exclusion exception in North Dakota

2020Pouliot asserts that the remedy for the failure to follow N.D.C.C. § 39-20-01(a) is the exclusion of the test result from evidence under N.D.C.C. § 39-20-01(b). [¶6] “When reviewing a district court’s decision on a motion to suppress evidence, this Court will defer to the district court’s findings of fact and resolve conflicts in testimony in favor of affirmance.” State v. Washington, 2020 ND 120, ¶ 7 (citing State v. Vigen, 2019 ND 134, ¶ 5 , 927 N.W.2d 430 ).

2020Pouliot asserts that the remedy for the failure to follow N.D.C.C. § 39-20-01(a) is the exclusion of the test result from evidence under N.D.C.C. § 39-20-01(b). [¶6] “When reviewing a district court’s decision on a motion to suppress evidence, this Court will defer to the district court’s findings of fact and resolve conflicts in testimony in favor of affirmance.” State v. Washington, 2020 ND 120, ¶ 7 (citing State v. Vigen, 2019 ND 134, ¶ 5 , 927 N.W.2d 430 ).

2013United States Fire Ins., 979 So.2d at 875 . [¶ 18] One scholarly article summarized the Florida Supreme Court’s decision as follows: The court first disagreed with the insurer’s numerous arguments against finding an “occurrence,” expressly rejecting “the use of the concept of ‘natural and probable consequences’ or ‘foreseeability 1 in insurance contract interpretation.” Second, the court rejected the insurer’s distinction between tort and contractual claims, because the policy does not distinguish between either form of liability.

2013United States Fire Ins. , 979 So. 2d at 875 . [¶18] One scholarly article summarized the Florida Supreme Court’s decision as follows: The court first disagreed with the insurer’s numerous arguments against finding an “occurrence,” expressly rejecting “the use of the concept of ‘natural and probable consequences’ or ‘foreseeability’ in insurance contract interpretation.” Second, the court rejected the insurer’s distinction between tort and contractual claims, because the policy does not distinguish between either form of liability.

1979See State v. Matousek, 287 Minn. 344 , 178 N.W.2d 604, 608 (1970); Phillips v. Neil, 452 F.2d 337, 348 (6th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 884 , 93 S.Ct. 96 , 34 L.Ed.2d 141 ; State v. Wiley, 295 Minn. 411 , 205 N.W.2d 667, 674-675 (1973); State v. Tims, 9 Ohio St.2d 136 , 224 N.E.2d 348, 351 (1967); Commonwealth v. McCloud, 457 Pa. 310 , 322 A.2d 653, 656 (1974).

1979See State v. Matousek, 287 Minn. 344 , 178 N.W.2d 604, 608 (1970); Phillips v. Neil, 452 F.2d 337, 348 (6th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 884 , 93 S.Ct. 96 , 34 L.Ed.2d 141 ; State v. Wiley, 295 Minn. 411 , 205 N.W.2d 667, 674-675 (1973); State v. Tims, 9 Ohio St.2d 136 , 224 N.E.2d 348, 351 (1967); Commonwealth v. McCloud, 457 Pa. 310 , 322 A.2d 653, 656 (1974).

1977In United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Company, 363 U.S. 574, 585 , 80 S.Ct. 1347, 1354 , 4 L.Ed.2d 1409 , the United States Supreme Court said: "In the absence of any express provision excluding a particular grievance from arbitration, we think only the most forceful evidence of a purpose to exclude the claim from arbitration can prevail, particularly where, as here, the exclusion clause is vague and the arbitration clause quite broad." We construe this to mean that where there is a broad arbitration clause and no exclusion clause, doubt should be resolved in favor of

1977In United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Company, 363 U.S. 574, 585 , 80 S.Ct. 1347, 1354 , 4 L.Ed.2d 1409 , the United States Supreme Court said: "In the absence of any express provision excluding a particular grievance from arbitration, we think only the most forceful evidence of a purpose to exclude the claim from arbitration can prevail, particularly where, as here, the exclusion clause is vague and the arbitration clause quite broad." We construe this to mean that where there is a broad arbitration clause and no exclusion clause, doubt should be resolved in favor of

1965The defendants cite Dowdall v. Commercial Travelers Mutual Accident Association of America, 344 Mass. 71, 181 N.E. 2d 594 , in support of its position that the condition of the plaintiff was in existence before the effective date of the policy, and, therefore, the defendant was not precluded in calling up the exclusion clause in defense of the claim of the plaintiff.

1965The defendants cite Dowdall v. Commercial Travelers Mutual Accident Association of America, 344 Mass. 71, 181 N.E. 2d 594 , in support of its position that the condition of the plaintiff was in existence before the effective date of the policy, and, therefore, the defendant was not precluded in calling up the exclusion clause in defense of the claim of the plaintiff.