45 Wisconsin opinions name it 3 courts 1937–2026 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Wisconsin courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
American Family Mutual Insurance v. American Girl, Inc.green2 sentences2025Furthermore, “[a]n exception pertains only to the exclusion clause within which it appears; the applicability of an exception will not create coverage if the insuring agreement precludes it or if a separate exclusion applies.” Id. ¶16 Based on our review of the terms of the policy and the record, we conclude that although the CGL Coverage Form provides an initial grant of coverage for the claims alleged in Finley’s parents’ amended complaint and Hemauer’s third-party complaint, the Limited Event Coverage Endorsement restricts coverage to occurrences taking place during a scheduled, reported, a 2023Specifically, American Girl states that “[a]n exception pertains only to the exclusion clause within which it appears; the applicability of an exception will not create coverage if the insuring agreement precludes it or if a separate exclusion applies.” 33 Allenton, 2023 WI App 3, ¶16 (emphasis omitted; quoting American Girl, 268 Wis. 2d 16, ¶24 ). | 1 | 3 |
Holmes v. South Carolinagreen2 sentences2015See Chambers, 410 U.S. at 302 ("In the exercise of this right, the accused, as is required of the State, must comply with established rules of procedure and evidence designed to assure both fairness and reliability in the ascertainment of guilt and innocence."); See also Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 327 (2006) ("While the Constitution thus prohibits the exclusion of defense evidence under rules that serve no legitimate purpose or that are disproportionate to the ends that they are asserted to promote, well-established rules of evidence permit trial judges to exclude evidence if its 2015See Chambers, 410 U.S. at 302 ("In the exercise of this right, the accused, as is required of the State, must comply with established rules of procedure and evidence designed to assure both fairness and reliability in the ascertainment of guilt and innocence."); See also Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 327 (2006) ("While the Constitution thus prohibits the exclusion of defense evidence under rules that serve no legitimate purpose or that are disproportionate to the ends that they are asserted to promote, well-established rules of evidence permit trial judges to exclude evidence if its | 1 | 3 |
Taryn Ef v. Joshua Mcgreen2 sentences2020Id. ¶19 The grammatically-focused inquiry that drove the result in Nemetz (and arguably Hedtcke) continued with our decision in Taryn E.F. v. Joshua M.C., 178 Wis. 2d 719 , 505 N.W.2d 418 (Ct. App. 1993). 1995The exclusion clause in Taryn barred the claim if the act was committed by "any insured." Id. at 723, 505 N.W.2d at 420. | 1 | 2 |
ESTATE OF SUSTACHE v. American Family Mutual Insurance Companygreen1 sentence2026See Estate of Sustache, 311 Wis. 2d 548, ¶¶52-56 . ¶10 Atkinson devotes significant argument to whether the circuit court improperly limited its analysis to the complaint when, in this case, there was a developed record. | 1 | 1 |
Swift v. Fitchburg Mutual Insurancegreen1 sentence2024Co., 700 N.E.2d 288, 295 (Mass. App. Ct. 1998) (“[A]n at least equally plausible meaning [of ‘criminal acts’] … is that a person who is not convicted, or convictable, of a crime has not committed a criminal act, or that a person who is incapable of rational thinking or action at the time has not committed a criminal act.”). ¶30 Because the definition of “criminal” in the exclusion clause is susceptible to more than one reasonable meaning, that word is ambiguous. | 1 | 1 |
Folkman v. Quammegreen1 sentence2024See Folkman, 264 Wis. 2d 617, ¶13 . | 1 | 1 |
Secura Insurance v. 33 Allenton Venture, L.L.C.green1 sentence2023Specifically, American Girl states that “[a]n exception pertains only to the exclusion clause within which it appears; the applicability of an exception will not create coverage if the insuring agreement precludes it or if a separate exclusion applies.” 33 Allenton, 2023 WI App 3, ¶16 (emphasis omitted; quoting American Girl, 268 Wis. 2d 16, ¶24 ). | 1 | 1 |
Chambers v. Mississippigreen2 sentences2015See Chambers, 410 U.S. at 302 ("In the exercise of this right, the accused, as is required of the State, must comply with established rules of procedure and evidence designed to assure both fairness and reliability in the ascertainment of guilt and innocence."); See also Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 327 (2006) ("While the Constitution thus prohibits the exclusion of defense evidence under rules that serve no legitimate purpose or that are disproportionate to the ends that they are asserted to promote, well-established rules of evidence permit trial judges to exclude evidence if its 2015See Chambers, 410 U.S. at 302 ("In the exercise of this right, the accused, as is required of the State, must comply with established rules of procedure and evidence designed to assure both fairness and reliability in the ascertainment of guilt and innocence."); See also Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 327 (2006) ("While the Constitution thus prohibits the exclusion of defense evidence under rules that serve no legitimate purpose or that are disproportionate to the ends that they are asserted to promote, well-established rules of evidence permit trial judges to exclude evidence if its | 1 | 1 |
Gross v. Hoffmangreen1 sentence2011See Gross, 227 Wis. at 300 , 277 N.W at 665 (only dispositive issue need be addressed). | 1 | 1 |
St. John's Home v. Continental Casualty Co.green1 sentence1999See id. 7 West Bend also relies on this exclusion to bar coverage for the damage to, and loss of use of, the interior of the Jacobs' residence. | 1 | 1 |
SPHERE DRAKE INS. CO. PLC v. YL Realty Co.green1 sentence1999Realty Co., 990 F. Supp. 240, 243 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), the court summarized its view of the law as follows: Several courts recently have interpreted pollution exclusion clauses similar to the one at issue here. *140 The overwhelming trend in these cases has been to hold that such clauses do not exclude contaminants such as lead paint poisoning....These courts have held, and this Court agrees, that pollution exclusion clauses refer only to industrial and environmental pollution....The language of the exclusion clause supports this interpretation. | 1 | 1 |
| Utley v. Allstate Insurancegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Applegren v. Milbank Mutual Insurance Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Hudak v. Union Indemnity Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Beahm v. Pautschgreen2 sentences1996But see Beahm v. Pautsch, 180 Wis. 2d 574, 580-585 , 510 N.W.2d 702, 705-707 (Ct. App. 1993), where, contrary to the exclusion clause at issue in this case, the exclusion clause applied to the "discharge, dispersal, release, or escape" of various substances "into or upon the land, the atmosphere or a watercourse, body of water, bog, marsh, swamp or wetland." Id., 180 Wis. 2d at 580 , 510 N.W.2d at 705 (emphasis added). 1996But see Beahm v. Pautsch, 180 Wis. 2d 574, 580-585 , 510 N.W.2d 702, 705-707 (Ct. App. 1993), where, contrary to the exclusion clause at issue in this case, the exclusion clause applied to the "discharge, dispersal, release, or escape" of various substances "into or upon the land, the atmosphere or a watercourse, body of water, bog, marsh, swamp or wetland." Id., 180 Wis. 2d at 580 , 510 N.W.2d at 705 (emphasis added). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Frye v. Theige
green
2 sentences2014The insurance company contended that because the provision was a general exclusion of coverage that applied equally to the named insured and additional insureds, it did not violate the omnibus statute. 24 The court in Frye v. Theige, 253 Wis. 596 , 34 N.W.2d 793 (1948), distinguished Archer v. General Casualty Co. of Wisconsin, 219 Wis. 100 , 261 N.W. 9 (1935), which accorded coverage for liability for injury to a named insured, from Munsert v. Farmers Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 229 Wis. 581 , 281 N.W. 671 (1938), which did not accord coverage for liability for injury to a named insured, 2014The insurance company contended that because the provision was a general exclusion of coverage that applied equally to the named insured and additional insureds, it did not violate the omnibus statute. 24 The court in Frye v. Theige, 253 Wis. 596 , 34 N.W.2d 793 (1948), distinguished Archer v. General Casualty Co. of Wisconsin, 219 Wis. 100 , 261 N.W. 9 (1935), which accorded coverage for liability for injury to a named insured, from Munsert v. Farmers Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 229 Wis. 581 , 281 N.W. 671 (1938), which did not accord coverage for liability for injury to a named insured, | 3 | 1948–2014 |
Muehlenbein v. West Bend Mutual Insurance
green
2 sentences2012Collectively, these cases provide that an unambiguous initial grant of third-party coverage will not be undone by an exclusion, see Jaderborg, 239 Wis. 2d 533, ¶ 17 ; that an endorsement that includes both an exclusion and an exception to the exclusion will not be read to overcome the initial grant of coverage, see Muehlenbein, 175 Wis. 2d at 265-66 ; and that the requirement of maintaining underlying automobile liability insurance does not translate into a corresponding requirement that UM coverage be maintained, see Etter, 314 Wis. 2d 678, ¶¶ 13-15 . ¶ 39. 2011Muehlenbein, 175 Wis. 2d at 265-66 . | 2 | 2011–2012 |
Meiser v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.
green
2 sentences2010Id. 1963Meiser v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. (1959), 8 Wis. (2d) 233, 238, 98 N. W. (2d) 919 , sets forth this rule, as follows: “ ‘Exclusion clauses are strictly construed against the insurer, especially if they are of uncertain import. | 2 | 1963–2010 |
Behringer v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
neutral
2 sentences1960Co. (1957), 275 Wis. 586, 594 , 82 N. W. (2d) 915 , wherein we declared: “Universal Underwriters contends that in the instant case it does have a valid defense based upon an exclusion clause in the policy. 1960Co. (1957), 275 Wis. 586, 594 , 82 N. W. (2d) 915 , wherein we declared: “Universal Underwriters contends that in the instant case it does have a valid defense based upon an exclusion clause in the policy. | 2 | 1959–1960 |
Havlik v. Bittner
green
2 sentences1960Co. (1954), 266 Wis. 387 , 63 N. W. (2d) 691 , and Havlik v. Bittner (1956), 272 Wis. 71 , 74 N. W. (2d) 798 , the exclusion clause contained in the motorcycle policy is valid. 1960Co. (1954), 266 Wis. 387 , 63 N. W. (2d) 691 , and Havlik v. Bittner (1956), 272 Wis. 71 , 74 N. W. (2d) 798 , the exclusion clause contained in the motorcycle policy is valid. | 2 | 1959–1960 |
Schneider v. Depies
green
2 sentences1954The insurance with respect to any person or organization other than the named insured does not ap-piy: .... “(b) to any employee with respect to injury to or sickness, disease, or death of another employee of the same employer injured in the course of such employment in an accident arising out of the maintenance or use of the automobile in the business of such employer.” Appellant brought the motion for summary judgment following the decision of this court in Schneider v. Depies (1954), 266 Wis. 43 , 62 N. W. (2d) 431 , where it was held that an exclusion clause phrased in language identical t 1954The insurance with respect to any person or organization other than the named insured does not ap-piy: .... “(b) to any employee with respect to injury to or sickness, disease, or death of another employee of the same employer injured in the course of such employment in an accident arising out of the maintenance or use of the automobile in the business of such employer.” Appellant brought the motion for summary judgment following the decision of this court in Schneider v. Depies (1954), 266 Wis. 43 , 62 N. W. (2d) 431 , where it was held that an exclusion clause phrased in language identical t | 2 | 1954–1954 |
Northwestern National Insurance v. Nemetz
green
1 sentence2020Id. ¶19 The grammatically-focused inquiry that drove the result in Nemetz (and arguably Hedtcke) continued with our decision in Taryn E.F. v. Joshua M.C., 178 Wis. 2d 719 , 505 N.W.2d 418 (Ct. App. 1993). | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Professional Office Buildings, Inc. v. Royal Indemnity Co.
green
2 sentences2016Prof'l Office Bldgs., 145 Wis. 2d at 584-85 . 2016Prof'l Office Bldgs., 145 Wis. 2d at 584-85 . | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Archer v. General Casualty Co. of Wisconsin
green
2 sentences2014The insurance company contended that because the provision was a general exclusion of coverage that applied equally to the named insured and additional insureds, it did not violate the omnibus statute. 24 The court in Frye v. Theige, 253 Wis. 596 , 34 N.W.2d 793 (1948), distinguished Archer v. General Casualty Co. of Wisconsin, 219 Wis. 100 , 261 N.W. 9 (1935), which accorded coverage for liability for injury to a named insured, from Munsert v. Farmers Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 229 Wis. 581 , 281 N.W. 671 (1938), which did not accord coverage for liability for injury to a named insured, 2014The insurance company contended that because the provision was a general exclusion of coverage that applied equally to the named insured and additional insureds, it did not violate the omnibus statute. 24 The court in Frye v. Theige, 253 Wis. 596 , 34 N.W.2d 793 (1948), distinguished Archer v. General Casualty Co. of Wisconsin, 219 Wis. 100 , 261 N.W. 9 (1935), which accorded coverage for liability for injury to a named insured, from Munsert v. Farmers Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 229 Wis. 581 , 281 N.W. 671 (1938), which did not accord coverage for liability for injury to a named insured, | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Munsert v. Farmers Mutual Automobile Insurance
green
2 sentences2014The insurance company contended that because the provision was a general exclusion of coverage that applied equally to the named insured and additional insureds, it did not violate the omnibus statute. 24 The court in Frye v. Theige, 253 Wis. 596 , 34 N.W.2d 793 (1948), distinguished Archer v. General Casualty Co. of Wisconsin, 219 Wis. 100 , 261 N.W. 9 (1935), which accorded coverage for liability for injury to a named insured, from Munsert v. Farmers Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 229 Wis. 581 , 281 N.W. 671 (1938), which did not accord coverage for liability for injury to a named insured, 2014The insurance company contended that because the provision was a general exclusion of coverage that applied equally to the named insured and additional insureds, it did not violate the omnibus statute. 24 The court in Frye v. Theige, 253 Wis. 596 , 34 N.W.2d 793 (1948), distinguished Archer v. General Casualty Co. of Wisconsin, 219 Wis. 100 , 261 N.W. 9 (1935), which accorded coverage for liability for injury to a named insured, from Munsert v. Farmers Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 229 Wis. 581 , 281 N.W. 671 (1938), which did not accord coverage for liability for injury to a named insured, | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Great American Restoration Services, Inc. v. Scottsdale Insurance
green
1 sentence2013Great American, 78 A.D.3d at 777 . ¶ 31. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Hirschhorn v. Auto-Owners Insurance
green
1 sentence2013Id. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Shannon v. Shannon
green
2 sentences2012Shannon v. Shannon, 145 Wis. 2d 763, 774-78 , 429 N.W.2d 525 (Ct. App. 1988). 2012Shannon v. Shannon, 145 Wis. 2d 763, 774-78 , 429 N.W.2d 525 (Ct. App. 1988). | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Etter v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
green
1 sentence2012Collectively, these cases provide that an unambiguous initial grant of third-party coverage will not be undone by an exclusion, see Jaderborg, 239 Wis. 2d 533, ¶ 17 ; that an endorsement that includes both an exclusion and an exception to the exclusion will not be read to overcome the initial grant of coverage, see Muehlenbein, 175 Wis. 2d at 265-66 ; and that the requirement of maintaining underlying automobile liability insurance does not translate into a corresponding requirement that UM coverage be maintained, see Etter, 314 Wis. 2d 678, ¶¶ 13-15 . ¶ 39. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Jaderborg Ex Rel. Jaderborg v. American Family Mutual Insurance
green
1 sentence2012Collectively, these cases provide that an unambiguous initial grant of third-party coverage will not be undone by an exclusion, see Jaderborg, 239 Wis. 2d 533, ¶ 17 ; that an endorsement that includes both an exclusion and an exception to the exclusion will not be read to overcome the initial grant of coverage, see Muehlenbein, 175 Wis. 2d at 265-66 ; and that the requirement of maintaining underlying automobile liability insurance does not translate into a corresponding requirement that UM coverage be maintained, see Etter, 314 Wis. 2d 678, ¶¶ 13-15 . ¶ 39. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. St. Paul Surplus Lines Insurance
green
1 sentence2003Id. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Leverence v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty
green
2 sentences1996In Leverence v. United States Fidelity & Guar., 158 Wis. 2d 64 , 462 N.W.2d 218 (Ct. App. 1990), the court concluded that the exclusion clause did not bar coverage. 1996In Leverence v. United States Fidelity & Guar., 158 Wis. 2d 64 , 462 N.W.2d 218 (Ct. App. 1990), the court concluded that the exclusion clause did not bar coverage. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Whirlpool Corp. v. Ziebert green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Just v. Land Reclamation Ltd.
green
2 sentences1996Both clauses exclude coverage for injuries caused by the "discharge, dispersal, seepage, migration, release or escape of pollutants." The "sudden and accidental" clause, however, does not exclude such injuries if the release was sudden and accidental." Compare the "absolute" exclusion in this case . . . with the "sudden and accidental" exclusion discussed in Just v. Land Reclamation Ltd., 155 Wis. 2d 737 , 456 N.W.2d 570 (1990). [3] Hereafter, we refer to this clause as a "discharge." [4] Fink, the treating physician for two of the plaintiffs, used the term "contaminants" throughout his report 1996Both clauses exclude coverage for injuries caused by the "discharge, dispersal, seepage, migration, release or escape of pollutants." The "sudden and accidental" clause, however, does not exclude such injuries if the release was sudden and accidental." Compare the "absolute" exclusion in this case . . . with the "sudden and accidental" exclusion discussed in Just v. Land Reclamation Ltd., 155 Wis. 2d 737 , 456 N.W.2d 570 (1990). [3] Hereafter, we refer to this clause as a "discharge." [4] Fink, the treating physician for two of the plaintiffs, used the term "contaminants" throughout his report | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| United States Fire Insurance v. Ace Baking Co. green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Bulen v. West Bend Mutual Insurance green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| K.A.G. Ex Rel. Carson v. Stanford green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Maryland Casualty Company v. Citizens National Bank of West Hollywood green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Namekagon Development Co. v. Bois Forte Reservation Housing Authority green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Pachucki v. Republic Insurance Co. green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Tomlyanovich v. Tomlyanovich green | 1 | 1973–1973 |
| Pyykola v. Woody green | 1 | 1972–1972 |
| Lontkowski v. Ignarski green | 1 | 1961–1961 |
| Dore v. Glenn Rock Mineral Spring Co. neutral | 1 | 1961–1961 |
| Bauman v. Gilbertson green | 1 | 1960–1960 |
| Musselman v. Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. of Herman neutral | 1 | 1960–1960 |
| Sandstrom v. Estate of Clausen neutral | 1 | 1955–1955 |
| Hoefer v. Last green | 1 | 1938–1938 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.