exclusion clause in Maryland

2020Vigna’s theory was that the circuit court’s admission of his prior reprimands, combined with the exclusion of the defense witnesses’ proffered opinion and/or reputation testimony concerning Vigna’s character for appropriateness with children, was so prejudicial that it 19 Vigna’s reliance on Pierce v. State, 62 Md.

2018Id. at 165-66 , 729 A.2d 910 .

2018Id. at 165-66 , 729 A.2d 910 .

2013As indicated, the statement here was not admissible because it was “ ‘inherently suspect as being self-serving.’ ” Conyers, 345 Md. at 545 , 693 A.2d 781 (quoting Muir v. State, 64 Md.App. 648, 656 , 498 A.2d 666 (1985)).

2013As indicated, the statement here was not admissible because it was “ ‘inherently suspect as being self-serving.’ ” Conyers, 345 Md. at 545 , 693 A.2d 781 (quoting Muir v. State, 64 Md.App. 648, 656 , 498 A.2d 666 (1985)).

2013As indicated, the statement here was not admissible because it was “ ‘inherently suspect as being self-serving.’ ” Conyers, 345 Md. at 545 , 693 A.2d 781 (quoting Muir v. State, 64 Md.App. 648, 656 , 498 A.2d 666 (1985)).

2013As indicated, the statement here was not admissible because it was “ ‘inherently suspect as being self-serving.’ ” Conyers, 345 Md. at 545 , 693 A.2d 781 (quoting Muir v. State, 64 Md.App. 648, 656 , 498 A.2d 666 (1985)).

2006To support the determination of the existence of ambiguity with these terms as used in the exclusion clause of the insurance policy, the Court first analyzed dictionary definitions of the terms and concluded that a reasonable prudent layperson may consider lead paint to be a “contaminant” or “pollutant.” Sullins, 340 Md. at 510 , 667 A.2d at 620 .

2006To support the determination of the existence of ambiguity with these terms as used in the exclusion clause of the insurance policy, the Court first analyzed dictionary definitions of the terms and concluded that a reasonable prudent layperson may consider lead paint to be a “contaminant” or “pollutant.” Sullins, 340 Md. at 510 , 667 A.2d at 620 .

2006In EDP, the Court was called to interpret an exclusion clause on an general business insurance policy stating that: “Coverage does not apply to bodily injury or property damage arising out of the ownership, maintenance, operation, use, loading or unloading of ... [a vehicle].” Id. at 224-25 , 533 A.2d at 686 .

2006In EDP, the Court was called to interpret an exclusion clause on an general business insurance policy stating that: “Coverage does not apply to bodily injury or property damage arising out of the ownership, maintenance, operation, use, loading or unloading of ... [a vehicle].” Id. at 224-25 , 533 A.2d at 686 .

2006Bernhardt, 102 Md.App. at 53-54 , 648 A.2d at 1050 .

2006Bernhardt, 102 Md.App. at 53-54 , 648 A.2d at 1050 .

2006For instance, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit noted: “[m]any courts, including the Sixth Circuit, have held that a pollution exclusion clause in a CGL insurance policy applies only to injuries caused by traditional environmental pollution.” Kelliman, 197 F.3d at 1181 (citing over twenty state and federal cases to support its view); see also Stoney Run Company v. Prudential-LMI Commercial Insurance Company, 47 F.3d 34 , 37 (2nd Cir.1995) (stating that “we believe that it is appropriate to construe the standard pollution exclusion clause in light of its general purpose, which is

2002If a court affirmatively rules that a witness, whether proffered by the defense or the State, has a reasonable basis for invoking his or her right to remain silent, as articulated in Adkins, 316 Md. at 6-7 , 557 A.2d at 205-06 , and its progeny, and the court determines that the witness will elect to exercise his or her right to remain silent if he or she takes the stand, then a court has no choice but to exclude this witness.

2002If a court affirmatively rules that a witness, whether proffered by the defense or the State, has a reasonable basis for invoking his or her right to remain silent, as articulated in Adkins, 316 Md. at 6-7 , 557 A.2d at 205-06 , and its progeny, and the court determines that the witness will elect to exercise his or her right to remain silent if he or she takes the stand, then a court has no choice but to exclude this witness.

2002In Ben Lewis Plumbing v. Liberty Mutual, 354 Md. 452 , 731 A.2d 904 (1999), the dispute concerned a retrospective rating clause in a workers’ compensation policy.

2002In Ben Lewis Plumbing v. Liberty Mutual, 354 Md. 452 , 731 A.2d 904 (1999), the dispute concerned a retrospective rating clause in a workers’ compensation policy.

2001Manbeck, 384 F.2d at 972 .

2001The Manbeck court concluded that the exclusion of the privilege was error and rejected appellee’s argument that the jury, “in awarding punitive damages, necessarily found that appellant’s conduct possessed a degree of malice that would have operated to defeat the privilege.” Manbeck, 384 F.2d at 976-77 .

1997Co., 38 Md.App. 197 , 379 A.2d 1234 (1977), involved the legal meaning of the term farm or farming in an exclusion clause in an insurance policy and also whether the facts before the trial court supported the trial court’s finding that the incident was not within the ambit of the exclusionary clause.

1997Co., 38 Md.App. 197 , 379 A.2d 1234 (1977), involved the legal meaning of the term farm or farming in an exclusion clause in an insurance policy and also whether the facts before the trial court supported the trial court’s finding that the incident was not within the ambit of the exclusionary clause.

1994A portion of the history of the exclusion clause was described in Bents v. Mutual Fire, 83 Md.App. 524, 532 , 575 A.2d 795 (1990), and is discussed in greater depth in Note, The Pollution Exclusion Clause Through The Looking Glass, 74 Geo.L.J. 1237, 1986 (hereinafter, “Through The Looking Glass”).

1994A portion of the history of the exclusion clause was described in Bents v. Mutual Fire, 83 Md.App. 524, 532 , 575 A.2d 795 (1990), and is discussed in greater depth in Note, The Pollution Exclusion Clause Through The Looking Glass, 74 Geo.L.J. 1237, 1986 (hereinafter, “Through The Looking Glass”).

1991THE SANCTION Rule 2-513(c) provides for a specific sanction: “The court may exclude all or part of the testimony of the witness who receives information in violation of an order under this Rule.” In McCray v. State, 305 Md. 126, 134 , 501 A.2d 856 (1985), the Court of Appeals discussed the background of the exclusion rule: “Prior to the adoption of the exclusion rule it was within the discretion of the trial court whether to exclude a witness, although abuse of discretion was reversible error.

1991THE SANCTION Rule 2-513(c) provides for a specific sanction: “The court may exclude all or part of the testimony of the witness who receives information in violation of an order under this Rule.” In McCray v. State, 305 Md. 126, 134 , 501 A.2d 856 (1985), the Court of Appeals discussed the background of the exclusion rule: “Prior to the adoption of the exclusion rule it was within the discretion of the trial court whether to exclude a witness, although abuse of discretion was reversible error.

1991And, in Harrison v. State, 276 Md. 122, 155 , 345 A.2d 830 (1975), we said: Where the other crime is so linked in point of time or circumstances as to show intent or motive, the exclusion rule does not apply.

1991And, in Harrison v. State, 276 Md. 122, 155 , 345 A.2d 830 (1975), we said: Where the other crime is so linked in point of time or circumstances as to show intent or motive, the exclusion rule does not apply.

1988Heflin, 727 P.2d at 36 ; Nationwide Mutual, 330 S.E.2d at 445 . “... [T]he material facts are not in dispute, and the controversy is over the proper application of the uncontroverted facts to the exclusion clause contained in the contract.” Economy Fire v. State Farm, 106 Ill.Dec. at 545 , 505 N.E.2d at 1336 ; Cheney v. Bell Nat’l Life Ins., 70 Md.App. 163 , 520 A.2d 402 (1987).

1988Heflin, 727 P.2d at 36 ; Nationwide Mutual, 330 S.E.2d at 445 . “... [T]he material facts are not in dispute, and the controversy is over the proper application of the uncontroverted facts to the exclusion clause contained in the contract.” Economy Fire v. State Farm, 106 Ill.Dec. at 545 , 505 N.E.2d at 1336 ; Cheney v. Bell Nat’l Life Ins., 70 Md.App. 163 , 520 A.2d 402 (1987).

1988Heflin, 727 P.2d at 36 ; Nationwide Mutual, 330 S.E.2d at 445 . “... [T]he material facts are not in dispute, and the controversy is over the proper application of the uncontroverted facts to the exclusion clause contained in the contract.” Economy Fire v. State Farm, 106 Ill.Dec. at 545 , 505 N.E.2d at 1336 ; Cheney v. Bell Nat’l Life Ins., 70 Md.App. 163 , 520 A.2d 402 (1987).

1988Heflin, 727 P.2d at 36 ; Nationwide Mutual, 330 S.E.2d at 445 . “... [T]he material facts are not in dispute, and the controversy is over the proper application of the uncontroverted facts to the exclusion clause contained in the contract.” Economy Fire v. State Farm, 106 Ill.Dec. at 545 , 505 N.E.2d at 1336 ; Cheney v. Bell Nat’l Life Ins., 70 Md.App. 163 , 520 A.2d 402 (1987).

1988Heflin, 727 P.2d at 36 ; Nationwide Mutual, 330 S.E.2d at 445 . “... [T]he material facts are not in dispute, and the controversy is over the proper application of the uncontroverted facts to the exclusion clause contained in the contract.” Economy Fire v. State Farm, 106 Ill.Dec. at 545 , 505 N.E.2d at 1336 ; Cheney v. Bell Nat’l Life Ins., 70 Md.App. 163 , 520 A.2d 402 (1987).

1988Heflin, 727 P.2d at 36 ; Nationwide Mutual, 330 S.E.2d at 445 . “... [T]he material facts are not in dispute, and the controversy is over the proper application of the uncontroverted facts to the exclusion clause contained in the contract.” Economy Fire v. State Farm, 106 Ill.Dec. at 545 , 505 N.E.2d at 1336 ; Cheney v. Bell Nat’l Life Ins., 70 Md.App. 163 , 520 A.2d 402 (1987).

1988Rejecting that defense, the court observed initially that, under Illinois law, insurance policies are construed liberally in favor of the insured and that “where an insurer relies upon an exclusion as a defense, it has the burden of showing that the loss involved falls within such exclusion.” 456 F.Supp. at 968 .

1988Moreover, as Illinois law requires the existence of a causal connection in order for coverage to be *441 afforded, the court said that it would be unfair “not to require such connection between the loss which occurs and the exclusion, in order for the insurer to successfully escape coverage____” Id. at 970 .

1987He concluded, at 291 Md. 475 , 436 A.2d 420 : “The third reason [that this delay should not bar the evidence] ... is the time lag would relate not to admissibility of evidence but as to the presumptions arising from the evidence.” The appellant’s present contention goes only to evidentiary admissibility, not to evidentiary significance.

1987Co., Cedar Rapids v. Day, 657 P.2d 981 (Colo.App.1982), or because exclusion clauses are construed more strictly than coverage clauses, State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins.

1987See, e.g., Partridge, supra; U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. State Farm, 107 Ill.App.3d 190 , 63 Ill.Dec. 14 , 437 N.E.2d 663 (1982); Houser v. Gilbert, 389 N.W.2d 626 (N.D.1986).

1987Stating that “[t]he view rejecting exclusion seems to us to require a torturing of the language in which the Maryland courts would not be likely to indulge,” id. at 676 , the court found the exclusion clause applicable and held the automobile carrier, and not the business carrier, responsible for providing coverage.

1987Stating that “[t]he view rejecting exclusion seems to us to require a torturing of the language in which the Maryland courts would not be likely to indulge,” id. at 676 , the court found the exclusion clause applicable and held the automobile carrier, and not the business carrier, responsible for providing coverage.

1987See, e.g., Partridge, supra; U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. State Farm, 107 Ill.App.3d 190 , 63 Ill.Dec. 14 , 437 N.E.2d 663 (1982); Houser v. Gilbert, 389 N.W.2d 626 (N.D.1986).

1987See, e.g., Partridge, supra; U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. State Farm, 107 Ill.App.3d 190 , 63 Ill.Dec. 14 , 437 N.E.2d 663 (1982); Houser v. Gilbert, 389 N.W.2d 626 (N.D.1986).

1987See, e.g., Partridge, supra; U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. State Farm, 107 Ill.App.3d 190 , 63 Ill.Dec. 14 , 437 N.E.2d 663 (1982); Houser v. Gilbert, 389 N.W.2d 626 (N.D.1986).