exclusion clause in California

2025A defendant has a due process right to “present all relevant evidence of significant probative value to his or her defense.” (People v. Cunningham, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 999 .) However, the defendant “has no constitutional right ‘to present all relevant evidence in his favor, no matter how limited in probative value such evidence will be so as to preclude the trial court from using Evidence Code section 352.’ ” (People v. Shoemaker (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 442, 450 .) “Although the complete exclusion of evidence intended to establish an accused’s defense may impair his or her right to due proce

2024(See, e.g., People v. Aranda (2012) 55 Cal.4th 342, 363 [federal constitutional errors subject to review for harmlessness under Chapman].) But generally, “ ‘ “[a]pplication of the ordinary rules of evidence . . . does not impermissibly infringe on a defendant’s right to present a defense.” [Citations.]’ ” (People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 998 .) “Although the complete exclusion of evidence intended to establish an accused’s defense may impair his or her right to due process of law, the exclusion of defense evidence on a minor or subsidiary point does not interfere with that constitu

2025(See Holmes v. South Carolina (2006) 547 U.S. 319 , 326– 327 [“While the Constitution thus prohibits the exclusion of defense evidence under rules that serve no legitimate purpose or that are disproportionate to the ends that they are asserted to promote, well-established rules of evidence permit trial judges to exclude evidence if its probative value is outweighed by certain other factors such as unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or potential to mislead the jury”]; Taylor v. Illinois (1988) 484 U.S. 400, 410 [“The accused does not have an unfettered right to offer testimony that is i

2021Within the confines of the confrontation clause, the trial court retains wide latitude in restricting cross-examination that is repetitive, prejudicial, confusing of the issues, or of marginal relevance.” ’ ” (Harris, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 1292 ; accord, Delaware v. Van Arsdall (1986) 475 U.S. 673, 679 .) “While the Constitution . . . prohibits the exclusion of defense evidence under rules that serve no legitimate purpose or that are disproportionate to the ends that they are asserted to promote, well-established rules of evidence permit trial judges to exclude evidence if its probative valu

2023As a general rule, “the ‘ “[a]pplication of the ordinary rules of evidence . . . does not impermissibly infringe on a defendant’s right to present a defense.” [Citations.]’ ” (People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 998 .) “Although the complete exclusion of evidence intended to establish an accused’s defense may impair his or her right to due process of law, the exclusion of defense evidence on a minor or subsidiary point does not interfere with that constitutional right.” (Id. at p. 999.) When a trial court’s rulings have precluded a defendant from presenting a defense in violation of th

2020“The United States Constitution guarantees criminal defendants a meaningful opportunity to present a defense. [Citation.] Evidence that falls short of exonerating a defendant may still be critical to a defense.” (People v. Cash (2002) 28 Cal.4th 703, 727 (Cash).) “In general, the ‘ “[a]pplication of the ordinary rules of evidence . . . does not impermissibly infringe on a defendant’s right to present a defense.” [Citations.]’ [Citations.] [¶] . . . [¶] Although the complete exclusion of evidence intended to establish an accused’s defense may impair his or her right to due process of law, the e

2021“In general, the ‘ “[a]pplication of the ordinary rules of evidence . . . does not impermissibly infringe on a defendant’s right to present a defense.” [Citations.]’ [Citations.] [¶] . . . [¶] Although the complete exclusion of evidence intended to establish an accused’s defense may impair his or her right to due process of law, the exclusion of defense 33 evidence on a minor or subsidiary point does not interfere with that constitutional right. [Citation.] Accordingly such a ruling, if erroneous, is ‘an error of law merely,’ which is governed by the standard of review announced in People v. W

2020“The United States Constitution guarantees criminal defendants a meaningful opportunity to present a defense. [Citation.] Evidence that falls short of exonerating a defendant may still be critical to a defense.” (People v. Cash (2002) 28 Cal.4th 703, 727 (Cash).) “In general, the ‘ “[a]pplication of the ordinary rules of evidence . . . does not impermissibly infringe on a defendant’s right to present a defense.” [Citations.]’ [Citations.] [¶] . . . [¶] Although the complete exclusion of evidence intended to establish an accused’s defense may impair his or her right to due process of law, the e

2015(Washington v. Texas (1967) 388 U.S. 14, 19 .) However, “[w]hile the Constitution . . . prohibits the exclusion of defense evidence under rules that serve no legitimate purpose or that are disproportionate to the ends that they are asserted to promote, well-established rules of evidence permit trial judges to exclude evidence if its probative value is outweighed by certain other factors such as unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or potential to mislead the jury. [Citations.]” (Holmes v. South Carolina (2006) 547 U.S. 319, 326-327 .) Thus, “‘[a]s a general matter, the ordinary rules of

2013(Washington v. Texas (1967) 388 U.S. 14, 23 [ 18 L.Ed.2d 1019,1025 ].) The exclusion of defense evidence on a minor or subsidiary point does not interfere with these rights.

2025(People v. Kelly (1992) 1 Cal.4th 495, 523 .) “The court’s ruling will not be disturbed unless made ‘in an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice.’ ” (People v. Powell (2018) 6 Cal.5th 136 , 162.) A “ ‘miscarriage of justice’ should be declared only when the court, ‘after an examination of the entire cause, including the evidence,’ is of the ‘opinion’ that it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appealing party would have been reached in the absence of the error.” (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 .) W

2025(People v. Kelly (1992) 1 Cal.4th 495, 523 .) “The court’s ruling will not be disturbed unless made ‘in an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice.’ ” (People v. Powell (2018) 6 Cal.5th 136 , 162.) A “ ‘miscarriage of justice’ should be declared only when the court, ‘after an examination of the entire cause, including the evidence,’ is of the ‘opinion’ that it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appealing party would have been reached in the absence of the error.” (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 .) W

2025The Trial Court Did Not Violate Hinojos’s Due Process Right To Present a Defense Hinojos further argues that the trial court’s exclusion of expert testimony, even if not an abuse of discretion, nonetheless violated his due process right to present his defense. “‘As a general matter, the ordinary rules of evidence do not impermissibly infringe on the accused’s right to present a 41 defense.’” (People v. Turner (2020) 10 Cal.5th 786 , 818, quoting People v. Hall (1986) 41 Cal.3d 826, 834 .) Indeed, “[o]nly rarely” is “the right to present a complete defense . . . violated by the exclusion of def

2015(Washington v. Texas (1967) 388 U.S. 14, 19 .) However, “[w]hile the Constitution . . . prohibits the exclusion of defense evidence under rules that serve no legitimate purpose or that are disproportionate to the ends that they are asserted to promote, well-established rules of evidence permit trial judges to exclude evidence if its probative value is outweighed by certain other factors such as unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or potential to mislead the jury. [Citations.]” (Holmes v. South Carolina (2006) 547 U.S. 319, 326-327 .) Thus, “‘[a]s a general matter, the ordinary rules of

2025A defendant has a due process right to “present all relevant evidence of significant probative value to his or her defense.” (People v. Cunningham, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 999 .) However, the defendant “has no constitutional right ‘to present all relevant evidence in his favor, no matter how limited in probative value such evidence will be so as to preclude the trial court from using Evidence Code section 352.’ ” (People v. Shoemaker (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 442, 450 .) “Although the complete exclusion of evidence intended to establish an accused’s defense may impair his or her right to due proce

2021Within the confines of the confrontation clause, the trial court retains wide latitude in restricting cross-examination that is repetitive, prejudicial, confusing of the issues, or of marginal relevance.” ’ ” (Harris, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 1292 ; accord, Delaware v. Van Arsdall (1986) 475 U.S. 673, 679 .) “While the Constitution . . . prohibits the exclusion of defense evidence under rules that serve no legitimate purpose or that are disproportionate to the ends that they are asserted to promote, well-established rules of evidence permit trial judges to exclude evidence if its probative valu

2020“The United States Constitution guarantees criminal defendants a meaningful opportunity to present a defense. [Citation.] Evidence that falls short of exonerating a defendant may still be critical to a defense.” (People v. Cash (2002) 28 Cal.4th 703, 727 (Cash).) “In general, the ‘ “[a]pplication of the ordinary rules of evidence . . . does not impermissibly infringe on a defendant’s right to present a defense.” [Citations.]’ [Citations.] [¶] . . . [¶] Although the complete exclusion of evidence intended to establish an accused’s defense may impair his or her right to due process of law, the e

2020“The United States Constitution guarantees criminal defendants a meaningful opportunity to present a defense. [Citation.] Evidence that falls short of exonerating a defendant may still be critical to a defense.” (People v. Cash (2002) 28 Cal.4th 703, 727 (Cash).) “In general, the ‘ “[a]pplication of the ordinary rules of evidence . . . does not impermissibly infringe on a defendant’s right to present a defense.” [Citations.]’ [Citations.] [¶] . . . [¶] Although the complete exclusion of evidence intended to establish an accused’s defense may impair his or her right to due process of law, the e

2021(Delaware v. Van Arsdall (1986) 475 U.S. 673, 679 .) A trial court’s limitation on cross-examination pertaining to the credibility of a witness violates the confrontation clause only when “a reasonable jury might have received a significantly different impression of the witness’s credibility had the excluded cross-examination been permitted.” (Quartermain, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 624 .) The federal Constitution also guarantees criminal defendants “ ‘ “a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.” ’ ” (Nevada v. Jackson (2013) 569 U.S. 505, 509 .) While this guarantee “prohibits the

2020Having concluded the trial court properly denied defense counsel’s motion in limine to introduce impeachment evidence based on alleged sexual conduct of K., we also reject defendant’s claim of federal constitutional error. “[W]e find no violation of defendant’s right to due process of law or of the confrontation clause. ‘Although the complete exclusion of evidence intended to establish an accused’s defense may impair his or her right to due process of law, the exclusion of defense evidence on a minor or subsidiary point does not interfere with that constitutional right.’ (People v. Cunningham

2021(People v. Thornton (2007) 41 Cal.4th 391, 443 .) 18 defense]; Chambers v. Mississippi (1973) 410 U.S. 284, 302-303 (Chambers) [criticizing exclusion of “critical” evidence of declarations against interest and finding constitutional violation in conjunction with other trial error].) The case before us does not involve the exclusion of defense evidence “on a minor or subsidiary point.” (Cunningham, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 999 .) Rather, defendant’s statements, proffered for the nonhearsay purpose of establishing his mental state, were directly relevant and material to an element of the charge o

2016(See Crane v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 683 [ 90 L.Ed.2d 636 , 106 S.Ct. 2142 ]; Chambers v. Mississippi (1973) 410 U.S. 284 [ 35 L.Ed.2d 297 , 93 S.Ct. 1038 ]; People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 999 [ 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 291 , 25 P.3d 519 ] [“complete exclusion of evidence intended to establish an accused’s defense may impair his or her right to due process of law”]; cf. Nevada v. Jackson (2013) 569 U.S. _ [ 186 L.Ed.2d 62 , 133 S.Ct. 1990 , 1992] [“Only rarely have we held that the right to present a complete defense was violated by the exclusion of defense evidence under a state rule of

2015(People v. Riccardi (2012) 54 Cal.4th 758, 808-809 .) Although Evidence Code 13. section 352 must yield to a defendant’s due process right to a fair trial and to present all significant probative evidence to his or her defense, the exclusion of defense evidence on a minor or subsidiary point does not interfere with that constitutional right.

2014(See People v. Riccardi (2012) 54 Cal.4th 758, 809 [ 144 Cal.Rptr.3d 84 , 281 P.3d 1 ] [“The routine and proper application of state evidentiary law does not impinge on a defendant’s due process rights.”].) “Although the complete exclusion of evidence intended to establish an accused’s defense may impair his or her right to due process of law, the exclusion of defense evidence on a minor or subsidiary point does not interfere with that constitutional right.” *496 (People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 999 [ 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 291 , 25 P.3d 519 ].) Under the circumstances here, Leonard and W

2025A defendant has a due process right to “present all relevant evidence of significant probative value to his or her defense.” (People v. Cunningham, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 999 .) However, the defendant “has no constitutional right ‘to present all relevant evidence in his favor, no matter how limited in probative value such evidence will be so as to preclude the trial court from using Evidence Code section 352.’ ” (People v. Shoemaker (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 442, 450 .) “Although the complete exclusion of evidence intended to establish an accused’s defense may impair his or her right to due proce

2022(See People v. Chavez (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 663, 681 ; People v. Cornwell (2005) 37 Cal.4th 50, 82 [disapproved on another ground in People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 421, fn.22 ].) Under Evidence Code section 352, a trial court may exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability its admission will consume undue time, mislead the jury, or confuse the issues.

2025(See People v. Garcia (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 961, 969 [“Although a defendant has a ‘ “general [constitutional] right” ’ to offer a defense through the testimony of his or her witnesses, a state court’s exclusion of defense evidence under ordinary rules of evidence — including Evidence Code section 352 — generally does not infringe upon this right.”].) Thus, since we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion under the ordinary rules of evidence in excluding evidence, we necessarily find no due process violation as a result of that exclusion.

2024(See In re Jordan R. (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 111, 133 [ordinary rules of evidence do not impermissibly infringe on parents’ rights to present their case, and due process does not require the admission of all evidence which may tend to support parents’ positions]; People v. Garcia (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 961, 969 [“Although a defendant has a ‘ “general [constitutional] right” ’ to offer a defense through the testimony of his or her witnesses, a state court’s exclusion of defense evidence under ordinary rules of evidence—including Evidence Code section 352—generally does not infringe upon this righ

2024Co. (1936) 6 Cal.2d 439, 448 [where the insured requested specific coverage for a particular car and explained the relevant facts to the agent, the insurance “company must be held bound to give the protection thus contracted for, and it cannot be permitted to perpetrate what would undoubtedly be a fraud on the insured by relying upon the exclusion clause of the policy”]; Ames v. Employers Casualty Co. (1936) 16 Cal.App.2d 255, 266 [“where, as here, the insurer makes a promise to write a certain specific coverage, the insured is entitled to rely thereon and the insurer is estopped from taking a

2024Co. (1936) 6 Cal.2d 439, 448 [where the insured requested specific coverage for a particular car and explained the relevant facts to the agent, the insurance “company must be held bound to give the protection thus contracted for, and it cannot be permitted to perpetrate what would undoubtedly be a fraud on the insured by relying upon the exclusion clause of the policy”]; Ames v. Employers Casualty Co. (1936) 16 Cal.App.2d 255, 266 [“where, as here, the insurer makes a promise to write a certain specific coverage, the insured is entitled to rely thereon and the insurer is estopped from taking a

2024(See, e.g., People v. Aranda (2012) 55 Cal.4th 342, 363 [federal constitutional errors subject to review for harmlessness under Chapman].) But generally, “ ‘ “[a]pplication of the ordinary rules of evidence . . . does not impermissibly infringe on a defendant’s right to present a defense.” [Citations.]’ ” (People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 998 .) “Although the complete exclusion of evidence intended to establish an accused’s defense may impair his or her right to due process of law, the exclusion of defense evidence on a minor or subsidiary point does not interfere with that constitu

2023(See, e.g., People v. Aranda (2012) 55 Cal.4th 342, 363 [federal constitutional errors subject to review for harmlessness under Chapman].)11 11 A violation of the confrontation clause would trigger the application of the Chapman standard, but, as we have determined ante, Duangputra has not in fact presented a confrontation clause claim.

2024Co. (1936) 6 Cal.2d 439, 448 [where the insured requested specific coverage for a particular car and explained the relevant facts to the agent, the insurance “company must be held bound to give the protection thus contracted for, and it cannot be permitted to perpetrate what would undoubtedly be a fraud on the insured by relying upon the exclusion clause of the policy”]; Ames v. Employers Casualty Co. (1936) 16 Cal.App.2d 255, 266 [“where, as here, the insurer makes a promise to write a certain specific coverage, the insured is entitled to rely thereon and the insurer is estopped from taking a

2024Co. (1936) 6 Cal.2d 439, 448 [where the insured requested specific coverage for a particular car and explained the relevant facts to the agent, the insurance “company must be held bound to give the protection thus contracted for, and it cannot be permitted to perpetrate what would undoubtedly be a fraud on the insured by relying upon the exclusion clause of the policy”]; Ames v. Employers Casualty Co. (1936) 16 Cal.App.2d 255, 266 [“where, as here, the insurer makes a promise to write a certain specific coverage, the insured is entitled to rely thereon and the insurer is estopped from taking a

2022(People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 998 (Cunningham).) Nevertheless 15 “Evidence Code section 352 must yield to a defendant’s due process right to a fair trial and to the right to present all relevant evidence of significant probative value to his or her defense.” (See id. at pp. 998−999.) In striking this balance, “the complete exclusion of evidence intended to establish an accused’s defense may impair his or her right to due process of law, [whereas] the exclusion of defense evidence on a minor or subsidiary point does not interfere with that constitutional right.” (Ibid., citing Pe

2021“In general, the ‘ “[a]pplication of the ordinary rules of evidence . . . does not impermissibly infringe on a defendant’s right to present a defense.” [Citations.]’ [Citations.] [¶] . . . [¶] Although the complete exclusion of evidence intended to establish an accused’s defense may impair his or her right to due process of law, the exclusion of defense 33 evidence on a minor or subsidiary point does not interfere with that constitutional right. [Citation.] Accordingly such a ruling, if erroneous, is ‘an error of law merely,’ which is governed by the standard of review announced in People v. W

2020(Id. at p. 836; see People v. Boyette (2002) 29 Cal.4th 381 , 427–428 [“ ‘ “[a]pplication of the ordinary rules of evidence … does not impermissibly infringe on a defendant’s right to present a defense” [Citations.]’ ”].) Under the Watson standard, we consider whether there is a “reasonable probability that a result more favorable to [defendant] would have occurred absent the error. [Citation.]” (People v. Dalton (2019) 7 Cal.5th 166, 259 , citing Watson, at p. 837.) However, defendant contends the exclusion of defense expert 9 We also note that even if defendant had believed the shotgun conta

2014(People v. Boyette, supra, at pp. 427– 428.) While the complete exclusion of defense evidence could rise to the level of a constitutional violation, that is not what occurred here.

2023(See People v. Blacksher (2011) 52 Cal.4th 769, 821 [“ ‘As a general matter, the ordinary rules of evidence do not impermissibly infringe on the accused’s right to present a defense.’ ”]; see also People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 999 [“Although the complete exclusion of evidence intended to establish an accused’s defense may impair his or her right to due process of law, the exclusion of defense evidence on a minor or subsidiary point does not interfere with that constitutional right.”].) 18 Alternatively, assuming the claims were not preserved for appeal, defendant makes a number o

2016(People v Brown, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 545 .) “‘“Confrontation clause violations are subject to federal harmless-error analysis under Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [ 17 L.Ed.2d 705 , 87 S.Ct. 824 ].” [Citation.] We ask whether it is 10 clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have reached the same verdict absent the error.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Livingston (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1145, 1159 .) “‘As a general matter, the ordinary rules of evidence do not impermissibly infringe on the accused’s right to present a defense.’” (People v. Blacksher (2011) 52 Cal.4th 76