exclusion clause in Tennessee

25 Tennessee opinions name it 3 courts 1917–2022 1 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Tennessee courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (10)

Case	Followed	Cited
Taylor v. Illinoisgreen scotus · 1988 · cited in 2 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 2002–2002 2 sentences 2002See Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 416 , 108 S. Ct. 646, 656 (1988) (holding that the exclusion of a defense witness as a sanction for a discovery violation does not violate the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process, which embodies the right to present a defense); State v. Garland, 617 S.W.2d 176, 185 (Tenn. Crim. 2002See Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 416 , 108 S. Ct. 646, 656 (1988) (holding that the exclusion of a defense witness as a sanction for a discovery violation does not violate the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process, which embodies the right to present a defense); State v. Garland, 617 S.W.2d 176, 185 (Tenn. Crim.	2	2
Alley v. Stategreen tenncrimapp · 1994 · cited in 2 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 1998–2022 2 sentences 2022Absent such a showing, an appellate court cannot determine whether the exclusion was error, and if error is found, whether the error is harmless.” Alley v. State, 882 S.W.2d 810, 816 (Tenn. Crim. 1998Alley, 882 S.W.2d at 816 .	1	2
Dossett v. City of Kingsportgreen tennctapp · 2007 · cited in 1 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 2011–2011 1 sentence 2011See Dossett v. City of Kingsport, 258 S.W.3d 139, 145 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007).	1	1
State v. Garlandgreen tenncrimapp · 1981 · cited in 1 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 2002–2002 1 sentence 2002See Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 416 , 108 S. Ct. 646, 656 (1988) (holding that the exclusion of a defense witness as a sanction for a discovery violation does not violate the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process, which embodies the right to present a defense); State v. Garland, 617 S.W.2d 176, 185 (Tenn. Crim.	1	1
United States v. Noblesgreen scotus · 1975 · cited in 1 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 2002–2002 2 sentences 2002See Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 416 , 108 S. Ct. 646, 656 (1988) (holding that the exclusion of a defense witness as a sanction for a discovery violation does not violate the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process, which embodies the right to present a defense); see also United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 241 , 95 S. Ct. 2160, 2171 (1975) (holding that the exclusion of the testimony of a defense investigator because the defendant refused to provide the state with the investigator’s “highly relevant” report did not violate the defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights to com 2002See Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 416 , 108 S. Ct. 646, 656 (1988) (holding that the exclusion of a defense witness as a sanction for a discovery violation does not violate the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process, which embodies the right to present a defense); see also United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 241 , 95 S. Ct. 2160, 2171 (1975) (holding that the exclusion of the testimony of a defense investigator because the defendant refused to provide the state with the investigator’s “highly relevant” report did not violate the defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights to com	1	1
Chambers v. Mississippigreen scotus · 1973 · cited in 1 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 2002–2002 2 sentences 2002App. 1981) (holding that the exclusion of defense evidence for a failure to comply with discovery rules must be based upon prejudice to the state that cannot be mitigated by other means); see also Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 , 93 S. Ct. 1038, 1046 (1973) (observing that competing interests proposing to warrant a limitation on a defendant’s right to present relevant evidence must “be closely examined”). 2 The defendant also argues that we should have reviewed the trial court’s imposition of sanctions using a de novo standard rather than an abuse of discretion standard because his 2002App. 1981) (holding that the exclusion of defense evidence for a failure to comply with discovery rules must be based upon prejudice to the state that cannot be mitigated by other means); see also Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 , 93 S. Ct. 1038, 1046 (1973) (observing that competing interests proposing to warrant a limitation on a defendant’s right to present relevant evidence must “be closely examined”). 2 The defendant also argues that we should have reviewed the trial court’s imposition of sanctions using a de novo standard rather than an abuse of discretion standard because his	1	1
Omer M. Harris v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Companygreen ca6 · 1956 · cited in 1 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 1979–1979 1 sentence 1979See, also, Harris v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 232 F.2d 532 (6th Cir. 1956), cert. denied 352 U.S. 827 , 77 S.Ct. 40 , 1 L.Ed.2d 49 (1956). *384 The courts of this State have repeatedly interpreted the word “cause,” when used in exclusion clauses of insurance policies substantially equivalent to the exclusion clause in the policy now before the Court,'to mean “proximate cause.” Maness v. Life & Casualty Ins.	1	1
Vevelstad v. Flynngreen scotus · 1956 · cited in 1 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 1979–1979 1 sentence 1979See, also, Harris v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 232 F.2d 532 (6th Cir. 1956), cert. denied 352 U.S. 827 , 77 S.Ct. 40 , 1 L.Ed.2d 49 (1956). *384 The courts of this State have repeatedly interpreted the word “cause,” when used in exclusion clauses of insurance policies substantially equivalent to the exclusion clause in the policy now before the Court,'to mean “proximate cause.” Maness v. Life & Casualty Ins.	1	1
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance v. Harrisgreen scotus · 1956 · cited in 1 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 1979–1979 2 sentences 1979See, also, Harris v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 232 F.2d 532 (6th Cir. 1956), cert. denied 352 U.S. 827 , 77 S.Ct. 40 , 1 L.Ed.2d 49 (1956). 384 The courts of this State have repeatedly interpreted the word “cause,” when used in exclusion clauses of insurance policies substantially equivalent to the exclusion clause in the policy now before the Court,'to mean “proximate cause.” Maness v. Life & Casualty Ins. 1979See, also, Harris v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 232 F.2d 532 (6th Cir. 1956), cert. denied 352 U.S. 827 , 77 S.Ct. 40 , 1 L.Ed.2d 49 (1956). 384 The courts of this State have repeatedly interpreted the word “cause,” when used in exclusion clauses of insurance policies substantially equivalent to the exclusion clause in the policy now before the Court,'to mean “proximate cause.” Maness v. Life & Casualty Ins.	1	1
State Automobile Mut. Ins. v. Connable-Joest, Inc.green tenn · 1939 · cited in 1 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 1961–1961 2 sentences 1961See State Automobile Mutual Insurance Company v. Connable-Joest, Inc., 174 Tenn. 377 , 125 S. W. (2d) 490 ; Sam Finley, Inc., for Use and Benefit of Fidelity & Casualty Co. of N. Y. v. Standard Accident Ins. 1961See State Automobile Mutual Insurance Company v. Connable-Joest, Inc., 174 Tenn. 377 , 125 S. W. (2d) 490 ; Sam Finley, Inc., for Use and Benefit of Fidelity & Casualty Co. of N. Y. v. Standard Accident Ins.	1	1

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

Case	Negative	Cited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Tennessee. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (26)

Case	Cited	Years
No. 18252 green ca6 · 1968 2 sentences 2010Id. (citing Transwestern Pipeline Co., 418 F.2d at 19 ). 2010Id. (citing Transwestern Pipeline Co., 418 F.2d at 19 ).	2	2010–2010
No. 26631 green ca5 · 1969 2 sentences 2010Id. (citing Transwestern Pipeline Co., 418 F.2d at 19 ). 2010Id. (citing Transwestern Pipeline Co., 418 F.2d at 19 ).	2	2010–2010
Murphey v. Inter-Ocean Casualty Co. green indctapp · 1933 2 sentences 1962Co. v. Hughes, [203] Tenn. [636], 315 S. W. (2d) 239, 243 , our Supreme Court quoted with approval from Murphey v. Inter-Ocean Casualty Co., 98 Ind. App. 668 , 186 N. E. 902 , wherein the Indiana court said: “ ‘Generally speaking, an exclusion clause cannot be used to create liability where none would otherwise exist. 1962Co. v. Hughes, [203] Tenn. [636], 315 S. W. (2d) 239, 243 , our Supreme Court quoted with approval from Murphey v. Inter-Ocean Casualty Co., 98 Ind. App. 668 , 186 N. E. 902 , wherein the Indiana court said: “ ‘Generally speaking, an exclusion clause cannot be used to create liability where none would otherwise exist.	2	1959–1962
Standard Life Insurance Company v. Hughes green tenn · 1958 2 sentences 1962Co. v. Hughes, [203] Tenn. [636], 315 S. W. (2d) 239, 243 , our Supreme Court quoted with approval from Murphey v. Inter-Ocean Casualty Co., 98 Ind. App. 668 , 186 N. E. 902 , wherein the Indiana court said: “ ‘Generally speaking, an exclusion clause cannot be used to create liability where none would otherwise exist. 1959Co. v. Hughes, 203 Tenn. 636 , 315 S. W. (2d) 239, 243 , our Supreme Court quoted with approval from Murphey v. Inter-Ocean Casualty Co., 98 Ind. App. 668 , 186 N. E. 902 , wherein the Indiana Court said: “Generally speaking, an exclusion clause cannot be used to create liability where none would otherwise exist.	2	1959–1962
Brown v. J.C. Penney Life Insurance Co. green tennctapp · 1992 1 sentence 2003Id. at 837 .	1	2003–2003
McManus v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance green tenn · 1971 2 sentences 1997Id. at 107-09 , 463 S.W.2d at 703 . 1997Id. at 107-09 , 463 S.W.2d at 703 .	1	1997–1997
Smith v. Mercantile Bank neutral tenn · 1915 1 sentence 1986Smith v. Mercantile Bank, 132 Tenn. 147 , 177 S.W. 72 (1915); State ex rel Clarke v. Ripley Savings Bank & Trust Company, 25 Tenn.App. 490 , 160 S.W.2d 189 (1941); Griffith Motors, Inc. v. Parker, 633 S.W.2d 319 (Tenn.App.1982).	1	1986–1986
Griffith Motors, Inc. v. Parker green tennctapp · 1982 1 sentence 1986Smith v. Mercantile Bank, 132 Tenn. 147 , 177 S.W. 72 (1915); State ex rel Clarke v. Ripley Savings Bank & Trust Company, 25 Tenn.App. 490 , 160 S.W.2d 189 (1941); Griffith Motors, Inc. v. Parker, 633 S.W.2d 319 (Tenn.App.1982).	1	1986–1986
State Ex Rel. Clarke v. Ripley Sav. Bank & Trust Co. neutral tennctapp · 1941 2 sentences 1986Smith v. Mercantile Bank, 132 Tenn. 147 , 177 S.W. 72 (1915); State ex rel Clarke v. Ripley Savings Bank & Trust Company, 25 Tenn.App. 490 , 160 S.W.2d 189 (1941); Griffith Motors, Inc. v. Parker, 633 S.W.2d 319 (Tenn.App.1982). 1986Smith v. Mercantile Bank, 132 Tenn. 147 , 177 S.W. 72 (1915); State ex rel Clarke v. Ripley Savings Bank & Trust Company, 25 Tenn.App. 490 , 160 S.W.2d 189 (1941); Griffith Motors, Inc. v. Parker, 633 S.W.2d 319 (Tenn.App.1982).	1	1986–1986
Fireman's Fund Insurance v. Glanton neutral tenn · 1970 2 sentences 1979Co., supra; Fireman’s Fund Insurance Company v. Glanton, 224 Tenn. 213 , 452 S.W.2d 861 (1970); North American Ins. 1979Co., supra; Fireman’s Fund Insurance Company v. Glanton, 224 Tenn. 213 , 452 S.W.2d 861 (1970); North American Ins.	1	1979–1979
Vaughn v. Standard Surety & Casualty Co. green tennctapp · 1944 2 sentences 1970Jaggars’ presence in the ill-fated truck at such time was not as an employee, but as an invitee for the express benefit of Gibbs, the owner. (2) It follows that the transportation accorded complainant at such time was not incidental to his contract of employment, because such contract had expired. (3) The Court carefully reviewed the case of Vaughn v. [Standard Surety &] Casualty Company [ 27 Tenn.App. 671 ], 184 S.W.(2d) 556 and has determined this case is not analogous to the case at Bar, either by facts, proof or pleadings. 1970Jaggars’ presence in the ill-fated truck at such time was not as an employee, but as an invitee for the express benefit of Gibbs, the owner. (2) It follows that the transportation accorded complainant at such time was not incidental to his contract of employment, because such contract had expired. (3) The Court carefully reviewed the case of Vaughn v. [Standard Surety &] Casualty Company [ 27 Tenn.App. 671 ], 184 S.W.(2d) 556 and has determined this case is not analogous to the case at Bar, either by facts, proof or pleadings.	1	1970–1970
Hill v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company neutral tennctapp · 1961 2 sentences 1968In Hill v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 48 Tenn.App. 419 , 348 S.W.2d 512 , this Court said what has been said in many other cases, that the Courts will not create an ambiguity where none exists. 1968In Hill v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 48 Tenn.App. 419 , 348 S.W.2d 512 , this Court said what has been said in many other cases, that the Courts will not create an ambiguity where none exists.	1	1968–1968
Sadikoff v. American Indemnity Co. neutral tennctapp · 1950 2 sentences 1960A similar policy covering the operation of a filling station was involved in Sadikoff v. American Indemnity Company, 35 Tenn. App. 1 , 242 S. W. (2d) 316, 317 . 1960A similar policy covering the operation of a filling station was involved in Sadikoff v. American Indemnity Company, 35 Tenn. App. 1 , 242 S. W. (2d) 316, 317 .	1	1960–1960
Pitts v. Glens Falls Indemnity Co. green sc · 1952 2 sentences 1959We can neither make a new agreement for the parties nor, by addition, give it a meaning contrary to its express and unambiguous terms.” Finally, counsel for plaintiff rests his case upon Pitts v. Glens Falls Indemnity Co., 222 S.C. 133 , 72 S.E.2d 174 . 1959We can neither make a new agreement for the parties nor, by addition, give it a meaning contrary to its express and unambiguous terms.” Finally, counsel for plaintiff rests his case upon Pitts v. Glens Falls Indemnity Co., 222 S.C. 133 , 72 S.E.2d 174 .	1	1959–1959
Allor v. Dubay green mich · 1947 2 sentences 1954Allor v. Dubay, 317 Mich. 281 , 26 N. W. (2d) 772 ; McDaniel v. Glens Falls Indemnity Company, 333 Ill. 1954Allor v. Dubay, 317 Mich. 281 , 26 N. W. (2d) 772 ; McDaniel v. Glens Falls Indemnity Company, 333 Ill.	1	1954–1954
McDaniel v. Glens Falls Indemnity Co. neutral illappct · 1948 1 sentence 1954Allor v. Dubay, 317 Mich. 281 , 26 N. W. (2d) 772 ; McDaniel v. Glens Falls Indemnity Company, 333 Ill.	1	1954–1954
Jackson v. Old Colony Ins. Co. green tennctapp · 1948 2 sentences 1954Appellant cites two decisions to support its theory that the use of the Monroe car was within the exclusion clause of the policy: Smith v. Service Fire Insurance Company, 184 Tenn. 139 , 197 S. W. (2d) 233 , and Jackson v. Old Colony Insurance Company, 31 Tenn. App. 424 , 216 S. W. (2d) 354 . 1954Appellant cites two decisions to support its theory that the use of the Monroe car was within the exclusion clause of the policy: Smith v. Service Fire Insurance Company, 184 Tenn. 139 , 197 S. W. (2d) 233 , and Jackson v. Old Colony Insurance Company, 31 Tenn. App. 424 , 216 S. W. (2d) 354 .	1	1954–1954
Smith v. Service Fire Ins. Co. neutral tenn · 1946 2 sentences 1954Appellant cites two decisions to support its theory that the use of the Monroe car was within the exclusion clause of the policy: Smith v. Service Fire Insurance Company, 184 Tenn. 139 , 197 S. W. (2d) 233 , and Jackson v. Old Colony Insurance Company, 31 Tenn. App. 424 , 216 S. W. (2d) 354 . 1954Appellant cites two decisions to support its theory that the use of the Monroe car was within the exclusion clause of the policy: Smith v. Service Fire Insurance Company, 184 Tenn. 139 , 197 S. W. (2d) 233 , and Jackson v. Old Colony Insurance Company, 31 Tenn. App. 424 , 216 S. W. (2d) 354 .	1	1954–1954
Hoover v. National Casualty Co. green · 1942 2 sentences 1951The Court there said: “When the Defendant, in said clause 10, excluded motorcycles and any vehicle or mechanical device for aerial navigation, they included every other kind of automobile.” 631 Likewise applicable as to the effect of this exclusion clause is the Missouri case of Hoover v. National Casualty Company, 236 Mo. App. 1093 , 162 S. W. (2d) 363, 365 . 1951The Court there said: “When the Defendant, in said clause 10, excluded motorcycles and any vehicle or mechanical device for aerial navigation, they included every other kind of automobile.” 631 Likewise applicable as to the effect of this exclusion clause is the Missouri case of Hoover v. National Casualty Company, 236 Mo. App. 1093 , 162 S. W. (2d) 363, 365 .	1	1951–1951
Mauldin v. Otto Schwill & Co. green tennctapp · 1925 1 sentence 1931These assignments do not present any questions for this court’s determination, “first, in that they do not set out the evidence excluded; and second, in that they do not point out wherein the exclusion was error.” See Mauldin v. Schwill & Co., 1 Tenn. App., 347, 354 .	1	1931–1931
Wise v. Mills green scotus · 1911	1	1925–1925
Young v. New Jersey Ins. neutral mtd · 1922	1	1923–1923
New Jersey Ins. v. Young neutral ca9 · 1923	1	1923–1923
Clark Loftus v. Pearce neutral tex · 1891	1	1921–1921
Wilkins v. McCorkle green · 1904	1	1917–1917
Wright v. Hurst neutral tenn · 1909	1	1917–1917

Where else courts name it

CA 175 (1939–2026) TX 96 (1952–2025) IL 88 (1901–2024) LA 86 (1925–2017) NY 78 (1898–2024) PA 62 (1934–2024) MO 59 (1933–2025) NJ 50 (1957–2024) FL 49 (1955–2024) CT 48 (1894–2024) WI 45 (1937–2026) MI 36 (1949–2024) WA 36 (1931–2025) MD 32 (1939–2020) OH 32 (1924–2026) MS 31 (1954–2022) GA 31 (1910–2026) OR 30 (1943–2026) MA 27 (1954–2026) IN 26 (1976–2020) MN 26 (1920–2018) TN 25 (1917–2022) CO 24 (1942–2013) IA 23 (1912–2024) NM 23 (1960–2025) SC 22 (1937–2025) NC 21 (1951–2023) KS 19 (1962–2016) UT 16 (1937–2024) VA 16 (1935–2025) AZ 15 (1970–2023) AL 15 (1903–2015) OK 14 (1952–2011) AR 14 (1945–2025) DC 12 (1986–2026) WY 12 (1971–2025) NH 12 (1963–2023) MT 12 (1967–2023) WV 12 (1982–2023) KY 11 (1958–2025) ID 9 (1981–2014) DE 8 (1962–2024) HI 8 (1992–2021) NV 8 (1952–2014) RI 7 (1958–2007) ND 7 (1965–2020) AK 7 (1981–2007) NE 6 (1943–2015) ME 6 (1952–2019) VT 5 (1894–2012) PR 5 (1949–2023) SD 4 (1963–2012)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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