fundamental rule in Illinois

2021The fundamental rule of statutory construction “is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature’s intent” (Michigan Avenue National Bank v. County of Cook, 191 Ill. 2d 493, 503-04 (2000)), and “[t]he plain language of the statute is the best indicator of legislative intent” (United States v. Glispie, 2020 IL 125483, ¶ 9 ).

2011The fundamental rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature’s intent (Michigan Avenue National Bank v. County of Cook, 191 Ill. 2d 493, 503-04 (2000)), and the best indication of legislative intent is the statutory language, given its plain and ordinary meaning.

2025It is “a fundamental rule of statutory construction that where there exists a general statutory provision and a specific statutory provision, either in the same or in another act, both relating to the same subject, the specific provision controls and should be applied.” Knolls Condominium Ass’n v. Harms, 202 Ill. 2d 450, 459 (2002).

2021See Knolls Condominium Ass’n v. Harms, 202 Ill. 2d 450, 459 (2002) (“It is also a fundamental rule of statutory construction that where there exists a general statutory provision and a specific statutory provision, either in the same or in another act, both relating to the same subject, the specific provision controls and should be applied.”).

2016“It is a fundamental rule of statutory construction that where there exists a general statutory provision and a specific statutory provision, either in the same or another act, which both relate to the same subject, the specific provision controls and should be applied.” People v. Villarreal, 152 Ill. 2d 368, 379 , 604 N.E.2d 923, 928 (1992).

2016“It is a fundamental rule of statutory construction that where there exists a general statutory provision and a specific statutory provision, either in the same or another act, which both relate to the same subject, the specific provision controls and should be applied.” People v. Villarreal, 152 Ill. 2d 368, 379 , 604 N.E.2d 923, 928 (1992).

2017General Motors Corp. v. Pappas, 242 Ill. 2d 163, 180 , 950 N.E.2d 1136, 1146 (2011).

2017General Motors Corp. v. Pappas, 242 Ill. 2d 163, 180 , 950 N.E.2d 1136, 1146 (2011).

2026Lyon v. Department of Children & Family Services, 209 Ill. 2d 264, 271 (2004). ¶ 18 “The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’ ” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)).

2022Defendant was denied that opportunity here. ¶ 17 “The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’ ” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)).

2026Moreover, at the hearing on the motion to reconsider, the court expressly acknowledged them and indicated that its original ruling was consistent with its consideration of the factors. “[I]t is a fundamental principle of appellate law that when an appeal is taken from a lower court judgment, the question before the court of review is the correctness of the result, not the correctness of the reasoning on which the result was reached.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. White, 2025 IL App (2d) 240477, ¶ 41 (citing People v. Johnson, 208 Ill. 2d 118, 128 (2003)).

2025To the extent the court required defendant to show a change in circumstances in the proceedings on her motion to relief, the court erred. ¶ 30 However, “[i]t is a fundamental principle of appellate law that when an appeal is taken from a judgment of a lower court, [t]he question before [the] reviewing court is the correctness of the result reached by the lower court and not the correctness of the reasoning upon which that result was reached.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Johnson, 208 Ill. 2d 118, 128 (2003).

2026Lyon v. Department of Children & Family Services, 209 Ill. 2d 264, 271 (2004). ¶ 18 “The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’ ” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)).

2022Defendant was denied that opportunity here. ¶ 17 “The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’ ” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)).

2019The rules applicable to this task are well-established and were summarized in Hendricks v. Board of Trustees of the Police Pension Fund, 2015 IL App (3d) 140858 , ¶ 14: “The fundamental rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. [Citation.] The most reliable indicator of that intent is the -5- language of the statute itself. [Citation.] In determining the plain meaning of statutory language, a court will consider the statute in its entirety, the subject the statute addresses, and the apparent intent of the legislature in enacting the stat

2018See DeLuna v. Burciaga , 223 Ill. 2d 49 , 60, 306 Ill.Dec. 136 , 857 N.E.2d 229 (2006) ("A fundamental principle of statutory construction is to view all provisions of a statutory enactment as a whole.

2024People v. Johnson, 208 Ill. 2d 118, 128 (2003) (“It is a fundamental principle of appellate law that when an appeal is taken from a judgment of a lower court, ‘[t]he question before [the] reviewing court is the correctness of the result reached by the lower court and not the correctness of the reasoning upon which that result was reached.’ ” (quoting People v. Novak, 163 Ill. 2d 93, 101 (1994))); Steiner Electric Co. v. Maniscalco, 2016 IL App (1st) 132023, ¶ 49 .

2022“It is a fundamental principle of appellate law that when an appeal is taken from a judgment of a lower court, ‘[t]he question before [the] reviewing court is the correctness of the result reached by the lower court and not the correctness of the reasoning upon which that result was reached.’ ” People v. Johnson, 208 Ill. 2d 118, 128 (2003) (quoting People v. Novak, 163 Ill. 2d 93, 101 (1994)).

2024King v. First Capital Financial Services Corp., 215 Ill. 2d 1, 26 (2005).

2021King v. First Capital Financial Services Corp., 215 Ill. 2d 1, 26 (2005).

2024We disagree. ¶ 16 “The fundamental rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the legislature's intent.” Horsehead, 2019 IL 124155, ¶ 37 (citing Comprehensive Community Solutions, Inc., v. Rockford School District No. 205, 216 Ill. 2d 455, 473 (2005)).

2007“The fundamental rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the legislature’s intent.” Comprehensive Community Solutions, Inc. v. Rockford School District No. 205, 216 Ill. 2d 455, 473 (2005).

2019Wisniewski v. Kownacki , 221 Ill. 2d 453 , 460, 303 Ill.Dec. 818 , 851 N.E.2d 1243 (2006).

2019Wisniewski v. Kownacki , 221 Ill. 2d 453 , 460, 303 Ill.Dec. 818 , 851 N.E.2d 1243 (2006).

1995A fundamental rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the true intent and meaning of the legislature. ( Kraft, Inc. v. Edgar (1990), 138 Ill.2d 178 , 149 Ill.Dec. 286 , 561 N.E.2d 656 .) The words used by the legislature in the statute itself are the best indicator of the meaning, and the courts should not look beyond the words of the statute unless those words are ambiguous. ( Kraft, 138 Ill.2d 178 , 149 Ill.Dec. 286 , 561 N.E.2d 656 .) To determine the meaning of the statute, it must be read in its entirety and should not be construed so as to render any of its part

1995A fundamental rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the true intent and meaning of the legislature. ( Kraft, Inc. v. Edgar (1990), 138 Ill.2d 178 , 149 Ill.Dec. 286 , 561 N.E.2d 656 .) The words used by the legislature in the statute itself are the best indicator of the meaning, and the courts should not look beyond the words of the statute unless those words are ambiguous. ( Kraft, 138 Ill.2d 178 , 149 Ill.Dec. 286 , 561 N.E.2d 656 .) To determine the meaning of the statute, it must be read in its entirety and should not be construed so as to render any of its part

2016"The fundamental rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature's intent. [Citation.] The best indication of legislative intent is the statutory language, given its plain and ordinary meaning. [Citation.] Where the language is -4- clear and unambiguous, we will apply the statute without resort to further aids of statutory construction. [Citation.] The construction of a statute is a question of law that is reviewed de novo. [Citation.]" People v. Ramirez, 214 Ill. 2d 176, 179 (2005). ¶ 11 Section 5-7-1 of the Unified Code, the statute governing the terms of pe

2016“The fundamental rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature’s intent. [Citation.] The best indication of legislative intent is the statutory language, given its plain and ordinary meaning. [Citation.] Where the language is clear and unambiguous, we will apply the statute without resort to further aids of statutory construction. [Citation.] The construction of a statute is a question of law that is reviewed de novo. [Citation.]” People v. Ramirez, 214 Ill. 2d 176, 179 (2005). ¶ 11 Section 5-7-1 of the Unified Code, the statute governing the terms of period

2025We review the applicable guiding principles for such questions of interpretation. ¶ 46 Principles of Statutory Interpretation ¶ 47 “Municipal ordinances are interpreted using the same general rules of statutory interpretation.” Landis v. Marc Realty, L.L.C., 235 Ill. 2d 1, 6 (2009) “The fundamental rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature.” Id.

2025We review the applicable guiding principles for such questions of interpretation. ¶ 46 Principles of Statutory Interpretation ¶ 47 “Municipal ordinances are interpreted using the same general rules of statutory interpretation.” Landis v. Marc Realty, L.L.C., 235 Ill. 2d 1, 6 (2009) “The fundamental rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature.” Id.

2019Specifically, defendant argues that the prior probability figure encompasses an assumption that sexual intercourse occurred between defendant and T.G. -5- ¶ 27 “[N]o rule is more firmly settled than that a defendant in a criminal case is not bound to prove himself innocent, but the State must prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, the defendant being presumed innocent.” People v. Magnafichi, 9 Ill. 2d 169, 174 (1956); see also People v. Weinstein, 35 Ill. 2d 467, 469-70 (1966) (“It is a fundamental doctrine of our system of criminal jurisprudence that the law presumes the innocence of an

2018Specifically, defendant argues that the prior probability figure encompasses an assumption that sexual intercourse occurred between defendant and T.G. ¶ 27 "[N]o rule is more firmly settled than that a defendant in a criminal case is not bound to prove himself innocent, but the State must prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, the defendant being presumed innocent." People v. Magnafichi , 9 Ill. 2d 169 , 174, 137 N.E.2d 256 (1956) ; see also People v. Weinstein , 35 Ill. 2d 467 , 469-70, 220 N.E.2d 432 (1966) ("It is a fundamental doctrine of our system of criminal jurisprudence that the

1996The trial court found that no promise was made to defendant. " 'It is a fundamental principle of criminal procedure that a confession must be voluntary; otherwise, it is inadmissible. [Citations.] "The test of voluntariness is whether the statement was made freely, voluntarily and without compulsion or inducement of any sort, or whether the defendant’s will was overcome at the time he confessed.” [Citations.] A determination of voluntariness requires consideration of the totality of the circumstances. [Citations.] Factors to be considered in making the determination include the age, education

1996In People v. Melock (1992), 149 Ill. 2d 423 , this court stated: "It is a fundamental principle of criminal procedure that a confession must be voluntary; otherwise, it is inadmissible.

2015Following Sprinkle, we will review the alleged errors despite the failure to object, because a fair trial before a neutral arbiter "is a fundamental requirement in a criminal prosecution and when such requirement is not met, it amounts to a denial of due process of law." People v. Finn, 17 Ill. 2d 614, 617 (1959). ¶ 46 The trial judge has discretion to raise objections and to question witnesses.

2015Following Sprinkle, we will review the alleged errors despite the failure to object, because a fair trial before a neutral arbiter "is a fundamental requirement in a criminal prosecution and when such requirement is not met, it amounts to a denial of due process of law." People v. Finn, 17 Ill. 2d 614, 617 (1959). ¶ 46 The trial judge has discretion to raise objections and to question witnesses.

2023The fundamental principle of statutory construction “is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature.” In re Detention of White, 2016 IL App (1st) 151187, ¶ 45 ; see People v. Dabbs, 239 Ill. 2d 277, 287 (2010).

2020White, 2016 IL App (1st) 151187, ¶ 45 ; see also People v. Dabbs, 239 Ill. 2d 277, 287 (2010).

2022“The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard, and that right ‘has little reality or worth unless one is informed that the matter is pending.’ ” Mitchell, 2014 IL 116311, ¶ 28 (quoting Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950)).

2019Fundamentally, “[d]ue process of law requires that a party be accorded procedural fairness, i.e., given notice and an opportunity to be heard.” Gredell v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 346 Ill. App. 3d 51, 62 (2004); see also BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP v. Mitchell, 2014 IL 116311, ¶ 28 (“The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard, and that right ‘has little reality or worth unless one is informed that the matter is pending.’ ” (quoting Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950))).

2006The court set out general rules of statutory construction we apply in this case: “The fundamental rule of statutory construction, of course, is to give effect to the intent of the legislature. [Citation.] In seeking to ascertain legislative intent, courts consider the statutes in their entirety, noting the subject they address and the legislature’s apparent objective in enacting them. [Citation.] It is presumed that the legislature, in enacting various statutes, acts rationally and with full knowledge of all previous enactments. [Citation.] It is further presumed that the legislature will not

2006The court set out general rules of statutory construction we apply in this case: "The fundamental rule of statutory construction, of course, is to give effect to the intent of the legislature. [Citation.] In seeking to ascertain legislative intent, courts consider the statutes in their entirety, noting the subject they address and the legislature=s apparent objective in enacting them. [Citation.] It is presumed that the legislature, in enacting various statutes, acts rationally and with full knowledge of all previous enactments. [Citation.] It is further presumed that the legislature will not

2024The doctrine applies not only to separate statutes but also to different sections of the same statute, and it is “consistent with the fundamental rule of statutory interpretation that all the provisions of a statute must be viewed as a whole.” People v. McCarty, 223 Ill. 2d 109, 133 (2006).

2012The court’s holding in this regard—that a remedy can be forfeited by a party—contravenes the fundamental principle underlying one of our own rules. ¶ 82 I note that the court cites to my partial dissent in People v. McCarty, 223 Ill. 2d 109 (2006), in what can only be characterized as an obvious attempt to embarrass me by trying to show that an inconsistency exists between my position in that case and my position today.

2021These sections, which appear to pertain directly to the actions the Governor took regulating plaintiffs’ operation of their restaurant and tavern businesses, do not require the payment of “just compensation.” Section 7(4) is the only emergency power that contains such a requirement. ¶ 44 “A fundamental principle of statutory construction is to view all provisions of a statutory enactment as a whole.” Southern Illinoisian v. Illinois Department of Public Health, 218 Ill. 2d 390, 415 , 844 N.E.2d 1, 14 (2006).

2021These sections, which appear to pertain directly to the actions the Governor took regulating plaintiffs’ operation of their restaurant and tavern businesses, do not require the payment of “just compensation.” Section 7(4) is the only emergency power that contains such a requirement. ¶ 44 “A fundamental principle of statutory construction is to view all provisions of a statutory enactment as a whole.” Southern Illinoisian v. Illinois Department of Public Health, 218 Ill. 2d 390, 415 , 844 N.E.2d 1, 14 (2006).

2023See 725 ILCS 5/110-6(g), (i), 110-6.1(a) (West 2022); see also In re D.W., 214 Ill. 2d 289 , 316 *** (2005) (finding it is ‘a fundamental requirement of due process *** that a respondent be afforded the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner’); LaChance v. Erickson, 522 U.S. 262, 266 (1998) (‘The core of due process is the right to notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard.’).” Thus, the State is permitted to file a responsive petition in a situation such as this, and there was no error in their doing so in this case. ¶ 16 B.

2023See 725 ILCS 5/110-6(g), (i), 110-6.1(a) (West 2022); see also In re D.W., 214 Ill. 2d 289 , 316 *** (2005) (finding it is ‘a fundamental requirement of due process *** that a respondent be afforded the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner’); LaChance v. Erickson, 522 U.S. 262, 266 (1998) (‘The core of due process is the right to notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard.’).” In sum, the State is permitted to file a responding petition in situations such as this where a defendant (1) was arrested and detained prior to the implementation of the Act, (2)