7 Rhode Island opinions name it 2 courts 1958–2007 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Rhode Island courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Gomesgreen1 sentence2007See State v. Gomes, 690 A.2d 310, 319 (R.I.1997) (holding that the exclusion of a defense witness was not excessive as a sanction for deliberate nondisclosure). | 1 | 1 |
Heinrich-Grundy v. Allstate Insurancegreen2 sentences1990Co., 402 Mass. 810, 811 , 525 N.E.2d 651, 652 (1988), Chief Justice Edward F. Hennessey of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, when considering a geographical limitation in a policy similar to Hartford’s, observed that the exclusion under challenge “explicitly and unambiguously excludes coverage for accidents and losses occurring outside the United States and Canada.” However, he emphasized that the challenged territorial restriction was a general condition of coverage, applicable to the entire insurance policy. 1990Co., 402 Mass. 810, 811 , 525 N.E.2d 651, 652 (1988), Chief Justice Edward F. Hennessey of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, when considering a geographical limitation in a policy similar to Hartford’s, observed that the exclusion under challenge “explicitly and unambiguously excludes coverage for accidents and losses occurring outside the United States and Canada.” However, he emphasized that the challenged territorial restriction was a general condition of coverage, applicable to the entire insurance policy. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Rhode Island. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
In Re Denisewich
green
1 sentence1998This Court finds that the issue has in fact already been resolved by our Supreme Court's decision In re Denisewich, 643 A.2d 1194 (R.I. 1994). | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Alaska Steamship Co. v. Petterson
green
2 sentences1989In Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400 , 108 S.Ct. 646 , 98 L.Ed.2d 798 (1988), the United States Supreme Court held the exclusion of a defense witness’ testimony appropriate and constitutionally permissible under the compulsory process clause where defense counsel intentionally and deliberately concealed the identity of the witness during discovery in order to gain a tactical advantage over the state. 1989Rejecting the argument that the exclusionary sanction is never appropriate under the Sixth Amendment no matter how serious the discovery violation, the Taylor Court stated: "It may well be true that alternative sanctions are adequate and appropriate in most cases, but it is equally clear that they would be less effective than the preclusion sanction and that there are instances in which they would perpetuate rather than limit the prejudice to the State and the harm to the adver *1065 sary process.” Id. at -, 108 S.Ct. at 655 , 98 L.Ed.2d at 813 . | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Taylor v. Illinois
green
2 sentences1989In Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400 , 108 S.Ct. 646 , 98 L.Ed.2d 798 (1988), the United States Supreme Court held the exclusion of a defense witness’ testimony appropriate and constitutionally permissible under the compulsory process clause where defense counsel intentionally and deliberately concealed the identity of the witness during discovery in order to gain a tactical advantage over the state. 1989In Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400 , 108 S.Ct. 646 , 98 L.Ed.2d 798 (1988), the United States Supreme Court held the exclusion of a defense witness’ testimony appropriate and constitutionally permissible under the compulsory process clause where defense counsel intentionally and deliberately concealed the identity of the witness during discovery in order to gain a tactical advantage over the state. | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Webbier v. Thoroughbred Racing Protective Bureau, Inc.
green
2 sentences1981Webbier v. Thoroughbred Racing Protective Bureau, Inc., 105 R.I. 605 , 254 A.2d 285 (1969). 1981Webbier v. Thoroughbred Racing Protective Bureau, Inc., 105 R.I. 605 , 254 A.2d 285 (1969). | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Amaral v. Turner
neutral
1 sentence1974We feel that these factors bring the instant case clearly within the rule stated in Amaral v. Turner, supra, and in that circumstance we must conclude that if the exclusion was error, it was harmless. | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Cohen & Powell, Inc. v. Great American Indemnity Co.
green
1 sentence1958In Cohen & Powell, Inc. v. Great American Indemnity Co., 127 Conn. 257, 259 , the court said: “* * * a person or thing is not ‘in charge of’ an insured within the meaning of the policy unless he has the right to exercise dominion or control over it.” In the light of the reasoning stated by the courts in the cases above cited, it is our opinion that an insured is “in charge of” property within the meaning of the exclusion clause contained in the policy under consideration when the insured has the property in his possession and has a right to exercise control over it. | 1 | 1958–1958 |
Lyon v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.
green
1 sentence1958In Lyon v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 140 Conn. 304 , the court, in deciding that vehicles left with a serviceman were in his charge within the meaning of the exclusion clause, stated at page 308: “The plaintiff had the possession and custody of the cars. | 1 | 1958–1958 |
Sky v. Keystone Mutual Casualty Co.
green
1 sentence1958They were in his charge within the meaning of the exclusion.” In Sky v. Keystone Mutual Casualty Co., 150 Pa. Super. 613, 618 , the court said that when reference is made to property of others in charge of an insured it does not mean property which is merely in possession of the insured. | 1 | 1958–1958 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.