exclusion clause in Kentucky

2024Id. (quoting Mullins, 317 S.W.3d at 579 ).

2024Id. (quoting Mullins, 317 S.W.3d at 579 ).

2014Appellee’s argument that he suffered harmful error is unavailing because he has not demonstrated that the exclusion of defense counsel from the formulation of the trial court’s response to the jury’s question “impugn[ed] the fundamental fairness” of the trial, as required for a finding of harmful error under McAtee, 413 S.W.3d at 626-27 .

2011Meece now asserts that the exclusion was error for reasons the fax was admissible under KRE 801A(b)(2), (3), and (4), and, in the alternative, were it to be hearsay, its exclusion violated the holding of Chambers, 410 U.S. at 302 , 93 S.Ct. 1038 , i.e., that state hearsay rules must give way to a defendant’s right to present a defense.

2011Meece now asserts that the exclusion was error for reasons the fax was admissible under KRE 801A(b)(2), (3), and (4), and, in the alternative, were it to be hearsay, its exclusion violated the holding of Chambers, 410 U.S. at 302 , 93 S.Ct. 1038 , i.e., that state hearsay rules must give way to a defendant’s right to present a defense.

1969We reject these arguments inasmuch as we held in Appleby v. Buck, Ky., 351 S.W. 2d 494 , that “[a]n oil and gas lease is an interest in real estate, * * * within the meaning of the statute of frauds.” Hagans says that “although an oil or gas lease has been held to be an interest in real estate within the Statute of Frauds, a working interest in a gas well is not an interest in real estate.” Just as in Appleby, we said in Har-Bel Coal Co. v. Asher Coal Mining Co., Ky., 414 S.W.2d 128 (1966), that “ * * * an oil and gas lease is an interest in real estate.” And in Williams’ Adm’r v. Union Bank &

1969We reject these arguments inasmuch as we held in Appleby v. Buck, Ky., 351 S.W. 2d 494 , that “[a]n oil and gas lease is an interest in real estate, * * * within the meaning of the statute of frauds.” Hagans says that “although an oil or gas lease has been held to be an interest in real estate within the Statute of Frauds, a working interest in a gas well is not an interest in real estate.” Just as in Appleby, we said in Har-Bel Coal Co. v. Asher Coal Mining Co., Ky., 414 S.W.2d 128 (1966), that “ * * * an oil and gas lease is an interest in real estate.” And in Williams’ Adm’r v. Union Bank &

1969We reject these arguments inasmuch as we held in Appleby v. Buck, Ky., 351 S.W. 2d 494 , that “[a]n oil and gas lease is an interest in real estate, * * * within the meaning of the statute of frauds.” Hagans says that “although an oil or gas lease has been held to be an interest in real estate within the Statute of Frauds, a working interest in a gas well is not an interest in real estate.” Just as in Appleby, we said in Har-Bel Coal Co. v. Asher Coal Mining Co., Ky., 414 S.W.2d 128 (1966), that “ * * * an oil and gas lease is an interest in real estate.” And in Williams’ Adm’r v. Union Bank &

1969We reject these arguments inasmuch as we held in Appleby v. Buck, Ky., 351 S.W. 2d 494 , that “[a]n oil and gas lease is an interest in real estate, * * * within the meaning of the statute of frauds.” Hagans says that “although an oil or gas lease has been held to be an interest in real estate within the Statute of Frauds, a working interest in a gas well is not an interest in real estate.” Just as in Appleby, we said in Har-Bel Coal Co. v. Asher Coal Mining Co., Ky., 414 S.W.2d 128 (1966), that “ * * * an oil and gas lease is an interest in real estate.” And in Williams’ Adm’r v. Union Bank &

1969Co. v. Posey, 196 Ky. 379 , 244 S.W. 770 (1922), and argues that “ * * * there is an exclusion to that exception and that is that when the persons or parties contemplate that the contract could not or would not be performed within the year, even though it was possible for performance within that year, then the Statute of Frauds will apply.” He notes that we said in Kentucky Utilities Co. v. Hurst, 207 Ky. 448 , 269 S.W. 525 (1925): “But, while such is the general rule, particularly as to contracts which have for their purpose accomplishment of a finished piece of work, and which might be finis

1969Co. v. Posey, 196 Ky. 379 , 244 S.W. 770 (1922), and argues that “ * * * there is an exclusion to that exception and that is that when the persons or parties contemplate that the contract could not or would not be performed within the year, even though it was possible for performance within that year, then the Statute of Frauds will apply.” He notes that we said in Kentucky Utilities Co. v. Hurst, 207 Ky. 448 , 269 S.W. 525 (1925): “But, while such is the general rule, particularly as to contracts which have for their purpose accomplishment of a finished piece of work, and which might be finis

1969Co. v. Posey, 196 Ky. 379 , 244 S.W. 770 (1922), and argues that “ * * * there is an exclusion to that exception and that is that when the persons or parties contemplate that the contract could not or would not be performed within the year, even though it was possible for performance within that year, then the Statute of Frauds will apply.” He notes that we said in Kentucky Utilities Co. v. Hurst, 207 Ky. 448 , 269 S.W. 525 (1925): “But, while such is the general rule, particularly as to contracts which have for their purpose accomplishment of a finished piece of work, and which might be finis

1969Co. v. Posey, 196 Ky. 379 , 244 S.W. 770 (1922), and argues that “ * * * there is an exclusion to that exception and that is that when the persons or parties contemplate that the contract could not or would not be performed within the year, even though it was possible for performance within that year, then the Statute of Frauds will apply.” He notes that we said in Kentucky Utilities Co. v. Hurst, 207 Ky. 448 , 269 S.W. 525 (1925): “But, while such is the general rule, particularly as to contracts which have for their purpose accomplishment of a finished piece of work, and which might be finis

1968He cites Jack Cole Co. v. Hoff, Ky., 274 S.W.2d 658 , 51 A.L.R.2d 1 (1954), which discussed certain emergency vehicles within the exclusion clause *589 of KRS 189.450(1) but it did not involve a police car or wrecker.

1968He cites Jack Cole Co. v. Hoff, Ky., 274 S.W.2d 658 , 51 A.L.R.2d 1 (1954), which discussed certain emergency vehicles within the exclusion clause *589 of KRS 189.450(1) but it did not involve a police car or wrecker.

1968Williams relies on Gasparac v. Castle, Ky., 330 S.W.2d 111 (1959) which held: “The provision exempting an emergency vehicle from ordinary traffic regulations confers no absolute immunity upon the driver for it is based on the prescribed conditions.

1967In Third National Bank of Ashland v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, Ky., 334 S.W.2d 261 , where an insurance policy with an exclusion clause similar to the one presented here was involved, we said: “We are impressed by the fact that the clear purpose of the exclusion was to *235 protect the insurer from over-friendly lawsuits, which nearly always would exist where plaintiff and insured defendant are bound by ties of kinship and are living together.” Such family exclusion provisions have been usually held valid unless forbidden by statute. 7 Am.Jur. (2) Automobile Insurance, Se

1958We think this contention is fully answered by the following quotation from Ratleff v. Tackett, 209 Ky. 588 , 273 S.W. 441 , at page 443: Lyttle v. Wilson, 252 Ky. 392 , 67 S.W.2d 498 , which is relied upon by the appellant, is distinguishable.

1958We think this contention is fully answered by the following quotation from Ratleff v. Tackett, 209 Ky. 588 , 273 S.W. 441 , at page 443: Lyttle v. Wilson, 252 Ky. 392 , 67 S.W.2d 498 , which is relied upon by the appellant, is distinguishable.

1958We think this contention is fully answered by the following quotation from Ratleff v. Tackett, 209 Ky. 588 , 273 S.W. 441 , at page 443: Lyttle v. Wilson, 252 Ky. 392 , 67 S.W.2d 498 , which is relied upon by the appellant, is distinguishable.

1958We think this contention is fully answered by the following quotation from Ratleff v. Tackett, 209 Ky. 588 , 273 S.W. 441 , at page 443: Lyttle v. Wilson, 252 Ky. 392 , 67 S.W.2d 498 , which is relied upon by the appellant, is distinguishable.