exclusion clause in Kansas

2016State v. Goodwin, 223 Kan. 257, 259 , 573 P.2d 999 (1977).

2016State v. Goodwin, 223 Kan. 257, 259 , 573 P.2d 999 (1977).

1989The court further stated: `We are of the opinion that the phrase as used in the exclusion clause of the defendant's policy was intended to exclude from the benefits of the policy persons whose claims might be based on injuries compensable under the Workmen's Compensation Act.' (Emphasis added.) 195 Kan. at 426 .

1989The court further stated: “We are of the opinion that the phrase as used in the exclusion clause of the defendant’s policy was intended to exclude from the benefits of the policy persons whose claims might be based on injuries compensable under the Workmen’s Compensation Act.” (Emphasis added.) 195 Kan. at 426 .

2014See [Holmes], 547 U.S., at 331 , 126 S. Ct. 1727 (rule did not rationally serve any discernible purpose); Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 61 , 107 S. Ct. 2704 , 97 L.

2014See [Holmes], 547 U.S., at 331 , 126 S. Ct. 1727 (rule did not rationally serve any discernible purpose); Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 61 , 107 S. Ct. 2704 , 97 L.

2010Similarly, in State v. Campbell, 29 Kan.App.2d 50, 63-64 , 23 P.3d 176 (2001), this court found that the district court improperly excluded a third party's admission to killing the victim.

2010Similarly, in State v. Campbell, 29 Kan.App.2d 50, 63-64 , 23 P.3d 176 (2001), this court found that the district court improperly excluded a third party's admission to killing the victim.

2010This court found that the exclusion was error. 31 Kan.App.2d at 495 , 67 P.3d 850 .

2010This court found that the exclusion was error. 31 Kan.App.2d at 495 , 67 P.3d 850 .

1998The exclusion clause therefore unambiguously reheves Calvert of any obligation to defend or indemnify the insured in this case.” 610 A.2d at 1299 .

1998Co. v. Cool, 205 Kan. 567, 572 , 471 P.2d 352 , and cases cited therein.) “In contrast to the prominence accorded the insuring agreement found under Coverage G at the top of page two, the exclusion clause on which the insurer relies is placed inconspicuously in a long paragraph near the bottom of the same page.

1998Co. v. Cool, 205 Kan. 567, 572 , 471 P.2d 352 , and cases cited therein.) “In contrast to the prominence accorded the insuring agreement found under Coverage G at the top of page two, the exclusion clause on which the insurer relies is placed inconspicuously in a long paragraph near the bottom of the same page.

1998Madison contends that the Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Bunker, 260 Kan. 564 , 920 P.2d 403 (1996), mandates the exclusion of test results or test refusals if the form is completed improperly.

1998Madison contends that the Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Bunker, 260 Kan. 564 , 920 P.2d 403 (1996), mandates the exclusion of test results or test refusals if the form is completed improperly.

1992The Wisconsin Court of Appeals, observing that the insurance contract contained a severability clause purporting to separate the insureds’ interests while the exclusion clause, “we do not cover . . . damage . . . expected or intended by an insured,” attempted to join the insureds’ obligations. 135 Wis. 2d at 256 .

1989See Gulf Insurance Company v. Tilley, 280 F. Supp. 60 ; State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Moore, 103 Ill.

1985In support appellants cite Lollis v. Superior Sales Co., 224 Kan. 251 , 580 P.2d 423 (1978).

1985In support appellants cite Lollis v. Superior Sales Co., 224 Kan. 251 , 580 P.2d 423 (1978).

1973As the court concluded in the case of Home Indemnity Company v. Miller, 8 Cir., 399 F. 2d 78 , “ 'The language used in this exclusion clause is clear and simple — there is nothing ambiguous in the words or phrases used therein.

1968Co. v. Saltzman (1954, CA 8 Ark) 213 F2d 743, cert den 348 US 862 , 99 L ed 679, 75 S Ct 85 , in construing an exclusion clause of the kind under consideration. . . .” (p. 1246.) It will be understood that there are many degrees or different classifications of trespass ranging all the way from an innocent trespasser to a willful and malicious trespasser.

1968Co. v. Saltzman (1954, CA 8 Ark) 213 F2d 743, cert den 348 US 862 , 99 L ed 679, 75 S Ct 85 , in construing an exclusion clause of the kind under consideration. . . .” (p. 1246.) It will be understood that there are many degrees or different classifications of trespass ranging all the way from an innocent trespasser to a willful and malicious trespasser.

1965In Sears v. Insurance Co., 108 Kan. 516 , 196 Pac. 235 , it was held: “Where an accident insurance company seeks to avoid liability because of a specific exception to its general liability under the terms of its policy, and on the ground that the accident and injury were within such exception, the burden of proof rests upon the insurance company to show that the facts of the case fell within the exception clause in the policy which relieved the company from liability.” (Syl. ¶ 1.) The appellant contends that in determining whether a particular injury “arose out of and in the course of employme

1965In Sears v. Insurance Co., 108 Kan. 516 , 196 Pac. 235 , it was held: “Where an accident insurance company seeks to avoid liability because of a specific exception to its general liability under the terms of its policy, and on the ground that the accident and injury were within such exception, the burden of proof rests upon the insurance company to show that the facts of the case fell within the exception clause in the policy which relieved the company from liability.” (Syl. ¶ 1.) The appellant contends that in determining whether a particular injury “arose out of and in the course of employme

1965In Sears v. Insurance Co., 108 Kan. 516 , 196 Pac. 235 , it was held: “Where an accident insurance company seeks to avoid liability because of a specific exception to its general liability under the terms of its policy, and on the ground that the accident and injury were within such exception, the burden of proof rests upon the insurance company to show that the facts of the case fell within the exception clause in the policy which relieved the company from liability.” (Syl. ¶ 1.) The appellant contends that in determining whether a particular injury “arose out of and in the course of employme

1965In Sears v. Insurance Co., 108 Kan. 516 , 196 Pac. 235 , it was held: “Where an accident insurance company seeks to avoid liability because of a specific exception to its general liability under the terms of its policy, and on the ground that the accident and injury were within such exception, the burden of proof rests upon the insurance company to show that the facts of the case fell within the exception clause in the policy which relieved the company from liability.” (Syl. ¶ 1.) The appellant contends that in determining whether a particular injury “arose out of and in the course of employme

1965Co., 333 Mass. 345 , 130 N. E. 2d 685 .) We are of the opinion that the phrase as used in the exclusion clause of the defendant’s policy was intended to exclude from the benefits of the policy persons whose claims might be based on injuries compensable under the Workmen’s Compensation Act.

1965Co., 333 Mass. 345 , 130 N. E. 2d 685 .) We are of the opinion that the phrase as used in the exclusion clause of the defendant’s policy was intended to exclude from the benefits of the policy persons whose claims might be based on injuries compensable under the Workmen’s Compensation Act.

1962Co., 92 N. H. 242, 29 A. 2d 121 , and cases there cited.)” (p. 539.) We find nothing ambiguous in the words or phrases used in the exclusion clause and this court should not search for ambiguities where the words used in the contract have a common and well understood meaning.

1962The argument of the plaintiff is considerably overcome by defendant insurance company’s reference to the case of Pirc v. Kortebein, 186 F. Supp. 621 .

1962Paul-Mercury Indemnity Co., 242 Minn. 354 , 65 N. W. 2d 122 , the court had under consideration an exclusion clause similar to the one under consideration.

1962Paul-Mercury Indemnity Co., 242 Minn. 354 , 65 N. W. 2d 122 , the court had under consideration an exclusion clause similar to the one under consideration.