exclusion clause in Missouri

2007Co., 903 S.W.2d 215, 217 (Mo.App.1995); Bowan ex rel.

2005Co., 903 S.W.2d 215, 217 (Mo.App.

1950A plaintiff’s judgment against both defendants was reversed as to the corporate defendant because the accident occurred at a place where plaintiff’s services for said employer reasonably required him to be and, hence, the accident was within the purview of the Workmen’s Compensation Act (38 S. W. 2d l. c. 501), while the judgment was affirmed as to the coemployee defendant because he was not subject to the Workmen’s Compensation Act, being a “third person” within § 3699, supra. 5 This ruling is in harmony with holdings to the effect that neither the exclusion clause of § 3691, nor the provisio

1950A plaintiff’s judgment against both defendants was reversed as to the corporate defendant because the accident occurred at a place where plaintiff’s services for said employer reasonably required him to be and, hence, the accident was within the purview of the Workmen’s Compensation Act (38 S. W. 2d l. c. 501), while the judgment was affirmed as to the coemployee defendant because he was not subject to the Workmen’s Compensation Act, being a “third person” within § 3699, supra. 5 This ruling is in harmony with holdings to the effect that neither the exclusion clause of § 3691, nor the provisio

2012This same result was reached by our Supreme Court in Schumacher, 232 S.W.2d at 917-18 (holding that a co-employee (whether fellow servant or foreman) is a "third person" within the meaning of the Act, and that the exclusion clause in the Act does not therefore operate to "abrogate!] the employee’s common law rights against” co-employees). .

2002Neither the exclusion clause (§ 287.120) nor the subrogation provision (§ 287.150) of the Act abolishes an employee’s common law right to recover damages from a negligent “third person” for injuries sustained by the employee while on the job. 7 Schumacher v. Leslie, 360 Mo. 1238 , 232 S.W.2d 913, 916-18 (banc 1950); State ex rel.

2011Co., 276 S.W.3d 342, 351 (Mo.App.2009) (internal citations omitted).

2009Co., 276 S.W.3d 342, 351 (Mo.App.

1950Co., 229 Mo. App. 472 , 76 S. W. 2d 1101, 1104 [3].

1950Co., 229 Mo. App. 472 , 76 S. W. 2d 1101, 1104 [3].

1950A plaintiff’s judgment against both defendants was reversed as to the corporate defendant because the accident occurred at a place where plaintiff’s services for said employer reasonably required him to be and, hence, the accident was within the purview of the Workmen’s Compensation Act (38 S. W. 2d l. c. 501), while the judgment was affirmed as to the coemployee defendant because he was not subject to the Workmen’s Compensation Act, being a “third person” within § 3699, supra. 5 This ruling is in harmony with holdings to the effect that neither the exclusion clause of § 3691, nor the provisio

1950A plaintiff’s judgment against both defendants was reversed as to the corporate defendant because the accident occurred at a place where plaintiff’s services for said employer reasonably required him to be and, hence, the accident was within the purview of the Workmen’s Compensation Act (38 S. W. 2d l. c. 501), while the judgment was affirmed as to the coemployee defendant because he was not subject to the Workmen’s Compensation Act, being a “third person” within § 3699, supra. 5 This ruling is in harmony with holdings to the effect that neither the exclusion clause of § 3691, nor the provisio

2025Co., 574 S.W.3d 251, 265 (Mo. App. W.D. 2019).

2019Manner v. Schiermeier, 393 S.W.3d 58, 62 (Mo. banc 2013).

2019Co. v. Parnell, 478 S.W.3d 489, 492 (Mo. App. W.D. 2015) (under the concurrent proximate cause rule, “‘“an insurance policy will be construed to provide coverage where an injury was proximately caused by two events—even if one of these events was subject to an exclusion clause—if the differing allegations of causation are independent and distinct”’”; quoting Taylor v. Bar Plan Mut.

2017“Because the scope of the exclusion clause in the policy is ambiguous, it should be construed narrowly in favor of providing coverage.” Harrison v. Tomes, 956 S.W.2d 268, 270 (Mo. banc 1997).

2015Co. v. Hill, 367 S.W.3d 84, 88 (Mo.App.2012) (internal quotations omitted). 8 The rule is usually applied in a negligent supervision context.

2012Co., 275 S.W.3d 268, 282 (Mo.App.

2000Hocker Oil Co., Inc. v. Barker-Phillips-Jackson, Inc., 997 S.W.2d 510, 516 (Mo.App.1999).

1999In a Missouri case, construing the term “household” in an exclusion clause, the supreme court stated .... “the term embraces a collection of persons as a single group, with one head, living together, a unit of permanent and domestic character, under one roof; a ‘collective body of persons living together within one curtilage, subsisting in common and directing their attention to a common object, the promotion of their mutual interests and social happiness.’ ” Mission Insurance Company v. Ward, 487 S.W.2d 449, 452 (Mo.banc.1972).

1998See Vinsant, 530 S.W.2d at 77 .

1998In Purdy the policy contained language purporting to cover “personal property usual or incidental to the occupancy of the premises as a dwelling.” Id. at 129.