8 Nevada opinions name it 1 courts 1952–2014 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Nevada courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Landon v. Plasenciagreen2 sentences2014The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that immigration law distinguishes between "exclusion" and "deportation." See Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 25 (1982) ("The deportation hearing is the usual means of proceeding against an alien already physically in the United States, and the exclusion hearing is the usual means of proceeding against an alien outside the United States seeking admission."). 2014The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that immigration law distinguishes between "exclusion" and "deportation." See Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 25 (1982) ("The deportation hearing is the usual means of proceeding against an alien already physically in the United States, and the exclusion hearing is the usual means of proceeding against an alien outside the United States seeking admission."). | 1 | 1 |
Leng May Ma v. Barbergreen2 sentences2014Historically, detention at the border has not been considered entry into the country, Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 188 (1958), and, thus, someone who is denied entry at the border generally cannot be considered deported. 2014Historically, detention at the border has not been considered entry into the country, Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 188 (1958), and, thus, someone who is denied entry at the border generally cannot be considered deported. | 1 | 1 |
Chapman v. Californiared2 sentences2014Because the exclusion of the defense evidence affected Coleman's constitutional right to a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense, the error is only considered harmless if the court can determine "beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained." Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967). 2014Because the exclusion of the defense evidence affected Coleman's constitutional right to a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense, the error is only considered harmless if the court can determine "beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained." Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967). | 1 | 1 |
Schultz v. Erie Insurance Groupgreen1 sentence2011See Schultz, 754 N.E.2d at 976-77 (“Read in context, ‘workmanship,’ falling between planning and maintenance, at the very least signifies a component of the building process leading up to a finished product.”) Additionally, if we were to interpret “workmanship” to only refer to a product, this would render another clause included within this same subsection meaningless. | 1 | 1 |
Minton v. Stuyvesant Life Insurance Companygreen2 sentences1979See Minton v. Stuyvesant Life Insurance Company, 373 F.Supp. 33 (D.Nev. 1974). 1979See Minton v. Stuyvesant Life Insurance Company, 373 F. Supp. 33 (D.Nev. 1974). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Nevada. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Clendening
green
2 sentences1992The court in State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Clendening, 150 Cal.App.3d 40 , 197 Cal.Rptr. 377 (1983), held only that the exclusion was not in violation of public policy. 1992The court in State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Clendening, 150 Cal.App.3d 40 , 197 Cal.Rptr. 377 (1983), held only that the exclusion was not in violation of public policy. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Baker v. Criterion Insurance
green
2 sentences1992We again upheld an exclusion clause in an insurance policy without discussing the issue of ambiguity in Baker v. Criterion Insurance Co., 107 Nev. 25 , 805 P.2d 599 (1991). 1992We again upheld an exclusion clause in an insurance policy without discussing the issue of ambiguity in Baker v. Criterion Insurance Co., 107 Nev. 25 , 805 P.2d 599 (1991). | 1 | 1992–1992 |
United States v. Candelaria
green
1 sentence1973Any justification for withholding access to its courts in such a case must be based upon jurisdictional grounds or an Act of Congz'ess exercising its power over Indian affairs. 4 United States v. Candelaria, supra, held that a suit brought by the Pueblo Tribe in a State court to quiet title was binding upon the Tribe and the United States. | 1 | 1973–1973 |
In Re Benolken's Estate
green
2 sentences1952The so-called exclusion clause in its ordinary limited form may be said reasonably to demonstrate such an intent, whether it be by nominal provision ("I hereby give and bequeath unto each of my heirs at law not elsewhere herein mentioned or provided for, the sum of $1"; In re Benolken's Estate, 122 Mont. 425 , 205 P.2d 1141, 1142 ); or by expressed intent to disinherit ("I have, except as otherwise in this will specified, intentionally and with full knowledge, omitted to provide for my heirs living at the time of my demise"; In re Lombard's Estate, 16 Cal. App.2d 526 , 60 P.2d 1000, 1001 .) In 1952The so-called exclusion clause in its ordinary limited form may be said reasonably to demonstrate such an intent, whether it be by nominal provision ("I hereby give and bequeath unto each of my heirs at law not elsewhere herein mentioned or provided for, the sum of $1"; In re Benolken's Estate, 122 Mont. 425 , 205 P.2d 1141, 1142 ); or by expressed intent to disinherit ("I have, except as otherwise in this will specified, intentionally and with full knowledge, omitted to provide for my heirs living at the time of my demise"; In re Lombard's Estate, 16 Cal. App.2d 526 , 60 P.2d 1000, 1001 .) In | 1 | 1952–1952 |
Thiess v. Rapaport
neutral
2 sentences1952The so-called exclusion clause in its ordinary limited form may be said reasonably to demonstrate such an intent, whether it be by nominal provision ("I hereby give and bequeath unto each of my heirs at law not elsewhere herein mentioned or provided for, the sum of $1"; In re Benolken's Estate, 122 Mont. 425 , 205 P.2d 1141, 1142 ); or by expressed intent to disinherit ("I have, except as otherwise in this will specified, intentionally and with full knowledge, omitted to provide for my heirs living at the time of my demise"; In re Lombard's Estate, 16 Cal. App.2d 526 , 60 P.2d 1000, 1001 .) In 1952The so-called exclusion clause in its ordinary limited form may be said reasonably to demonstrate such an intent, whether it be by nominal provision (“I hereby give and bequeath unto each of my heirs at law not elsewhere herein mentioned or provided for, the sum of $1”; In re Benolken’s Estate, 122 Mont. 425 , 205 P.2d 1141, 1142 ) ; or by expressed intent to disinherit (“I have, except as otherwise in this will specified, intentionally and with full knowledge, omitted to provide for my heirs living at the time of my demise”; In re Lombard’s Estate, 16 Cal. App.2d 526 , 60 P.2d 1000, 1001 .) I | 1 | 1952–1952 |
Estate of Lombard
green
2 sentences1952The so-called exclusion clause in its ordinary limited form may be said reasonably to demonstrate such an intent, whether it be by nominal provision ("I hereby give and bequeath unto each of my heirs at law not elsewhere herein mentioned or provided for, the sum of $1"; In re Benolken's Estate, 122 Mont. 425 , 205 P.2d 1141, 1142 ); or by expressed intent to disinherit ("I have, except as otherwise in this will specified, intentionally and with full knowledge, omitted to provide for my heirs living at the time of my demise"; In re Lombard's Estate, 16 Cal. App.2d 526 , 60 P.2d 1000, 1001 .) In 1952The so-called exclusion clause in its ordinary limited form may be said reasonably to demonstrate such an intent, whether it be by nominal provision (“I hereby give and bequeath unto each of my heirs at law not elsewhere herein mentioned or provided for, the sum of $1”; In re Benolken’s Estate, 122 Mont. 425 , 205 P.2d 1141, 1142 ) ; or by expressed intent to disinherit (“I have, except as otherwise in this will specified, intentionally and with full knowledge, omitted to provide for my heirs living at the time of my demise”; In re Lombard’s Estate, 16 Cal. App.2d 526 , 60 P.2d 1000, 1001 .) I | 1 | 1952–1952 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.