fundamental principle in North Dakota

2019We conclude the correct standard of review to determine whether the facts rise to a level of a constitutional violation is de novo, and the proper standard of review for Pailing’s alternative argument is abuse of discretion. [¶6] “It is a fundamental principle of constitutional law that a prosecutor may not comment on a defendant’s failure to testify in a criminal case.” State v. Myers, 2006 ND 242, ¶ 7 , 724 N.W.2d 168 (citing State v. His Chase, 531 N.W.2d 271, 273 (N.D. 1995)).

2009As a corollary, “[i]t is a fundamental principle of constitutional law that a prosecutor may not comment on a defendant’s failure to testify in a criminal case.” State v. Myers , 2006 ND 242, ¶ 7 , 724 N.W.2d 168 ; see also Griffin v. California , 380 U.S. 609 , 614 (1965); State v. His Chase , 531 N.W.2d 271, 273 (N.D. 1995); State v. Flohr , 310 N.W.2d 735, 736 (N.D. 1981).

2009As a corollary, “[i]t is a fundamental principle of constitutional law that a prosecutor may not comment on a defendant’s failure to testify in a criminal case.” State v. Myers , 2006 ND 242, ¶ 7 , 724 N.W.2d 168 ; see also Griffin v. California , 380 U.S. 609 , 614 (1965); State v. His Chase , 531 N.W.2d 271, 273 (N.D. 1995); State v. Flohr , 310 N.W.2d 735, 736 (N.D. 1981).

2009As a corollary, “[i]t is a fundamental principle of constitutional law that a prosecutor may not comment on a defendant’s failure to testify in a criminal case.” State v. Myers, 2006 ND 242, ¶ 7 , 724 N.W.2d 168 ; see also Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 614 , 85 S.Ct. 1229 , 14 L.Ed.2d 106 (1965); State v. His Chase, 531 N.W.2d 271, 273 (N.D.1995); State v. Flohr, 310 N.W.2d 735, 736 (N.D.1981).

2009As a corollary, “[i]t is a fundamental principle of constitutional law that a prosecutor may not comment on a defendant’s failure to testify in a criminal case.” State v. Myers , 2006 ND 242, ¶ 7 , 724 N.W.2d 168 ; see also Griffin v. California , 380 U.S. 609 , 614 (1965); State v. His Chase , 531 N.W.2d 271, 273 (N.D. 1995); State v. Flohr , 310 N.W.2d 735, 736 (N.D. 1981).

2009As a corollary, “[i]t is a fundamental principle of constitutional law that a prosecutor may not comment on a defendant’s failure to testify in a criminal case.” State v. Myers, 2006 ND 242, ¶ 7 , 724 N.W.2d 168 ; see also Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 614 , 85 S.Ct. 1229 , 14 L.Ed.2d 106 (1965); State v. His Chase, 531 N.W.2d 271, 273 (N.D.1995); State v. Flohr, 310 N.W.2d 735, 736 (N.D.1981).

2024Legislative Assembly v. Burgum, 2018 ND 189, ¶¶ 84-85 , 916 N.W.2d 83 (Crothers, J., concurring and dissenting) (stating that when constitutional analysis is necessary, “deference to the work of our co-equal branches of government requires that we proceed with great caution and circumspection”); Three Affiliated Tribes of Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold Eng’g, P.C., 467 U.S. 138, 157 (1984) (“It is a fundamental rule of judicial restraint, however, that this Court will not reach constitutional questions in advance of the necessity of deciding them.”); Espeland v. Police Magistrate’s Court of

2018Otherwise stated: "In Three Affiliated Tribes of Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold Engineering , P.C. , 467 U.S. 138 , 157 [ 104 S.Ct. 2267 , 81 L.Ed.2d 113 ] (1984), the United States Supreme Court said, 'It is a fundamental rule of judicial restraint, however, that this Court will not reach constitutional questions in advance of the necessity of deciding them.' Seeking to avoid the necessity of deciding the constitutional question, the high court said, *111 'The same prudential rule is properly employed in this case' and remanded the case to this Court for an additional determination.

2019He claims he was not given actual notice of the reasons for termination, and he was *409 not given a reasonable opportunity to present testimony in his own defense because he was not allowed to subpoena or cross-examine witnesses. [¶17] "The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard 'at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.' " Mathews v. Eldridge , 424 U.S. 319 , 333, 96 S.Ct. 893 , 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976) (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo , 380 U.S. 545 , 552, 85 S.Ct. 1187 , 14 L.Ed.2d 62 (1965) ).

2019He claims he was not given actual notice of the reasons for termination, and he was *409 not given a reasonable opportunity to present testimony in his own defense because he was not allowed to subpoena or cross-examine witnesses. [¶17] "The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard 'at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.' " Mathews v. Eldridge , 424 U.S. 319 , 333, 96 S.Ct. 893 , 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976) (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo , 380 U.S. 545 , 552, 85 S.Ct. 1187 , 14 L.Ed.2d 62 (1965) ).

2016“A state’s attorney’s statements of fact to the jury which are not warranted by the evidence are improper and such statements are presumed to be prejudicial unless harmless in themselves.” State v. Mehralian, 301 N.W.2d 409, 418 (N.D.1981). [¶ 11] Although Gibbs testified she was unable to make a microscopic visual observation of spermatozoa on the complainant’s underwear, she testified the PSA tests of cuttings from the complainant’s underwear *51 were positive, for proteins found in semen and the results of those tests were denoted “presumptively positive for semen.” Gibbs testified she did

2007“A state’s attorney’s statements of fact to the jury which are not warranted by the evidence are improper and such statements are presumed to be prejudicial unless harmless in themselves.” State v. Mehralian, 301 N.W.2d 409, 418 (N.D.1981). [¶ 11] The record in this case contains evidence that the defendant was aware the complainant had mental limitations.

2002Neblett v. Neblett, 274 Wis. 574, 571 [sic], 81 N.W.2d 61 (1957).

2002Neblett v. Neblett, 274 Wis. 574, 571 [sic], 81 N.W.2d 61 (1957).

2016“To be prejudicial, absent a fundamental error, improper closing argument by the state’s attorney must have stepped beyond the bounds of any fair and reasonable criticism of the evidence, or any fair and reasonable argument based upon any theory of the case that has support in the evidence.” Id.

2007“To be prejudicial, absent a fundamental error, improper closing argument by the state’s attorney must have stepped beyond the bounds of any fair and reasonable criticism of the evidence, or any fair and reasonable argument based upon any theory of the case that has support in the evidence.” Id.

2023“A comment on the silence of a defendant is an improper comment on the right to remain silent in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the [United States] Constitution.” State v. Ebach, 1999 ND 5, ¶ 15 , 589 N.W.2d 566 ; see also N.D.

2019“A comment on the silence of a defendant is an improper comment on the right to remain silent in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the [United States] Constitution.” Id. (citing State v. Ebach, 1999 ND 5, ¶ 15 , 589 N.W.2d 566 ).

2023“A comment on the silence of a defendant is an improper comment on the right to remain silent in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the [United States] Constitution.” State v. Ebach, 1999 ND 5, ¶ 15 , 589 N.W.2d 566 ; see also N.D.

2019“A comment on the silence of a defendant is an improper comment on the right to remain silent in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the [United States] Constitution.” Id. (citing State v. Ebach, 1999 ND 5, ¶ 15 , 589 N.W.2d 566 ).

2019He claims he was not given actual notice of the reasons for termination, and he was *409 not given a reasonable opportunity to present testimony in his own defense because he was not allowed to subpoena or cross-examine witnesses. [¶17] "The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard 'at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.' " Mathews v. Eldridge , 424 U.S. 319 , 333, 96 S.Ct. 893 , 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976) (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo , 380 U.S. 545 , 552, 85 S.Ct. 1187 , 14 L.Ed.2d 62 (1965) ).

2019He claims he was not given actual notice of the reasons for termination, and he was *409 not given a reasonable opportunity to present testimony in his own defense because he was not allowed to subpoena or cross-examine witnesses. [¶17] "The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard 'at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.' " Mathews v. Eldridge , 424 U.S. 319 , 333, 96 S.Ct. 893 , 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976) (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo , 380 U.S. 545 , 552, 85 S.Ct. 1187 , 14 L.Ed.2d 62 (1965) ).

2009Under the Griffin rule, a “comment to the jury by a prosecutor in a State criminal trial upon the defendant’s failure to testify as to matters which he can reasonably be expected to deny or explain, because of facts within his knowledge, violates the self-incrimination clause of the Fifth Amendment to the Federal Constitution.” State v. Marmon , 154 N.W.2d 55, 59 (N.D. 1967); see also State v. Ebach , 1999 ND 5, ¶ 15 , 589 N.W.2d 566 (“A comment on the silence of a defendant is an improper comment on the right to remain silent in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitu

2009Under the Griffin rule, a “comment to the jury by a prosecutor in a State criminal trial upon the defendant’s failure to testify as to matters which he can reasonably be expected to deny or explain, because of facts within his knowledge, violates the self-incrimination clause of the Fifth Amendment to the Federal Constitution.” State v. Marmon, 154 N.W.2d 55, 59 (N.D.1967); see also State v. Ebach, 1999 ND 5, ¶ 15 , 589 N.W.2d 566 (“A comment on the silence of a defendant is an improper comment on the right to remain silent in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitutio

2007Article I, section 12 of the North Dakota Constitution also provides: "No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law." "The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard `at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.'" Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)). [¶12] This Court has held that a "prisoner's due process rights are generally satisfied if the prisoner is represented at the termination hearing by counsel and has an opportunity to appear by deposition or o

2007Article I, section 12 of the North Dakota Constitution also provides: “No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law.” “The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’ ” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 , 96 S.Ct. 893 , 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976) (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 , 85 S.Ct. 1187 , 14 L.Ed.2d 62 (1965)). [¶ 12] This Court has held that a “prisoner’s due process rights are generally satisfied if the prisoner is represented at the termination hearing

1999State v. Marks , 452 N.W.2d 298, 302 (N.D. 1990).

1999State v. Marks, 452 N.W.2d 298, 302 (N.D.1990).

1996Estate of Robertson v. Cass County , 492 N.W.2d 599, 602 (N.D. 1992); see also Shipley v. Shipley , 509 N.W.2d 49, 55 (N.D. 1993) (the paramount purpose of our procedural rules for motions is to give notice of the claims brought and the relief sought by an opposing party).

1996Estate of Robertson v. Cass County, 492 N.W.2d 599, 602 (N.D.1992); see also Shipley v. Shipley, 509 N.W.2d 49, 55 (N.D.1993) (the paramount purpose of our procedural rules for motions is to give notice of the claims brought and the relief sought by an opposing party).

1996When a party is not complaining of a fundamental error, that party must demonstrate the error of admitting evidence was “improper and prejudicial.” State v. Drader, 374 N.W.2d 601, 602 (N.D.1985) (emphasis in original).

1987State v. Drader, 374 N.W.2d 601, 602 (N.D.1985).

1996Estate of Robertson v. Cass County , 492 N.W.2d 599, 602 (N.D. 1992); see also Shipley v. Shipley , 509 N.W.2d 49, 55 (N.D. 1993) (the paramount purpose of our procedural rules for motions is to give notice of the claims brought and the relief sought by an opposing party).

1996Estate of Robertson v. Cass County, 492 N.W.2d 599, 602 (N.D.1992); see also Shipley v. Shipley, 509 N.W.2d 49, 55 (N.D.1993) (the paramount purpose of our procedural rules for motions is to give notice of the claims brought and the relief sought by an opposing party).

1990State v. Loyland, 149 N.W.2d 713, 731 (N.D.1967). ‘He is allowed a wide latitude of speech, and must be protected therein.

1990State v. Loyland, 149 N.W.2d 713, 731 (N.D.1967). `He is allowed a wide latitude of speech, and must be protected therein.

1996Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 , 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1612 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 720 (1966); State v. Chihanski 540 N.W.2d 621, 623 (N.D.1995).

1996Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 , 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1612 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 720 (1966); State v. Chihanski 540 N.W.2d 621, 623 (N.D.1995).

1991Herman v. Magnuson, 277 N.W.2d 445 (N.D.1979).

1979“However, the fundamental test in all cases pertaining to repeal by implication is the intent of the Legislature.” Herman v. Magnuson, 277 N.W.2d 445, 447 (N.D.1979).