997) (quoting Virginia Real Estate Bd. v. Clay, 9 Va.App. 152, 157 , 384 S.E.2d 622, 625 (1989)).

2006Moreover, “a fundamental rule of statutory construction requires that courts view the entire body of legislation and the statutory scheme to determine the ‘true intention of each part.’ ” Allard v. Commonwealth, 24 Va.App. 57, 67 , 480 S.E.2d 139, 144 (1997) (quoting Virginia Real Estate Bd. v. Clay, 9 Va.App. 152, 157 , 384 S.E.2d 622, 625 (1989)).

2005See Commonwealth v. Brown, 259 Va. 697, 704-05 , 529 S.E.2d 96, 100 (2000) (holding that, under the fundamental principle of statutory construction expressio unius est exclusio alterius — which “provides that where a statute speaks in specific terms, an implication arises that omitted terms were not intended to be included within the scope of the statute” — when a “ ‘legislative enactment limits the manner in which something may be done, the enactment also evinces the intent that it shall not be done another way1 ” (quoting Grigg v. Commonwealth, 224 Va. 356, 364 , 297 S.E.2d 799, 803 (1982)))

2005See Commonwealth v. Brown, 259 Va. 697, 704-05 , 529 S.E.2d 96, 100 (2000) (holding that, under the fundamental principle of statutory construction expressio unius est exclusio alterius — which “provides that where a statute speaks in specific terms, an implication arises that omitted terms were not intended to be included within the scope of the statute” — when a “ ‘legislative enactment limits the manner in which something may be done, the enactment also evinces the intent that it shall not be done another way1 ” (quoting Grigg v. Commonwealth, 224 Va. 356, 364 , 297 S.E.2d 799, 803 (1982)))

2023“This is true even if there is a fundamental error of law appearing upon the face of the record.” Id. at 536-37 .

2023“This is true even if there is a fundamental error of law appearing upon the face of the record.” Id. at 536-37 . -3- Holloway alleges that perjury in a search warrant affidavit constituted extrinsic fraud.

2017Id. at 227-28 , 768 S.E.2d at 678 (quoting Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican Party , 552 U.S. 442 , 450, 128 S.Ct. 1184 , 170 L.Ed.2d 151 (2008) (some internal quotation marks omitted)).

2017Id. at 227-28 , 768 S.E.2d at 678 (quoting Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican Party , 552 U.S. 442 , 450, 128 S.Ct. 1184 , 170 L.Ed.2d 151 (2008) (some internal quotation marks omitted)).

2013The fundamental principle set forth in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963), is that "the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused . . . violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution." To be awarded a retrial based on a Brady violation, the defendant must make three showings as set forth in Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. ___ , 131 S. Ct. 1289 (2011): "(1) the evidence at issue is favorable to the accused, either because it was exculpatory, or because it is impeaching

1999Brady is relevant to this issue only to the extent the Supreme Court stated a fundamental principle that governs all criminal trials: "Society wins not only when the guilty are convicted but when criminal trials are fair; our system of the administration of justice suffers when any accused is treated unfairly." 373 U.S. at 87 , 83 S.Ct. 1194 .

2013“The proponent of the evidence bears the burden of establishing!],] by a preponderance of the evidence, the facts necessary to support its admissibility.” Id. “ ‘It is a fundamental principle of jurisprudence that evidence which is not relevant is not admissible.’ ” McMillan v. Commonwealth, 277 Va. 11, 22 , 671 S.E.2d 396, 401 (2009) (quoting Davis v. Marshall Homes, 265 Va. 159, 166 , 576 S.E.2d 504, 507 (2003)). “ ‘Evidence is relevant if it tends to prove or disprove, or is pertinent to, matters in issue.’ ” Id. (quoting McCloud v. Commonwealth, 269 Va. 242, 257 , 609 S.E.2d 16, 24 (2005))

2013“The proponent of the evidence bears the burden of establishing!],] by a preponderance of the evidence, the facts necessary to support its admissibility.” Id. “ ‘It is a fundamental principle of jurisprudence that evidence which is not relevant is not admissible.’ ” McMillan v. Commonwealth, 277 Va. 11, 22 , 671 S.E.2d 396, 401 (2009) (quoting Davis v. Marshall Homes, 265 Va. 159, 166 , 576 S.E.2d 504, 507 (2003)). “ ‘Evidence is relevant if it tends to prove or disprove, or is pertinent to, matters in issue.’ ” Id. (quoting McCloud v. Commonwealth, 269 Va. 242, 257 , 609 S.E.2d 16, 24 (2005))

2008“In the exercise of its power to set aside a final award upon the ground of fraud or mistake, the Commission applies the same rules applicable to a proceeding in equity to annul a final judgment at law.” J & D Masonry, Inc. v. Kornegay, 224 Va. 292, 295 , 295 S.E.2d 887, 889 (1982) (citing Williamsburg v. Altizer, 220 Va. 9, 13 , 255 S.E.2d 536, 538 (1979)). “[I]t is a fundamental principle of equity jurisprudence that a litigant who files an independent action in equity to set aside a judgment must be free of fault or neglect.” Charles v. Precision Tune, Inc., 243 Va. 313, 318 , 414 S.E.2d 83

1992National Surety, 120 F. at 599 .