23 Iowa opinions name it 2 courts 1912–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Iowa courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State of Iowa v. Carson Michael Walkergreen2 sentences2017See State v. Walker, 804 N.W.2d 284, 296 (Iowa 2011) (suppressing breath-test results as remedy for violation of statutory requirement to permit detainee to meet alone and in private with attorney); State v. Albrecht, 657 N.W.2d 474, 477 (Iowa 2003) (“The remedy for not substantially complying with the implied-consent procedure is the exclusion of the test results . . . .”). 2017See State v. Walker, 804 N.W.2d 284, 296 (Iowa 2011) (suppressing breath-test results as remedy for violation of statutory requirement to permit detainee to meet alone and in private with attorney); State v. Albrecht, 657 N.W.2d 474, 477 (Iowa 2003) (“The remedy for not substantially complying with the implied-consent procedure is the exclusion of the test results . . . .”). | 3 | 3 |
State v. Albrechtgreen2 sentences2017See State v. Walker, 804 N.W.2d 284, 296 (Iowa 2011) (suppressing breath-test results as remedy for violation of statutory requirement to permit detainee to meet alone and in private with attorney); State v. Albrecht, 657 N.W.2d 474, 477 (Iowa 2003) (“The remedy for not substantially complying with the implied-consent procedure is the exclusion of the test results . . . .”). 2017See State v. Walker, 804 N.W.2d 284, 296 (Iowa 2011) (suppressing breath-test results as remedy for violation of statutory requirement to permit detainee to meet alone and in private with attorney); State v. Albrecht, 657 N.W.2d 474, 477 (Iowa 2003) (“The remedy for not substantially complying with the implied-consent procedure is the exclusion of the test results . . . .”). | 3 | 3 |
Dale Boelman and Nancy Boelman v. Grinnell Mutual Reinsurance Companygreen2 sentences2016See Boelman, 826 N.W.2d at 501–02. 2016See Boelman, 826 N.W.2d at 501-02 . | 3 | 3 |
People v. Griffingreen2 sentences1977People v. Griffin, 66 Cal.2d 459, 466 , 58 Cal.Rptr. 107, 111 , 426 P.2d 507, 510-511 (1967); Womble v. State, 8 Md.App. 119, 125 , 258 A.2d 786, 789-790 (1969); State v. Smith, 271 Or. 294, 298-299 , 532 P.2d 9, 11-12 (Or.1975); see 1 Wharton’s Criminal Evidence § 262, at 625 (1972); Annot., Evidence — Other Offense — Acquittal, 86 A.L.R.2d 1132 (1962). 1977People v. Griffin, 66 Cal.2d 459, 466 , 58 Cal.Rptr. 107, 111 , 426 P.2d 507, 510-511 (1967); Womble v. State, 8 Md.App. 119, 125 , 258 A.2d 786, 789-790 (1969); State v. Smith, 271 Or. 294, 298-299 , 532 P.2d 9, 11-12 (Or.1975); see 1 Wharton’s Criminal Evidence § 262, at 625 (1972); Annot., Evidence — Other Offense — Acquittal, 86 A.L.R.2d 1132 (1962). | 2 | 2 |
Womble v. Stategreen2 sentences1977People v. Griffin, 66 Cal.2d 459, 466 , 58 Cal.Rptr. 107, 111 , 426 P.2d 507, 510-511 (1967); Womble v. State, 8 Md.App. 119, 125 , 258 A.2d 786, 789-790 (1969); State v. Smith, 271 Or. 294, 298-299 , 532 P.2d 9, 11-12 (Or.1975); see 1 Wharton’s Criminal Evidence § 262, at 625 (1972); Annot., Evidence — Other Offense — Acquittal, 86 A.L.R.2d 1132 (1962). 1977People v. Griffin, 66 Cal.2d 459, 466 , 58 Cal.Rptr. 107, 111 , 426 P.2d 507, 510-511 (1967); Womble v. State, 8 Md.App. 119, 125 , 258 A.2d 786, 789-790 (1969); State v. Smith, 271 Or. 294, 298-299 , 532 P.2d 9, 11-12 (Or.1975); see 1 Wharton’s Criminal Evidence § 262, at 625 (1972); Annot., Evidence — Other Offense — Acquittal, 86 A.L.R.2d 1132 (1962). | 1 | 2 |
State v. Reitenbaughgreen1 sentence2024See, e.g., State v. Reitenbaugh, 392 N.W.2d 486 , 487–90 (Iowa 1986) (holding that admission of criminal defendant’s arrest warrant containing statements of non-testifying probation officer under public records exception was improper because “statements of the probation officer constituted factual findings resulting from the special investigation of a particular incident, defendant’s failure to report, thereby making those hearsay statements inadmissible under rule [5.]803(8)(B)(iv)”); State v. McCurry, 544 N.W.2d 444 , 446–48 (Iowa 1996) (discussing reasoning behind rule 5.803(8)(B) exception | 1 | 1 |
State v. Tategreen1 sentence2018A postconviction hearing would provide Esparza’s trial counsel the chance to explain his decision to raise the exclusion claim in a motion in limine rather than a motion to suppress and to “defend against the charge.” See State v. Tate, 710 N.W.2d 237, 240 (Iowa 2006). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Shanahangreen1 sentence2018The record is also undeveloped “as to any prejudice which may or may not have resulted from trial counsel’s actions.” See State v. Shanahan, 712 N.W.2d 121, 143 (Iowa 2006). | 1 | 1 |
State of Iowa v. Mark Daryl Beckergreen1 sentence2017Third, as the court of appeals, we cannot revisit our supreme court’s decision in State v. Becker, 818 N.W.2d 135, 137 (Iowa 2012),1 which found no error in the denial of a jury instruction explaining the consequences of an insanity verdict. | 1 | 1 |
State of Iowa v. Denise Leone Freigreen1 sentence2015See Frei, 831 N.W.2d at 73-74 . | 1 | 1 |
Kalell v. Mutual Fire & Automobile Insurance Co.green1 sentence2004As to an exclusion clause, however, a narrow or restrictive construction is required. 471 N.W.2d at 867 (emphasis added and original emphases omitted). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Kjosgreen1 sentence2003State v. Kjos, 524 N.W.2d 195,197 (Iowa 1994). | 1 | 1 |
Pachucki v. Republic Insurance Co.green1 sentence2001Id. at 904. | 1 | 1 |
Eichelberger v. Warnergreen2 sentences1991See, e.g., Eichelberger v. Warner, 290 Pa.Super. 269, 275-76 , 434 A.2d 747, 750 (1981). 1991See, e.g., Eichelberger v. Warner, 290 Pa.Super. 269, 275-76 , 434 A.2d 747, 750 (1981). | 1 | 1 |
Beyer v. City of Dubuquegreen2 sentences1980See Beyer v. City of Dubuque, 258 Iowa 476, 486 , 139 N.W.2d 428, 435 (1966) (“We are satisfied that when an action in tort is brought against a municipality and others as parties defendant, plaintiff may nevertheless effectively challenge any members of the jury panel who are taxpayers in the defendant municipality.”). 1980See Beyer v. City of Dubuque, 258 Iowa 476, 486 , 139 N.W.2d 428, 435 (1966) (“We are satisfied that when an action in tort is brought against a municipality and others as parties defendant, plaintiff may nevertheless effectively challenge any members of the jury panel who are taxpayers in the defendant municipality.”). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Smithgreen2 sentences1977People v. Griffin, 66 Cal.2d 459, 466 , 58 Cal.Rptr. 107, 111 , 426 P.2d 507, 510-511 (1967); Womble v. State, 8 Md.App. 119, 125 , 258 A.2d 786, 789-790 (1969); State v. Smith, 271 Or. 294, 298-299 , 532 P.2d 9, 11-12 (Or.1975); see 1 Wharton’s Criminal Evidence § 262, at 625 (1972); Annot., Evidence — Other Offense — Acquittal, 86 A.L.R.2d 1132 (1962). 1977People v. Griffin, 66 Cal.2d 459, 466 , 58 Cal.Rptr. 107, 111 , 426 P.2d 507, 510-511 (1967); Womble v. State, 8 Md.App. 119, 125 , 258 A.2d 786, 789-790 (1969); State v. Smith, 271 Or. 294, 298-299 , 532 P.2d 9, 11-12 (Or.1975); see 1 Wharton’s Criminal Evidence § 262, at 625 (1972); Annot., Evidence — Other Offense — Acquittal, 86 A.L.R.2d 1132 (1962). | 1 | 1 |
United Fire & Casualty Co. v. Mrasgreen2 sentences1963The court says: “The Casualty Company relies upon decisions of the Oklahoma Supreme Court holding that an injury to an employee sustained while he is returning from work in a conveyance furnished by his employer is an injury ‘arising out of and in the course of his employment.’ But, in those decisions, the Supreme Court was construing a provision of the Oklahoma Workmen’s Compensation Law and not a private contract, and it has repeatedly held that such law is a remedial statute and should receive a liberal construction in favor of the injured °employee.” After pointing out that an exclusion cl 1963The court says: “The Casualty Company relies upon decisions of the Oklahoma Supreme Court holding that an injury to an employee sustained while he is returning from work in a conveyance furnished by his employer is an injury ‘arising out of and in the course of his employment.’ But, in those decisions, the Supreme Court was construing a provision of the Oklahoma Workmen’s Compensation Law and not a private contract, and it has repeatedly held that such law is a remedial statute and should receive a liberal construction in favor of the injured °employee.” After pointing out that an exclusion cl | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Iowa. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Francis v. Scheper
green
2 sentences1963Pointing out that the exclusion clause differs materially from the clause in the Workmen’s Compensation law, “‘arising out of and in the course of his employment” ’, the decision states: ‘The word “engaged” connotes action.’ “In Francis v. Scheper, 326 Mich. 441, 447 , 40 N.W.2d 214, 217 , the exclusion clause in the policy excepted those ‘engaged in the employment’ of insured. 1963Pointing out that the exclusion clause differs materially from the clause in the Workmen’s Compensation law, “‘arising out of and in the course of his employment” ’, the decision states: ‘The word “engaged” connotes action.’ “In Francis v. Scheper, 326 Mich. 441, 447 , 40 N.W.2d 214, 217 , the exclusion clause in the policy excepted those ‘engaged in the employment’ of insured. | 2 | 1952–1963 |
State v. McCurry
green
1 sentence2024See, e.g., State v. Reitenbaugh, 392 N.W.2d 486 , 487–90 (Iowa 1986) (holding that admission of criminal defendant’s arrest warrant containing statements of non-testifying probation officer under public records exception was improper because “statements of the probation officer constituted factual findings resulting from the special investigation of a particular incident, defendant’s failure to report, thereby making those hearsay statements inadmissible under rule [5.]803(8)(B)(iv)”); State v. McCurry, 544 N.W.2d 444 , 446–48 (Iowa 1996) (discussing reasoning behind rule 5.803(8)(B) exception | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Krause v. Krause
green
1 sentence2001Accordingly, Westfield has not established that “an ordinary layperson would misunderstand [the policy] coverage.” See id. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
American Fire and Casualty Company v. Charles E. (Charley) Bramlett
green
1 sentence1963It was incumbent on defendant casualty com-.tyii’iiy, who draftrA *Giie policy, in order to escape liability under *217 the circumstances of this case, so to draft the policy as to make clear the extent of nonliability under the exclusion clause.’ ” The case of American Fire and Casualty Co. v. Bramlett, supra, is the only case cited by appellant which has an exclusion clause containing the phrase “arising out of and in the course of employment”. | 1 | 1963–1963 |
Sanco Co. v. Employers Mutual Liability Insurance
green
1 sentence1959Co. of Wisconsin, N. H., 154 A.2d 454 . | 1 | 1959–1959 |
McLoughlin v. Shaw
green
2 sentences1959R. 1102, in the course of the opinion it is among other things said: “ ‘While the word “charge” has a very broad and varied meaning (McLoughlin v. Shaw, 95 Conn. 102, 107 , 111 A. 62 ), a person or thing is not “in charge of” an insured within the meaning of the policy unless he has the right to exercise dominion or control over it ’ ” However, Edwards v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 201 Tenn. 435 , 300 S.W.2d 615 , which quotes at length from the Saltzman case, holds damage to a bulldozer which insured used without the consent of its owner, for his own benefit and for its ordinary general purpose 1959R. 1102, in the course of the opinion it is among other things said: “ ‘While the word “charge” has a very broad and varied meaning (McLoughlin v. Shaw, 95 Conn. 102, 107 , 111 A. 62 ), a person or thing is not “in charge of” an insured within the meaning of the policy unless he has the right to exercise dominion or control over it ’ ” However, Edwards v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 201 Tenn. 435 , 300 S.W.2d 615 , which quotes at length from the Saltzman case, holds damage to a bulldozer which insured used without the consent of its owner, for his own benefit and for its ordinary general purpose | 1 | 1959–1959 |
McLouth Steel Corp. v. Mesta MacHine Co. Foster v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. (Landis Tool Co., Third-Party Defendant)
green
1 sentence1959In other words, the exclusion clause applies not only in situations in which the insured is the owner of the damaged property but also in cases in which his dominion over the property damage is not based on ownership.” The case just referred to as not supporting the general view is McLouth Steel Corp. v. Mesta Machine Co., 1954, 3 Cir., 214 F.2d 608 , certiorari denied 348 U. S. 873 , 75 S. Ct. 109 , 99 L. | 1 | 1959–1959 |
Edwards v. Travelers Indemnity Co.
green
2 sentences1959R. 1102, in the course of the opinion it is among other things said: “ ‘While the word “charge” has a very broad and varied meaning (McLoughlin v. Shaw, 95 Conn. 102, 107 , 111 A. 62 ), a person or thing is not “in charge of” an insured within the meaning of the policy unless he has the right to exercise dominion or control over it ’ ” However, Edwards v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 201 Tenn. 435 , 300 S.W.2d 615 , which quotes at length from the Saltzman case, holds damage to a bulldozer which insured used without the consent of its owner, for his own benefit and for its ordinary general purpose 1959R. 1102, in the course of the opinion it is among other things said: “ ‘While the word “charge” has a very broad and varied meaning (McLoughlin v. Shaw, 95 Conn. 102, 107 , 111 A. 62 ), a person or thing is not “in charge of” an insured within the meaning of the policy unless he has the right to exercise dominion or control over it ’ ” However, Edwards v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 201 Tenn. 435 , 300 S.W.2d 615 , which quotes at length from the Saltzman case, holds damage to a bulldozer which insured used without the consent of its owner, for his own benefit and for its ordinary general purpose | 1 | 1959–1959 |
American Federation of Musicians v. Stein
green
1 sentence1959In other words, the exclusion clause applies not only in situations in which the insured is the owner of the damaged property but also in cases in which his dominion over the property damage is not based on ownership.” The case just referred to as not supporting the general view is McLouth Steel Corp. v. Mesta Machine Co., 1954, 3 Cir., 214 F.2d 608 , certiorari denied 348 U. S. 873 , 75 S. Ct. 109 , 99 L. | 1 | 1959–1959 |
Vaughan v. Petroleum Conversion Corp.
green
1 sentence1959In other words, the exclusion clause applies not only in situations in which the insured is the owner of the damaged property but also in cases in which his dominion over the property damage is not based on ownership.” The case just referred to as not supporting the general view is McLouth Steel Corp. v. Mesta Machine Co., 1954, 3 Cir., 214 F.2d 608 , certiorari denied 348 U. S. 873 , 75 S. Ct. 109 , 99 L. | 1 | 1959–1959 |
Vulcan Furniture Manufacturing Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board
green
1 sentence1959In other words, the exclusion clause applies not only in situations in which the insured is the owner of the damaged property but also in cases in which his dominion over the property damage is not based on ownership.” The case just referred to as not supporting the general view is McLouth Steel Corp. v. Mesta Machine Co., 1954, 3 Cir., 214 F.2d 608 , certiorari denied 348 U. S. 873 , 75 S. Ct. 109 , 99 L. | 1 | 1959–1959 |
Hardware Mutual Casualty Co. v. Ozmun
green
2 sentences1952Co. v. Ozmun, 217 Minn. 280 , 14 N.W.2d. 351 ; Preferred Acc. Ins. 1952Co. v. Ozmun, 217 Minn. 280 , 14 N.W.2d. 351 ; Preferred Acc. Ins. | 1 | 1952–1952 |
Hudak v. Union Indemnity Co.
green
2 sentences1942We must hold that at the time of the collision in question his driving was a clear violation of section 85.08 (la), Stats., within the exclusion clause of the insurance policy.” The opinion cites Hudak v. Union Indemnity Co., 108 Conn. 598 , 143 A. 885 ; Weiss v. Preferred Acc. Ins. 1942We must hold that at the time of the collision in question his driving was a clear violation of section 85.08 (la), Stats., within the exclusion clause of the insurance policy.” The opinion cites Hudak v. Union Indemnity Co., 108 Conn. 598 , 143 A. 885 ; Weiss v. Preferred Acc. Ins. | 1 | 1942–1942 |
| McCann v. Downey green | 1 | 1942–1942 |
| Weiss v. Preferred Accident Insurance neutral | 1 | 1942–1942 |
| Hart v. Cedar Rapids & Marion City Railway Co. neutral | 1 | 1912–1912 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.