26 Minnesota opinions name it 2 courts 1920–2018 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Minnesota courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
SCSC Corp. v. Allied Mutual Insurance Co.green2 sentences2018Co. , 536 N.W.2d 305 , 314 (Minn. 1995) ("[O]nce the insurer shows the application of an exclusion clause, the burden of proof shifts back to the insured because the exception to the exclusion 'restores' coverage for which the insured bears the burden of proof."), overruled on other grounds by Bahr v. Boise Cascade Corp. , 766 N.W.2d 910 (Minn. 2009). 2003Co., 536 N.W.2d 305, 313 (Minn.1995). [Ojnce the insurer shows the application of an exclusion clause, the burden of proof shifts back to the insured because the exception to the exclusion “restores” coverage for which the insured bears the burden of proof. | 2 | 2 |
Flynn v. Sawyergreen2 sentences1994See Flynn v. Sawyer, 272 N.W.2d 904, 907-08 (Minn.1978) (parol evidence is inadmissible to vary the terms of a written agreement absent ambiguity or incompleteness); Pedersen v. United Servs. 1994See Flynn v. Sawyer, 272 N.W.2d 904, 907-08 (Minn.1978) (parol evidence is inadmissible to vary the terms of a written agreement absent ambiguity or incompleteness); Pedersen v. United Servs. | 2 | 2 |
Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Bloomington Steel & Supply Co.green1 sentence2013Co. v. Bloomington Steel & Supply Co., 718 N.W.2d 888, 894 (Minn.2006). “[0]nce the insurer shows the application of an exclusion clause, the burden of proof shifts back to the insured because the exception to the exclusion ‘restores’ coverage for which the insured bears the burden of proof.” SCSC Corp. v. Allied Mut. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Postengreen1 sentence2010State v. Posten, 302 N.W.2d 638, 642 (Minn.1981). | 1 | 1 |
Meadowbrook, Inc. v. Tower Insurance Co.green1 sentence2008Co., 559 N.W.2d 411, 419 (Minn.1997) (“Typically, this court has defined the words ‘arising out of in an insurance policy to mean ‘causally connected with’ and not ‘proximately caused by.’ ”); Roloff v. Taste of Minn., 488 N.W.2d 325, 326 (Minn.App.1992), review denied (Minn. Oct. 20, 1992) (stating that “arising out of’ language “unambiguously excludes coverage when a claim is causally related to” the conduct described in the exclusion clause — there assault and battery — even if the actual claim is for negligence); Ross v. City of Minneapolis, 408 N.W.2d 910, 912 (Minn.App.1987) (stating tha | 1 | 1 |
Roloff v. Taste of Minnesotagreen1 sentence2008Co., 559 N.W.2d 411, 419 (Minn.1997) (“Typically, this court has defined the words ‘arising out of in an insurance policy to mean ‘causally connected with’ and not ‘proximately caused by.’ ”); Roloff v. Taste of Minn., 488 N.W.2d 325, 326 (Minn.App.1992), review denied (Minn. Oct. 20, 1992) (stating that “arising out of’ language “unambiguously excludes coverage when a claim is causally related to” the conduct described in the exclusion clause — there assault and battery — even if the actual claim is for negligence); Ross v. City of Minneapolis, 408 N.W.2d 910, 912 (Minn.App.1987) (stating tha | 1 | 1 |
Ross v. City of Minneapolisgreen1 sentence2008Co., 559 N.W.2d 411, 419 (Minn.1997) (“Typically, this court has defined the words ‘arising out of in an insurance policy to mean ‘causally connected with’ and not ‘proximately caused by.’ ”); Roloff v. Taste of Minn., 488 N.W.2d 325, 326 (Minn.App.1992), review denied (Minn. Oct. 20, 1992) (stating that “arising out of’ language “unambiguously excludes coverage when a claim is causally related to” the conduct described in the exclusion clause — there assault and battery — even if the actual claim is for negligence); Ross v. City of Minneapolis, 408 N.W.2d 910, 912 (Minn.App.1987) (stating tha | 1 | 1 |
Farmers Insurance Exchange v. Sipplegreen2 sentences2000We also held that the exclusion and its exception applied in Farmers Insurance Exchange v. Sipple, where the insured, a state highway department employee, assaulted a farmer during a heated debate over a new highway that was allegedly creating drainage problems for the farmer's land. 255 N.W.2d 373, 374 (Minn. 1977). 2000We also held that the exclusion and its exception applied in Farmers Insurance Exchange v. Sipple, where the insured, a state highway department employee, assaulted a farmer during a heated debate over a new highway that was allegedly creating drainage problems for the farmer’s land. 255 N.W.2d 373, 374 (Minn.1977). | 1 | 1 |
SCSC Corp. v. Allied Mutual Insurance Co.green1 sentence1997Co., 533 N.W.2d 603, 611 (Minn.1995) (regarding applicability of an exclusion clause in an insurance contract); Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 583 (Minn.1988) (regarding assertion of a statute of limitations); Anderson v. First Nat’l Bank of Pine City, 303 Minn. 408, 411 , 228 N.W.2d 257, 259 (1975) (regarding ratification of a mortgage). | 1 | 1 |
Thiele v. Stichgreen1 sentence1997Co., 533 N.W.2d 603, 611 (Minn.1995) (regarding applicability of an exclusion clause in an insurance contract); Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 583 (Minn.1988) (regarding assertion of a statute of limitations); Anderson v. First Nat’l Bank of Pine City, 303 Minn. 408, 411 , 228 N.W.2d 257, 259 (1975) (regarding ratification of a mortgage). | 1 | 1 |
Anderson v. First Nat. Bank of Pine Citygreen2 sentences1997Co., 533 N.W.2d 603, 611 (Minn.1995) (regarding applicability of an exclusion clause in an insurance contract); Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 583 (Minn.1988) (regarding assertion of a statute of limitations); Anderson v. First Nat’l Bank of Pine City, 303 Minn. 408, 411 , 228 N.W.2d 257, 259 (1975) (regarding ratification of a mortgage). 1997Co., 533 N.W.2d 603, 611 (Minn.1995) (regarding applicability of an exclusion clause in an insurance contract); Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 583 (Minn.1988) (regarding assertion of a statute of limitations); Anderson v. First Nat’l Bank of Pine City, 303 Minn. 408, 411 , 228 N.W.2d 257, 259 (1975) (regarding ratification of a mortgage). | 1 | 1 |
Pedersen v. United Services Automobile Ass'ngreen1 sentence1992See Flynn v. Sawyer, 272 N.W.2d 904, 907-08 (Minn.1978) (parol evidence is inadmissible to vary the terms of a written agreement absent ambiguity or incompleteness); Pedersen v. United Services Auto Ass’n, 383 N.W.2d 427, 430 (Minn.App.1986) (extrinsic evidence is inadmissible to construe an insurance policy absent ambiguity in the policy language). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Brechongreen2 sentences1992See State v. Brechon, 352 N.W.2d 745, 747-50 (Minn.1984). 1992See State v. Brechon, 352 N.W.2d 745, 747-50 (Minn.1984). | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Hayden Miller Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Minnesota. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Holmes v. South Carolina
green
2 sentences2013Put differently, the Constitution “prohibits the exclusion of defense evidence under rules that serve no legitimate purpose or that are disproportionate to the ends that they are asserted to promote.” Id. at 326 , 126 S.Ct. 1727 . 2013Put differently, the Constitution “prohibits the exclusion of defense evidence under rules that serve no legitimate purpose or that are disproportionate to the ends that they are asserted to promote.” Id. at 326 , 126 S.Ct. 1727 . | 2 | 2011–2013 |
Bahr v. Boise Cascade Corp.
green
1 sentence2018Co. , 536 N.W.2d 305 , 314 (Minn. 1995) ("[O]nce the insurer shows the application of an exclusion clause, the burden of proof shifts back to the insured because the exception to the exclusion 'restores' coverage for which the insured bears the burden of proof."), overruled on other grounds by Bahr v. Boise Cascade Corp. , 766 N.W.2d 910 (Minn. 2009). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Midwest Family Mutual Insurance Co. v. Wolters
green
2 sentences2015Id. “[O]nce the insurer shows the application of an exclusion clause, the burden of proof shifts back to the insured because the exception to the exclusion restores coverage for which the insured bears the burden of proof.” Id. (alteration in original) (quotations omitted). 2015Id. “[O]nce the insurer shows the application of an exclusion clause, the burden of proof shifts back to the insured because the exception to the exclusion restores coverage for which the insured bears the burden of proof.” Id. (alteration in original) (quotations omitted). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Boedigheimer v. Taylor
green
2 sentences1995The exclusion clause provides: This insurance does not apply * * * to bodily injury or property damage arising out of the discharge, dispersal, release or escape of smoke, vapors, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, toxic chemicals, liquids or gases, waste materials or other irritants, contaminants or pollutants into or upon land, the atmosphere or any water course or body of water; but this exclusion does not apply if such discharge, dispersal, release or escape is sudden and aecidental[.] 2 In an action to determine insurance coverage, once the insured has established a prima facie case of coverage 1995The exclusion clause provides: This insurance does not apply * * * to bodily injury or property damage arising out of the discharge, dispersal, release or escape of smoke, vapors, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, toxic chemicals, liquids or gases, waste materials or other irritants, contaminants or pollutants into or upon land, the atmosphere or any water course or body of water; but this exclusion does not apply if such discharge, dispersal, release or escape is sudden and aecidental[.] 2 In an action to determine insurance coverage, once the insured has established a prima facie case of coverage | 1 | 1995–1995 |
United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co.
green
2 sentences1993Id. at 584-85 , 80 S.Ct. at 1353-54 . 1993Id. at 584-85 , 80 S.Ct. at 1353-54 . | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Economy Fire & Casualty Co. v. Iverson
green
1 sentence1993Id. at 827 . | 1 | 1993–1993 |
People v. Taylor
green
2 sentences1987After twice refusing to hear cases in which the issue is whether the exclusion of defense witnesses merely for the failure to abide by a discovery rule impermissibly infringes upon an accused’s constitutional rights, Smith v. Jago, 470 U.S. 1060 , 105 S.Ct. 1777 , 84 L.Ed.2d 836 (1985) (White, Burger, and Brennan, JJ., dissenting to the Court’s refusal to grant certiorari), and Taliaferro v. Maryland, 461 U.S. 948 , 103 S.Ct. 2114 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1307 (1983) (White, Brennan and Blackmun, JJ., dissenting to the Court’s refusal to grant certiorari), the Court has granted certiorari in the case of S 1987After twice refusing to hear cases in which the issue is whether the exclusion of defense witnesses merely for the failure to abide by a discovery rule impermissibly infringes upon an accused’s constitutional rights, Smith v. Jago, 470 U.S. 1060 , 105 S.Ct. 1777 , 84 L.Ed.2d 836 (1985) (White, Burger, and Brennan, JJ., dissenting to the Court’s refusal to grant certiorari), and Taliaferro v. Maryland, 461 U.S. 948 , 103 S.Ct. 2114 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1307 (1983) (White, Brennan and Blackmun, JJ., dissenting to the Court’s refusal to grant certiorari), the Court has granted certiorari in the case of S | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Taliaferro v. Maryland
green
1 sentence1987After twice refusing to hear cases in which the issue is whether the exclusion of defense witnesses merely for the failure to abide by a discovery rule impermissibly infringes upon an accused’s constitutional rights, Smith v. Jago, 470 U.S. 1060 , 105 S.Ct. 1777 , 84 L.Ed.2d 836 (1985) (White, Burger, and Brennan, JJ., dissenting to the Court’s refusal to grant certiorari), and Taliaferro v. Maryland, 461 U.S. 948 , 103 S.Ct. 2114 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1307 (1983) (White, Brennan and Blackmun, JJ., dissenting to the Court’s refusal to grant certiorari), the Court has granted certiorari in the case of S | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Stallworth v. Detroit Board of Education
green
1 sentence1987After twice refusing to hear cases in which the issue is whether the exclusion of defense witnesses merely for the failure to abide by a discovery rule impermissibly infringes upon an accused’s constitutional rights, Smith v. Jago, 470 U.S. 1060 , 105 S.Ct. 1777 , 84 L.Ed.2d 836 (1985) (White, Burger, and Brennan, JJ., dissenting to the Court’s refusal to grant certiorari), and Taliaferro v. Maryland, 461 U.S. 948 , 103 S.Ct. 2114 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1307 (1983) (White, Brennan and Blackmun, JJ., dissenting to the Court’s refusal to grant certiorari), the Court has granted certiorari in the case of S | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Welty v. United States
green
1 sentence1987After twice refusing to hear cases in which the issue is whether the exclusion of defense witnesses merely for the failure to abide by a discovery rule impermissibly infringes upon an accused’s constitutional rights, Smith v. Jago, 470 U.S. 1060 , 105 S.Ct. 1777 , 84 L.Ed.2d 836 (1985) (White, Burger, and Brennan, JJ., dissenting to the Court’s refusal to grant certiorari), and Taliaferro v. Maryland, 461 U.S. 948 , 103 S.Ct. 2114 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1307 (1983) (White, Brennan and Blackmun, JJ., dissenting to the Court’s refusal to grant certiorari), the Court has granted certiorari in the case of S | 1 | 1987–1987 |
United Telecommunications, Inc. v. Saffels
green
1 sentence1987After twice refusing to hear cases in which the issue is whether the exclusion of defense witnesses merely for the failure to abide by a discovery rule impermissibly infringes upon an accused’s constitutional rights, Smith v. Jago, 470 U.S. 1060 , 105 S.Ct. 1777 , 84 L.Ed.2d 836 (1985) (White, Burger, and Brennan, JJ., dissenting to the Court’s refusal to grant certiorari), and Taliaferro v. Maryland, 461 U.S. 948 , 103 S.Ct. 2114 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1307 (1983) (White, Brennan and Blackmun, JJ., dissenting to the Court’s refusal to grant certiorari), the Court has granted certiorari in the case of S | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Weiss v. York Hospital
green
1 sentence1987After twice refusing to hear cases in which the issue is whether the exclusion of defense witnesses merely for the failure to abide by a discovery rule impermissibly infringes upon an accused’s constitutional rights, Smith v. Jago, 470 U.S. 1060 , 105 S.Ct. 1777 , 84 L.Ed.2d 836 (1985) (White, Burger, and Brennan, JJ., dissenting to the Court’s refusal to grant certiorari), and Taliaferro v. Maryland, 461 U.S. 948 , 103 S.Ct. 2114 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1307 (1983) (White, Brennan and Blackmun, JJ., dissenting to the Court’s refusal to grant certiorari), the Court has granted certiorari in the case of S | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Smith v. Jago
green
1 sentence1987After twice refusing to hear cases in which the issue is whether the exclusion of defense witnesses merely for the failure to abide by a discovery rule impermissibly infringes upon an accused’s constitutional rights, Smith v. Jago, 470 U.S. 1060 , 105 S.Ct. 1777 , 84 L.Ed.2d 836 (1985) (White, Burger, and Brennan, JJ., dissenting to the Court’s refusal to grant certiorari), and Taliaferro v. Maryland, 461 U.S. 948 , 103 S.Ct. 2114 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1307 (1983) (White, Brennan and Blackmun, JJ., dissenting to the Court’s refusal to grant certiorari), the Court has granted certiorari in the case of S | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Dunning v. Nebraska Health Care Ass'n
green
1 sentence1987Taylor v. Illinois, — U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 947 , 93 L.Ed.2d 996 (1987). | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Stettler v. Board of Review, Division of Employment Security
neutral
1 sentence1979In Weedo v. Stone-E-Brick, Inc., 155 N.J.Super. 474 , 382 A.2d 1152 (1977), certification granted, 75 N.J. 615 , 384 A.2d 845 (1978), the court was interpreting an exclusion with an exception which under the facts of the case was excluded by a later exclusion. | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Gerson v. Jemison
neutral
1 sentence1979In Weedo v. Stone-E-Brick, Inc., 155 N.J.Super. 474 , 382 A.2d 1152 (1977), certification granted, 75 N.J. 615 , 384 A.2d 845 (1978), the court was interpreting an exclusion with an exception which under the facts of the case was excluded by a later exclusion. | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Weedo v. Stone-E-Brick, Inc.
green
2 sentences1979In Weedo v. Stone-E-Brick, Inc., 155 N.J.Super. 474 , 382 A.2d 1152 (1977), certification granted, 75 N.J. 615 , 384 A.2d 845 (1978), the court was interpreting an exclusion with an exception which under the facts of the case was excluded by a later exclusion. 1979In Weedo v. Stone-E-Brick, Inc., 155 N.J.Super. 474 , 382 A.2d 1152 (1977), certification granted, 75 N.J. 615 , 384 A.2d 845 (1978), the court was interpreting an exclusion with an exception which under the facts of the case was excluded by a later exclusion. | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| Pearson v. Johnson neutral | 1 | 1976–1976 |
| Standard Surety & Casualty Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co. neutral | 1 | 1966–1966 |
| The Maytag Co. v. Commissioner of Taxation green | 1 | 1951–1951 |
| Industrial Commission v. Woodlawn Cemetery Ass'n green | 1 | 1940–1940 |
| Mannheimer Bros. v. Kansas Casualty & Surety Co. green | 1 | 1938–1938 |
| Engebretson v. Austvold green | 1 | 1938–1938 |
| Berry Chevrolet Co. v. Automobile Insurance Co. neutral | 1 | 1938–1938 |
| Humphrey v. Polski green | 1 | 1938–1938 |
| Wendt v. Wallace green | 1 | 1938–1938 |
| Messersmith v. . American Fidelity Co. green | 1 | 1938–1938 |
| Van Leet v. Kilmer green | 1 | 1938–1938 |
| Cooke v. Iverson green | 1 | 1933–1933 |
| Harbroe's Case green | 1 | 1920–1920 |
| State ex rel. Common School District No. 1 v. District Court of Itasca County green | 1 | 1920–1920 |
| Walther v. American Paper Co. neutral | 1 | 1920–1920 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.