96 Texas opinions name it 3 courts 1952–2025 7 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Whirlpool Corp. v. Camachogreen2 sentences2016As the court reiterated in Crump: [I]n very few cases will the evidence be such that the trial court’s reliability determination can properly be based only on the experience of a qualified witness to the exclusion of factors such as those set out in Robinson, or, on the other hand, properly be based only on factors such as those set out in Robinson to the exclusion of considerations based on a qualified expert’s experience. 330 S.W.3d at 216 (quoting Whirlpool Corp. v. Camacho, 298 S.W.3d 631, 638 (Tex. 2009)). 2015But experts ordinarily should meet the standards enunciated in both Robinson and Gammill: “[I]n very few cases will the evidence be such that the trial court's reliability determination can properly be based only on the experience of a qualified expert to the exclusion of factors such as those set out in Robinson, or, on the other hand, properly be based only on factors such as those set out in Robinson to the exclusion of considerations based on a qualified expert's experience.” Whirlpool Corp., 298 S.W.3d at 638 . | 8 | 10 |
MacK Trucks, Inc. v. Tamezgreen2 sentences2013But while the court’s “criteria for assessing reliability must vary depending on the nature of the evidence,” the court should consider the Robinson factors “when doing so will be helpful in determining reliability of the expert’s testimony, regardless of whether the testimony is scientific in nature or experience-based.” Id. “[I]n very few cases will the evidence be such that the trial court’s reliability determination can properly be based only on the experience of a qualified expert to the exclusion of factors such as those set out in Robinson, or, on the other hand, properly be based 21 on 2011Id. at 638 (citing Gammill v. Jack Williams Chevrolet, Inc., 972 S.W.2d 713, 720 (Tex.1998)); see Robinson, 923 S.W.2d at 557 . [16] "[I]n very few cases will the evidence be such that the trial court's reliability determination can properly be based only on the experience of a qualified expert to the exclusion of factors such as those set out in Robinson." Whirlpool, 298 S.W.3d at 638 (citing Mack Trucks, 206 S.W.3d at 579 and Gammill, 972 S.W.2d at 726 ). | 7 | 8 |
EI Du Pont De Nemours & Co. v. Robinsongreen2 sentences2011Id. at 638 (citing Gammill v. Jack Williams Chevrolet, Inc., 972 S.W.2d 713, 720 (Tex.1998)); see Robinson, 923 S.W.2d at 557 . [16] "[I]n very few cases will the evidence be such that the trial court's reliability determination can properly be based only on the experience of a qualified expert to the exclusion of factors such as those set out in Robinson." Whirlpool, 298 S.W.3d at 638 (citing Mack Trucks, 206 S.W.3d at 579 and Gammill, 972 S.W.2d at 726 ). 2011Id. at 638 (citing Gammill v. Jack Williams Chevrolet, Inc., 972 S.W.2d 713, 720 (Tex.1998)); see Robinson, 923 S.W.2d at 557 . 16 “[I]n very few cases will the evidence be such that the trial court’s reliability determination can properly be based only on the experience of a qualified expert to the exclusion of factors such as those set out in Robinson.” Whirlpool, 298 S.W.3d at 638 (citing Mack Trucks, 206 S.W.3d at 579 and Gammill, 972 S.W.2d at 726 ). | 4 | 4 |
Gonzalez v. Stategreen2 sentences2006Gonzales v. State, 571 S.W.2d 11, 13 (Tex.Cr.App. 1978). 1995Gonzales v. State, 571 S.W.2d 11, 13 (Tex.Cr.App. 1978). | 4 | 4 |
Gammill v. Jack Williams Chevrolet, Inc.green2 sentences2011Id. at 638 (citing Gammill v. Jack Williams Chevrolet, Inc., 972 S.W.2d 713, 720 (Tex.1998)); see Robinson, 923 S.W.2d at 557 . [16] "[I]n very few cases will the evidence be such that the trial court's reliability determination can properly be based only on the experience of a qualified expert to the exclusion of factors such as those set out in Robinson." Whirlpool, 298 S.W.3d at 638 (citing Mack Trucks, 206 S.W.3d at 579 and Gammill, 972 S.W.2d at 726 ). 2011Id. at 638 (citing Gammill v. Jack Williams Chevrolet, Inc., 972 S.W.2d 713, 720 (Tex.1998)); see Robinson, 923 S.W.2d at 557 . [16] "[I]n very few cases will the evidence be such that the trial court's reliability determination can properly be based only on the experience of a qualified expert to the exclusion of factors such as those set out in Robinson." Whirlpool, 298 S.W.3d at 638 (citing Mack Trucks, 206 S.W.3d at 579 and Gammill, 972 S.W.2d at 726 ). | 3 | 5 |
Baldree v. Stategreen2 sentences2020See Baldree v. State, 784 S.W.2d 676, 686 (Tex.Crim.App. 1989) (en banc) (indicating that “a trial judge need not instruct the jury on corroboration when the corpus delicti is established by the evidence”). 2015See Baldree v. State, 784 S.W.2d 676, 686 (Tex.Crim.App. 1989)(holding that “a trial judge need not instruct the jury on corroboration when the corpus delicti is established by other evidence”); Callaway v. State, No. 13-08-259-CR, 2010 WL 467001 (Tex.App.--Corpus Christi Feb. 11, 2010, pet. ref’d)(mem. op., not designated for publication)(trial court does not err in refusing to give corpus delicti instruction where independent evidence apart from DWI confession renders corpus delicti of DWI more probable than not). | 3 | 3 |
Zuliani v. Stategreen2 sentences2016Zuliani v. State, 97 S.W.3d 589, 595 (Tex.Crim.App. 2003). 2016Zuliani v. State, 97 S.W.3d 589, 595 (Tex.Crim.App. 2003). | 3 | 3 |
Scugoza v. Stategreen2 sentences2014Margraves v. State, 34 S.W.3d 912, 919 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000); see also Scugoza v. State, 949 S.W.2d 360, 362 (Tex.App. – San Antonio 1997, no pet.) (the jury was entitled to believe the State’s witnesses’ version of the events to the exclusion of the defense witnesses’ version). 2013App. 2000); see also Scugoza, 949 S.W.2d at 362 (the jury was entitled to believe the State’s witnesses’ version of the events to the exclusion of the defense witnesses’ version). | 2 | 2 |
Grain Dealers Mutual Insurance v. McKeegreen2 sentences2003See Grain Dealers , 943 S.W.2d at 458 (stating that an insurance contract that is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation is ambiguous, and interpretation that most favors coverage for insured will be adopted). 2003See Grain Dealers , 943 S.W.2d at 458 (an insurance contract that is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation is ambiguous, and interpretation that most favors coverage for insured will be adopted). | 2 | 2 |
National Union Fire Insurance Co. of Pittsburgh v. Hudson Energy Co.green2 sentences1999See Hudson Energy Co., 811 S.W.2d at 555 (citing Barnett v. Aetna Life Ins. 1999See Hudson Energy Co. , 811 S.W.2d at 585 (citing Barnett v. Aetna Life Ins. | 2 | 2 |
Weisel Enterprises, Inc. v. Currygreen2 sentences1991Weisel Enterprises, Inc. v. Curry, 718 S.W.2d 56, 58 (Tex.1986); Caudillo v. Chiuminatto, 741 S.W.2d 545, 546 (Tex.App.Corpus Christi 1987, orig. proceeding). 1991Weisel Enterprises, Inc. v. Curry, 718 S.W.2d 56, 58 (Tex.1986); Caudillo v. Chiuminatto, 741 S.W.2d 545, 546 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1987, orig. proceeding). | 2 | 2 |
State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Reedgreen2 sentences2000Id. at 701 . 2000Id. at 701 . | 1 | 2 |
State Ex Rel. State Department of Highways & Public Transportation v. Gonzalezgreen1 sentence2023See, e.g., Gonzalez, 82 S.W.3d at 326 (stating § 101.056 excepts discretionary policy decisions, including “decisions about highway design or what types of safety features to install” from Act’s waiver of governmental immunity). | 1 | 1 |
Jaime Hernandez Vidal v. Stategreen1 sentence2023See Vidal v. State, 418 S.W.3d 907, 911 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, pet. ref’d) (holding trial court did not err in denying appellant’s request for defense of third person instruction because appellant was prosecuted for reckless injury of innocent third person). | 1 | 1 |
Jones v. Stategreen2 sentences2023See id. at 391-92 . “[T]he [trial court’s] erroneous excusing of a veniremember will call for reversal only if the record shows that the error deprived the defendant of a lawfully constituted jury.” Id. at 394 ; see also Cano v. State, No. 09-13-00223- CR, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 1530 , at **12-13 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Feb. 18, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). 2023See id. at 391-92 . “[T]he [trial court’s] erroneous excusing of a veniremember will call for reversal only if the record shows that the error deprived the defendant of a lawfully constituted jury.” Id. at 394 ; see also Cano v. State, No. 09-13-00223- CR, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 1530 , at **12-13 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Feb. 18, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). | 1 | 1 |
Clark v. Stategreen1 sentence2021The Golliday court agreed that although hyper-technical words are not required to preserve error, the complaining party must still “let the trial judge know what he wants, why he thinks he is entitled to it, and to do so clearly enough for the judge to understand him at a time when the 11 judge is in a proper position to do something about it.” Golliday, 560 S.W.3d at 670 , quoting Clark v. State, 365 S.W.3d 333, 339 (Tex.Crim.App. 2012) (instructing that the complaint on appeal must comport with the objection made at trial). | 1 | 1 |
Reyna v. Stategreen1 sentence2021The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the lower court’s finding that the trial court violated the defendant’s rights, noting that “in order to preserve an argument that the exclusion of defense evidence violates constitutional principles, a defendant must state the grounds for the ruling that he seeks with sufficient specificity to make the court aware of these grounds.” Id. at 668-671 , citing Reyna, 168 S.W.3d at 177 (instructing that it is not enough for an appellant to tell a trial court evidence is admissible; he must tell the trial court why the evidence is admissible). | 1 | 1 |
Boles v. Stategreen1 sentence2020We disagree. 7 Ephraim believed the incident occurred around 2006. 8 Prior was wearing a police body camera. 5 To properly preserve any alleged jury charge error relating to the exclusion of an instruction on a lesser-included offense, the defendant must present either a timely objection to the charge or a requested charge. 9 Boles v. State, 598 S.W.2d 274, 278 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Great American Insurance Co. v. Primogreen1 sentence2020See id. (“A contract’s plain language controls, not what one side or the other alleges they intended to say but did not.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). | 1 | 1 |
| Duhig v. Peavy-Moore Lumber Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Gee v. Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Michael Carbone, Inc. v. General Accident Insurancegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Margraves v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Salazar v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Gomez v. Hartford Co. of the Midwestgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Holmes v. South Carolinagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Stewart Title Guaranty Co. v. Kiefergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Zani v. Statered | 1 | 1 |
| Sulacia v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| U.S. Underwriters Insurance v. Congregation B'nai Israelgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Burrhus v. M&S SUPPLY, INC.green | 1 | 1 |
| Kelley v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Reyes v. Statered | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Trowbridgegreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Mazerollegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Ianellogreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Ericksongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Castro v. Sebestagreen | 1 | 1 |
| LSR Joint Venture No. 2 v. Callewartgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Wise v. DeTocagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Petticrew v. ABB Lummus Global, Inc.
green
2 sentences2014“If the exclusion clause uses the term ‘the insured,’ application of the separation of insureds clause requires that the term be interpreted as referring only to the insured against whom a claim is being made under the policy.” Id. (citing Commercial Standard Ins. 2014However, we further explained that if “the exclusion clause uses the term ‘any insured,’ then application of the separation of insureds clause has no effect on the exclusion clause; a claim made against any insured is excluded.” Id. (citing Petticrew, 53 F.Supp.2d at 871 ; Michael Carbone, Inc. v. General Acc. Ins. | 4 | 2003–2014 |
Gilbert Texas Construction, L.P. v. Underwriters at Lloyd's London
green
2 sentences2015Id. 2015Id. | 3 | 2014–2015 |
Exxon Pipeline Co. v. Zwahr
green
2 sentences2011Id. at 638 (citing Gammill v. Jack Williams Chevrolet, Inc., 972 S.W.2d 713, 720 (Tex.1998)); see Robinson, 923 S.W.2d at 557 . [16] "[I]n very few cases will the evidence be such that the trial court's reliability determination can properly be based only on the experience of a qualified expert to the exclusion of factors such as those set out in Robinson." Whirlpool, 298 S.W.3d at 638 (citing Mack Trucks, 206 S.W.3d at 579 and Gammill, 972 S.W.2d at 726 ). 2011Id. at 638 (citing Gammill v. Jack Williams Chevrolet, Inc., 972 S.W.2d 713, 720 (Tex.1998)); see Robinson, 923 S.W.2d at 557 . 16 “[I]n very few cases will the evidence be such that the trial court’s reliability determination can properly be based only on the experience of a qualified expert to the exclusion of factors such as those set out in Robinson.” Whirlpool, 298 S.W.3d at 638 (citing Mack Trucks, 206 S.W.3d at 579 and Gammill, 972 S.W.2d at 726 ). | 3 | 2011–2011 |
Walters v. State
green
2 sentences2008Walters, 247 S.W.3d at 220-21 . 2008Walters , 247 S.W.3d at 220-21 . | 3 | 2008–2008 |
Webb v. State
green
2 sentences2022Routier, 112 S.W.3d at 590 ; Webb, 766 S.W.2d at 240 . 2003Id. at 240 . | 2 | 2003–2022 |
Kentucky v. Stincer
green
2 sentences2012Id. 2012Id. | 2 | 2012–2012 |
Garcia v. State
green
1 sentence2025Id. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Routier v. State
green
1 sentence2022Routier, 112 S.W.3d at 590 ; Webb, 766 S.W.2d at 240 . | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Goodspeed v. State
green
1 sentence2021Even if we assume appellant’s attorney concluded that appellant’s exchange permitting the officer to open her phone was subject to Miranda, that Miranda warnings were not given, and that such statements could have been suppressed or that a court would have suppressed, we cannot conclude that appellant’s trial counsel’s failure to act on such and seek the exclusion or an instruction with respect to the evidence in question — with no discernable bearing on her offense or the seizure of her cell phone data — was “so outrageous that no competent attorney would have engaged in it.” Goodspeed, 187 S | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Golliday v. State
green
2 sentences2021The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the lower court’s finding that the trial court violated the defendant’s rights, noting that “in order to preserve an argument that the exclusion of defense evidence violates constitutional principles, a defendant must state the grounds for the ruling that he seeks with sufficient specificity to make the court aware of these grounds.” Id. at 668-671 , citing Reyna, 168 S.W.3d at 177 (instructing that it is not enough for an appellant to tell a trial court evidence is admissible; he must tell the trial court why the evidence is admissible). 2021The Golliday court agreed that although hyper-technical words are not required to preserve error, the complaining party must still “let the trial judge know what he wants, why he thinks he is entitled to it, and to do so clearly enough for the judge to understand him at a time when the 11 judge is in a proper position to do something about it.” Golliday, 560 S.W.3d at 670 , quoting Clark v. State, 365 S.W.3d 333, 339 (Tex.Crim.App. 2012) (instructing that the complaint on appeal must comport with the objection made at trial). | 1 | 2021–2021 |
City of Corsicana v. Willman
green
2 sentences2018As in Sullivan , we conclude that the absence of a comma after the term "premises" indicates an intent to limit the now-owned-by-Grantor modifier "to the last item in the series." If the clause had separated the now-owned-by-Grantor phrase from the rest of the clause by including a comma after the word premises, it might indicate an intent that the phrase modify "royalties," "minerals," and "premises," or perhaps even just the term "royalties." And it certainly would have indicated that intent had it saved and excepted 1/2 "of all royalties which are now owned by Grantor, from the production o 2018As in Sullivan , we conclude that the absence of a comma after the term "premises" indicates an intent to limit the now-owned-by-Grantor modifier "to the last item in the series." If the clause had separated the now-owned-by-Grantor phrase from the rest of the clause by including a comma after the word premises, it might indicate an intent that the phrase modify "royalties," "minerals," and "premises," or perhaps even just the term "royalties." And it certainly would have indicated that intent had it saved and excepted 1/2 "of all royalties which are now owned by Grantor, from the production o | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| Transcontinental Insurance Co. v. Crump green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Atkinson v. State green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Barrios v. State green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Commercial Standard Insurance Co. v. American General Insurance Co. green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Mid-Continent Casualty Co. v. JHP Development, Inc. green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Drilex Systems, Inc. v. Flores green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| McKinney v. City of Gainesville green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co. green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| Potter v. State green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Exxon Corporation v. Brecheen green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| People v. Shipstead green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Crane v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| McElroy v. State green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Holyfield v. Members Mutual Insurance Co. green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Automobile Underwriters' Ins. Co. v. Long green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Sherman v. Provident American Insurance Company green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| International Travelers Ass'n v. Marshall green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Woods v. Insurance Co. of North America green | 1 | 1976–1976 |
| California Casualty Indemnity Exchange v. Steven green | 1 | 1974–1974 |
| Republic National Life Insurance Co. v. Spillars green | 1 | 1972–1972 |
| Commercial Standard Insurance Company v. Sanders neutral | 1 | 1970–1970 |
| Texas Power & Light Company v. Adams green | 1 | 1970–1970 |
| Dumas v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company green | 1 | 1969–1969 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.