exclusion defense in Indiana

2006"This is especially true where the policy language in question concerns an exclusion clause." Id.

2002“This is especially true where the policy language in question concerns an exclusion clause.” Id.

2018“However, this exclusion does not bar admission of police records pertaining to ‘routine, ministerial, objective nonevaluative matters made in non-adversarial settings.’” Allen, 994 N.E.2d at 320 (quoting Fowler, 929 N.E.2d at 879 ). “‘The rote recitation of Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A05-1711-CR-2653 | December 11, 2018 Page 7 of 9 biographical information in a booking sheet ordinarily does not implicate the same potential perception biases that a subjective narrative of an investigation or an alleged offense might.’” Fowler, 929 N.E.2d at 879 (quoting United States v

2018“However, this exclusion does not bar admission of police records pertaining to ‘routine, ministerial, objective nonevaluative matters made in non-adversarial settings.’” Allen, 994 N.E.2d at 320 (quoting Fowler, 929 N.E.2d at 879 ). “‘The rote recitation of Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A05-1711-CR-2653 | December 11, 2018 Page 7 of 9 biographical information in a booking sheet ordinarily does not implicate the same potential perception biases that a subjective narrative of an investigation or an alleged offense might.’” Fowler, 929 N.E.2d at 879 (quoting United States v

2018“However, this exclusion does not bar admission of police records pertaining to ‘routine, ministerial, objective nonevaluative matters made in non-adversarial settings.’” Allen, 994 N.E.2d at 320 (quoting Fowler, 929 N.E.2d at 879 ). “‘The rote recitation of Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A05-1711-CR-2653 | December 11, 2018 Page 7 of 9 biographical information in a booking sheet ordinarily does not implicate the same potential perception biases that a subjective narrative of an investigation or an alleged offense might.’” Fowler, 929 N.E.2d at 879 (quoting United States v

2015The State argued that the warrant was either supported by probable cause or the evidence seized was admissible under the good faith exception in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 , 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984). [8] This court observed that the credibility of an informant could be established by declarations against penal interest. 837 N.E.2d at 1048-1049 .

2015The State argued that the warrant was either supported by probable cause or the evidence seized was admissible under the good faith exception in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 , 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984). [8] This court observed that the credibility of an informant could be established by declarations against penal interest. 837 N.E.2d at 1048-1049 .

2015The State argued that the warrant was either supported by probable cause or the evidence seized was admissible under the good faith exception in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 , 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984). [8] This court observed that the credibility of an informant could be established by declarations against penal interest. 837 N.E.2d at 1048-1049 .

2015Because the exclusion of defense witnesses raises Sixth Amendment concerns, the Wiseheart Court then articulated a nonexclusive list of factors from which trial courts should evaluate the exclusion of witnesses for discovery Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1411-JV-777 | May 13, 2015 Page 6 of 12 violations, noting that some of the factors would be inapplicable to a certain set of facts or other factors might be relevant in a given case.4 Id. at 991. [11] More recently, our Supreme Court observed in Wright, where the Court reviewed the trial court’s discovery sanction in

2014Meanwhile, Walkup sought to recover from Cincinnati Insurance under the uninsured motorist coverage provision of Wabash’s policy, which contained an exclusion clause stating the coverage did not apply to “[t]he direct or indirect benefit of any insurer o[r] self-insurer under any worker’s compensation, disability benefits or similar law.” Id. at 715 .

2011As the Court of Appeals observed, "`Except' is defined as `with the exclusion or exception of'" D.C., 935 N.E.2d at 295 n. 3 (citing www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/except (last visited September 20, 2010)).

2010So, it concluded, the Constitution "prohibits the exclusion of defense evidence under rules that serve no legitimate purpose or that are disproportionate to the ends that they are asserted to promote," id. at 326 , 126 S.Ct. 1727 but trial judges may exclude evidence "if its probative value is outweighed by certain other factors such as unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or potential to mislead the jury." Id. *535 The Hoimes court noted "illustrations" of rules that were "arbitrary" because they "excluded important defense evidence but ... did not serve any legitimate interests." Id. a

2010So, it concluded, the Constitution "prohibits the exclusion of defense evidence under rules that serve no legitimate purpose or that are disproportionate to the ends that they are asserted to promote," id. at 326 , 126 S.Ct. 1727 but trial judges may exclude evidence "if its probative value is outweighed by certain other factors such as unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or potential to mislead the jury." Id. *535 The Hoimes court noted "illustrations" of rules that were "arbitrary" because they "excluded important defense evidence but ... did not serve any legitimate interests." Id. a

2010Id. at 532 ; Malachowski v. Bank One, Indianapolis, 590 N.E.2d 559, 565 (Ind.1992); Matter of Walz, 423 N.E.2d 729, 733 (Ind.Ct.App.1981); Zitter, 37 A.L.R.5th at § 2(a) ("[In the law of trusts it is the intent of the individual settlor that must govern, not the general attitudes of society, and thus if a settlor would specifically provide for an adopted child or descendant to take under a trust instrument, the child should be entitled to receive said share, but the converse is also true and thus a specific exclusion should bar the adopted child from any portion of the estate.").

2010Id. at 532 ; Malachowski v. Bank One, Indianapolis, 590 N.E.2d 559, 565 (Ind.1992); Matter of Walz, 423 N.E.2d 729, 733 (Ind.Ct.App. 1981); Zitter, 37 A.L.R.5th at § 2(a) ("[I]n the law of trusts it is the intent of the individual settlor that must govern, not the general attitudes of society, and thus if a settlor would specifically provide for an adopted child or descendant to take under a trust instrument, the child should be entitled to receive said share, but the converse is also true and thus a specific exclusion should bar the adopted child from any portion of the estate.").

2010One such "arbitrary" rule was held unconstitutional in Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683 , 106 S.Ct. 2142 , 90 L.Ed.2d 636 (1986), where Crane was prevented from attempting to show at trial that his confession was unreliable because of the cireumstances under which it was obtained.

2010One such "arbitrary" rule was held unconstitutional in Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683 , 106 S.Ct. 2142 , 90 L.Ed.2d 636 (1986), where Crane was prevented from attempting to show at trial that his confession was unreliable because of the cireumstances under which it was obtained.

2008Id.

2002In New Hampshire Insurance Company v. Jefferson Insurance Company of New York, 213 A.D.2d 325, 327 , 624 N.Y.S.2d 392 (N.Y.App.Div.1995), the supreme court of New York found that an exclusion clause nearly identical to the exclusion clause in the case at bar was clear and unambiguous.

2002In New Hampshire Insurance Company v. Jefferson Insurance Company of New York, 213 A.D.2d 325, 327 , 624 N.Y.S.2d 392 (N.Y.App.Div.1995), the supreme court of New York found that an exclusion clause nearly identical to the exclusion clause in the case at bar was clear and unambiguous.

1993In United States v. Smith (1984) 6th Cir., 736 F.2d 1103 , cert. denied, 469 U.S. 868 , 105 S.Ct. 213 , 83 L.Ed.2d 143 , the court addressed the same question and concluded: "The day may have arrived, therefore, when [expert testimony about eyewitness reliability] can be said to conform to a generally accepted explanatory theory." Id. at 1107.

1993In United States v. Smith (1984) 6th Cir., 736 F.2d 1103 , cert. denied, 469 U.S. 868 , 105 S.Ct. 218 , 83 L.Ed.2d 148 , the court addressed the same question and concluded: "The day may have arrived, therefore, when [expert testimony about eyewitness reliability] can be said to conform to a generally accepted explanatory theory." Id. at 1107.

1993In United States v. Smith (1984) 6th Cir., 736 F.2d 1103 , cert. denied, 469 U.S. 868 , 105 S.Ct. 218 , 83 L.Ed.2d 148 , the court addressed the same question and concluded: "The day may have arrived, therefore, when [expert testimony about eyewitness reliability] can be said to conform to a generally accepted explanatory theory." Id. at 1107.

1993In United States v. Smith (1984) 6th Cir., 736 F.2d 1103 , cert. denied, 469 U.S. 868 , 105 S.Ct. 218 , 83 L.Ed.2d 148 , the court addressed the same question and concluded: "The day may have arrived, therefore, when [expert testimony about eyewitness reliability] can be said to conform to a generally accepted explanatory theory." Id. at 1107.

1993In United States v. Smith (1984) 6th Cir., 736 F.2d 1103 , cert. denied, 469 U.S. 868 , 105 S.Ct. 213 , 83 L.Ed.2d 143 , the court addressed the same question and concluded: "The day may have arrived, therefore, when [expert testimony about eyewitness reliability] can be said to conform to a generally accepted explanatory theory." Id. at 1107.