exclusion clause in North Carolina

2022Id. at 464, 303 S.E.2d at 217 .

2022Id. at 464, 303 S.E.2d at 217 .

2010Any such policy implementation is best left to the wisdom of our legislature. 204 N.C.

2010Any such policy implementation is best left to the wisdom of our legislature. 204 N.C.

1970Under an automobile garage liability policy containing exactly the same exclusion clause as does Jamestown’s policy in this case, our Court in Allstate Insurance Co. v. Shelby Mutual Insurance Co., 269 N.C. 341 , 152 S.E. 2d 436 , held that the existence of other liability insurance was an event activating the exclusion clause of the garage liability policy (Jamestown’s policy in this case) relieving the insurer under the garage liability policy from any liability or duty to ■defend its insured who was covered by other liability insurance.

1970Under an automobile garage liability policy containing exactly the same exclusion clause as does Jamestown’s policy in this case, our Court in Allstate Insurance Co. v. Shelby Mutual Insurance Co., 269 N.C. 341 , 152 S.E. 2d 436 , held that the existence of other liability insurance was an event activating the exclusion clause of the garage liability policy (Jamestown’s policy in this case) relieving the insurer under the garage liability policy from any liability or duty to ■defend its insured who was covered by other liability insurance.

2011In Acuity v. Burd & Smith Const., Inc., 721 N.W.2d 33 (N.D. 2006), the Supreme Court of North Dakota construed an exclusion clause that excluded property damage to: (5) That particular part of real property on which you or any contractor or subcontractor working directly or indirectly on your behalf is performing operations, if the property damage arises out of those operations; or (6) That particular part of any property that must be restored, repaired or replaced because your work was incorrectly performed on it. *486 Id. at 37 .

2011In Acuity v. Burd & Smith Const., Inc., 721 N.W.2d 33 (N.D. 2006), the Supreme Court of North Dakota construed an exclusion clause that excluded property damage to: (5) That particular part of real property on which you or any contractor or subcontractor working directly or indirectly on your behalf is performing operations, if the property damage arises out of those operations; or (6) That particular part of any property that must be restored, repaired or replaced because your work was incorrectly performed on it. *486 Id. at 37 .

2011Faulty work you performed.” Id. at 102 , 408 S.E.2d at 841 .

2011Faulty work you performed.” Id. at 102 , 408 S.E.2d at 841 .

2010Such is not the case with [this] policy[.] Crocker, 688 A.2d at 931 ; see also Korhonen v. Allstate Ins.

2010Such is not the case with [this] policy[.] Crocker, 688 A.2d at 931 ; see also Korhonen v. Allstate Ins.

1996Accordingly, the court found that there were genuine issues of material fact surrounding its interpretation and thus, summary judgment was inappropriate as to coverage based on the “employee exception.” Id. at 604 .

1994Instead, we hold that if defendant uses his/her pleadings and supporting materials to negate an essential element of a Woodson claim, i.e., that the injury was solely accidental, Id., 329 N.C. at 337 , 407 S.E.2d at 226 , then the burden shifts to plaintiff and plaintiff will be required to produce a forecast of evidence to show that the injury is also due to the tortious conduct of the employer.

1994Instead, we hold that if defendant uses his/her pleadings and supporting materials to negate an essential element of a Woodson claim, i.e., that the injury was solely accidental, Id., 329 N.C. at 337 , 407 S.E.2d at 226 , then the burden shifts to plaintiff and plaintiff will be required to produce a forecast of evidence to show that the injury is also due to the tortious conduct of the employer.

1994Instead, we hold that if defendant uses his/her pleadings and supporting materials to negate an essential element of a Woodson claim, i.e., that the injury was solely accidental, Id., 329 N.C. at 337 , 407 S.E.2d at 226 , then the burden shifts to plaintiff and plaintiff will be required to produce a forecast of evidence to show that the injury is also due to the tortious conduct of the employer.

1994Instead, we hold that if defendant uses his/her pleadings and supporting materials to negate an essential element of a Woodson claim, i.e., that the injury was solely accidental, Id., 329 N.C. at 337 , 407 S.E.2d at 226 , then the burden shifts to plaintiff and plaintiff will be required to produce a forecast of evidence to show that the injury is also due to the tortious conduct of the employer.

1991Furthermore, provisions excluding coverage “are to be construed strictly so as to provide the coverage, which would otherwise be afforded by the policy.” Wachovia, 276 N.C. at 355 , 172 S.E.2d at 522-23 . “[T]he burden of proving coverage under a policy of insurance is on the party claiming benefits under the policy, but the burden of showing an exclusion or exception to policy coverage is on the insurer.” Walker v. Durham Life Ins.

1991Furthermore, provisions excluding coverage “are to be construed strictly so as to provide the coverage, which would otherwise be afforded by the policy.” Wachovia, 276 N.C. at 355 , 172 S.E.2d at 522-23 . “[T]he burden of proving coverage under a policy of insurance is on the party claiming benefits under the policy, but the burden of showing an exclusion or exception to policy coverage is on the insurer.” Walker v. Durham Life Ins.

1991Co., 90 N.C.

1976In State v. Armstrong, 232 N.C. 727 , 62 S.E. 2d 50 (1950), Chief Justice Stacy held it was reversible error to deny the defense the opportunity to impeach the mentality or intellectual grasp of a witness.

1976In State v. Armstrong, 232 N.C. 727 , 62 S.E. 2d 50 (1950), Chief Justice Stacy held it was reversible error to deny the defense the opportunity to impeach the mentality or intellectual grasp of a witness.

1973In State v. Mobley, 273 N.C. 471 , 160 S.E. 2d 334 (1968), the officers erroneously told defendant that if he refused to *562 submit to the breathalyzer test “it will be used as an assumption of guilt in court.” It was held that the coerciveness of the misstatement required the exclusion of the test results.

1973In State v. Mobley, 273 N.C. 471 , 160 S.E. 2d 334 (1968), the officers erroneously told defendant that if he refused to *562 submit to the breathalyzer test “it will be used as an assumption of guilt in court.” It was held that the coerciveness of the misstatement required the exclusion of the test results.

1966On appeal the Fourth Circuit, by per curiam decision, 327 F. 2d 637 , said: “We agree with the District Court that a private automobile being driven from the place of business of the owner by a garage keeper for the purpose of repairs . . . was not being used in the automobile business within the meaning of the exclusion clause in the owner’s liability insurance policy.” The court attempted to justify the reasoning by saying the business of the man driving the car did not determine the business in which the car was being used while he drove it.

1966Co. v. Strohkorb, 205 Va. 472 , 137 S.E. 2d 913 (1964).

1966Co. v. Strohkorb, 205 Va. 472 , 137 S.E. 2d 913 (1964).

1951Bennett Chevrolet Co. v. Insurance Co., supra; Boyd v. Insurance Co., 147 Neb. 237 , 22 N.W. 2d 700 ; Stuart Motor Co. v. General Exchange Insurance Corporation (Texas—Civ.

1951Bennett Chevrolet Co. v. Insurance Co., supra; Boyd v. Insurance Co., 147 Neb. 237 , 22 N.W. 2d 700 ; Stuart Motor Co. v. General Exchange Insurance Corporation (Texas—Civ.

1951The appellant argues that the language used in the exclusion clause is not clear since the word “possession” has many different meanings in legal terminology, citing National Safe Deposit Co. v. Stead, 232 U.S. 58 , 58 L.

1951The appellant argues that the language used in the exclusion clause is not clear since the word “possession” has many different meanings in legal terminology, citing National Safe Deposit Co. v. Stead, 232 U.S. 58 , 58 L.

1951A contrary conclusion, however, was reached in passing upon a factual situation similar to that before us and involving the identical exclusion clause, in McConnell v. Insurance Co. (USCA 5th Circuit), 178 F. 2d 76 , and in Tripp v. Insurance Co., 141 Kan. 897 , 44 P. 2d 236 .

1951A contrary conclusion, however, was reached in passing upon a factual situation similar to that before us and involving the identical exclusion clause, in McConnell v. Insurance Co. (USCA 5th Circuit), 178 F. 2d 76 , and in Tripp v. Insurance Co., 141 Kan. 897 , 44 P. 2d 236 .

1951A contrary conclusion, however, was reached in passing upon a factual situation similar to that before us and involving the identical exclusion clause, in McConnell v. Insurance Co. (USCA 5th Circuit), 178 F. 2d 76 , and in Tripp v. Insurance Co., 141 Kan. 897 , 44 P. 2d 236 .

1951Co., 58 R.I. 16 , 190 A. 863 , 109 A.L.R. 1077 ; Gibson v. Insurance Co., 117 W.

1951Co., 58 R.I. 16 , 190 A. 863 , 109 A.L.R. 1077 ; Gibson v. Insurance Co., 117 W.

1951Co., 58 R.I. 16 , 190 A. 863 , 109 A.L.R. 1077 ; Gibson v. Insurance Co., 117 W.

1951Co., 58 R.I. 16 , 190 A. 863 , 109 A.L.R. 1077 ; Gibson v. Insurance Co., 117 W.