exclusion clause (Illinois) · Go Syfert
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exclusion clause in Illinois

88 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1901–2024 8 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (13)

CaseFollowedCited
Country Mutual Insurance v. Waldman Mercantile Co.green
illappct · 1981 · cited in 5 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 1991–2017
2 sentences

2007"While the control exercised by the insured must be exclusive, it need not be continuous, and if the insured has possessory control at the time the property is damaged, the exclusion clause will apply." Country Mutual Insurance Co. v. Waldman Mercantile Co., 103 Ill.

2007“While the control exercised by the insured must be exclusive, it need not be continuous, and if the insured has possessory control at the time the property is damaged, the exclusion clause will apply.” Country Mutual Insurance Co. v. Waldman Mercantile Co., 103 Ill.

45
Crum & Forster Managers Corp. v. Resolution Trust Corp.green
ill · 1993 · cited in 3 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 2015–2016
2 sentences

2016After this appeal was filed, Elizabeth and Jacob Skolnik were voluntarily dismissed without prejudice to reinstatement. ¶ 20 ANALYSIS ¶ 21 Standard of Review ¶ 22 “ ‘The construction of an insurance policy and a determination of the rights and obligations thereunder are questions of law for the court [to decide and] are appropriate subjects for disposition by way of summary judgment.’ ” Illinois Emcasco Insurance Co. v. Waukegan Steel Sales Inc., 2013 IL App (1st) 120735, ¶ 11 (quoting Crum & Forster Managers Corp. v. Resolution Trust Corp., 156 Ill. 2d 384, 391 (1993)).

2016After this appeal was filed, Elizabeth and Jacob Skolnik were voluntarily dismissed without prejudice to reinstatement. ¶ 20 ANALYSIS ¶ 21 Standard of Review ¶ 22 “ ‘The construction of an insurance policy and a determination of the rights and obligations thereunder are questions of law for the court [to decide and] are appropriate subjects for disposition by way of summary judgment.’ ” Illinois Emcasco Insurance Co. v. Waukegan Steel Sales Inc., 2013 IL App (1st) 120735, ¶ 11 (quoting Crum & Forster Managers Corp. v. Resolution Trust Corp., 156 Ill. 2d 384, 391 (1993)).

33
Illinois Emcasco Insurance Company v. Waukegan Steel Sales, Inc.green
illappct · 2013 · cited in 3 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 2015–2016
2 sentences

2016After this appeal was filed, Elizabeth and Jacob Skolnik were voluntarily dismissed without prejudice to reinstatement. ¶ 20 ANALYSIS ¶ 21 Standard of Review ¶ 22 “ ‘The construction of an insurance policy and a determination of the rights and obligations thereunder are questions of law for the court [to decide and] are appropriate subjects for disposition by way of summary judgment.’ ” Illinois Emcasco Insurance Co. v. Waukegan Steel Sales Inc., 2013 IL App (1st) 120735, ¶ 11 (quoting Crum & Forster Managers Corp. v. Resolution Trust Corp., 156 Ill. 2d 384, 391 (1993)).

2016After this appeal was filed, Elizabeth and Jacob Skolnik were voluntarily dismissed without prejudice to reinstatement. ¶ 20 ANALYSIS ¶ 21 Standard of Review ¶ 22 “ ‘The construction of an insurance policy and a determination of the rights and obligations thereunder are questions of law for the court [to decide and] are appropriate subjects for disposition by way of summary judgment.’ ” Illinois Emcasco Insurance Co. v. Waukegan Steel Sales Inc., 2013 IL App (1st) 120735, ¶ 11 (quoting Crum & Forster Managers Corp. v. Resolution Trust Corp., 156 Ill. 2d 384, 391 (1993)).

33
Smith v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.green
minnctapp · 2003 · cited in 2 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 2021–2021
2 sentences

2021See id. (“As a generality, the view that the insured bears the burden of showing that an exception to an exclusion applies, restoring coverage, is consistent with both the view that the burden should follow the benefit, and the view that the burden is to be placed on the party with the best access to the information that will be required to carry the burden.”); Smith v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 656 N.W.2d 432, 436 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003) (once the insurer shows the application of an exclusion clause, the burden of proof shifts back to the insured because the exception to the exclusion res

2021See id. (“As a generality, the view that the insured bears the burden of showing that an exception to an exclusion applies, restoring coverage, is consistent with both the view that the burden should follow the benefit, and the view that the burden is to be placed on the party with the best access to the information that will be required to carry the burden.”); Smith v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 656 N.W.2d 432, 436 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003) (once the insurer shows the application of an exclusion clause, the burden of proof shifts back to the insured because the exception to the exclusion res

22
Bolanowski v. McKinneygreen
illappct · 1991 · cited in 2 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 2017–2017
2 sentences

2017“With respect to whether an insured [has] possessory control of the property at the time of the loss, it has been noted that, ‘[w]hile the control exercised by the insured must be exclusive, it need not be continuous, and if the insured has possessory control at the time the property is damaged, the exclusion clause will apply.’ ” Bolanowski v. McKinney, 220 Ill.

2017“With respect to whether an insured [has] possessory control of the property at the time of the loss, it has been noted that, ‘[w]hile the control exercised by the insured must be exclusive, it need not be continuous, and if the insured has possessory control at the time the property is damaged, the exclusion clause will apply.’ ” Bolanowski v. McKinney, 220 Ill.

22
Honeycomb Systems, Inc. v. Admiral Insurancegreen
med · 1983 · cited in 2 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 2011–2011
2 sentences

2011The supreme court described the exclusion clause in Wilkin as a “ ‘sistership’ exclusion” that 14 No. 1-10-2214 “excludes coverage ‘in cases where, because of the actual failure of the insured’s product, similar products are withdrawn from use to prevent the failure of these other products, which have not yet failed but are suspected of containing the same defect.’ ” Id. at 81 (quoting Honeycomb Systems, Inc. v. Admiral Insurance Co., 567 F. Supp. 1400, 1406 (D.C.

2011The supreme court described the exclusion clause in Wilkin as a “ ‘sis-tership’ exclusion” that “excludes coverage ‘in cases where, because of the actual failure of the insured’s product, similar products are withdrawn from use to prevent the failure of these other products, which have not yet failed but are suspected of containing the same defect.’ ” Id. at 81 (quoting Honeycomb Systems, Inc. v. Admiral Insurance Co., 567 F. Supp. 1400, 1406 (D.C.

22
Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corpgreen
ca8 · 1953 · cited in 2 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 1998–1998
2 sentences

1998Mildly stated, it does not comport with the usual understanding to say that every time one person wrongfully obtains property from another and thus becomes legally obligated to restore it, he has succeeded in obtaining a loan from his victim. [First National Bank, 424 F.2d at 316 .] In the words of the Eighth Circuit: 'It is not conceivable to us that any disinterested banker, insurance underwriter, or lawyer would construe the word "loan," as used in the exclusion clause of this indemnity bond, to cover the obligation imposed by law to reimburse a bank for money or credit obtained through the

1998In the words of the Eighth Circuit: ‘It is not conceivable to us that any disinterested banker, insurance underwriter, or lawyer would construe the word “loan,” as used in the exclusion clause of this indemnity bond, to cover the obligation imposed by law to reimburse a bank for money or credit obtained through the use of worthless checks.’ ” First National Bank, 424 F.2d at 316 , quoting Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., 204 F.2d 933, 937 (8th Cir. 1953).

22
National Fire Insurance Co. of Hartford v. Visual Pak Co.green
illappct · 2023 · cited in 1 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 2024–2024
1 sentence

2024Id. ¶ 32 In Visual Park this appellate court acknowledged the holding of Krishna, but noted that the plain language of the catch-all provision in its Recording and Distribution exclusion was “materially different” and “broader” than the one in Krishna because it used verbs such as “ ‘disposal, collecting, [and] recording.’ ” Visual Park, 2023 IL App (1st) 221160, ¶¶ 54, 57 .

11
Nevada v. Jacksongreen
scotus · 2013 · cited in 1 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 2024–2024
1 sentence

2024Indeed, as the United States Supreme Court stated in Nevada v. Jackson, 569 U.S. 505, 509 (2013), “[o]nly rarely have we held that the right to present a complete defense was violated by the exclusion of defense evidence under a state rule of evidence.” This is not that rare type of case.

11
People v. Chatmangreen
ill · 2024 · cited in 1 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 2024–2024
1 sentence

2024See Chatman, 2024 IL 129133, ¶ 37 . ¶ 94 Both the Illinois and Federal Rule 615 include the general exclusion of witnesses upon a party’s request or the court’s own motion and four categories of witnesses exempt from the exclusion rule.

11
Thornton v. Paulgreen
ill · 1978 · cited in 1 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 1986–1986
11
People v. Zennergreen
illappct · 1979 · cited in 1 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 1983–1983
11
Pierce v. Standard Accident Insurancegreen
illappct · 1966 · cited in 1 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 1978–1978
11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (67)

CaseCitedYears
Holmes v. South Carolina green
scotus · 2006
2 sentences

2024“Although the United States Constitution prohibits the exclusion of defense evidence under rules ‘that serve no legitimate purpose or that are disproportionate to the ends that they are asserted to promote,’ well-established rules of evidence permit trial judges to exclude evidence if its probative value is outweighed by other factors, such as unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or potential to mislead the jury.” Id. (quoting Holmes, 547 U.S. at 326 ).

2024“Although the United States Constitution prohibits the exclusion of defense evidence under rules ‘that serve no legitimate purpose or that are disproportionate to the ends that they are asserted to promote,’ well-established rules of evidence permit trial judges to exclude evidence if its probative value is outweighed by other factors, such as unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or potential to mislead the jury.” Id. (quoting Holmes, 547 U.S. at 326 ).

62015–2024
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Wilkin Insulation Co. green
ill · 1991
2 sentences

2011In the alternative, United National argues that exclusion “n” of the policy precludes coverage, where the exclusion provides, “Damages claimed for any loss, cost or expense incurred by you or others for the loss of use, withdrawal, recall, inspection, repair, replacement, adjustment, removal or disposal of: (2) ‘Your Work[.]’ if such product, work, or property is withdrawn or recalled from the market or from use by any person or organization because of a known or suspected defect, deficiency, inadequacy or dangerous condition in it.” In United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Wilkin Insulatio

2011In the alternative, United National argues that exclusion “n” of the policy precludes coverage, where the exclusion provides, “Damages claimed for any loss, cost or expense incurred by you or others for the loss of use, withdrawal, recall, inspection, repair, replacement, adjustment, removal or disposal of: (2) ‘Your Work[.]’ if such product, work, or property is withdrawn or recalled from the market or from use by any person or organization because of a known or suspected defect, deficiency, inadequacy or dangerous condition in it.” In United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Wilkin Insulatio

32005–2011
People v. McCullough green
illappct · 2015
2 sentences

2018Holmes , 547 U.S. at 326 , 126 S.Ct. 1727 ; McCullough , 2015 IL App (2d) 121364 , ¶ 104, 395 Ill.Dec. 124 , 38 N.E.3d 1 .

2015While the Constitution prohibits the exclusion of defense evidence under rules “that serve no legitimate purpose or that - 36 - 2015 IL App (2d) 121364 are disproportionate to the ends that they are asserted to promote,” other, well-established rules of evidence permit trial judges to exclude evidence if its probative value is outweighed by other factors, such as unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or potential to mislead the jury.

22015–2018
Cowan v. Insurance Co. of North America green
illappct · 1974
2 sentences

2012Cowan, 22 Ill.App.3d at 886-87 , 318 N.E.2d 315 .

2012Cowan, 22 Ill.App.3d at 886-87 , 318 N.E.2d 315 .

22012–2012
Allstate Insurance v. Pruitt green
illappct · 1988
2 sentences

2008Pruitt, 177 Ill.

2008Pruitt, 177 Ill.

22008–2008
Caisson Corp. v. Home Indemnity Corp. green
· 1986
2 sentences

2007To determine whether property is in the care, custody or control of an insured so as to preclude liability under such an exclusion clause, Illinois courts employ a two-pronged test. -6- 1-05-0267 "If the property damaged is within the possessory control of the insured at the time of the loss and is a necessary element of the work performed, the property is considered to be in the care, custody, or control of the insured." Caisson Co., 151 Ill.

2007“If the property damaged is within the possessory control of the insured at the time of the loss and is a necessary element of the work performed, the property is considered to be in the care, custody, or control of the insured.” Caisson Co., 151 Ill.

22007–2007
Thommes v. Milwaukee Insurance Co. green
minn · 2002
2 sentences

2006Thommes, 641 N.W.2d at 883 .

2006Thommes, 641 N.W.2d at 883 .

22006–2006
Holmes v. Sahara Coal Co. green
illappct · 1985
2 sentences

2003Holmes, 131 Ill.

2003Holmes , 131 Ill.

22003–2003
Scott v. Salerno green
njsuperctappdiv · 1997
2 sentences

2000In August 1999, Fisher and Harrah's moved to reconsider the grant of summary judgment, arguing that Fisher could be both Barnes' bailee and agent and asked the circuit court to follow a factually similar case from New Jersey, Scott v. Salerno , 688 A.2d 614 , 297 N.J.

2000In August 1999, Fisher and Harrah's moved to reconsider the grant of summary judgment, arguing that Fisher could be both Barnes' bailee and agent and asked the circuit court to follow a factually similar case from New Jersey, Scott v. Salerno , 688 A.2d 614 , 297 N.J.

22000–2000
Safeco Insurance v. Seck green
illappct · 1992
2 sentences

1998Seck, 225 Ill.App.3d at 404 , 167 Ill.Dec. 636 , 587 N.E.2d 1251 .

1998Seeck, 225 Ill.

21998–1998
The First National Bank Of Decatur v. Insurance Company Of North America green
ca1 · 1970
2 sentences

1998Mildly stated, it does not comport with the usual understanding to say that every time one person wrongfully obtains property from another and thus becomes legally obligated to restore it, he has succeeded in obtaining a loan from his victim. [First National Bank, 424 F.2d at 316 .] In the words of the Eighth Circuit: 'It is not conceivable to us that any disinterested banker, insurance underwriter, or lawyer would construe the word "loan," as used in the exclusion clause of this indemnity bond, to cover the obligation imposed by law to reimburse a bank for money or credit obtained through the

1998Mildly stated, it does not comport with the usual understanding to say that every time one person wrongfully obtains property from another and thus becomes legally obligated to restore it, he has succeeded in obtaining a loan from his victim. [First National Bank, 424 F.2d at 316 .] In the words of the Eighth Circuit: 'It is not conceivable to us that any disinterested banker, insurance underwriter, or lawyer would construe the word "loan," as used in the exclusion clause of this indemnity bond, to cover the obligation imposed by law to reimburse a bank for money or credit obtained through the

21998–1998
Gibraltar Casualty Co. v. Sargent & Lundy green
illappct · 1991
2 sentences

1995(Gibraltar Casualty Co. v. Sargent & Lundy (1990), 214 Ill.

1995(Gibraltar Casualty Co. v. Sargent & Lundy (1991), 214 Ill.

21995–1995
Town of Massena v. Healthcare Underwriters Mutual Insurance green
ny · 2002
1 sentence

2023Id. at 444 .

12023–2023
Founders Insurance Company v. Sheikh neutral
illappct · 2017
1 sentence

2021Therefore, at this stage of the litigation, we cannot conclude that the professional services exclusions apply to all of the factual allegations of negligent conduct asserted against the insureds in the underlying lawsuits. ¶ 34 “An exclusion clause denying coverage will be applied only if its applicability is clear and free from doubt.” Founders Insurance Co. v. Sheikh, 2017 IL App (1st) 170176, ¶ 12 .

12021–2021
Bituminous Casualty Corporation v. Iles green
illappct · 2013
1 sentence

2021The specific policy language states that State Farm does not insure for any loss caused by “water that leaks or flows from plumbing, heating, air conditioning or other equipment (except fire protective systems) caused by freezing unless: (1) you do your best to maintain heat in the building or structure.” (Emphasis added.) To define this standard, we must interpret the meaning of phrase “you do your best to maintain heat in the building or structure.” ¶ 31 “The rules for construction of an insurance contract are well established.” Bituminous Casualty Corp. v. Iles, 2013 IL App (5th) 120485, ¶

12021–2021
State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Moore green
illappct · 1981
1 sentence

2020Applying the policy’s exclusion and the exception together, our appellate court held that Marcus’s injury did not arise out of the insured’s business pursuit (babysitting), and that the exception for “activities which are ordinarily incident to nonbusiness pursuits” applied. ¶ 41 In so holding, our appellate court determined that “[t]he fact that the injury occurred on business premises is not conclusive,” and that “the exception applies where the activity [that led to the injury] is not incident to a business purpose.” Moore, 103 Ill.

12020–2020
National Union Fire Insurance Co. of Pittsburgh v. Hudson Energy Co. green
tex · 1991
1 sentence

2016National Union Fire Insurance Co., 811 S.W.2d at 555 . ¶ 20 The Liquidator’s argument that Claimants’ characterization of mold as a pollutant in their underlying negligence lawsuit is further evidence that the Exclusion included mold injuries is not persuasive.

12016–2016
Allstate Insurance v. Kovar green
illappct · 2006
2 sentences

2012App.3d 493 , 299 Ill.Dec. 916 , 842 N.E.2d 1268 (2006), as authority that the conviction of the insured of a criminal offense or a finding of liability for tortious conduct underlying the civil claim does not automatically bar the insured from contending that his conduct was not intentional for purposes of an exclusion clause. ¶ 37 In Cowan , the insured got into a car accident, and in the course of an argument that followed the accident, the insured pushed the other driver, causing him to fall and fracture his leg.

2012App.3d 493 , 299 Ill.Dec. 916 , 842 N.E.2d 1268 (2006), as authority that the conviction of the insured of a criminal offense or a finding of liability for tortious conduct underlying the civil claim does not automatically bar the insured from contending that his conduct was not intentional for purposes of an exclusion clause. ¶ 37 In Cowan , the insured got into a car accident, and in the course of an argument that followed the accident, the insured pushed the other driver, causing him to fall and fracture his leg.

12012–2012
People v. Campbell green
illappct · 1975
1 sentence

2012Citing Barrett, the court noted that, “[w]hile the fact that the defendant has made restitution is no defense to the charge of theft, it is a factor which is relevant in determining the absence of the requisite felonious intent.” Id. at 490 .

12012–2012
cluster 757515 green
ca8 · 1998
1 sentence

2005Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 153 F.3d at 924 .

12005–2005
United States Fire Insurance v. Schnackenberg green
ill · 1981
11995–1995
Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance green
ill · 1992
11994–1994
Squire v. Economy Fire & Casualty Co. green
ill · 1977
11994–1994
U.S. Fire Insurance Company v. Beltmann North American Co., Inc., and James J. Cash green
ca7 · 1989
11993–1993
Dungey v. Haines & Britton, Ltd. green
illappct · 1992
11993–1993
People v. Linscott green
ill · 1991
11992–1992
People v. Heidorn green
illappct · 1983
11992–1992
People v. Brown neutral
illappct · 1980
11992–1992
Insurance Co. of Illinois v. Markogiannakis green
illappct · 1989
11991–1991
Leiter Electric Co. v. Bituminous Casualty Corp. green
illappct · 1968
11991–1991
Schuster Equipment Co. v. Design Electric Services, Inc. green
illappct · 1990
11991–1991
Barry v. Barchi green
scotus · 1979
11989–1989
People v. Carr green
illappct · 1986
11988–1988
People v. Echols green
illappct · 1986
11988–1988
American States Insurance v. Action Fire Equipment, Inc. green
illappct · 1987
11988–1988
Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Case Foundation Co. green
illappct · 1973
11987–1987
Kotteakos v. United States green
scotus · 1946
11987–1987
Catalano v. Pechous green
ill · 1980
11987–1987
Economy Fire & Casualty Co. v. Kubik green
illappct · 1986
11987–1987
People v. Rayford green
illappct · 1976
11986–1986

Statutes the citing opinions construe

IL § 215 ILCS 5/155 (5) IL § 720 ILCS 5/9-1 (4) IL § 735 ILCS 5/2-615 (3) IL § 755 ILCS 5/27-6 (3) USC § 21u.s.c.811 (3)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

CA 175 (1939–2026) TX 96 (1952–2025) IL 88 (1901–2024) LA 86 (1925–2017) NY 78 (1898–2024) PA 62 (1934–2024) MO 59 (1933–2025) NJ 50 (1957–2024) FL 49 (1955–2024) CT 48 (1894–2024) WI 45 (1937–2026) MI 36 (1949–2024) WA 36 (1931–2025) MD 32 (1939–2020) OH 32 (1924–2026) MS 31 (1954–2022) GA 31 (1910–2026) OR 30 (1943–2026) MA 27 (1954–2026) IN 26 (1976–2020) MN 26 (1920–2018) TN 25 (1917–2022) CO 24 (1942–2013) IA 23 (1912–2024) NM 23 (1960–2025) SC 22 (1937–2025) NC 21 (1951–2023) KS 19 (1962–2016) UT 16 (1937–2024) VA 16 (1935–2025) AZ 15 (1970–2023) AL 15 (1903–2015) OK 14 (1952–2011) AR 14 (1945–2025) DC 12 (1986–2026) WY 12 (1971–2025) NH 12 (1963–2023) MT 12 (1967–2023) WV 12 (1982–2023) KY 11 (1958–2025) ID 9 (1981–2014) DE 8 (1962–2024) HI 8 (1992–2021) NV 8 (1952–2014) RI 7 (1958–2007) ND 7 (1965–2020) AK 7 (1981–2007) NE 6 (1943–2015) ME 6 (1952–2019) VT 5 (1894–2012) PR 5 (1949–2023) SD 4 (1963–2012)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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