exclusion clause in Louisiana

1988Wolfe v. Henderson Ford, Inc., supra ; Harris v. Automatic Enterprises of Louisiana, Inc., 145 So.2d 335 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1962).

1973Harris v. Automatic Enterprises of Louisiana, Inc., 145 So.2d 335 (La.App., 4th Cir. 1962); Stumpf v. Metairie Motor Sales, Inc., supra. Specific provisions are provided in the Civil Code for the protection of buyers from vices and defects in the things sold.

1998In fact, when construed in light of the myriad fact situations to which it has been applied, it is often ambiguous." Breland, 550 So.2d at 610 .

1995The State Farm homeowner's policy at issue herein provides that coverage to others for personal liability and for medical payments does not apply to bodily injury or property damage: "(1) which is either expected or intended by an insured; or (2) which is the result of willful and malicious acts of an insured." The Supreme Court, in Breland v. Schilling, 550 So.2d 609 (La.1989), considered an exclusion clause in an insurance policy similar to the first clause in this policy.

1990Creole Explorations, Inc. v. Underwriter's at Lloyd's of London, 245 La. 927 , 161 So.2d 768 (1964); Stanley v. Cryer Drilling Co., 213 La. 980 , 36 So.2d 9 (1948); Couch on Insurance 2d, Section 44:414 (1964).

1990Creole Explorations, Inc. v. Underwriter's at Lloyd's of London, 245 La. 927 , 161 So.2d 768 (1964); Stanley v. Cryer Drilling Co., 213 La. 980 , 36 So.2d 9 (1948); Couch on Insurance 2d, Section 44:414 (1964).

1990Creole Explorations, Inc. v. Underwriter's at Lloyd's of London, 245 La. 927 , 161 So.2d 768 (1964); Stanley v. Cryer Drilling Co., 213 La. 980 , 36 So.2d 9 (1948); Couch on Insurance 2d, Section 44:414 (1964).

1990Creole Explorations, Inc. v. Underwriter's at Lloyd's of London, 245 La. 927 , 161 So.2d 768 (1964); Stanley v. Cryer Drilling Co., 213 La. 980 , 36 So.2d 9 (1948); Couch on Insurance 2d, Section 44:414 (1964).

1980State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Partridge, 10 Cal.3d 94 , 109 Cal.Rptr. 811 , 514 P.2d 123 (1973); United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Breslin, 243 Ky. 734 , 49 S.W.2d 1011 (1932); Assurance Company of North America, 108 Ga.App. 766 , 134 S.E.2d 540 (1963); Couch, cited above, Section 44:532.

1980State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Partridge, 10 Cal.3d 94 , 109 Cal.Rptr. 811 , 514 P.2d 123 (1973); United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Breslin, 243 Ky. 734 , 49 S.W.2d 1011 (1932); Assurance Company of North America, 108 Ga.App. 766 , 134 S.E.2d 540 (1963); Couch, cited above, Section 44:532.

1980State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Partridge, 10 Cal.3d 94 , 109 Cal.Rptr. 811 , 514 P.2d 123 (1973); United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Breslin, 243 Ky. 734 , 49 S.W.2d 1011 (1932); Assurance Company of North America, 108 Ga.App. 766 , 134 S.E.2d 540 (1963); Couch, cited above, Section 44:532.

1980State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Partridge, 10 Cal.3d 94 , 109 Cal.Rptr. 811 , 514 P.2d 123 (1973); United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Breslin, 243 Ky. 734 , 49 S.W.2d 1011 (1932); Assurance Company of North America, 108 Ga.App. 766 , 134 S.E.2d 540 (1963); Couch, cited above, Section 44:532.

1980State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Partridge, 10 Cal.3d 94 , 109 Cal.Rptr. 811 , 514 P.2d 123 (1973); United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Breslin, 243 Ky. 734 , 49 S.W.2d 1011 (1932); Assurance Company of North America, 108 Ga.App. 766 , 134 S.E.2d 540 (1963); Couch, cited above, Section 44:532.

1980State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Partridge, 10 Cal.3d 94 , 109 Cal.Rptr. 811 , 514 P.2d 123 (1973); United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Breslin, 243 Ky. 734 , 49 S.W.2d 1011 (1932); Assurance Company of North America, 108 Ga.App. 766 , 134 S.E.2d 540 (1963); Couch, cited above, Section 44:532.

1977In so doing, the Supreme Court commented: “[CJonsidering that the decedent Guil-beau was hired by the joint venture (as the court of appeal held) or by Caldwell (as his widow contends), it is apparent that a serious doubt exists as to whether Guilbeau could be a ‘fellow employee’ of the truckdriver (employed by and paid by Higgins, not by the joint venture or by Caldwell) for purposes of an exclusion clause in each policy which provides: ‘None of the following is an insured: (i) any person while engaged in the business of his employer with respect to bodily injury to any fellow employee of suc

1977In so doing, the Supreme Court commented: “[CJonsidering that the decedent Guil-beau was hired by the joint venture (as the court of appeal held) or by Caldwell (as his widow contends), it is apparent that a serious doubt exists as to whether Guilbeau could be a ‘fellow employee’ of the truckdriver (employed by and paid by Higgins, not by the joint venture or by Caldwell) for purposes of an exclusion clause in each policy which provides: ‘None of the following is an insured: (i) any person while engaged in the business of his employer with respect to bodily injury to any fellow employee of suc

1963However, in that case ( 99 So.2d at 116 ) the Supreme Court said: “We find our conclusion amply supported by the case of Smith v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company, 1942, 142 Neb. 321 , 6 N.W.2d 81, 83 , wherein the following exclusion clause employed by the insurer relieved it of liability: “ ‘This policy shall not cover loss from liability for, or any suit based [there] on, injuries or death; * * * (4) Caused by accidents occurring after .final completion of the work performed by the insured at the place of occurrence of such accidents.’ “It is clearly apparent that in that cited c

1963However, in that case ( 99 So.2d at 116 ) the Supreme Court said: “We find our conclusion amply supported by the case of Smith v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company, 1942, 142 Neb. 321 , 6 N.W.2d 81, 83 , wherein the following exclusion clause employed by the insurer relieved it of liability: “ ‘This policy shall not cover loss from liability for, or any suit based [there] on, injuries or death; * * * (4) Caused by accidents occurring after .final completion of the work performed by the insured at the place of occurrence of such accidents.’ “It is clearly apparent that in that cited c

2017In Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319 , 126 S.Ct. 1727 , 164 L.Ed.2d 503 (2006), the Court stated that “while the Constitution thus prohibits the exclusion of defense evidence under rules that serve no legitimate purpose or that are disproportionate to the ends that they are asserted to promote, well-established rules of evidence permit trial judges to exclude evidence if its probative value is outweighed by certain other factors such as unfair prejudice, Imconfusion of the issues, or potential to mislead the jury.” 547 U.S. at 326 , 126 S.Ct. 1727 .

2017In Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319 , 126 S.Ct. 1727 , 164 L.Ed.2d 503 (2006), the Court stated that “while the Constitution thus prohibits the exclusion of defense evidence under rules that serve no legitimate purpose or that are disproportionate to the ends that they are asserted to promote, well-established rules of evidence permit trial judges to exclude evidence if its probative value is outweighed by certain other factors such as unfair prejudice, Imconfusion of the issues, or potential to mislead the jury.” 547 U.S. at 326 , 126 S.Ct. 1727 .

2005Washington v. Texas, 338 [388] U.S. 14[, 87 S.Ct. 1920 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1019 ] (1967).

2005Washington v. Texas, 338 [388] U.S. 14[, 87 S.Ct. 1920 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1019 ] (1967).

2004The earlier case of Vobill Homes, Inc. v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company, 179 So.2d 496 (La.App. 3 Cir.1965), gave an even stronger expression to view expressed in Vitenas : For this reason, it has uniformly been held that a liability policy with an exclusion clause such as the present does not insure any obligation of the policyholder to repair or replace his own defective work or defective product.

1983Consequently, this case is governed by the rule enunciated in Vobill Homes, Inc. v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co., 179 So.2d 496 (La.App. 3rd Cir.1965) writ refused 248 La. 698 , 181 So.2d 398 (1966), which held that, "... a liability policy with an exclusion clause such as the present does not insure any obligation of the policyholder to repair or replace his own defective work or defective product. " 179 So.2d at 497 . (emphasis added) Again, in Breaux v. St.

1976Hooley & Sons v. Zurich General Accident & Life Insurance Co., 235 La. 289 , 103 So.2d 449 (1958), Justice Tate said in interpretating the care, custody or control exclusion that "damaged property or premises merely incidental or adjacent to the contracted object upon which work is being performed by the insured is not within the "care, custody or control' of the insured for purposes of the exclusion clause in question, even though he might be permitted access thereto during the performance of his contract." In interpreting the second clause of the exclusion excluding "property ... as to which

1976Hooley & Sons v. Zurich General Accident & Life Insurance Co., 235 La. 289 , 103 So.2d 449 (1958), Justice Tate said in interpretating the care, custody or control exclusion that "damaged property or premises merely incidental or adjacent to the contracted object upon which work is being performed by the insured is not within the "care, custody or control' of the insured for purposes of the exclusion clause in question, even though he might be permitted access thereto during the performance of his contract." In interpreting the second clause of the exclusion excluding "property ... as to which

1976Willis, supra; Haynes v. Modern Woodmen of America, 135 So.2d 548 (La.App. 3rd Cir. 1962).

1973Cutitto v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., supra; Haynes v. Modern Woodmen of America, supra; Lafield v. New York Life Insurance Co., supra; Thorn v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 2 So.2d 269 (La.

1970Dufief v. Boykin, 9 La.Ann. 295 .

1962Dufief v. Boykin, 9 La.Ann. 295 .

2017State v. Coleman, 14-402 (La. 2/26/16), 188 So.3d 174,197 , cert. denied, — U.S. -, 137 S.Ct. 153 , 196 L.Ed.2d 116 (2016).

2017State v. Coleman, 14-402 (La. 2/26/16), 188 So.3d 174,197 , cert. denied, — U.S. -, 137 S.Ct. 153 , 196 L.Ed.2d 116 (2016).

2017State v. Coleman, 14-402 (La. 2/26/16), 188 So.3d 174,197 , cert. denied, — U.S. -, 137 S.Ct. 153 , 196 L.Ed.2d 116 (2016).

2016Id. at 86 .

2007The Hare opinion does not hold that after community property is voluntarily partitioned and a final judgment regarding that property has issued, res judicata is inapplicable to bar a re-adjudication of that property. [1] *354 This court distinguishes Terrebonne Fuel & Lube Inc. v. Placid Refining Company, 95-0654, 95-0671 (La.1/16/96), 666 So.2d 624 , which dealt with a judgment that contained a specific exclusion of the claim asserted, therefore barring the application of res judicata.

2007Instead, as recognized in Allen v. Allen, 01-0213 (La.App. 3 Cir. 06/06/01) , 787 So.2d 1226 , absent a showing that community property exists which was not previously partitioned, the exception of res judicata will apply.

2006In the case of Calvin v. Janbar Enterprises, Inc., XXXX-XXXX (La.App. 4 Cir. 9/24/03), 856 So.2d 88 , the parents of a minor child who was seriously injured when he was struck by a truck after exiting a bus sued the owner of the truck along with the owner's automobile insurer and its CGL insurer.

2004In Travelers Insurance Co. v. Blanchard, 431 So.2d 913, 914-15 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1983), the second circuit made the same distinction, explaining: We find that the language of this exclusion clause is significantly different from the provision in McBride [ 303 So.2d 795 ]....

2001Had the accident not intervened, the trailer would have been taken to the wash-rack building and cleaned before Mr. Fleniken proceeded with making the haul. [6] The language of the exclusionary clause in Manuel is almost identical to the exclusion clause quoted above; it provides the agreement does not apply to "any bodily injury ... arising out of the ... use ... of (a) any automobile ... owned or operated by or rented or loaned to any Insured ...." Manuel, 577 So.2d at 205-206 . [7] The trial court rendered judgment in a previous motion for summary judgment filed by Safeway, which judgment p