12 New Hampshire opinions name it 1 courts 1963–2023 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Hampshire courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Blagbrough Family Realty Trust v. a & T Forest Products, Inc.green1 sentence2023See Blagbrough Family Realty Trust v. A&T Forest Prods., 155 N.H. 29, 41 (2007) (“Moreover, we will not guess what the drafters of the ordinance might have intended, or add words that they did not see fit to include.”). | 1 | 1 |
Lafayette Insurance v. Peerboomgreen1 sentence2015Co., 813 F. Supp. 2d at 829-35 (concluding, for similar reasons, that the exclusion applied to bar coverage). | 1 | 1 |
Hillman v. Gracegreen1 sentence2012See, e.g., Hillman v. Grace, 498 So. 2d 1108, 1110 (La. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Favreaugreen2 sentences1999“Whether a statement is inadmissible hearsay, or whether an exclusion or exception applies, are questions for the trial court, whose determination we will uphold unless it is clearly erroneous.” State v. Favreau, 134 N.H. 336, 339 , 592 A.2d 1136, 1137 (1991). 1999“Whether a statement is inadmissible hearsay, or whether an exclusion or exception applies, are questions for the trial court, whose determination we will uphold unless it is clearly erroneous.” State v. Favreau, 134 N.H. 336, 339 , 592 A.2d 1136, 1137 (1991). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Sampsongreen2 sentences1991See State v. Sampson, 132 N.H. 343, 346 , 565 A.2d 1040, 1042 (1989). 1991See State v. Sampson, 132 N.H. 343, 346 , 565 A.2d 1040, 1042 (1989). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Hampshire. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Mid-Continent Casualty Co. v. JHP Development, Inc.
green
1 sentence2015Co. v. JHP Development, Inc., 557 F.3d 207 (5th Cir. 2009), in which the court reviewed an exclusion identical to the one at issue in this case and concluded that the exclusion: bars coverage only for property damage to parts of a property that were themselves the subject of defective work by the insured; the exclusion does not bar coverage for damage to parts of a property that were the subject of only nondefective work by the insured and were damaged as a result of defective work by the insured on other parts of the property. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
In Re Dunn
green
1 sentence2011As we made clear in Petition of Dunn, 160 N.H. at 624 , the statute “excludes from the definition of ‘injury’ stress-related disability resulting from good faith personnel action.” It does not exclude stress-related disability resulting from “normal condition[s] of employment.” It excludes only those stress-related injuries that result from disciplinary actions, work evaluations, job transfers, layoffs, demotions, terminations, or other similar personnel actions against an employee “taken in good faith by an employer!’ RSA 281-A:2, XI (emphasis added). | 1 | 2011–2011 |
United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co.
green
1 sentence1999The court reasoned that “[i]n the absence of any express provision excluding a particular grievance from arbitration, we think only the most forceful evidence of a purpose to exclude the claim from arbitration can prevail, particularly where, as here, the exclusion clause is vague and the arbitration clause quite broad.” Id. at 584-85 . | 1 | 1999–1999 |
MacKinnon v. Hanover Insurance
green
2 sentences1988It instead limited coverage by means of an exclusion clause denying payment for “‘bodily injury . . . expected or intended by the insured.’” Id. at 459 , 471 A.2d at 1167 . 1988It instead limited coverage by means of an exclusion clause denying payment for “‘bodily injury . . . expected or intended by the insured.’” Id. at 459 , 471 A.2d at 1167 . | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Oregon v. Elstad
green
1 sentence1986It was not until Oregon v. Elstad, 105 S. Ct. 1285 (1985), that the Supreme Court confronted the applicability of the Wong Sun doctrine to Miranda violations. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Atwood v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co.
green
2 sentences1979In Atwood , we held that “[n]either the quoted heading nor the quoted exclusion clause constitutes fair notice to the insured that the policy does not cover the risks defined on the completed operations hazard, which the front page would lead him to believe was covered.” 116 N.H. at 639 , 365 A.2d at 747 . 1979In Atwood , we held that “[n]either the quoted heading nor the quoted exclusion clause constitutes fair notice to the insured that the policy does not cover the risks defined on the completed operations hazard, which the front page would lead him to believe was covered.” 116 N.H. at 639 , 365 A.2d at 747 . | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Kenner v. Century Indemnity Co.
green
1 sentence1968If this exclusion clause may not result in a denial of coverage under New Hampshire law (See Case v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 105 N. H. 422, 426), the Massachusetts law interprets the exclusion clause as denying coverage under the aging but still viable authority of Kenner v. Century Indemnity Co., 320 Mass. 6 . | 1 | 1968–1968 |
Meiser v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.
green
1 sentence1963While the evidence in this case was not extensive on this issue, we think the Court was justified in finding that control of the walls remained in the owner and any work that needed to be done by the contractor in connection with the walls was incidental to his contract job of removing the debris. 7A Appleman, Insurance, s. 4493.4 (1962); Meiser v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 8 Wis. 2d 233 ; Cohen v. Keystone Mut. | 1 | 1963–1963 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.