exclusion clause in Colorado

2013Co. v. Schauf, 967 S.W.2d 74, 81 (Mo.1998). {101 The phrase "that particular part," found in subsections I2(J)(8), has been construed to bar coverage only for property damage to parts of a property that were themselves the subject of defective work by the insured; the exclusion does not bar coverage for damage to parts of a property that were the subject of only nondefective work by the insured and were damaged as a result of defective work by the insured on other parts of the property.

2008However, in doing so we recognize that “CRE 403 strongly favors admission of relevant evidence.” People v. Harlan, 8 P.3d 448, 496 (Colo.2000); see also People v. Dist.

2008However, in doing so we recognize that "CRE 403 strongly favors admission of relevant evidence." People v. Harlan, 8 P.3d 448, 496 (Colo.2000); see also People v. Dist.

2008See People v. Rivera, 56 P.3d 1155, 1169 (Colo.App.2002)(holding, in a review of postconviction hearing, that “the evidence would have been cumulative and properly excluded,” citing CRE 403); People v. Greenwell, 830 P.2d 1116, 1119 (Colo.App.1992) (upholding the exclusion of defense testimony in a jury trial, due to a late endorsement based, in part, on a determination that, under CRE 403, “[t]he proffered testimony was cumulative to that of another witness and could have been excluded on that basis alone notwithstanding the late endorsement”); People v. Vialpando, 804 P.2d 219, 223 (Colo.App

2008See People v. Rivera, 56 P.3d 1155, 1169 (Colo.App.2002)(holding, in a review of postconviction hearing, that "the evidence would have been cumulative and properly excluded," citing CRE 403); People v. Greenwell, 830 P.2d 1116, 1119 (Colo.App. 1992) (upholding the exclusion of defense testimony in a jury trial, due to a late endorsement based, in part, on a determination that, under CRE 403, "[t]he proffered testimony was cumulative to that of another witness and could have been excluded on that basis alone notwithstanding the late endorsement"); People v. Vialpando, 804 P.2d 219, 223 (Colo.Ap

2008See People v. Rivera, 56 P.3d 1155, 1169 (Colo.App.2002)(holding, in a review of postconviction hearing, that “the evidence would have been cumulative and properly excluded,” citing CRE 403); People v. Greenwell, 830 P.2d 1116, 1119 (Colo.App.1992) (upholding the exclusion of defense testimony in a jury trial, due to a late endorsement based, in part, on a determination that, under CRE 403, “[t]he proffered testimony was cumulative to that of another witness and could have been excluded on that basis alone notwithstanding the late endorsement”); People v. Vialpando, 804 P.2d 219, 223 (Colo.App

2008See People v. Rivera, 56 P.3d 1155, 1169 (Colo.App.2002)(holding, in a review of postconviction hearing, that "the evidence would have been cumulative and properly excluded," citing CRE 403); People v. Greenwell, 830 P.2d 1116, 1119 (Colo.App. 1992) (upholding the exclusion of defense testimony in a jury trial, due to a late endorsement based, in part, on a determination that, under CRE 403, "[t]he proffered testimony was cumulative to that of another witness and could have been excluded on that basis alone notwithstanding the late endorsement"); People v. Vialpando, 804 P.2d 219, 223 (Colo.Ap

2008See People v. Pronovost, 773 P.2d 555, 557 (Colo.1989); People v. Hampton, 696 P.2d 765, 777-78 (Colo.1985); see also Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 , 93 S.Ct. 1038 , 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 , 87 S.Ct. 1920 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1967).

2008See People v. Pronovost, 773 P.2d 555, 557 (Colo.1989); People v. Hampton, 696 P.2d 765, 777-78 (Colo.1985); see also Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 , 93 S.Ct. 1038 , 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 , 87 S.Ct. 1920 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1967).

2008See People v. Pronovost, 773 P.2d 555, 557 (Colo.1989); People v. Hampton, 696 P.2d 765, 777-78 (Colo.1985); see also Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 , 93 S.Ct. 1038 , 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 , 87 S.Ct. 1920 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1967).

2008See People v. Pronovost, 773 P.2d 555, 557 (Colo.1989); People v. Hampton, 696 P.2d 765, 777-78 (Colo.1985); see also Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 , 93 S.Ct. 1038 , 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 , 87 S.Ct. 1920 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1967).

2008See People v. Rivera, 56 P.3d 1155, 1169 (Colo.App.2002)(holding, in a review of postconviction hearing, that “the evidence would have been cumulative and properly excluded,” citing CRE 403); People v. Greenwell, 830 P.2d 1116, 1119 (Colo.App.1992) (upholding the exclusion of defense testimony in a jury trial, due to a late endorsement based, in part, on a determination that, under CRE 403, “[t]he proffered testimony was cumulative to that of another witness and could have been excluded on that basis alone notwithstanding the late endorsement”); People v. Vialpando, 804 P.2d 219, 223 (Colo.App

2008See People v. Rivera, 56 P.3d 1155, 1169 (Colo.App.2002)(holding, in a review of postconviction hearing, that "the evidence would have been cumulative and properly excluded," citing CRE 403); People v. Greenwell, 830 P.2d 1116, 1119 (Colo.App. 1992) (upholding the exclusion of defense testimony in a jury trial, due to a late endorsement based, in part, on a determination that, under CRE 403, "[t]he proffered testimony was cumulative to that of another witness and could have been excluded on that basis alone notwithstanding the late endorsement"); People v. Vialpando, 804 P.2d 219, 223 (Colo.Ap

2008See People v. Pronovost, 773 P.2d 555, 557 (Colo.1989); People v. Hampton, 696 P.2d 765, 777-78 (Colo.1985); see also Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 , 93 S.Ct. 1038 , 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 , 87 S.Ct. 1920 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1967).

2008See People v. Pronovost, 773 P.2d 555, 557 (Colo.1989); People v. Hampton, 696 P.2d 765, 777-78 (Colo.1985); see also Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 , 93 S.Ct. 1038 , 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 , 87 S.Ct. 1920 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1967).

2003See United States v. Hobbs, 31 F.3d 918 (9th Cir.1994)(plain error to exclude defense witness, who had entered courtroom while defense counsel had her back to spectators, where there was no evidence that defense counsel had acquiesced in the violation and witness’s testimony was neither cumulative nor irrelevant); Williams v. State, 258 Ark. 207 , 523 S.W.2d 377 (1975)(exclusion of rebuttal witness who had inadvertently violated sequestration order was abuse of discretion even though witness had been present for all of defendant’s testimony); Jiosa v. State, 755 N.E.2d 605 (Ind.2001)(reversibl

2001Likewise, in J & S Enterprises, Inc. v. Continental Casualty Co., 825 P.2d 1020, 1023 (Colo.App.1991), the panel concluded that, because "the format of the [insurance] policy clearly segregated the different coverages into different sections of the contract," an exclusion clause in one part of the contract could not be applied to an exclusion clause in an entirely different part of the contract.

2001Likewise, in J & S Enterprises, Inc. v. Continental Casualty Co., 825 P.2d 1020, 1023 (Colo.App.1991), the panel concluded that, because "the format of the [insurance] policy clearly segregated the different coverages into different sections of the contract," an exclusion clause in one part of the contract could not be applied to an exclusion clause in an entirely different part of the contract.

2000In determining that the exclusion operated to preclude UM coverage, the division concluded that "the effect of the excluded driver endorsement is to revoke all insurance coverage on the vehicle ... if the vehicle is operated by the excluded driver." Lopez v. Dairyland Insurance Co., 890 P.2d 192, 195 (Colo. see also Sersion v. Dairyland Insurance Co., 757 P.2d 1169, 1170 (Colo.App.1988) ("This language [of § 10-4-T721(2)] clearly and unambiguously demonstrates a legislative intent to authorize an insurer to exclude from coverage all Hability arising from the use of an automobile by certain nam

2000In determining that the exclusion operated to preclude UM coverage, the division concluded that "the effect of the excluded driver endorsement is to revoke all insurance coverage on the vehicle ... if the vehicle is operated by the excluded driver." Lopez v. Dairyland Insurance Co., 890 P.2d 192, 195 (Colo. see also Sersion v. Dairyland Insurance Co., 757 P.2d 1169, 1170 (Colo.App.1988) ("This language [of § 10-4-T721(2)] clearly and unambiguously demonstrates a legislative intent to authorize an insurer to exclude from coverage all Hability arising from the use of an automobile by certain nam

1996See Castro v. Allstate Insurance Co., supra (absence of qualification clarifies rather than obscures the scope of the exclusion); Podiatry Insurance Co. v. Isham, 65 Wash.App. 266 , 828 P.2d 59, 62 (1992) (holding exclusionary clause not ambiguous because clause “interpreted in the context of the entire policy is not fairly susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation”).

1996See Castro v. Allstate Insurance Co., supra (absence of qualification clarifies rather than obscures the scope of the exclusion); Podiatry Insurance Co. v. Isham, 65 Wash.App. 266 , 828 P.2d 59, 62 (1992) (holding exclusionary clause not ambiguous because clause “interpreted in the context of the entire policy is not fairly susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation”).

1996An unambiguous clause may be void and unenforceable if it violates public policy by attempting to “dilute, condition, or limit statutorily mandated coverage.” Farmers Insurance Exchange v. Dotson, 913 P.2d 27, 30 (Colo.1996) (finding exclusion violative of public policy as expressed in No-Fault Act).

1991Co., 74 N.Y.2d 66, 73 , 544 N.Y.S.2d 531, 533 , 542 N.E.2d 1048, 1050 (1989) ("when an exclusion clause is relied upon to deny coverage, the insurer has the burden of demonstrating that the ‘allegations of the complaint cast that pleading solely and entirely within the policy exclusions, and, further, that the allegations, in toto, are subject to no other interpretation’”) (emphasis in original) (citation omitted); Waste Management of Carolinas v. Peerless Ins.

1991Co., 74 N.Y.2d 66, 73 , 544 N.Y.S.2d 531, 533 , 542 N.E.2d 1048, 1050 (1989) ("when an exclusion clause is relied upon to deny coverage, the insurer has the burden of demonstrating that the ‘allegations of the complaint cast that pleading solely and entirely within the policy exclusions, and, further, that the allegations, in toto, are subject to no other interpretation’”) (emphasis in original) (citation omitted); Waste Management of Carolinas v. Peerless Ins.

1991Trosper v. Wilkerson, 764 P.2d 375 (Colo.App.1988). *102 The May Co. argues that the plain language of the exclusion clause negates University Hills’ obligation to indemnify only as to actual negligent acts or omissions by it or its agents.

1991See Trosper v. Wilkerson, supra. The trial court, therefore, correctly premised its ruling upon the plain language of the exclusion clause.

1991Co., 315 N.C. 688, 690-93 , 340 S.E.2d 374, 377-78 (1986) (insurer’s duty to defend is measured by facts alleged in pleadings, and any doubt as to coverage is to be resolved in favor of insured). .

1991Co., 315 N.C. 688, 690-93 , 340 S.E.2d 374, 377-78 (1986) (insurer’s duty to defend is measured by facts alleged in pleadings, and any doubt as to coverage is to be resolved in favor of insured). .

1991See, e.g., In re Gilbraith, 32 Ohio St.3d 127 , 512 N.E.2d 956 (1987).

1991See, e.g., In re Gilbraith, 32 Ohio St.3d 127 , 512 N.E.2d 956 (1987).

1991See Williams v. White Mountain Construction Co., 749 P.2d 423 (Colo.1988).